Tuesday, August 26, 2014

Chang Hsien-yao Incident Must Not Become a Drowning Incident

Chang Hsien-yao Incident Must Not Become a Drowning Incident
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
August 27, 2014


Summary: The political fallout from the Chang Hsien-yao leaks case continues. Some pundits would repudiate the past six years of improved cross-Strait relations. This sort of cheap political calculus must be thoroughly discredited. Did Chang Hsien-yao leak secrets? He is a key government negotiator. If he betrayed his duties as a civil servant, he must be severely punished. The public is advised to remain calm. The facts will eventually emerge and a reasonable judgment will be made. The ruling KMT must reflect on its lack of crisis management skills. It must learn from its mistakes and avoid such pitfalls in the future.

Full Text Below:

The political fallout from the Chang Hsien-yao leaks case continues. Some pundits would repudiate the past six years of improved cross-Strait relations. This sort of cheap political calculus must be thoroughly discredited. Did Chang Hsien-yao leak secrets? He is a key government negotiator. If he betrayed his duties as a civil servant, he must be severely punished.

The Ma administration has been in office for six years. Cross-Strait relations are the best they have been in 60 years. The administration's achievements include direct flights, Mainland tourists coming to Taiwan, cooperation in combating crime, and 21 signed agreements. These are all objective achievements that stand up to scrutiny in the harsh light of day. How can suspected leaks by a solitary individual negate these accomplishments in cross-Strait relations? How can they invalidate past agreements signed by both sides? We must reaffirm out fundamental direction, then return to the specifics of the event. We must reflect on the government's crisis management skills, and consider improvements.

The more open and transparent a society is, the more important government and corporate crisis management becomes. In particular, those agencies responsible for national security crisis prevention and management must be watertight. There is no room for error. Consider the current case. When Chang Hsien-yao's superiors learned of the leaks, what did they do? According to the ABCs of crisis management, they must ask three questions. How strong is the evidence? How much damage will the leaks do? How should the leaks be explained to the public? Consider the Ma administration's perspective. Any evidence presented suggesting that Chang Hsien-yao leaked secrets must be concrete and specific. If they are, then Chang must be removed from office. That is as it should be. But the executive branch is not the criminal justice system. All it can do is impose administrative sanctions and cope with the political repercussions. Whether the evidence warrants criminal prosecution is not within the purvue of the Ma administration. The administration is obligated to presume innocence and await the verdict of the criminal justice system.

Alas, public opinion is unwilling to allow the government to wait and see. When Chang Hsien-yao was about to be fired, the reason became clear. We must then confront the second question. How much damage will the leaks do? The damage is threefold. One. Damage to Chang Hsien-yao's reputation. Two. Damage to the government's credibility. Three. Damage to the future of cross-Strait relations. This is going to be a real shocker. Another question is when were the leaks uncovered? If the leak was uncovered before the facts were ascertained, the shock effect will be multiplied. Therefore it is easy to understand why Wang Yu-chi would consult with Chang Hsien-yao as chairman, and cite family considerations as his reason for leaving. One. This would buy time to investigate. Two. It would be consistent with the presumption of innocence. It would protect Chang's reputation and interests during the investigation. Three. It would minimize the damage to the credibility of the Ma administration and to cross-Strait relations.

Once this understanding with Chang was reached, the issue entered the third stage. How should the leaks be explained to the public? The Ma administration underestimated Chang Hsien-yao's reaction. It did not expect Chang to violate the understanding, then bring down the Ma adminstration along with himself.

Some say that Chang Hsien-yao, as chairman of the board, wanted the leak case settled privately. This allegation is questionable. President Ma never compromises with illegal conduct. Others say that given the sequence of events, a private settlement would not have required Wang Yu-chi to mention leaks to Chang. The Ma administration clearly had no intention of settling the matter privately. Chang Hsien-yao knew his situation was perilous. That is why he made a huge splash and presented his case to the public. But the Ma administration is in the habit of backing down. This led to one-sided public criticism. It lost control of the incident. The government should learn a lesson from the crisis.

