Greater One China, Two Governments: Shih Ming-teh's Five Cross-Strait Principles

Greater One China, Two Governments: 
Shih Ming-teh's Five Cross-Strait Principles
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 27, 2014

Summary: Yesterday Shih Ming-teh announced his "Five Principles for Dealing with Cross-Strait Issues." Seven promoters of the Five Principles, blue and green camp alike, sat on the stage above. Dozens of guests, blue and green camp alike, sat among the audience below. This was the first time in history both blue and green parties have gathered under the same roof to participate in a privately sponsored cross-Strait policy conference.

Full Text Below: 

Yesterday Shih Ming-teh announced his "Five Principles for Dealing with Cross-Strait Issues." Seven promoters of the Five Principles, blue and green camp alike, sat on the stage above. Dozens of guests, blue and green camp alike, sat among the audience below. This was the first time in history both blue and green parties have gathered under the same roof to participate in a privately sponsored cross-Strait policy conference.

As we can see, the cross-Strait policies of the blue, green, and red parties have all arrived at bottlenecks. Beijing's "one country, two systems," the Ma administration's "one China, different interpretations," and the green camp's "one nation on each side" policies have all hit the wall. Why? Because politically and ideologically. all three have their hands tied, either by themselves, or by others. Solutions to cross-Strait problems remain forever mired in political calculations that reflect neither the spirit of civilization nor the interests of the public.

Shih MIng-teh said his move was an attempt to cut the Gordian Knot. His Five Principles have two distinct traits. One. They were a private sector initiative that transcended blue vs. green barriers. Two. They stood outside the blue, green, and red political parties. They proposed a new framework for cross-Strait policy, and Five Principles for dealing with cross-Strait issues.

From his "Five Principles" we can infer the following. Under the Greater One China Framework, the Republic of China is linked to the People's Republic of China. The two sides' warring governments are transformed into divided rule governments. This is referred to as Greater One China, Two Governments, or One China, Two Governments for short.

Cross-Strait relations include two basic elements. One. Linkage points. For example, the term "One China" addresses the matter of linkage points. Two. Primacy. The term "Primacy" addresses the fact that the two sides are separately ruled. Therefore any solution to cross-Strait relations must deal both with linkage points and primacy. Lean too far toward one side or the other, and one will lose the necessary balance.

Under One China Two Governments, the term "One China" addresses the linkage points, while the term "Two Governments" addresses primacy. Therefore the "One China, Two Governments Framework" has two implications.

One. The One China Framework becomes the Great One China Framework. The Great One China Framework does not shatter or repudiate the One China Framework. It extends and enlarges it. Under the One China Framework the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China do not recognize each other's sovereignty. This involves a mutual repudiation. But the Great One China Framework is a more inclusive framework, under which the Republic of China can coexists side by side with the People's Republic of China. The two sides do not repudiate each other's sovereignty. Instead they share sovereignty. Therefore the Great One China Framework is a framework that addresses both linkage points and primacy.

Two. The two warring governments are transformed into peaceful, separately ruled governments. The 1949 era warring governments are transformed into 21st century era separately ruled governments. The separately ruled governments have both linkage points and primacy.

The primacy of the Republic of China is honored within the Great One China Framework. The ROC and the Great One China Framework linkage points are preserved. Therefore under the Great One China Framework the primacy of the Republic of China and the linkage points are two sides of the same coin. This cross-Strait relation, which addresses both linkage points and primacy, may be referred to as the "new cross-Strait relationship."

To establish a new cross-Strait relationship, Taiwan must look beyond internal Blue vs. Green clashes over reunification or independence. The two sides of the Strait must look beyond civil war era conflict between the KMT and CCP. The two sides must transform the warring governments into divided rule governments. The One China Framework must be raised to the level of the Great One China Framework. Cross-Strait relations can no longer be a civil war in which there is only me and no you. The resolution of cross-Strait problems must lead to a more humane civilization. Internationally, we must not revert to the law of the jungle. Domestically, we must not add another tragedy to the history of the Chinese nation. The Great One China, Two Governments Framework ends mutual aggression. It champions a "You do not swallow me up. I do not swallow you up" relationship. This of course amounts to a new kind of cross-Strait relationship.

Actually, in recent years, divided rule under the Great One China, Two Governments Framework has been the reality. It reflects the blue, green, and red parties' area of greatest overlap. Beijing has the advantage. Therefore it is reluctant to acknowledge this. The Ma administration remains wary of Beijing and fearful of a Green Camp backlash. Therefore it is afraid to acknowledge this. The Green Camp clings to its On Nation on Each Side premise. Therefore it is unwilling to acknowledge this. Shih Ming-teh and others have proposed divided rule under a Great One China Framework. This is both innovative and realistic. It says what the blue, green, and red parties were reluctant to say, or afraid to say, or unwilling to say. Therefore the three parties should take maximum advantage of the opportunity to cut the Gordian Knot and create a new cross-Strait policy framework.

