Burn Your Bridges: Eric Chu's Four Levers

Burn Your Bridges: Eric Chu's Four Levers
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 29, 2015

Executive Summary: The edifice is on the verge of collapse. It is time to save the day. Eric Chu is now KMT chairman. The party's circumstances are dire. He must make full use of four levers. One. The Chu Xi meeting. Two. The National Affairs Conference. Three. The constitutional amendment process. Four. The 2016 legislative and presidential elections. Sunzi's Art of War says: "If soldiers have their backs to the wall, they will not fear, they will fight to the death.” If Chu controls these four levers, he could improve the KMT's chances in 2016. But even if the party loses the election, it may be able to lead Taiwan back onto the right path. This would be the KMT's contribution to Taiwan. It might even enable the KMT to make a comeback.

Full Text Below: 

The edifice is on the verge of collapse. It is time to save the day. Eric Chu is now KMT chairman. The party's circumstances are dire. He must make full use of four levers. One. The Chu Xi meeting. Two. The National Affairs Conference. Three. The constitutional amendment process. Four. The 2016 legislative and presidential elections.

These four levers are complementary. Although 2016 is the target, 2020 is also a possibility. Based on current trends, the KMT would find it difficult to win the presidential election in 2016. But Eric Chu must use the election to slow the KMT's fall. The Kuomintang cannot remain in free fall until 2016. Even if it expects to be defeated, the KMT must discuss its policy platform. It must formulate a strategy for a comeback in 2020.

Eric Chu must have a strategic goal for 2016. The DPP may win the election, but lose the policy path debate. The KMT must continue its struggle. Although it is likely to lose the election, it must win the policy path battle.

Take the National Affairs Conference. Chu has indicated a willingness to participate. But he must not allow himself to become one of Tsai Ing-wen's props. The organization of the conference must meet with KMT satisfaction. There must be a proper role for the Ma government, and equal status for the political parties. There must be diversity and balance among the participants. There must be clarity in the agenda, particularly on issues of national identity, amendments to the Constitution, globalization, energy policy, cross-Strait relations, the 1992 consensus, ECFA follow-up negotiations, and other issues troubling Taiwan The Kuomintang must not pass up this opportunity. It must use the conference as a basis for consensus-building.

Tsai Ing-wen wants the National Affairs Conference to serve as a stepping stone in her presidential campaign. Following the nine in one election victory, she has been either silent or highly selective about the issues she is willing to address. But Eric Chu must insist that the conference be a genuine, in depth debate. The KMT must set the agenda. It must have the determination to get to the bottom of things. If Tsai Ing-wen ducks the issues, the KMT must hold her feet to the fire, then turn them into 2016 election issues.

A constitutional amendment is imminent. Tsai Ing-wen apparently has reservations. The KMT, however, must not miss the opportunity to force the nation to hold a constitutional debate. Three themes should be addressed: National identity, cross-Strait relations, and government institutions. None of these should be overlooked. If these issues are not made crystal clear, constitutional reform will be impossible. Therefore Tsai Ing-wen must not be allowed to duck these issues again and again. What would the constitutional amendment include? It could include a referendum on whether 18 year olds may vote in the 2016 election, and whether the Legislative Yuan's authority to approve of premier appointments should be restored. Once the 2016 elections are over, the KMT should demand further constitutional amendments, and a public referendum during the 2018 county and municipal elections. By then, the Legislative Yuan's authority to approve premier appointments may have been restored, and serve as a benchmark. If the KMT can maintain the momentum for constitutional reform from 2016, even if it loses the presidential election, it will retain access to the bully pulpit.

The Chu Xi meeting is the most crucial of the four levers. The KMT may lose the 2016 election. Beijing may not be happy. Any Chu Xi meeting should therefore reaffirm the 1992 Consensus and even go beyond the 1992 Consensus.It should establish a new benchmark for cross-Strait relations. It should establish a new "divided rule but not a divided nation” concept. On the one hand, the KMT could break new ground for 2016. On the other hand it could pressure the DPP to reform. During the Chu Xi meeting, Eric Chu should encourage Beijing to help the DPP reform. The Chu Xi meeting should echo, then surpass the cross-Strait achievements of the National Affairs Conference. 

Now take the 2016 presidential election. As mentioned above, the KMT may well lose the election. But it must not allow it to become a crushing defeat. It must make full use of these four levers, rhetorically and strategically. It may lose the election, but it must win the policy path high ground. Eric Chu must be willing to burn his bridges. The National Affairs Conference, the constitutional amendment process, and the Chu Xi meeting will allow him to shrug off the albatross on his back. They will allow him to plan for 2020. Should Eric Chu throw his hat in the ring for 2016? That can be debated. But if the KMT fields another candidate, one unable to wage a respectable campaign, it might never rise again.

For Taiwan, 2016 is a crisis and an opportunity. As mentioned earlier, the shock waves from 2016 will soon buffet Taiwan. A consensus must be reached on national identity, constitutional amendments. energy policy, globalization, the 1992 consensus, cross-Strait relations, and ECFA. If the Democratic Progressive Party returns to power, it cannot dodge these issues. Otherwise it may win the election, but lose the national policy debate. The KMT may indeed lose the election. But it need not shrink from the prospect. It must take an even tougher line, and remind itself that even though it lost the election, it won the national policy debate.

