Explain Your Cross-Strait Policy to the Common Man

Explain Your Cross-Strait Policy to the Common Man
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
August 26, 2014

Summary: Relations between the two sides have become increasingly close. Taiwan politics cannot exclude the "Mainland Factor." The DPP and the CCP have yet to conduct formal exchanges. But the blue, green, and red parties already form an equilateral triangle that affects Taiwan's politics. The 2016 election will have an enormous impact on Taiwan's future. The three parties have a responsibility to make their post-election policies and attitudes clear. They must make themselves understood, so that the people can make an informed decision.

Full Text Below:

Recent developments have undermined Kuomintang rule. The Sunflower Student Movement and the Chang Hsien-yao case have endangered cross-Strait relations. The year end nine in one elections are fast approaching. Public anxiety is palpable. The nine in one elections will impact the 2016 presidential election. Will yet another change in ruling parties harm Taiwan's future and the peoples' well-being? With the general election looming, the cross-Strait outlook remains daunting. The two parties' cross-Strait policies remain vague and chaotic, deepening public concerns.

During past elections, political parties and candidates on Taiwan engaged in "spittle exchanges." Important policy discussions remained fuzzy. Voters discovered that what the candidate said before the election, and what he did after the election were two different things. External factors, including the Mainland and the United States, began to exert an increasing influence on Taiwan elections. The Mainland of course, is always concerned about election results on Taiwan. The public on Taiwan is also concerned about cross-Strait relations in the wake of elections. Therefore it high time the blue, green and red parties all made their positions crystal clear.

The Ma administration won a second term in 2008. It promoted large scale cross-Strait economic and trade exchanges. It enabled Taiwan's economy to maintain a 2 to 3 percent growth rate. It facilitated peaceful development between the two sides. But the KMT's "no reunification, no independence, no use of force" policy failed to offer people a long term vision for their nation. Lack of idealism led to loss of consensus. Some think the KMT's cross-Strait policy is too conservative. They think we must establish military confidence building measures and cross-Strait political negotiations, as soon as possible. Others think the KMT has been too hasty. They think it has made Taiwan too economically dependent upon the Mainland. They think the Mainland will use business as stalking horse for politics, bringing us to the negotiating table.

The "no reunification, no independence, no use of force" policy, is a policy without a principle, one that myopically seeks temporary safety. It has lost its appeal for young people. At best, it is consistent with the status quo and with mainstream public opinion. But the fact remains it lacks direction, it lacks vision, and it lacks idealism. The sands of time march on. The tides of fortune ebb and flow. There is no such thing as an unchanging status quo. The KMT has successfully promoted the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations. But it has now come to the hard part. It now faces challenges both from within and without. Within, it must unite in order to win the nine in one elections. Without, it must pass the STA, must negotate the MTA, and advance cross-Strait development, enabling Taiwan to connect with the international economy. The "no reunification, no independence, no use of force" policy is unworkable. The KMT must make clear what its next step will be.

When Chen Shui-bian was in power he made a shamble of cross-Strait relations. Taiwan's economy nearly stalled. Diplomatic relations turned into a war zone. Even the US, which has always been friendly to Taiwan, lost all patience. The DPP, which waves the holy sacred banner of Taiwan independence, may make a comeback in 2016. Taiwan's economic prosperity, cross-Strait relations, and even diplomatic relations may deteriorate. Faced with this situation, Will the DPP cling for dear life to Taiwan independence? The DPP must make its position clear to the Taiwan public.

Party Chairman Tsai Ing-wen has been evasive about her response to the proposed freeze to the Taiwan independence party platform. She submitted the proposal to the Central Executive Committee, hoping to see which way the electoral winds blow before proceeding further. She even said that if the green camp wins the election, the Mainland will modify its policy to accomodate the DPP. The DPP is a past master at campaign strategy. It knows the best way to scare up votes. In 2000 Chen Shui-bian's "Resolution on Taiwan's Future" duped swing voters. Following the election it reverted to Taiwan independence ideology and de-Sinicization. Will Tsai Ing-wen do the same thing? What kind of relations will she maintain with the Mainland after the election? Will Mainland China be an enemy, a partner, a neighbor, or a member of our own family? The DPP must explain.

Cross-Strait relations have led to the formation of an equilateral triangle, with the red, blue, and green parties at each corner. Every time an election is held on Taiwan, the Mainland reiterates its cross-Strait policy. This undoubtedly affects voter behavior. In 2000, Mainland Premier Zhu Rongji's anti-independence declaration played an important part in Taiwan's election. The key to the 2012 presidential election was the debate over the 1992 consensus. During the 2016 election, the Mainland's attitude will inevitably play a decisive role.

If the Kuomintang retains power in 2016, cross-Strait relations will enjoy continuity. They will continue along the path of peaceful development. But if the DPP takes over, what attitude will the Mainland adopt? Will cross-Strait relations regress or stagnate? KMT morale is low. Its public approval ratings have hit bottom. The year end nine in one elections have upset the traditional blue north/south green power distribution. Green power is gradually expanding northwards. The DPP has been deliberately fuzzy about its cross-Strait policy. Once it seizes power however, it is likely to adopt the same de-Sinicization and soft Taiwan independence strategies as when Chen Shui-bian was in office. How will the Mainland respond? Will cross-Strait relations be frozen, yet again? Could this detonate another Taiwan Strait military crisis? The Mainland must make its position clear.

