One Country, Two Systems: From Compartmentalization to Coopetition

One Country, Two Systems: From Compartmentalization to Coopetition
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 23, 2014

Executive Summary: Hong Kong rule is a headache for Beijing. But Beijing faces an even greater challenge, namely Mainland rule and how to alter it. Beijing's tough stance on Hong Kong and Taiwan is actually a retreart. If Beijing fails to alter its thinking and practices, Deng Xiaoping's one country two systems could be discredited in Hong Kong. The rigor mortis of the Mainland regime could lead to its doom. Is this not a "bad ending" that warrants concern?

Full Text Below:

Hong Kong Newsflash: Hong Kong Federation of Students representatives and government officials are engaged in a tug of war at the negotiating table. Demonstrators and police are engaged in a tug of war on the streets.

The Mainland's official news outlets say the protesters are tired. They say the movement has been "hollowed out," that it "must come to an end, and is on the verge of collapse," and that "Democracy cannot avoid a bad ending." If Beijing and the Hong Kong Government adopt this attitude when talking to pro-democracy activists, no solution is likely. Internally, the tug of war on the streets of Hong Kong may be coming to an end. But they are not necessarily "on the verge of collapse," Externally, outside observers are hoping that Hong Kong can become an object lesson in the pursuit of peace. They object to bad-mouthing and references to "bad endings." They have no desire to see Hong Kong become a source of regret.

Regardless of the outcome of the Occupy Central movement, democracy in Hong Kong has gained momentum. It will find its place amidst political ups and downs. Even when the "no change for 50 years" deadline arrives, Hong Kong will not backslide. The world turns. "One Country, Two Systems" is a dynamic process. In the long term, today's "compartmentalized two systems" may become tomorrow's "coopetitive two systems." That will be the real day of reckoning. Therefore Beijing faces a more serious problem. In another fifty years, will the Mainland's political system still be what it is today? Will it still be an immutable communist dictatorship?

How should Beijing respond to Hong Kong's  political reform as it moves toward democracy? That is a tough question. But an even tougher question is whether Beijing's one-party dictatorship should also undergo political reform? In other words, one country, two systems could go from compartmentalization to coopetition.

In 1997 Beijing adopted "one country, two systems" in response to the problem of Hong Kong. Beijing knew that Mainland rule over Hong Kong would be inferior to Hong Kong rule over Hong Kong. This was common sense. But an even better question is whether Mainland rule is better for the Mainland, in the long run. If the CCP leadership did not have doubts, it would not mention the "end of the party and the end of the nation" so frequently.

Mainland rule has four cardinal principles. But they boil down to one. Principle One. The socialist road, but with "Chinese characteristics." This of course, is a self-contradiction. Principle Two. The dictatorship of the proletariat. But the CCP regime has already become a dictatorship of second generation officials, second-generation plutocrats, with workers and peasants pushed to the margins. Principle Three. Marxism-Leninism-Maoism. Reall? Principle Four. The leadership of the Communist Party. The CCP demands the "leadership of the Communist Party" even though it is no longer socialist, no longer a dictatorship of the proletariat, and no longer has any relationship with Marx, Lenin, and Mao. All that remains is the leadership of the CCP. But this is the 21st century. Can the party continue making such demands for another 50 years?

In fact, since reforms begain in 1978, the Communist regime has made significant achievements in political reform. For example, in TV dramas Deng Xiaoping is portrayed as critical of the Cultural Revolution. He blasts it as "Inexplicable and outrageous." For example, Mao Zedong "criticized Confucius and praised the Qin Emperor." But Xi Jinping frequently praises Confucius and expresses respect for Confucianism. For example, one seldom hears "class struggle" cited as the key to ruling the nation. The old socialist path permitted socialism but not capitalism. That path no longer exists. The dictatorship of the proletariat no longer exists. It is no longer something the party demands. Marxism-Leninism-Maoism exists in name only. Three of the four cardinal principles have already been forsaken. The only remaining principle is the leadership of the Communist Party. Communist party rule need not be ruled out. But it should be achieved through democratic competition.

The Chinese Communist Party's 36 years of achievements in reform and opening deserve affirmation. But recent tightening of communist regime control puts its legitimacy at risk. The situation on Mainland China is complex. At times calls for "Communist Party leadership" are understandable. They provide the CCP the time needed to slough off other three principles. But the CCP should use this political tutelage period to improve political and economic conditions. It should transition from demanding "the dictatorship of the Chinese Communist Party," to demanding Chinese Communist Party "participation in democratic competition." This is a daunting task, But seven years of disease require three years of healing. If the crops and livestock are inadequate, the people cannot survive.

The situation in Hong Kong is a microcosm of the Mainland. Sham universal suffrage shows that Beijing fears its man might lose under genuine universal suffrage. Therefore it demands screening. By the same token, Beijing fears that a more democratic form of government on the Mainland might threaten the Communist Party's power. Therefore it demands Communist Party leadership. But without popular support, the CCP must get tough and apply more pressure. In the long term, this will make the regime less inclusive. less appealing, and less legitimate. It will greatly increase the risks of governance.