To this extent the new cross-Strait relationship, or the Great One China, Two Governments Framework, enables the blue, green, and red parties to save face and break through the impasse. It enables the blue, green and red camps to take the high road, and cross-Strait relations to make a soft landing.


大一中兩府：解讀施明德兩岸五原則
【聯合報╱社論】
2014.05.28 02:08 am

施明德昨日領銜發布《處理兩岸問題五原則》。會場中，台上是七名跨藍綠的發起人，台下坐著幾十位跨藍綠的賓客。這是台灣首次跨藍綠人士在同一屋簷下，見證一場由民間發起的兩岸政策發布會。

眾所共見，此時兩岸藍綠紅三個政黨的兩岸政策皆已出現瓶頸。北京的「一國兩制」，馬政府的「一中各表」，及綠營的「一邊一國」都發生撞牆現象；究其原委，是這三個政黨因政治現實或意識形態而自我捆綁或相互捆綁，使得兩岸的解決方案始終陷於政治權謀的糾纏之中，而不能反映文明的真諦與人民的利益。

施明德稱，他的這個舉動是「破題式的引領」，其特徵有二：一、民間發動，跨越藍綠、超越藍綠；二、在藍綠紅政黨之外，提出了一個兩岸政策的新架構：處理兩岸問題五原則。

若歸納及演繹其《五原則》，可以得到基本論述如下：在大一中架構下，中華民國與中華人民共和國建立連結；兩岸交戰政府轉為分治政府。這可稱為「大一中兩府」，亦可簡稱為「一中兩府」。

兩岸關係有兩個基本元素。一、連結點：例如，「一個中國」即是有關連結點的議題。二、主體性：即是關於兩岸分治現實的議題。兩岸關係的解決方案，必須處理「連結點」，也必須處理「主體性」。在二者間若倚重倚輕，即無可能成為平衡的方案。

大一中兩府，「大一中」是在處理「連結點」，「兩府」是要處理「主體性」。準此，關於「一中兩府」的基本論述，可作兩點闡發：

一、是將「一中架構」引申為「大一中架構」。「大一中架構」不是「一中架構」的斷裂或否定，而是「一中架構」的延續、引申及放大。在「一中架構」中，中華人民共和國與中華民國是「主權互不承認」的排他關係；但「大一中架構」是一個「上位概念」，在其下並立並存的中華民國與中華人民共和國不是「主權互不承認」，而可謂是「主權相互含蘊並共同合成」的關係。因此，「大一中架構」是一個連結點與主體性兼具的架構。

二、是將兩岸交戰政府轉為和平分治政府。亦即將一九四九年代發生內戰的兩個交戰政府，轉變為二十一世紀的兩個分治政府。「分治政府」亦是一個連結點與主體性兼具的架構。

中華民國的主體性在「大一中架構」中受到尊重，中華民國與「大一中架構」的連結點始能保全。因此，在「大一中架構」中，中華民國的主體性與連結點其實是一體兩面。這個兼具主體性與連結點的兩岸關係，也可稱作「新型兩岸關係」。

建構新型的兩岸關係，台灣內部必須在藍綠統獨的捆綁中求超越，兩岸之間也必須自國共內戰思維的糾纏中求昇華。將兩岸交戰政府轉為兩岸分治政府即是求超越，將「一中架構」引申為「大一中架構」即是求昇華。因為，今日兩岸關係早已不能再是有我無你的內戰格局，兩岸關係的解決更必須要能為人類文明創造典範。對外，不能在國際上再增一場弱肉強食的災難；對內，不能在中華民族又添一筆萁豆相煎的悲劇。「大一中兩府」不再是你我相噬相食，而為「不是你吃掉我，也不是我吃掉你」的關係，這當然是在倡議一種「新型的兩岸關係」。

其實，近幾年來，「大一中架構下的兩岸分治政府」已是真實存在的事實，亦是藍綠紅三黨兩岸思維的最大交集地帶。但是，北京因自估占了優勢而「不肯說」，馬政府因顧慮北京猜忌及綠營反彈而「不敢說」，綠營則自縛在一邊一國而「不能說」。現在，施明德等人所提「大一中架構／分治政府」，既反映了現實，又創新了論述，其實不啻即是說出了藍綠紅三黨「不肯說」、「不敢說」或「不能說」的話，因而三方自應因勢利導、借力使力，朝往這個「破題式的引領」的方向，共同致力於建造一個兩岸政策新架構。

倘能如此，在新型的兩岸關係中，「大一中兩府」即是藍綠紅共同跳脫僵局的「下台階」，也是藍綠紅共同開創未來的「青雲路」，更是兩岸關係軟著陸的最佳平台。