Policy Change: The Soft Underbelly of the Democratic Progressive Party

Policy Change: The Soft Underbelly of the Democratic Progressive Party
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 15 2012

Summary: Su Tseng-chang has manipulated the "Raging Citizens Protest March." He has turned it into a showdown between himself and Tsai Ing-wen. The DPP hopes to fan the flames of change. It hopes to "change the cabinet, change legislators, and change the president." But it must first tell the public what changes it intends to make in the event it returns to power. Su Tseng-chang wants to impeach the president. He has pitted himself against Tsai Ing-wen. He is serving notice. Blue vs. Green struggle will continue. There will be no peace. The time table for 2016 has apparently been moved up, dramatically.

Full Text below:

Su Tseng-chang has manipulated the "Raging Citizens Protest March." He has turned it into a showdown between himself and Tsai Ing-wen.

One. For starters, Su Tseng-chang refused to allow Frank Hsieh to head up the China Affairs Committee. This was Su's declaration that he favored the path taken by the Taiwan independence movement. He is serving notice. He intends to take a very different path than reform advocates Tsai Ing-wen and Frank Hsieh. Two. Su has resorted to heavy-handed measures. He is demanding the impeachment of Blue camp legislators and President Ma. He intends to take extreme and hawkish measures. He intends to take a very different path than the moderate and dovish Tsai Ing-wen. Three. He has escalated the conflict. He is calling for the impeachment of the president. This clashes head on with Tsai Ing-wen's call for a National Policy Conference. After all, Su Tseng-chang cannot simultaneously impeach President Ma Ying-jeou and demand that he convene a National Policy Conference. Su Tseng-chang has also committed himself to the DPP's "alternative" pension program in the Legislative Yuan.

Su Tseng-chang is siding with Taiwan independence hawks to consolidate his leadership within the Pan Green camp and the DPP. He is attempting to marginalize Tsai Ing-wen. That is why Su Tseng-chang's slogan is "change policies, change legislators, change the president." It is not a policy declaration. It is a call to arms. His primary goal is to heighten Blue vs. Green conflict in order to undermine Tsai Ing-wen. Will this enable Su to lead the DPP out of the political winderness? For the moment Su Tseng-chang cannot be bothered with that.

What does "change policies, change legislators, change the president" mean? It means to incite clashes over policy, initiate a cabinet reshuffle, impeach legislators, and impeach the president. It means a multi-front political struggle aimed at effecting ruling party change and to return to power.

But this path is strewn with pitfalls. The main driving force behind presidential change or ruling party change should derive from policy change. But Su Tseng-chang has put policy change on hold. His focus is clearly on the political struggle. His "policy," if it can be called that, is fragmented and unclear. In fact, this is Su Tseng-chang's weak point. This is also the soft underbelly of the Democratic Progressive Party.

We all know why the DPP is mired where it is today. The main reason is its desire to "change policies." The DPP demands change. But it demands the wrong kind of change. The DPP demands Taiwan independence, the "rectification of names" and "one country on each side." It wants more than just policy change. It wants to change the constitution and even the name of the country.

In 2008, he KMT regained political power. The voters demanded change -- from DPP policy. In 2012, Tsai Ing-wen went down in defeat. The voters refused to allow the DPP to change the KMT's 1992 consensus and ECFA. The DPP was forced to promise that "If we return to power, we will continue the previous administration's cross-Strait policy." This being the case, precisely what policies does Su Tseng-chang intend to change?

The DPP must establish a credible long term policy regarding national allegiance, constitutional allegiance, and cross-Strait relations. All other policy debates, are mere pretexts for fodder for political struggles. They will not restore public confidence in the DPP and allow it to return to office. So the question is, just what sort of "change" is the DPP calling for with regards national allegiance, constitutional allegiance, and cross-Strait relations?

Consider other DPP policies. From the perspective of political struggles, it may pay to be paranoid. But if the DPP expects to rule once again, it cannot afford to miss the forest for the trees. Take the matter of nuclear power generation. Antinuclear sentiments are currently on the rise. Naturally this sentiment can be exploited. But the abolition of nuclear power generation is a serious matter. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe declared three times that he opposed a nuclear free Japan. The DPP has characterized gasoline price and electricity rate increases as tyranny. The DPP advocates the elimination of nuclear power generation. So how does it stand on gasoline and electricity subsidies? What about the capital gains tax, health insurance rate hikes, pension reform, and the so-called "media monopoly?" It cannot just vent its rage. It must offer policy proposals. Ideology is not "policy." Political struggle is not "reform." Inciting social divisions is not "love for Taiwan." Su Tseng-chang's "policy changes" were merely political struggles, not policy reform.

Su Tseng-chang knows full well that he must change policy to justify presidential change and ruling party change. But policies cannot be changed without reason. U.S. beef imports is one example. Some policies were unsuccessful due to execution rather than principle. These include gasoline prices and electricity rates. Some policies in particular must not be enacted rashly. These include the "rectification of names" and "one country on each side." These amount to changing the constitution and the name of the country. The DPP must offer sober policy proposals for peacefully governing the nation. Otherwise it is merely fanning the flames of discontent in the guise of "policy." The public may have to put up with such an opposition party. But it is under no obligation to make it the ruling party.

