Sacrifices in the National Interest: ROC, or USA?

Sacrifices in the National Interest: ROC, or USA?
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 18, 2012

Summary: The truth is, Taipei may have no choice but to be Washington's tool. It may have to be Washington's pawn in its effort to contain Mainland China. But changes are taking place, both short-term and long. We must distinguish between being active and being passive. The Ma Ying-jeou administration must maintain a sense of direction. It must see the Big Picture. It must distinguish between right and wrong. It must turn passivity into activity. It must maximize Taipei's advantage. Taipei's direction will then be self-evident.

Full Text below:

President Ma Ying-jeou met with U.S. Senator Murkowski on the 15th. He said cross-Strait relations and Taipei-Washington relations do not conflict. He said the Republic of China government will continue purchasing advanced weapons from the United States, to ensure national security and maintain peace in the Taiwan Strait. But Taipei will also continue to improve relations with Mainland China. It will continue to expand bilateral exchanges. Simply put, arms sales from the US and cross-Strait reconciliation will coexist.

The day before, former AIT Director Richard Bush published a summary of his new book, "The Unknown Strait," at the Brookings Institution website. He said that if Beijing is hoping Washington will abandon Taipei, it is in for a disappointment. He said U.S. arms sales to Taiwan are not the biggest obstacle to reunification across the Strait. He said Washington's current policy will encourage Beijing to be more creative and seek a better way to resolve cross-Strait disputes. Put plainly, Washington has no intention of letting go.

On the surface, some of the arguments in President Ma's remarks and Richard Bush's new book make sense. But both men are merely looking after their own interests. At the theoretical level, both fail to see the strategic picture. Both lack vision. In practice, their views contain blind spots and internal contradictions. Everyone wants to avoid risk. But the current practice is to procratinate, and hope that circumstances will change for the better. But this "feeling one's way across the river" approach may not be the answer.

From President Ma's perspective, Taipei will continue improving relations with the Mainland. It will increase interaction and exchanges with the Mainland. Taipei must also be able to to defend itself. One must never assume that one's enemy is not coming. One must always ensure that one can defend oneself. U.S. arms sales mean that Taipei and Beijing cannot engage in comprehensive, long-term military confrontation. But perhaps they can offer the public on Taiwan temporary psychological reassurances. Perhaps they can show Washington's determination to defend Taipei. The two appear to go hand in hand. They seem to have no down side.

Taipei cannot and should not bet its future on the Beijing's good faith. It cannot bet its future on US arms purchases it cannot afford. Otherwise it will end ups as Washington's anti-China tool and patsy. It could even provoke a cross-Strait arms race. That would hardly be consistent with the interests of the Republic of China or the Chinese people as a whole. After all, national and ethnic identity on Taiwan are also involved. Many considerations must be weighed against each other. Taipei must be extremely cautious.

Richard Bush warned Taipei not to give Beijing the impression that reunification is hopeless. Do not make Beijing lose patience and misjudge the situation, he warned. Taipei must strengthen Taiwan's economy and reform the ROC's political system. It must prevent cross-Strait relations from becoming an asymmetrical form of interdependence. It must increase the price Beijing must pay if it attempts to pressure Taipei. Superficially such arguments sound reasonable. But on closer examination, they are actually rather questionable.

Washington has long urged the two sides to maintain a dynamic balance. The two sides should not increase tensions, thereby upsetting the status quo. But Washington's definition of the status quo must be clarified. On the one hand, Washington hopes that cross-Strait relations will improve, that the two sides will increase cross-Strait exchanges and reduce regional tensions. On the other hand, it wants to maintain over the situation. It does not want the two sides to move too fast, and become too close. Washington cares only about its own interests. It refuses to allow Taiwan independence. It also refuses to allow reunification. It refuses to allow Taipei to provoke the Mainland. It also refuses to allow Beijing to use force.

In concrete terms, Taipei's arms purchases merely fulfill its own false and temporary psychological need for security. But they are consistent with Washington's military interests. Taipei cannot and must not accept unreasonable terms for reunification imposed by Beijing. But for Taipei, Washington's continued intervention in cross-Strait affairs reeks of insufferable arrogance. It can only undermine future opportunities for cross-Strait integration. Washington wants Taipei to adopt the lowest possible standards. It does not want Beijing to feel that reunification is hopeless. Such thinking may accord wtih Washington's interests. But does it accord with the best interests of the public on Taiwan and the Mainland? That is debatable.

In fact, knowledgeable parties in the US understand that as long as the two sides reduce tensions, increase interaction, increase people to people exchanges, intermarry, and facilitate investments, then relations between Taiwan and the Mainland will become closer. Taiwan's need for psychological and military assurances will change. The process will take time. But this natural process is not subject to personal whims. One day Washington's policy of procrastination will no longer be viable.

Former American Institute in Taiwan Representative Stephen M. Young said that he is neither pro-blue, nor pro-green, he is pro-American. Similarly, Richard Bush's views reflect Washington's interests. Will Washington abandon Taipei? This question will be decided by whether it is in Washington's national interests. Washington's dismal record in this respect is well known. One need only recall the Polish uprising, the Prague Spring, the fall of South Vietnam, the assassination of President Allende in Chile.

