Ma Ying-jeou's Cross-Strait Policy: Blue, Green, and Red Must Reach an Accord

Ma Ying-jeou's Cross-Strait Policy: Blue, Green, and Red Must Reach an Accord
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 22, 2014

Summary: Ma Ying-jeou 's cross-Strait policy has been in effect for six years. But it is self-limiting. Beijing is concerned that it is bound to the Green Camp, and has little room for development. What we need is a solution that meets the needs of all three camps, blue, green, and red. What we need is a solution that involves the greatest overlap between all three camps, blue, green, and red. The blue, green, and red camps must reach a tripartite accord. The government must apply the finishing touches to Ma's cross-Strait policy. Otherwise it could all come to naught. Disaster hangs in the balance.

Full Text Below:

In 2008 President Ma Ying-jeou began his first term. At the time the hot political and economic topic was cross-Strait relations. Today, only two years remain in President Ma's second and last term. Today the hot political and economic topic is globalization.

Globalization means that Taiwan cannot avoid cross-Strait exchanges. But it also means Taiwan has an opportunity to use globalization to control cross-Strait relations. Over the past six years, the Ma administration's strategy has been to use ECFA to normalize cross-Strait and international relations, then use the TPP and RCEP to help Taiwan globalize. This "cross-Straits first, globalization next" strategy is essentially correct. It has been strongly affirmed by the U.S. and the international community. It is favorable to the balance of power in the world. It will benefit both sides of the Strait, and both the blue and green camps on Taiwan. Ma must firm up his "cross-Straits first, globalization second" framework while he is still in office. If he can do this, even if another change in ruling parties takes place in 2016, the shocks and injuries inflicted upon cross-Strait relations and Taiwan internally will be limited.

But such a strategic plan depends on others. It has major limitations. Beijing still has reservations about "accepting the other side's jurisdiction." In early February Wang Yu-chi and Zhang Zhijun addressed each other by their official titles. But they made clear that this "cannot be applied to other agencies," even as the hoped for a Ma Xi meeting. The above constraints prevent any breakthrough in cross-Strait relations. Meanwhile, over the past two years, the DPP missed the opportunity to undergo reform. It was affected by the student movement, and reverted to advocating Taiwan independence. It is now obstinately standing in the way of the STA and free trade zones. As a result cross-Strait relations have taken a backward step.

Consider the role of the DPP. Hot war has already erupted in the 2016 political struggle. Opposition to Ma is conflated with opposition to Ma's policies. Take the 2013 presidential election. Tsai Ing-wen initially opposed ECFA. She denounced it as "pandering to [Mainland] China" and "selling out Taiwan." But later during the campaign, she opposed Ma but "unconditionally accepted ECFA." Clearly her opposition to Ma's policy was phony. Only her opposition to Ma was genuine. The DPP opposes Ma at every turn. It conflates opposition to Ma with opposition to Ma's policies. Because it opposes Ma, it opposes STA. Because it opposes Ma, it opposes free trade zones. The DPP knows that standing in the way of the "first cross-Straits, then globalization" path will bring Taiwan to ruin. Even if the DPP wins in 2016, it will Inevitably face catastrophe. The student movement could result in a Closed Door Policy, rooted in Taiwan independence and opposed to the STA and free trade zones. If so, Taiwan will run headlong into a brick wall. It will commit economic suicide. The DPP knows all this perfectly well. Will Ma Ying-jeou's "first cross-Straits, second globalization" strategy be given a chance to work? The DPP is unlikely to play a constructive role in this.

Consider Beijing's role. For Beijing, the student movement must have been a bolt out of the blue. Beijing never imagined that its thoughtful concessions would be perceived by people on Taiwan as "economic conspiracy." It assumed Taiwan independence sentiment would diminish as a result of generational factors. It never expected the Taiwan independence movement to pass the baton to a younger generation. As we can see, cross-Strait relations must give the public on Taiwan a sense of political equality, self-esteem, civic pride, and security. Otherwise economic and trade exchanges or concessions will only provoke political anxiety on Taiwan .

Wang and Zhang referring to each other by their official titles this February. As we can see, this reflected belated awareness. The Wang Zhang example remained inapplicable to other agencies. In effect, progress was aborted. Lung Ying-tai cannot visit the Mainland in her capacity as Minister. By extension, the Ma Xi meeting remains stalled by the same concerns. Why can't the two sides facilitate a Ma Xi meeting simply by referring to each other as "leader?" In one fell swoop cross-Strait relations would be elevated to a new level. 

The student movement told Beijing something. Under the one China framework, cross-Strait relations must provide the public on Taiwan with a sense of political equality, self-esteem, civic pride, and security. Otherwise persuading a majority of people on Taiwan to identify with Chinese as an ethnicity, China as a nation, and the Chinese as a people, will be impossible. Persuading them to proceed with political integration under the concept of China will be even more difficult. One might say that the greater the pressure to integrate, the greater the resistance. Therefore cross-Strait relations calls for a new framework based on the "big roof concept of China, with the two sides separately ruled." Beijing should take the lead.

Beijing remains mired in "peaceful reunification," and "one country, two systems." The Green Camp remains mired in "one country on each side." The Ma administration remains mired in "one China, different interpretations," and "No reunification, no Taiwan independence, and no use of force." The blue, green, and red camps should jointly create a new framework. In this framework, reunification would include independence, and independence would include reunification. This would amount to a "big roof concept of China with the two sides separately ruled."