One. When dealing with a crisis, the number one concern must be public perception. Wang Yu-chi was chairman. Settling the matter privately would have been inappropriate. Doing so would have left a bad impression on the public. Ignoring public perception undermines the legitimacy of one's other, legitimate actions. One forces those who might have spoken up for the government to remain silent. During crisis management, the first question to ask oneself is whether the public will buy it?

Two. Human nature is difficult to fathom. One must be accurate in one's perceptions. Were Chang Hsien-yao's leaks serious? Chang himself knows best. He appears confident of his innocence. It's possible he lashed back merely because he feared being defamed. On the other hand, if he knew he was guilty, he might fight back even more desperately. Chang's office would have been provided him with s ammunition. The key to crisis management is understanding human nature. This is a lesson that the Ma government must learn.

Three. Assuming both sides are prepared, an organized team will prevail over a lone individual. Chang Hsien-yao fell out with the Ma administration. He refused to follow the Ma administration's script. This made the situation even more chaotic. The Bureau of Investigation later denied that it had accused him of being a "Communist agent" or of committing "treason." But the media had already published these reports in black and white. This left the waters seriously muddied. The government team fragmented into ten one man operations, confusing the message even further. Conspiracy theories proliferated, making the crisis still worse. First it showed that the government's crisis management was inadequate. Then it showed that the government's lateral communications in normal times was equally weak.

Four. Damage control must prevent someone choking on water from drowning in water. The opposition DPP is sharpening its knives. Chang Hsien-yao has counterattacked. The two sides of the Strait remain shrouded in fog. The crisis continues. The Ma administration must tread lightly. It cannot afford mistakes. It must redirect attention to the bigger picture and stop the hemorraging as soon as possible. The government's credibility has take a huge hit. It must not allow cross-Strait relations to go from choking on water to drowning in it. That would be a disaster.

Five. The Ma administration must stop being so cowardly. Allowing Wang to resign will destroy the Ma administration's credibility. Some are demanding that Wang Yu-chi step down. Ma government should not dance to their tune. The focus should be on the justice system. It must uncover the facts behind the leak. If the Ma administration repeatedly retreats in a cowardly fashion and forces Wang to step down, even before the justice system has released its findings, then it is effectively admitting that this is a political struggle and not a leak. This would wipe out any remaining shred of the Ma administration's credibility.

We would call also on the Mainland authorities to exercise restraint. It must avoid any miscalculation that would unwittingly help those attempting to undermine cross-Strait relations. The opposition DPP is wallowing in Schadenfreude. Its opportunistic political rhetoric can be laid to rest. The public is advised to remain calm. The facts will eventually emerge and a reasonable judgment will be made. The ruling KMT must reflect on its lack of crisis management skills. It must learn from its mistakes and avoid such pitfalls in the future.

莫讓張顯耀事件嗆水變溺水
2014年08月27日 中國時報

張顯耀涉洩密案政治餘波不斷。若干論者想藉此一竿子打翻過去6年兩岸關係的成果,這種廉價的政治算術,必須先予駁斥。如果張顯耀洩密屬實,他身為政府談判大將,竟然違背公務員忠誠義務,必須從嚴究責。

但馬政府執政6年,兩岸關係進入60年以來最佳的狀態,直航、陸客來台觀光、合作打擊犯罪、簽署21項協議等種種成果,都是可以攤在陽光下客觀檢驗的,豈能以一人可能洩密,就全盤否定兩岸關係成績,甚至質疑過去兩岸協議簽署的有效性?這個大方向必須準確拿捏,接下來才能回到事件的脈絡,反省政府的危機處理,並檢討改進。

愈公開透明的社會,政府與企業的危機管理工作愈重要,尤其國家安全相關部門的危機預防與管理,更必須滴水不漏,不容任何閃失。就本案而言,張顯耀的長官在知悉發生洩密事件時,依據危機處理ABC,先要問三個問題,證據強度如何?事件揭露的傷害?如何因應與對外說明?從馬政府方面的說法來看,在張顯耀洩密證據面上,應掌握一定具體性,必須將張調離職務,這一點並無不當。但行政部門不是司法機關,能做的只有行政處分與政治處斷,但證據的具體性能否轉換為刑事論罪的有效性,卻不是馬政府所能置喙,仍需持「無罪推定」,待司法處斷。

