Ma Xi Meeting a Bust: Restart Cross-Strait Negotiations

Ma Xi Meeting a Bust: Restart Cross-Strait Negotiations
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 9, 2014

Executive Summary: The Ma Xi meeting is now a bust. The government lacks the will to improve cross-Strait relations. The Ma government's policy since he took office has been to be "close to the US, at peace with the Mainland, and friendly to Japan." This attempt to maintain a balanced relationship has failed. President Ma should cease insisting on a Ma Xi meeting. He must think instead about how to disarm opposition across the island, and restart cross-Strait negotiations.

Full Text Below:

The Office of the President has announced that former Vice President Vincent Siew will attend next month's APEC Leaders' Meeting in Beijing, as a special envoy. This means that the Ma Xi Meeting is officially a bust. President Ma told Chang Hsien-yao that this was merely a "minor ripple" in cross-Strait relations, not a tsunami. Cross-Strait negotiations will continue to be increasingly systematized. More and more agreements pertaining to trade in services, merchandise, and other matters will be signed

Negotiations over the Ma Xi meeting resulted in many twists and turns. APEC was the most appropriae venue for leaders from the two sides to meet. But Beijing believes that leaders from the two sides should not meet in an international venue. As we can see, the leaders of the two sides are not on the same page. This was perhaps the clearest sign that the Ma Xi meeting would be a bust.

Why were leaders from the two sides not on the same page? Some of the reasons had to do with Taiwan. Some had to do with CCP concerns over the internationalization of cross-Strait relations. Both reasons played a part. Take factors within Taiwan. This year the Sunflower Student Movement disrupted progress in cross-Strait economic and trade relations. Cross-Strait relations were enveloped in fog and the participants lost all sense direction. In recent years, cross-Strait interaction has become increasingly systematized. But the Sunflower Student Movement and political obstructionism brought cross-Strait relations to a low point. The government lacks the motivation to make further progress. The two sides are once again feeling their way, guessing about each others' intent. Both sides are seeking a new direction in cross-Strait relations. Both sides are adapting to the new atmosphere in cross-Strait relations.

Leaders from the two sides must deal with two misconceptions about cross-Strait relations. The first misconception is that cross-Strait relations must be either "first international, then cross-Strait," or "first cross-Strait, then international." When the Ma administration first took office in 2008, cross-Strait relations and Taiwan's relations with the outside world followed a fixed pattern. After the two sides signed ECFA, Taiwan, Singapore, and New Zealand signed bilateral free trade agreements. In other words, cross-Strait relations were becoming "first cross-Strait, then international" in nature.

But the Cross-Strait Agreement Oversight Regulations bill became stalled. Little progress was made in cross-Strait trade. The STA remained stalled in the legislature. MTA negotiations were delayed and remain uncertain. Meanwhile, Taiwan has established economic relations with numerous foreign governments. Taiwan and the United States have signed the BIA, and made significant progress with TIFA. Taiwan may be able to join the TPP and RCEP through different means. Progress in cross-Strait economic relations however lags behind Taiwan's accession to regional economic organizations. Cross-Strait economic relations now appear to be "first international, then cross-Strait" in nature.

The second misconception is that cross-Strait economic relations can improve even if the political situation fails to improve. During the 2012 presidential election, the cross-Strait peace agreement died, stillborn. Cross-Strait military confidence-building measures remained mere talk But following the election, cross-Strait economic relations improved. Eventually cross-Strait investment agreements werre signed, and trade in services negotiations were held, seemingly unaffected by the political standoff. But the highly political Ma Xi meeting is now a bust. The establishment of cross-Strait offices now appears remote. Review of the Cross-Strait Oversight Regulations and STA remain stalled in the Legislative Yuan. Internal disagreements over the MTA have arisen. A lack of progress in cross-Strait political relations has led to stagnation in economic relations. Cross-Strait relations now face a double dilemma.

Now consider changes in the international situation. The United States is "returning to Asia." Japan's Abe regime has great power ambitions. Hong Kong's Occupy Central movement has facilitated foreign power intervention in China's internal affairs. This has forced the Chinese mainland to deal with international factors. It has also led to three qualitative changes in cross-Strait relations.

One. Beijing hopes to imake cross-Strait relations more controllable. As a result, it is eager to build a cross-Strait relations firewall, It wants to avoid the internationalization of cross-Strait relations. It wants to prevent foreign governments making unwanted associations regarding cross-Strait relations. CCP leaders have reiterated that leaders from the two sides meeting is a "cross-Strait family affair." This is the main reason it does not want to meet at an international venue.

Two. Beijing hopes to make cross-Strait relations more manipulable. Since 2013, Mainland think tanks have been inviting DPP officials to visit. Beijing does not want cross-Strait exchanges to be limited to the KMT. Beijing expressed its willingness to make contact and communicated with anyone on Taiwan who favors cross-Strait peaceful development. That is why everyone is welcome to visit the mainland and participate in exchanges.

Three. Beijing hopes to make cross-Strait relations more defensible. Cross-Strait relations have warmed considerably in recent years. But the Sunflower Student Movement and the Chang Hsien-yao incident weakened mutual trust. Taiwan independence sentiment has never really abated on Taiwan. That is why when Xi Jinping met New Party Chairman Yok Mu-ming a few days ago, he reverted to the "one country, two systems" formulation.

