CSSTA vs. Delusion of Modest but Real Wealth

CSSTA vs. Delusion of Modest but Real Wealth
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
April 8, 2014

Summary: Establishing monitoring mechanisms does not require withdrawing the CSSTA. Doing so would be pointless. First of all, many people do not oppose the CSSTA. Many people took part in one public hearing after another over the past nine months. Restarting negotiations would negatively impact the perception of the Mainland and the international community. This must not be treated lightly.

Full text below:

The Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement (CSSTA) controversy remains unresolved. The government has responded to student movement demands and made numerous concessions. Yet the students remain unmoved and refuse to disperse. The anti-CSSTA protests are motivated by a mix of Sinophobic sentiment and generational rage. These feelings express themselves both internally and externally. That is why simple solutions are impossible.

The students and masses opposed to the CSSTA hold a variety of views. View One. Even if Taiwan and the Mainland sign the CSSTA, the Mainland will not necessarily green light Taiwan's participation in regional integration. View Two. Even if Taiwan fails to interact with the Mainland, and even if it fails to participate in regional economic integration, it need not be marginalized. View Three. Even if Taiwan is marginalized, it will not matter, as long as the public on Taiwan can enjoy "modest but real wealth." At least Mainland China's influence will not be able to extend to Taiwan.

These are dangerous views. They are no less dangerous than cross-strait opening. First of all, no one can guarantee that once the two sides sign the CSSTA and SSGTA, Taiwan will be able to join the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) or ASEAN 10 plus 6 (RCEP). These require mutual trust through cross-strait dialogue. On the other hand, if the CSSTA is stillborn, one can be sure the road to the TPP will be a bumpy one. Never mind the road to the RCEP.

Secondly, will Taiwan be marginalized? Basically, all economic agreements or integration mechanisms provide benefits to signatories, but shut out non-signatories. If Taiwan is not part of economic integration, it can still export its services or goods. But without tariff concessions, price will be higher. Competitiveness will inevitably be lost to member nations. More importantly, the TPP and other economic integration mechanisms involve numerous regulations. They deny non-members export opportunities. For example, the United States is demanding that TPP member nations use fabrics and key components in order to qualify for duty-free export of clothing and machine tools. These provisions will gradually result in our marginalization.

Thirdly, it is rational to invoke "modest but real wealth" logic when dealing with the Mainland Leviathan? The Mainland is now the world's second largest economy. It is the largest economic partner of most nations in the Asian-Pacific region. Two decades of experience has shown that attempts to block industry interaction with the Mainland are futile. Besides, individuals may pursue "modest but real wealth," but nations cannot. South Korea, Japan, and even the Mainland are pursuing "grand but real wealth." The pursuit of "modest but real wealth" will merely cause Taiwan to shrivel up. Taiwan will be deprived of bargaining chips by which it can deal with cross-strait risk. It will find it more difficult to resist Mainland influence. Academics opposed to the CSSTA argue that a mere 7% devaluation of the NTD is equivalent to signing agreements with other countries. But if the nation's assets instantly shrink by 7%, and the price of imported goods immediately grow by 7%, what happens to our "modest but real wealth?"

All these disputes are over how Taiwan should deal with the Mainland. Anti-Ma sentiment coupled with distrust of the government prevents focusing on real problems. Therefore if President Ma wants to handle this problem, he must resolve new generation distrust, rather than repeatedly stress the importance of the CSSTA.

As we all know, promoting the CSSTA is important. It will revive the economy. It will enable Taiwan to join the TPP and RCEP, via free trade agreements with Asia and the rest of the world. If cross-strait economic and trade relations are obstructed, regional integration will be more difficult, and Taiwan may well be shut out. 

Take the 12 member US-led TPP. Mainland China has yet to join. But the Mainland is already the largest trading partner of the six largest member nations. It is the second largest trading partner of the five other member nations. When Taiwan lobbies these states for support, it will have to answer the following questions. Is Taiwan ready? Does the U.S. support Taiwan's membership? Does Beijing support Taiwan's membership? These are questions we must answer. The more we are ready, the more U.S. support will appear. As for the last question, "Does Beijing support Taiwan's membership?" How will we answer? On this we must be pragmatic.

The CSSTA negotiation process definitely had problems with transparency. A line item review is necessary. The current monitoring mechanism for cross-strait agreements dates back to an era when almost no interaction took place between the two sides. It is no longer adequate. The public expects greater transparency in cross-strait agreements. Therefore legislation establishing monitoring mechanisms in step with the times is essential.

Establishing monitoring mechanisms however, does not require withdrawing the CSSTA. Doing so would be pointless. First of all, many people do not oppose the CSSTA. Many people took part in one public hearing after another over the past nine months. Restarting negotiations would negatively impact the perception of the Mainland and the international community. This must not be treated lightly. Therefore the establishment of a monitoring mechanism and the review of the CSSTA can be conducted simultaneously. That for Taiwan, is the most beneficial arrangement.

反服貿若只為追求小確幸，恐成虛幻
【聯合報╱社論】
2014.04.08 02:45 am

兩岸服貿協議之爭迄今無解。政府對於學運的要求雖有回應及讓步，但學生並不埋單，堅持不退。服貿抗爭背後夾雜著複雜的反中、恐中情緒及世代忿懣，對外對內兩種情緒交互糾纏，因而難有簡單的解方。

綜合反服貿學生和群眾的意見，大約可歸為幾類：一，是認為即使台灣和大陸簽署兩岸服貿協議，中國大陸也未必對台灣加入區域整合「亮綠燈」；二是認為即使台灣不與中國大陸互動，甚至不加入區域經貿整合，也不至於被「邊緣化」；三是認為台灣即使被邊緣化也沒關係，只要人民能過著「小確幸」的生活就好，至少中國的影響不會進到台灣。

這些說法，都具有相當高的風險，且其風險並不低於兩岸開放。首先，確實沒有人可以保證兩岸簽署服貿或貨貿協議後，就能爭取到加入跨太平洋夥伴協定（ＴＰＰ）或東協十加六（ＲＣＥＰ），因為這還需靠兩岸保持對話創造互信；但如果服貿協議胎死腹中，幾可斷言進入ＴＰＰ之路勢必坎坷，遑論加入ＲＣＥＰ。

其次，台灣會不會被「邊緣化」？基本上，所有經濟協議或整合機制都是為了提供簽約國相互優惠，而排擠非成員國。台灣若不加入經濟整合，服務或貨品照樣可以出口，只不過因沒有關稅優惠，價格優勢會越來越低，競爭力必然輸給其他加盟國。更重要的是，ＴＰＰ等經濟整合體會設下很多規定，直接排除非成員的出口機會；例如美國要求成衣、工具機出口要享免稅，必須使用來自ＴＰＰ成員國的布料及關鍵零組件。這些排擠規定，會逐漸造成我們的邊緣化。

第三，用「小確幸」對抗中國這條「大鯨魚」是否理性思考？中國已成為世界第二大經濟體，也是亞太地區大部分國家的最大經濟夥伴；過去二十年的經驗證明，台灣任何阻擋產業互動的政策都擋不住這個大趨勢。更何況，個人可以追求小確幸，但國家不能。特別是當韓國、日本甚至中國都在創造大確幸時，小確幸只會讓台灣愈發萎縮，更沒有籌碼處理兩岸風險，更難防止中國影響。反服貿學者說，只要新台幣貶值七％，其效果就等同與各國簽訂協定；但是，所有國民的資產立刻縮水七％，進口商品立刻大漲價，「小確幸」豈非立刻破滅？

這一切，涉及的都是「如何面對中國」的路線之爭，由於社會上的「反馬」情緒，加上對政府的不信任，使得討論無法聚焦。因此，馬總統處理此一問題，必須先化解新世代反彈與不信任，而非一再強調服貿協議的重要性。

眾所周知，台灣推動服貿一個很重要的理由，除了為經濟帶來活水，更要透過服貿協議走向亞太及世界，加入ＴＰＰ及ＲＣＥＰ。若兩岸經貿關係不順，加入區域整合的變數必然提高，也會加深台灣被排擠的危機。

以美國主導的ＴＰＰ為例，中國大陸雖尚未參加，但大陸已是十二個成員國其中六國的最大貿易夥伴，也是另外五國的第二大貿易夥伴。在這個情況下，當台灣遊說各國爭取支持時，必會面對以下的問題：台灣準備好了嗎？美國支持台灣嗎？北京支持台灣加入嗎？上述問題，準備工作操之在我，當我們準備程度越高，美國的支持就會出現；但對於最後一個問題「北京支持嗎」，我們將如何回答，就需要大家務實面對。

服貿協議在談判及協商過程中，確實存在不透明的問題，所以重新檢驗、逐條審查是必要的程序。目前兩岸協議的監督機制，是建立在兩岸幾乎沒有互動的年代，已不敷使用，也不符合社會對兩岸協議需要更高透明度的期待；因此，透過立法建立合乎時代需求的監督機制，亦是必要的。

但是，為了建立監督機制而要求退回服貿，卻顯得沒有意義。首先，很多民眾並不反對服貿協議本身，而過去九個月一場場的公聽會也有許多民眾參與。何況，重啟談判必須考量中國大陸和國際社會的反應和觀感，不可率爾為之。所以，監督條例立法與服貿審查同步進行，才是對台灣最有利的安排。