可是社會輿論不會給政府「等待」的時間,在張顯耀離職的當下,就會挖掘背後緣由。這時就要面對第二個問題:事件揭露的傷害?傷害有三方面,一是張顯耀名譽;二是政府威信;三是兩岸關係發展,這將是個超級震撼彈。伴隨的問題是,何時揭露?倘調查事實出爐前事件被揭露,震撼彈的傷殺力將倍增。準此,就不難理解,王郁琦為何要以董事長職和張顯耀協商,以及約定以家庭因素為離職說法。一是爭取調查時間;二是基於無罪推定,想保護張在調查期間的名譽與權益;三是減少馬政府威信與兩岸關係的傷害。

與張達成「共識」後,問題進入第三層次:如何因應說明。馬政府低估了張顯耀反應,沒料到張會推翻共識、不惜玉石俱焚。

或有批評,對張顯耀約以董事長職務,是想要將洩密案「私了」,此一說法頗值商榷。依馬總統行為慣性,他從來不會向不法妥協;另從事件脈絡言,若要私了,王郁琦不需要對張提及其涉洩密。馬政府顯然無意私了,張顯耀也深知處境危險,才會以大動作企圖藉輿論力量尋求自保。但馬政府一貫的退縮態度,已造成輿論一面倒的批判。對此一失控情勢,政府在此次危機事件中,應習得幾點教訓。

第一,處理危機,社會觀感為首要。王郁琦約以董事長職,縱不宜以「私了」論斷,也確實給外界極為不佳的觀感。一旦站在社會觀感的對立面,就會讓其他正確作法的正當性削弱,讓為政府說話的聲音退卻。危機處理時,首要自問,民眾會認同嗎?

第二,人性幽微,思慮掌握要準確。張顯耀涉洩密的情節輕重,張本人最清楚。其自信清白,也有可能因擔心受誣而反撲,若其自知有罪,更會孤注一擲全力反擊。以職務為約,就有可能成為張顯耀據以反擊的彈藥。危機處理的核心是面對人性,這一課,馬政府要學學。

第三,備妥備案,團隊整合勝單兵。張顯耀翻臉,不照著馬政府沙推的腳本走,事態更進入一團亂局。「共諜說」、「外患罪」雖然調查局事後否認提出,媒體報導卻白紙黑字,讓已渾的一池春水被攪得更濁。政府本是一個團隊,卻好像變成10個各自為政的單兵。導致訊息混亂、陰謀論滿天飛,讓事件的危機處理雪上加霜。一方面顯示對危機的應變備案不足,二方面也顯示政府平時水平連繫機制的脆弱。

第四,損害控管,勿讓嗆水變溺水。在野黨磨刀霍霍、張顯耀持續反撲、兩岸上空霧霾盈蓄,危機仍在持續中,馬政府要步步為營,不能再失算犯錯,應將重心拉回大局,盡速停損,政府的威信在此事件大傷,萬不能讓兩岸關係因此從嗆水變成溺水,演變成大倒退災難。

第五、勿再庸懦,讓王辭職,馬政府公信力將崩盤。部分人士炒作王郁琦下台,馬政府不宜隨之起舞,現在重點是由司法釐清洩密案真相,馬政府若再次庸懦退縮,讓王在司法調查結果出爐前下台,等於心虛,自己承認是政治鬥爭而非洩密。這將燒盡馬政府無多的公信。

我們也呼籲大陸當局應克制,避免錯誤判斷反而幫意圖破壞兩岸關係的人添柴火;在野黨勿見獵心喜,種種見縫插針的政治口水可以休矣;社會輿論則宜保持冷靜,本諸既有的事實合理評斷;執政黨則更應深切反省其危機處理能力,從錯誤中學習,避免重蹈覆轍。

No comments: