Beijing Should Reaffirm the Hu-Bush Hotline Version of the 1992 Consensus

Beijing Should Reaffirm the Hu-Bush Hotline Version of the 1992 Consensus
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 11, 2015

Executive Summary: Taiwan has recently witnessed the Sunflower Student Movement, protests against curriculum reform, Lee Teng-hui's "out with the old, in with the new", Hung Shiu-chu's "One China, Same Interpretation", and Tsai Ing-wen's pledge to "Uphold the Republic of China's existing constitutional framework". These developments can all be traced back to the War of Resistance Against Japan, and recent controversy over its historical significance.

Full Text Below:

Taiwan has recently witnessed the Sunflower Student Movement, protests against curriculum reform, Lee Teng-hui's "out with the old, in with the new", Hung Shiu-chu's "One China, Same Interpretation", and Tsai Ing-wen's pledge to "Uphold the Republic of China's existing constitutional framework". These developments can all be traced back to the War of Resistance Against Japan, and recent controversy over its historical significance.

The Chinese Communist Party has yet to abandon its claim that "The Republic of China has already perished." As a result, Beijing finds itself caught in a contradiction.

As Beijing must concede, China, i.e., the Republic of China, led the war against Japan, which in turn led to the retrocession of Taiwan. On the one hand, Beijing talks about Taiwan retrocession. On the other hand, it claims that the Republic of China has already perished. This constitutes a glaring contradiction. Beijing has since calle for the "sharing of history" and the "joint rewriting of history". It has no choice but to acknowledge the role of the Republic of China in fighting the Japanese. How can it simultaneously claim that the Republic of China has already perished? This too amounts to a glaring contradiction.

Cross-Strait relations involve a multitude of historical discrepancies. For the most part, these are the result of Beijing's self-contradictory interpretation of Chinese history. On the one hand, Beijing claims that "The Republic of China has already perished". On the other hand, it urges Taiwan to adhere to the ROC Constitution. It champions the "one China framework". It correctly maintains that "both sides of the Strait are part of one China". But it has never explained what it means by "one China". If Beijing refuses to define what it means by "one China", just what sort of "one China framework" does it seek to maintain?

Beijing cannot accept the premise that "One China is the Republic of China". But neither can it claim that "One China is the People's Republic of China". If "One China" cannot be defined, then the two sides of the Strait will interpret Chinese history differently. The solution is simple. Beijing should reaffirm the same 1992 Consensus that it upheld during the Bush-Hu hotline exchange.

On March 26, 2008, Hu Jintao spoke to George W. Bush on the Beijing-Washington hotline. Hu said, "The Chinese mainland and Taiwan will resume negotiations on the basis of the 1992 Consensus, that is, both sides recognize there is only one China, but agree that they each have different interpretations of what that one China is."

Hu Jintao upholds "one China, different interpretations". This does not definitively establish what "one China" means. Instead, it wisely leaves the term "one China" open to interpretation. One. At the very least, it abandons the allegation that "The Republic of China has already perished". Two. Its "different interpretations" clause offers a "one China" definition that both sides can accept. Three. It enables "one China, different interpretations" to serve as a foundation for cross-Strait dialogue.

In recent years however, Beijing has narrowed the meaning of the "1992 Consensus". It has reduced it to a synonym for "opposition to Taiwan independence", and nothing more. This narrows the original intent of the "1992 Consensus". When "backdoor listing" and "Taiwan independence in spirit" become the new normal on Taiwan, mere "opposition to Taiwan independence" will be pointless. Therefore Beijing must not equate the 1992 consensus with passively opposing Taiwan independence. Instead, it must actively champion "one China, different interpretations", then transition to the "big roof concept of China" concept, thereby enhancing and revitalizing the meaning of "one China".

Under the new normal of "backdoor listing" and "Taiwan independence in spirit", mere "opposition to Taiwan independence" has been reduced to a strawman. Beijing must instead reaffirm the ROC as defined by law, and the ROC as defined by the ROC constitution. It must cease insisting that "The Republic of China has already perished". It must cease subscribing to the "law of the jungle" and the "nature, red in tooth and claw" view of history. Taiwan independence has already adopted "backdoor listing". That leaves Beijing insisting that "The Republic of China has already perished."

Suppose next year's election results in another ruling party change? Beijing has three ways of invoking the "1992 Consensus". One. If Tsai Ing-wen is sufficiently equivocal, Beijing need not demand that she utter the words "1992 Consensus". Two. Beijing must invoke the term "1992 Consensus". It must explicitly counter the "Taiwan independence party platform". Three. Beijing must utter the words "1992 Consensus". The two sides can then interpret the "1992 Consensus" in their own way.

Consider the situation today. Beijing is unlikely to discard the term, "1992 consensus". If it did so, Xi Jinping's credibility would suffer, both internally on the Mainland, and externally in the United States.  On Taiwan, the green camp could then squeak by and view Beijing with contempt. Without the term, the blue camp would disintegrate. Therefore a new cross-Strait relationship may emerge, one that is more advantageous to bilateral interests than the preceding ones. This third way should be rooted in the "1992 consensus" as expressed in the Hu-Bush hotline exchange. As long as the DPP upholds the "current ROC constitutional framework" and understands and upholds the 1992 consensus", the two sides can continue to develop peacefully, based on the shared premise of "one China, different interpretations".