The DPP hopes to fan the flames of change. It hopes to "change the cabinet, change legislators, and change the president." But it must first tell the public what changes it intends to make in the event it returns to power.

Finally, Su Tseng-chang wants to impeach the president. He has pitted himself against Tsai Ing-wen. He is serving notice. Blue vs. Green struggle will continue. There will be no peace. The time table for 2016 has apparently been moved up, dramatically.

換政策：民進黨的軟肋
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.01.15 03:37 am

蘇貞昌將「火大遊行」操作成與蔡英文一決雌雄的槓桿。

一、先前，蘇貞昌否決了謝長廷出掌中國事務委員會，這是宣示蘇將在黨內採較傾獨派的路線，以與蔡英文及謝長廷可能採取的轉型路線作出區隔。二、如今，蘇又祭出「罷免立委／罷免總統」的重手，不啻宣示將以鷹派的激烈手段，與蔡英文可能採取的鴿派溫和路線作出區隔。三、既然將調門升高至「罷免總統」的層次，即不啻超越並否定了蔡英文「國是會議」的訴求；因為，蘇貞昌不能一面要罷免馬英九總統，又要馬英九以總統地位召開國是會議；何況，蘇貞昌已承諾將在立法院提出民進黨的年金對案。

蘇貞昌欲以傾獨鷹派的角色，重新鞏固他在綠營及民進黨的領導地位，而試圖藉此將蔡英文擠向邊緣地帶。因而，蘇貞昌喊出「換政策／換立委／換總統」的口號，這不是「政策」的宣言，而是「政治鬥爭」的檄文；他的首要目標是欲藉升高藍綠衝突將蔡英文壓下去，至於能否就此帶領民進黨走出一條生路，目前蘇貞昌恐怕尚無暇顧及。

「換政策／換內閣／換立委／換總統」，其意是指：用挑激政策衝突、發動閣潮、罷免立委、罷免總統的多層次及複合式政治鬥爭，以實現政黨輪替，重返執政。

此一路線的弔詭在於：「換總統」或「換執政黨」，主要的動力，皆應出自「換政策」；但蘇貞昌擺出的架式，卻顯然是側重「鬥爭」，但在「政策」上卻是支離破碎或交代不清。其實，這非但是蘇貞昌的弱項，亦正是民進黨的軟肋。

眾所皆知，民進黨陷於今日境地，最重要的敗因正是出自「換政策」；「台獨建國」、「正名制憲」、「一邊一國」，不但是要「換政策」，而且是要「換憲法／換國家」。

二○○八年，國民黨贏回政權，正是選民要「換掉」民進黨的「政策」；接著，二○一二年，蔡英文落敗，則是選民不容民進黨「換」掉國民黨「九二共識」及ＥＣＦＡ的「政策」。何況，民進黨還說：「若再執政將延續前朝兩岸政策。」然則，類此顛三倒四，蘇貞昌今日所稱的「換政策」，究何所指？

其實，民進黨若不先在國憲認同及兩岸關係上確立一套可信可行、可大可久的「政策」，其他一切的「政策」辯論，充其量皆只能作為政爭題材，而不可能作為重建國人信任及重返執政的憑藉。請問：關於國憲認同及兩岸關係，民進黨要「換」什麼「政策」？

至於民進黨在其他政策的辯論，就政爭的角度或許必須有所偏執，但若要執政治國卻不可見樹不見林。以核電論，現在反核民意上升，當然是民氣可用；但廢核畢竟茲事體大，君不見日相安倍晉三宣示反對「零核電」？至於油電漲價被民進黨形容成暴政，但主張廢核的民進黨豈有主張補貼油電價的立場？再如證所稅、健保調漲、年金改制、媒體壟斷等，皆不能只有「火大」，而必須拿出「政策」；亦即，不能將「意識形態」視為「政策」，將「政爭」視為「改革」，將「撕裂」視為「愛台灣」。準此以論，蘇貞昌所列舉的幾項「換政策」，其實皆是「政治鬥爭」高於「政策改革」。

蘇貞昌亦知，必須以「換政策」來支撐其「換總統」、「換執政黨」的正當性。然而，有些政策不能無理「換」掉，如美牛案；有些政策其實是敗在操作而非錯在原則，如油電漲價；有些政策則尤其不能輕舉妄動，如「正名制憲／一邊一國」，那將牽動到「換憲法」、「換國家」。倘若民進黨不能以安邦定國的嚴正立場來拿出「政策」，而只是將「政策」作為助長「火大」的政爭薪柴；國人也許不得不接受這樣的反對黨，卻未必能支持這樣的政黨成為執政黨。

民進黨若欲燃起「換內閣／換立委／換總統」的遍地烽火，應先向國人交代：民進黨究竟要「換」什麼「政策」來重返執政？

最後，蘇貞昌以「罷免總統」叫陣，拉開了黨內蘇蔡競爭的架構，也預告藍綠鬥爭將無寧日，儼然已將指向二○一六年的台灣政治時程表大幅提前。