The truth is, Taipei may have no choice but to be Washington's tool. It may have to be Washington's pawn in its effort to contain Mainland China. But changes are taking place, both short-term and long. We must distinguish between being active and being passive. The Ma Ying-jeou administration must maintain a sense of direction. It must see the Big Picture. It must distinguish between right and wrong. It must turn passivity into activity. It must maximize Taipei's advantage. Taipei's direction will then be self-evident.
   
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 　2013.01.18
社論－在棄台與棄美間 審思國家最高利益
本報訊

    　馬英九總統十五日接見美國聯邦參議員穆考斯基時表示，兩岸關係與台美關係的發展並不衝突，因此中華民國政府將來會繼續向美國採購各項先進武器，以保障國家安全和維護台海和平，但台灣同時也要持續和中國大陸改善關係，擴大雙方交流。簡單的說，這就是武器照買、和解照走。

    　此前一天，美國在台協會前理事主席卜睿哲在布魯金斯研究院網站發表《未知的海峽》新書摘要，略稱北京若寄望美國放棄台灣這是行不通的，美國對台軍售並非兩岸無法統一的最大障礙，美國堅持現行政策將會促使中共以更具創意、更有意義的方式來解決兩岸爭議等等。直白的講，這就是美國無意放手。

    　表面上，馬總統的講話和卜睿哲新作中的某些觀點都能言之成理，但也都只是從各自的角度和利益出發。在理論上，既缺乏戰略的高度，也沒有新的視野，而且在實踐上，還有其盲點和內生的矛盾存在。大家都只想「避險」，但目前這種以拖待變及摸著石頭過河的做法與想法，恐有進一步討論的空間。

    　從馬總統的角度來看，台灣一方面要和中國大陸持續改善關係，加強互動與往來，但另一方也要有自衛的能力，勿恃敵之不來、而恃我有備之，對美軍事採購即使無法讓台北與北京進行全面、長期的軍事對抗，但或許可以暫時滿足台灣心理上的安全感，同時對美展現台灣自衛的決心。兩者並行不悖，似乎好處全拿。

    　台灣當然不能、也不應把自身前途寄託在對岸不確定的善意上，但持續以超過能力所及的對美軍購，萬一使自己成了美國的反華工具或剝削對象，甚而造成兩岸軍備競賽，這些都並不符合中華民國和整個民族的利益，畢竟這其中還涉及台灣的自我定位與國家、民族的認同問題。輕重之間的拿捏，台北必須極為謹慎。

    　卜睿哲在書中提醒台灣，不要讓中共產生統一無望的印象，不要使北京喪失耐心，錯估整體形勢，而要加強台灣的經濟發展，進行政治體制改革，避免兩岸關係發展成一種不對稱的相互依賴，要增加北京萬一對台施壓的成本和不確定性。這些主張表面還算可以理解，但一經深入思考就發現其中頗有可資商榷之處。

    　從過去到現在，美國一直主張兩岸維持動態的平衡，兩岸都不應增加緊張，破壞現狀，但現狀的定義卻是要由美國來加以界定；美國一方面希望兩岸關係能夠改善，雙方加強往來，降低區域緊張，但又不希望在華府不能掌握的情況下，兩岸走得太快、太近。美國在乎的只是自己的利益，既不准台灣獨立、也不讓兩岸統一，不要台灣挑釁，但也不許中共動武。

    　具體的說，台灣對美軍購固然滿足了自己虛假、暫時的安全感，但更成就了美國的軍工利益；台灣確實不能也不宜接受中共所設定的不合理統一條件，但讓美國不斷插手兩岸事務，對台灣頤指氣使，亦將破壞兩岸未來整合的機會。美國只希望台灣採取最低的標準，不要讓大陸對統一感到絕望，而目前這種想像中的奢望或許更符合美國的利益，但這是否也符合兩岸之間的最大利益，顯有討論的空間。

    　其實，美國有識之士也已看出，只要兩岸降低緊張，加強互動，民眾往來、通婚、投資更為便利，雙方關係自然將會更為緊密，屆時台灣的心理和實體防衛需求自然隨之調整；這雖然需要一段發展的過程，但這種自然的規律並不隨人的主觀意志而轉移，美國當前的這種以拖待變的政策終將有無以為繼的一天。

    　就像在台協會前駐台代表楊甦棣所說，他既不親藍、也不親綠，他只親美。同樣的，卜睿哲的觀點反映和追求的主要還是美國的國家利益，美國的棄台與否完全是由美國的國家利益來決定。美國承諾的記錄不佳眾所皆知，從當年的波蘭抗暴、捷克的自由化事件到後來的南越淪陷、智利的阿葉德總統遇害都是例子。

    　在現實上，台灣或許不得不被美國利用，做為牽制中國大陸發展的棋子，但在長短期效應變化、主動與被動之間還是應有所區別、掌握；馬英九政府如果能夠抓穩方向、掌握大局、明辨是非，化被動為主動，發揮台灣尚有的優勢，台灣的何去何從應該已經不言自明。