DPP: Defending the ROC? Or Seeking Shelter Behind It?

DPP: Defending the ROC? Or Seeking Shelter Behind It?
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 15, 2015

Executive Summary: Tsai Ing-wen said she relished the "opportunity to participate in this year's National Day". The DPP followed up with the declaration that "We have always defended the Republic of China". The truth is that the Democratic Progressive Party expects to return to power in 2016. It realizes it needs the "Republic of China" as a shield. If the DPP fails to defend the Republic of China, it will not be able to rule the nation. Is the DPP defending the Republic of China, or is it seeking shelter behind the Republic of China?

Full Text Below:

Tsai Ing-wen said she relished the "opportunity to participate in this year's National Day". The DPP followed up with the declaration that "We have always defended the Republic of China". The truth is that the Democratic Progressive Party expects to return to power in 2016. It realizes it needs the "Republic of China" as a shield. If the DPP fails to defend the Republic of China, it will not be able to rule the nation. Is the DPP defending the Republic of China, or is it seeking shelter behind the Republic of China?

The DPP did this before, during Chen Shui-bian's eight years in power. Chen advanced his "Five Noes", only to renege on them, forcing Beijing to "listen to what he says and watch what he does”. Chen then advanced his "rectification of names", his "authoring of a new constitution", and his one country on each side" arguments. Once he did so, his regime collapsed. Tsai Ing-wen has not recognized the 1992 consensus and one China, different interpretations. Instead she has sought shelter behind the 1992 consensus and one China, different interpretations.

Just how does one "defend the Republic of China"? The answer is simple. One, Renounce Taiwan independence and affirm our Chinese heritage. Two. Champion democracy and defend the republic. The more we affirm out Chinese heritage, the stronger the Republic of China will be.

The recent controversy over the history of the War of Resistance Against Japan has revealed the agenda of the Sunflower Student Movement, the opponents of curriculum reform, and former president Lee Teng-hui. Their agenda includes four points. One. To sever the historical links between China's Taiwan and Mainland regions. Two. To deny the retrocession of Taiwan. Three. To drive the Republic of China government back to the Mainland. Four. To promote Lee Teng-hui's "out with the old, in with the new" policy. In sum, these forces claim that Taiwan was not retroceded to the Republic of China. They say Taiwan merely borrowed the name Republic of China. They intend to found an separate, sovereign and independent country. By contrast, the Ma government confirms that the ROC government led the eight-year long War of Resistance Against Japan. It recovered Taiwan from Japan. The Republic of China currently exercises jurisdiction over Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu. The facts are clear. Both sides of the Strait must face up to them. Taiwan was retroceded to the Republic of China.

Consider the differences. One side censors history, and denies that the Republic of China recovered Taiwan. It argues that "The more independent Taiwan becomes, the more powerful it will be". The other side affirms the history of the Republic of China, defends the Republic of China, and understands that the more Taiwan acknowledges its Chinese heritage, the stronger the Republic of China will be. The recent controversy reveals how powerful the forces of history are. It reveals the roots of Taiwan's power. If Taiwan severs its connection to history, it cuts itself off from the future.

Just how does denying that the Republic of China recovered Taiwan benefit Taiwan? Just how absurd are green camp claims that the Republic of China is a "foreign government"?  Especially when the green camp uses the name "Republic of China" to engage in backdoor listing?

If Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP seek refuge behind the Republic of China and the 1992 consensus, they cannot get away with backdoor listing. Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian learned that the hard way.

Rumors are that the DPP hopes to cling to the "Resolution on Taiwan's Future" as the basis for its "[Mainland] China policy".  If this is true, the DPP had better think twice. Tsai Ing-wen talks about "promoting cross-Strait relations under the Republic of China's existing constitutional framework". She has not talked about "promoting cross-Strait relations based on the Resolution on Taiwan's Future". How could she? The Resolution flatly contradicts the ROC Constitution.