The one remaining cardinal principle shows that the CCP lacks tolerance and self-confidence. Hong Kong rule is a headache for Beijing. But Beijing faces an even greater challenge, namely Mainland rule and how to alter it. Beijing's tough stance on Hong Kong and Taiwan is actually a retreart. If Beijing fails to alter its thinking and practices, Deng Xiaoping's one country two systems could be discredited in Hong Kong. The rigor mortis of the Mainland regime could lead to its doom. Is this not a "bad ending" that warrants concern?

一國兩制：由區隔性轉為競爭性
【聯合報╱社論】
2014.10.23 02:05 am

快門下的香港：學聯代表與港府官員在談判桌上進行拉鋸戰，示威者與警察在街頭進行拉鋸戰。

近日，大陸官媒見示威者已現疲態，指占中運動「空洞無物」、「已經到了曲終人散、土崩瓦解的地步」、「民主秀難逃爛尾結局」。北京與港府若以此心態與民運人士對談，只怕不易得到解決方案。事實上，從內部看，香港街頭的拉鋸戰雖難罷干休，但所謂「曲終人散、土崩瓦解」之說未必盡然；從外部看，外界皆期待香港問題能以追求和平收場為旨，不要刻意唱衰或真弄到「爛尾結局」，以免使港中關係留下不可彌補的遺憾。

不論此次占中運動的成果如何，但香港的民主動能應已建立，自會在張弛起落中找到歸宿，即使過了「五十年不變」的大限也不可能走回頭路。其實，地球在轉動，「一國兩制」是一個動態過程，從長期看，如今是「區隔的兩制」，未來可能轉為「競爭的兩制」，屆時才是評價「結局」之日。於是，另一個更嚴肅的問題是：再隔五十年，大陸的政治體制仍將是今天的面貌嗎？仍將是一成不變的共黨專政嗎？

因此，就北京的立場言，如何因應「港制」民主走向的「政改」固然棘手，更嚴肅的議題則在「陸制」的一黨專政應不應當也考慮「政改」？亦即，兩制有無可能在一國之中從區隔性轉為競爭性。

北京在一九九七年採「一國兩制」處理香港問題，主要是自知若要治港，則「陸制」不如「港制」。但「陸制」不能用於香港原是政治常識，更嚴肅的問題在「陸制」能否永遠用於大陸也是一個疑問，否則中共領導階層不會常把「亡黨亡國」掛在嘴邊。

「陸制」的天條是「四個堅持」，但實際上已變質為「一個堅持」。一、堅持社會主義道路（加上「中國特色」，已是白馬非馬）；二、堅持無產階級專政（目前已幾成官二代、富二代主政，工農階級又退至邊緣）；三、堅持馬列主義、毛澤東思想（是嗎？）；四、堅持共產黨的領導，即使已非社會主義、已非無產階級專政、已甩掉了馬列毛，但仍要「堅持共產黨的領導」，也就只剩這「一個堅持」。在二十一世紀的今天，這樣的「一個堅持」，在主觀上要不要再維持五十年？在客觀上能不能再維持五十年？

其實，一九七八年改革開放以來，中共政權在廣義的「政改」上已有顯著的努力與成就。例如，電視劇中的鄧小平，以「莫名其妙、豈有此理」批評文革諸事。又如，毛澤東「批孔揚秦」，但習近平頻密表達揚孔尊儒。再如，已罕聞「抓綱治國」（以階級鬥爭為綱）。這些皆可印證，只准姓社不准姓資的「社會主義道路」基本上已不存在；無產階級專政在現實上亦不存在，不再是「綱」；馬列毛也名存實亡。如此，「四個堅持」已去其三，最後的課題是在要不要「堅持共產黨的領導」；且並非排除中共統治，而是應當在民主競爭制衡中贏得政權。

中共在三十六年來改革開放的成就應予肯定，但隨著中共政權近期在控制上的大幅緊縮，政權的合理性及風險性皆在增加。以中國大陸情勢之複雜，在一定時段中「堅持共產黨領導」或許亦能理解，以利用此一時段蛻去「三個堅持」；但亦應當利用此一「訓政」時段努力累積政經條件，使「堅持共產黨專政」的中共，轉型為「在民主運作中競爭參政」的中共。這當然是一艱鉅工程，但七年之病，求三年之艾，苟為不畜，終身不得。

香港此際的政情可以視為大陸政局的縮影。「假普選」顯示北京擔心自己的人透過「真普選」會選不上，因此主張「篩選」。同理，北京擔心在大陸若採行較具民主競爭的政體，會威脅共產黨主政，因此堅持共產黨領導。但是，若缺乏普遍的民主檢驗和支撐，此一路線將使中共愈來愈走向強硬與高壓，從長期看，這在道德上將使政權愈來愈失去包容性、親和力甚至正當性，在現實上亦大大增加治理的風險。

「一個堅持」顯示中共缺乏氣度與自信，北京正為「港制」頭痛，但北京更大的挑戰則在「陸制」的前景如何調整。從最近的跡象看來，北京團隊所表現的「強硬」，例如在香港及台灣問題上，其實是在退縮。若不改變思維與作法，鄧小平「一國兩制」在香港的發展性恐遭摧折，大陸政體的僵固化則難以挽救，這難道不是值得擔憂的「爛尾結局」？