Ma Ying-jeou 's cross-Strait policy has been in effect for six years. But it is self-limiting. Beijing is concerned that it is bound to the Green Camp, and has little room for development. What we need is a solution that meets the needs of all three camps, blue, green, and red. What we need is a solution that involves the greatest overlap between all three camps, blue, green, and red. The blue, green, and red camps must reach a tripartite accord. The government must apply the finishing touches to Ma's cross-Strait policy. Otherwise it could all come to naught. Disaster hangs in the balance.
   
馬英九兩岸政策 有賴藍綠紅共同收尾
【聯合報╱社論】
2014.05.22 04:05 am

二○○八年馬英九總統首任伊始，當時台灣的政經主題是「兩岸關係」；如今，當馬總統任期僅餘兩年，台灣的政經主題卻已轉化為「全球化」。

全球化意味著台灣更無從迴避兩岸關係，但也意味著台灣有機會藉全球化來節制兩岸關係。回顧過去六年，馬政府的國家戰略規劃是：以ＥＣＦＡ來建構正常的兩岸關係及國際環境，再藉ＴＰＰ及ＲＣＥＰ帶台灣進入全球化。此一「經兩岸到全球」的戰略構思，大體來說是正確的，也獲致美國及國際社會的高度肯定；因其不僅對世界均勢有利，亦對兩岸有利，且對台灣藍綠雙方皆有利。因為，馬英九任內若能奠定好「經兩岸到全球」的架構，即使在二○一六出現政黨輪替，亦可減低對兩岸關係及台灣內部的衝擊與損傷。

但是，這套戰略規劃終非完全操之在己，以致仍有其重大侷限。一方面是北京對「治權互不否認」仍有遲疑，遲至今年二月始有「王郁琦、張志軍互稱官銜」，且明言「不能引用在其他機構」，又對「馬習會」多所瞻顧，凡此均使兩岸關係不能突破。另一方面是民進黨過去兩年錯失了轉型契機，竟被一場學運又帶回台獨的老路，目下正對「服貿協議」及「自由經濟示範區」強力杯葛，凡此亦使兩岸關係出現逆流。

先論民進黨的角色。由於台灣已進入二○一六的政權爭奪熱戰，遂使「反馬」與「反對馬英九的政策」糾纏不清。以二○一二年總統大選為例，蔡英文起初是「反對ＥＣＦＡ政策」，斥為「傾中賣台」；但到了大選後期，卻成了只是「反馬」，但「概括承受ＥＣＦＡ」。可見，「反政策」是假，「反馬」是真。如今，民進黨逢馬必反又將「反馬」與「反政策」糾纏不清，因反馬而反服貿，因反馬而反自由經濟示範區；但民進黨不會不知，倘若因此將「經兩岸到全球」的路徑封阻，台灣恐就此走上絕路，則民進黨即使在二○一六年奪得了政權，難免面對一場大災難。何況，由於這場學運，不論反服貿或反示範區均以台獨鎖國為替代方案，那即不啻是要台灣推車撞壁，自尋死路，民進黨亦明知其理。因而，對於馬英九「經兩岸到全球」戰略部署的成敗得失，民進黨即使成事不足，亦不能扮演敗事有餘的角色。

再言北京的角色。這場學運，對北京應當也是青天霹靂。北京萬萬沒想到，有心「讓利」，卻被台灣民眾視為「經濟陰謀」；更沒想到，台獨因素非但未因世代轉移而消減，反而出現「台獨世代交替」。可見，兩岸關係若不能使台灣人在政治上獲得平等感、自尊心、光榮感及安全感，經貿的交流或施惠反而可能引發台灣人的政治恐懼。

由此可知，今年二月「王張互稱官銜」其實是遲來的覺悟，而謂王張之例不能引伸於其他機構，不啻猶執迷不悟，眼前即有龍應台不能以部長之名往訪大陸。推而廣之，「馬習會」的猶豫亦是困於同一心結，為何不能用「互稱領導人」來促成馬習會，一舉將兩岸關係推上一個新台階？

這場學運給北京的啟示是：兩岸關係在「一個中國」的架構下，若不能使台灣人民在政治上獲得平等感、自尊心、光榮感及安全感，即不可能使多數台灣人認同中華民族、中國，或中國人，更遑論在「中國」的概念下進行政治整合。甚且，整合的壓力愈大，反彈的力道也會愈大。因此，兩岸關係必須要有一個新架構，而這個架構的原理原則應建立於「在大屋頂中國下的兩岸分治政府」之上，且應由北京率先跨出一步。

現在，北京仍陷於「和平統一，一國兩制」的想像中，綠營則仍困於「一邊一國」的自我束縛中，馬政府也只能停留在「一中各表」、「不統，不獨，不武」的觀望狀態。其實，若欲讓藍綠紅三方面共同建立一個「統中有獨，獨中有統」新架構，那應就是「在大屋頂中國下的兩岸分治政府」。

馬英九的兩岸政策至今六年，既有其自我設限，再加上北京的顧慮多端與綠營的自我捆綁，以致開展不大。若欲有一符合藍綠紅三方共同利益、並包容藍綠紅三方理念最大交集的解方，當然有賴藍綠紅三方來共同收尾。而馬政府的兩岸政策倘不能妥適收尾，非但可能前功盡棄，且是後禍難料。