A new cross-Strait relationship could emerge next year. The DPP will not be able to take the "rectification of names, authoring of a new constitution, and de jure Taiwan independence" path. If it repudiates even the "1992 Consensus" and "one China, different interpretations", the result could be disastrous. Beijing wants to prevent the DPP from resorting to "backdoor listing" and "Taiwan independence in spiirt". It must urge the DPP to uphold the Republic of China and the ROC Constitution. But if Beijing insists that "The Republic of China has already perished", how can it possibly make such demands of the DPP? 

In short, cross-Strait dialogue requires a new vocabulary. Beijing should cease passively thinking about how to "oppose Taiwan independence". Instead it should actively consider how to "jointly reaffirm the jurisprudence of the Republic of China".  Otherwise Beijing, the DPP, and the blue camp, will not be able to forestall "backdoor listing" and "Taiwan independence in spirit".

With this understanding, Beijing should reaffirm the 1992 Consensus and One China, Different Interpretations mentioned in the Hu-Bush hotline exchange of 2008.

北京應先回到布胡熱線的九二共識

2015-09-11聯合報

從太陽花、反課綱，到李登輝的「脫古改新」，至洪秀柱一度提出的「一中同表」，及蔡英文的「中華民國現行憲政體制推動論」，皆可在最近引發的抗戰史觀辯論中找到根源。

由於中共迄未放棄「中華民國已經滅亡」的史觀，致使北京在這場史觀辯論中陷於自我矛盾。

北京必須承認，中國（當然是中華民國）抗日導致了台灣光復；但北京一方面談台灣光復，另一方面又如何主張屹立於台灣的中華民國已經滅亡？這是矛盾。而北京既然宣示「共用史料／同修史書」，勢須在抗日史上重建中華民國的地位，則又如何主張中華民國已經滅亡？這也是矛盾。

兩岸對於中國史觀的種種歧異，主要源自北京在兩岸史觀的種種自相矛盾。一方面主張「中華民國已經滅亡」，一方面又要台灣維持中華民國及中華民國憲法。一方面主張「一中框架」，「兩岸同屬一個中國」，又始終未曾說明何謂「一個中國」。若北京不言「一個中國」是何意義，則究竟要維持什麼樣的「一中框架」？

北京不可能接受「一個中國是中華民國」，但亦不可能主張「一個中國是中華人民共和國」。「一個中國」的定義若不能確立，兩岸的史觀也必呈分歧。解決之道，北京應先回到布胡熱線中所主張的九二共識。

二○○八年三月二十六日，胡錦濤在熱線中對小布希說：「中國大陸和台灣將在九二共識的基礎上恢復談判，也就是雙方承認只有一個中國，但同意對其定義各自表述。」

胡錦濤的見解，就是「一個中國／各自表述」。此說雖未對「一個中國」作出最後的定義，但也為「一個中國」的定義保留了必要的空間。一、此說至少否棄了「中華民國已經滅亡」的史觀。二、此說接受了雙方可對「一個中國」的定義「各自表述」。三、此說確立了「一個中國／各自表述」為兩岸談判的「基礎」。

然而，近年來北京卻將「九二共識」狹隘地視為「反對台獨」的同義詞，這使「九二共識」失去了許多原有的空間。因為，在「借殼上市／心靈台獨」可能成為新常態時，「反對台獨」將成無的放矢。在此情勢下，九二共識必須從「反對台獨」的負向思考，回到「一中各表」的正向思考，然後再設法經由「大屋頂中國」的思維，提升並重建「一個中國」的定義。

也就是說，在「借殼上市／心靈台獨」的新常態下，「反對台獨」已形同對稻草人喊話；真正的對策，應在「回到法理中華民國／回到中華民國憲法」，不能再持「中華民國已經滅亡」這種「弱肉強食／生吞活剝」的史觀。且看：如今連台獨都「借中華民國之殼上市」，只剩下北京還在主張「中華民國已經滅亡」。

倘若台灣明年大選又見政黨輪替，北京在「九二共識」的操作不外三途。一、只要蔡英文含含糊糊地說得過去，也就不必堅持她必須說出「九二共識」四個字。二、必須說出「九二共識」四個字，而且要對《台獨黨綱》作出明確處理。三、必須說出「九二共識」四個字，但雙方可在「九二共識」的定義上創造空間。

看現今情勢，北京似乎不可能丟掉「九二共識」四個字。丟掉這四個字，習近平對美國及對大陸內部的威信將受重創；在台灣，綠的能躲過這四個字，就不會再將北京放在眼裡，藍的失去這四個字則必告崩解。所以，為兩岸可能出現的新局計，應以前述第三途較符雙邊利益。這第三途即應建立在布胡熱線所揭示的「九二共識」之上，只要民進黨屆時以「在中華民國現行憲政體制下，理解並發展九二共識」相回應，兩岸即可繼續在「一個中國／各自表述」的「共同政治基礎」上和平發展。

面對明年兩岸可能出現的新局，民進黨不可能再走「正名制憲／法理台獨」的路線，因而若連「九二共識」都予以否定，將連「一中各表」的陣地亦告失守，不堪設想。北京方面，則若欲挽回「借殼上市／心靈台獨」的情勢，就必須引導民進黨回到中華民國及中華民國憲法；但北京若謂「中華民國已經滅亡」，將教民進黨回到何處？

也就是說，未來兩岸對話的新語彙，不應再是負向思考的「反對台獨」，而應以「一起回到真正的法理的中華民國」為正向表述，並據此相互檢證。倘非如此，北京、民進黨及泛藍三方面，皆無以節制「借殼上市／心靈台獨」的持續發展。

有此認識，北京就應先回到布胡熱線的「九二共識／一中各表」。