Sunzi's Art of War says: "If soldiers have their backs to the wall, they will not fear, they will fight to the death.” If Chu controls these four levers, he could improve the KMT's chances in 2016. But even if the party loses the election, it may be able to lead Taiwan back onto the right path. This would be the KMT's contribution to Taiwan. It might even enable the KMT to make a comeback.

釜破舟沉：朱立倫的四支槓桿
2015-01-29 01:40:30 聯合報 社論

扶大廈之將傾，挽狂瀾於既倒。朱立倫出任國民黨主席，情勢艱危，必須審慎操持四支槓桿：一、朱習會。二、國是會議。三、修憲。四、二○一六立委及總統選舉。

這四支槓桿相因相成，雖將以二○一六大選為總結，但也可能穿越二○二○年。就當前趨勢看，國民黨很難贏得二○一六總統大選，但朱立倫至少必須使國民黨在此次大選中出現煞車甩尾的情勢；也就是說，不能聽任國民黨繼續在二○一六如自由落體般墜落，縱使敗選，也須透過大選為國民黨在論述及戰略上重建一個能夠指向二○二○年的制高點。

朱立倫二○一六年的戰略目標應是：民進黨可能贏了選舉，卻輸在路線；國民黨即應力爭，雖可能輸了選舉，但必須贏在路線。

先論國是會議。朱立倫雖表示願意參與，但不可能只是扮演蔡英文的道具。因此，國民黨對於主辦單位的組成（如馬政府在此會中的角色如何、政黨的對等地位如何），及與會人員之多元及平衡，還有議題設定的高度及深廣度等，皆應爭取到國民黨的話語權。尤其關於國家認同、修憲方案、全球化、能源政策、兩岸關係、九二共識及ＥＣＦＡ後續工程等長期嚴重困擾台灣的議題，國民黨皆不可任其錯失，務必促使大會成為建立共識的平台。

蔡英文似想將國是會議做為她競選總統的政治嫁妝，九合一大勝後，已見她對議題有選擇性並冷處理。但朱立倫必須堅持此會為一個真正深廣辯論的場域，國民黨須成為議題的發動機，要有打破砂鍋問到底的決戰心志。倘若蔡英文有所迴避閃躲，國民黨即應強勢回應，並延伸為二○一六大選的議題。

修憲儼已箭在弦上。蔡英文對修憲似有保留，但國民黨不能錯失藉國是會議進行憲政大辯論的機會，對於憲政的三大主題，國家認同、兩岸關係及政府體制，均不應有所遺漏。因為，若不徹底談清楚這些問題，憲政改革即根本不可能完成，因而亦不容蔡英文對這些問題再閃避。至於實際的修憲方案，二○一六大選或許只將十八歲投票權及恢復立院的閣揆任命同意權兩案付諸公民複決；但待二○一六選後，國民黨應主張在新民意上繼續深化修憲方案，以交付二○一八縣市長選舉時公民複決為目標。屆時，修憲方案若以「恢復立院的閣揆任命同意權」為基準，則國民黨若操持了二○一六後的修憲動能，即使輸掉總統大選，也不致話語權盡失。

朱習會是四支槓桿中最具關鍵效應的一支。由於國民黨可能輸掉二○一六大選，而北京也未必樂見此結果；因此，朱立倫應設法在朱習會上爭取到「延續九二共識／超越九二共識」的兩岸關係新基準。此一新基準應在營造「分治而不分裂」的新思維，一方面可做為國民黨在二○一六年的先驅性主張，另一方面也可使民進黨更感受到轉型的壓力。朱立倫應設法在朱習會中，努力發揮引導北京思維昇華及協助民進黨轉型的功能；而朱習會的成果，在兩岸關係上應以呼應並超越國是會議的政治成就為目標。

再回頭談二○一六總統大選。如前所述，國民黨即使可能輸掉大選，但不可任其一敗塗地，而必須在論述及戰略上透過四支槓桿，建立「雖可能輸掉選舉，但必須贏在路線」的制高點。朱立倫若抱持破釜沉舟的決志，即更有在國是會議、修憲及朱習會中擺脫現實羈絆的操作空間，並將目標指向二○二○年。在這樣的思考下，朱立倫應否當仁不讓親自參選二○一六年總統大選，即有再作考慮的空間；因為，二○一六如果國民黨由其他人參選而打不出一場至少能止滑甩尾的選戰，恐怕就再也站不起來了。

對台灣而言，二○一六年是危機中存有轉機。如前所述，台灣經歷了二○一六年的震盪後，必須在國家認同、修憲方案、能源政策、全球化及九二共識、兩岸關係、ＥＣＦＡ架構等國政綱領上真正建立起共識。民進黨若重返執政，已不能閃躲，否則就可能「贏了選舉／輸了路線」；國民黨則縱使輸掉了選舉，亦無須退縮，而更應對「若輸了選舉，也要贏得路線」有所堅持。

兵法曰：「甚陷則不懼，不得已則鬥。」朱立倫若能正確操持這四支槓桿，或許可改善二○一六的國民黨選情；即使輸掉了選舉，但若能促成整個台灣回到正確的路線與軌道，那也將是國民黨對台灣的貢獻，亦可能是國民黨再起的資產。