Relations between the two sides have become increasingly close. Taiwan politics cannot exclude the "Mainland Factor." The DPP and the CCP have yet to conduct formal exchanges. But the blue, green, and red parties already form an equilateral triangle that affects Taiwan's politics. The 2016 election will have an enormous impact on Taiwan's future. The three parties have a responsibility to make their post-election policies and attitudes clear. They must make themselves understood, so that the people can make an informed decision.

社論－為蒼生計 兩岸政策要說清楚
2014年08月26日 04:10
本報訊

國民黨執政不利，兩岸關係在太陽花運動及張顯耀案衝擊下陷入倒退危機，年底九合一選舉將屆，可以感受到民眾處在極度不安的焦慮。九合一牽動2016總統大選，會不會再次政黨輪替，關係著台灣的前途和民眾的生計，但是在大選前，兩岸前景充滿挑戰，兩黨兩岸政策更是模糊、渾沌，加深了民眾的疑慮。

台灣過去的選舉，政黨和候選人擅打口水戰，重要的政策論述都被模糊化，選後才知道，原來選前說的和選後做的是兩回事。外部因素，包括大陸和美國在內，對台灣選舉的影響比重也逐年增高，大陸更是關心台灣選舉結果，台灣民眾也關心選後的兩岸關係。因此，藍綠紅三黨必須在此刻把話說清楚。

儘管馬政府在2008年重新掌政之後，推動兩岸經貿大步發展，使得台灣的經濟還能夠維持2～3％的成長，兩岸之間也呈現了和平發展的局面。然而，國民黨也因為採取「不統、不獨、不武」的政策，讓民眾對國家前途失去遠景、理想，因而失去共識。一部分人認為國民黨的兩岸政策太保守，必須盡快進入兩岸軍事互信機制和政治協商的進程，一部分人卻認為國民黨太躁進，會使得台灣的經濟過度依賴大陸，導致最後被大陸「以商逼政」坐上談判桌。

「不統、不獨、不武」政策只是沒有立場的偏安之計，對於時下青年已經喪失號召力，說好聽是符合維持現狀的主流民意，但它確實是沒有方向、沒有前瞻、沒有理想的政策。事實上，時代巨輪在運轉，世界的潮流在推進，沒有永遠的現狀。國民黨已經把兩岸關係帶向和平發展的深水區，現在遭遇到內外的雙重挑戰，對內必須凝聚力量迎戰九合一，對外必須通過服貿、貨貿後續談判，推前兩岸發展進程讓台灣與國際經濟接軌。「不統、不獨、不武」的號召已行不通，國民黨下一步要怎麼走，請說清楚。

民進黨在陳水扁執政時期因為兩岸關係處理不當，使得台灣的經濟幾近停擺，外交搞得烽火連天，一向對台灣友好的美國也備感不耐。以拿著台獨神主牌執政的民進黨很可能在2016捲土重來，台灣的經濟和兩岸關係、甚至外交關係都有可能大倒退，面對這樣的情境，民進黨是不是還要死抱著台獨神主牌，應該先向台灣人民說清楚。

但是黨主席蔡英文至今仍然抱持模糊以對的態度。針對黨內提出的「凍結台獨黨綱」提議，蔡英文採取軟處理，提交中執會後先擺著，觀望一下選舉風向再說；她甚至表示綠營只要選贏，大陸會朝民進黨的方向調整。民進黨始終是打選戰的高手，他們知道如何運用最適當的策略騙取選票，2000年陳水扁就是以《台灣前途決議文》騙取中間選民，選後以台獨意識形態去中國化。蔡英文如今是否如法炮製，選後將與大陸維持怎樣的關係？中國大陸是敵人、夥伴、鄰居還是一家人？請說清楚。

兩岸關係發展，很明顯已經形成紅藍綠三角的等距關係，台灣的選舉，大陸所宣示的兩岸政策，無疑會影響台灣民眾投票行為。2000年大陸總理朱鎔基的選前反台獨談話顯然對台灣的選情起了很大作用，2012年大選的勝負關鍵就圍繞在九二共識的論辯，我們深信，2016的大選，大陸的態度必然也會起決定性的作用。

如果2016國民黨繼續執政，兩岸關係可以在既有的基礎上延續，繼續開展和平發展的大道。但是如果民進黨取得政權之後，大陸會對台灣採取什麼樣的態度？兩岸關係會不會倒退或停滯？畢竟，國民黨目前的士氣低迷，施政滿意度也盪到谷底，年底九合一選情似乎已從北藍南綠的傳統板塊，綠色版圖逐漸向北浸漫。民進黨目前對兩岸政策採取模糊態度，很可能在取得政權後繼續走扁政時期的「去中國化」和「軟性台獨」策略，屆時大陸會採取什麼樣的手段回應？會不會冰封兩岸關係？是不是有可能再度引爆台海軍事危機？大陸必須說清楚。

兩岸之間的關係已經越來越緊密，台灣的政局不可能排除「中國因素」，即使民共之間尚未正式交流，但藍綠紅三黨對台灣政局幾已形成等距的三角關係。2016大選對台灣前途的影響既深且巨，三黨都有責任把選後的政策和態度說清楚、講明白，讓民眾有個抉擇的依據。