The Ma Xi meeting is now a bust. The government lacks the will to improve cross-Strait relations. The Ma government's policy since he took office has been to be "close to the US, at peace with the Mainland, and friendly to Japan." This attempt to maintain a balanced relationship has failed. Taiwan-US arms sales may also lead to unpredictable results.

Whoever creates a problem must solve it. President Ma should cease insisting on a Ma Xi meeting. He must think instead about how to disarm opposition across the island, and restart cross-Strait negotiations.

馬習會破局後，如何找回兩岸關係新動力
【聯合報╱社論】
2014.10.09 01:57 am

總統府宣布，前副總統蕭萬長將以特使身分出席下月在北京舉行的ＡＰＥＣ領袖會議，亦意味「馬習會」正式宣告破局。套句馬總統對張顯耀案的回應，這應該只是兩岸關係的「小波瀾」，而不是大海嘯，因為未來兩岸的制度化協商仍將持續進行，服貿及貨貿等協議也仍會持續推動。

從這次馬習會的協商波折，我方認為ＡＰＥＣ是兩岸領導人會面的最佳場合，對岸則認為兩岸領導人會面不必借助國際場合；可見，兩岸領導人之間「心不契、靈不合」，應是馬習會破局的最大警訊。

兩岸領導人之間的心靈無法契合，有來自台灣內部的因素，也有中共對外的考量，兩者彼此交互作用。先談台灣內部的因素：今年以來，在太陽花反服貿打亂兩岸經貿進展的步調後，兩岸關係便陷入五里霧中，失去了原有的方向感。兩岸互動近年雖漸形制度化，但經太陽花及隨後的各種政治杯葛，似乎逐漸陷入一個低潮，缺乏往前推進或提升的動力。雙方都在重新摸索、猜測彼此推動兩岸關係的意願，雙方都在重新尋找兩岸關係的新方向，雙方也都在適應兩岸關係的新氛圍。

此際，雙方領導人對兩岸關係的走向出現兩個迷思：第一個迷思是：兩岸關係到底是「先國際、後兩岸」，還是「先兩岸、後國際」？馬政府二○○八年上台後，兩岸關係與台灣對外關係出現了一種固定模式，在兩岸簽署ＥＣＦＡ後，台灣便接連與新加坡、紐西蘭簽署雙邊自由貿易協定；亦即，「先兩岸、後國際」似乎是兩岸關係大輪持續滾動的推力。

但由於《兩岸協議監督條例》卡關，兩岸經貿缺乏進展，《服貿》走不出立法院，《貨貿》談判則遲遲未定。但與此同時，台灣對外經濟關係卻有所斬獲：台灣與美國簽署ＢＩＡ、ＴＩＦＡ獲得重大進展，台灣加入ＴＰＰ及ＲＣＥＰ的方向也未變，在兩岸經濟關係的步調落後於台灣加入區域經濟組織的情況下，兩岸經濟關係似乎已經從過去的「先兩岸、後國際」，轉變為「先國際、後兩岸」。

第二個迷思是：如果政治不動，兩岸經濟關係還可以持續推動嗎？在二○一二年總統大選時，儘管兩岸和平協議胎死腹中，兩岸軍事互信機制也僅止於紙上談兵，但選舉過後兩岸經濟關係仍持續推進，陸續完成兩岸投資協議及服貿的談判，絲毫不受政治停滯的影響。然而，今天具有高度政治指標意義的「馬習會」宣告破局，兩岸互設辦事處遙遙無期，在《兩岸監督條例》遲遲無法審查的情況下，服貿協議卡在立法院，貨貿協議也因為台灣內部因素而出現相當大的歧見。兩岸的政治關係沒有進展，經濟關係也同時停滯，這形成兩岸關係的雙重困境。

再談國際情勢的變化。由於美國推動亞洲再平衡政策，日本安倍政權的大國野心，再加上香港占中運動使外國勢力有機會介入中國內政問題，這使得中國大陸亟需面對國際變數，也因而使其在兩岸關係上產生三個質變。

第一，是北京希望加強兩岸關係的「可控制性」。也因此，亟欲在兩岸關係上構築一道防火牆，不僅要避免兩岸關係問題的國際化，更要避免國際間對兩岸關係的發展產生不必要的聯想。中共一再重申兩岸領導人會面是「兩岸自己的事情」，而不需要借助國際場合，這正是主要原因。

其次，是要加強兩岸關係的「可操作性」。自二○一二年以來，大陸智庫便積極邀訪民進黨人士登陸訪問，使兩岸交流不必侷限在國共的平台。北京表示願與贊成兩岸和平發展的台灣各界人士接觸溝通，歡迎他們到大陸交流訪問，這是主要原因。

最後，是讓兩岸關係更有「可預防性」。近年兩岸關係雖然大幅緩和，但太陽花學運及張顯耀事件，都使兩岸間的互信基礎變得薄弱，台灣內部獨派的聲浪也從未止歇。習近平日前會晤新黨郁慕明主席，重提「一國兩制」主張，就是在打預防針。

馬習會宣告破局，顯示兩岸關係欠缺向上提升的推力，也讓馬政府上台以來的「親美、和中、友日」的平衡關係出現缺口；接下來，台美軍售問題將更添增兩岸關係的不可測。

解鈴仍需繫鈴人。馬總統眼前應不必再強求馬習會，而須轉而思考如何化解來自國內的阻力，重新找回推進兩岸關係的動力。