One. The resolution claims that Taiwan is a sovereign and independent state. But according to the ROC Constitution, and by extension its laws, the ROC is an a sovereign and independent state. Taiwan is the Free Region of the Republic of China. It is not a sovereign and independent state. Two. The resolution "abandons the claim of one China". But under the current constitution "the Republic of China is one China". One China is not Beijing's "one China". The ROC Constitution affirms "constitutional one China", "one country, two regions", and "one China, different interpretations". Three. If the Taiwan independence party platform is merely frozen instead of abolished, the problem will persist

In other words, if Tsai Ing-wen declares that she will "uphold the Republic of China's existing constitutional framework", she will not be able not backpedal and return to the "Resolution on Taiwan's Future". She will not be able to engage in backdoor listing. That will become a dead end. After all, she did not say that she would "promote cross-Strait relations based on the Resolution on Taiwan's Future",

Taiwan has been plagued by historical disputes and real world grievances. For Taiwan, the ROC and the ROC Constitution are assets. But they also involve responsibilities. Backdoor listing exploits these assets, but is too cowardly to assume responsibility for them. If one refuses to assume responsibility for these assets, means one will not be able to exploit them. For example. if one refuses to recognize that the Republic of China recovered Taiwan, one is essentially crediting the Chinese Communist Party for the victory over Japan and the recovery of Taiwan. If, on the other hand, one acknowledges that the ROC recovered Taiwan, the credit will accrue to the Republic of China government on Taiwan. In other words, if Republic of China citizens abandon their Chinese heritage, they will undermine the strength of the republic.

The more we demand Taiwan independence, the more we weaken Taiwan. When the Chen regime demanded the "rectification of names" and the "authoring of a new constitution", the United States openly criticized Taiwan, saying that Taiwan independence was not in the interest of Taiwan's democracy. In fact, Taiwan independence is already impossible. Promoti8ng Taiwan independence can only tear Taiwan apart. Taiwan independence can only make dialogue between Taiwan and 1.3 billion compatriots on the opposite side of the Strait impossible. Conversely, the more Taiwan acknowledges its Chinese heritage, the less the United States will worry about "troublemakers". Taiwan will then be able to heal its internal wounds and maintain a modicum of goodwill with 1.3 billion compatriots across the Strait. Recent controversy over the history of the War of Resistance Against Japan touched upon Chiang Kai-shek, Taiwan retrocession, and the status of the Republic of China. These are sensitive issues in cross-Strait coopetition. ROC citizens must have confidence in the Republic of China. We must reject Taiwan independence and demand democracy. We must realize that the more we acknowledge our Chinese heritage, the stronger we make the republic. 

If the DPP returns to power, it will have no alternative but to seek shelter behind the Republic of China and the 1992 Consensus.

民進黨捍衛中華民國或求救於中華民國

2015-09-15聯合報

蔡英文說「有機會參加今年國慶」，民進黨則聲稱「一直捍衛中華民國」。實情卻是，民進黨可能在二○一六重返執政，必須靠「中華民國」支撐；民進黨若不捍衛中華民國，即絕無平順執政的可能性。所以，究竟是民進黨「捍衛中華民國」，還是民進黨「求救於中華民國」？

這個道理，在陳水扁執政八年已演繹過一次。扁倡「四不一沒有」，還能換來「聽其言／觀其行」；待鬧出「正名制憲／一邊一國」，其政權也就撐持不住了。現在，不是等待蔡英文來承認一中各表的九二共識，而是等待蔡英文求救於一中各表的九二共識。

如何「捍衛中華民國」？答案是：一、不搞台獨，捍衛「中華」；二、堅持民主，捍衛「民國」。而且，愈「中華」，「民國」愈有力量。

從這一陣子的抗日史觀辯論，就能看出這個道理。太陽花、反課綱及李登輝的邏輯是：一、切斷台灣與中國的歷史連結。二、否定台灣光復。三、中華民國滾回中國。四、脫古改新。總而言之，主張台灣不是「中華民國所光復的台灣」，而是標榜「台灣只是借用中華民國國號而自成另一主權獨立的國家」。相對而言，馬政府主張八年抗戰由中華民國政府主導，中華民國光復了台灣，且中華民國迄今屹立於台澎金馬。史實昭然，兩岸直面台灣光復，自須直面中華民國。

兩相對照。一方是切斷歷史，否定光復，認為「愈台獨，台灣愈有力量」。另一方則是，引據歷史上的中華民國，來支撐現在的中華民國，認為「愈中華，民國愈有力量」。從此次史觀辯論可以看出，歷史的力量巨大，且是台灣的力量根源。台灣若自絕於歷史，就是自絕於未來。

試問：否定中華民國「光復」台灣，對台灣有何利益？再者，稱中華民國為外來政權，卻利用外來政權「中華民國」之國號「借殼上市」，這又是多荒謬的邏輯？

蔡英文及民進黨若欲求救於中華民國，求救於九二共識，即不能再玩「借殼上市」的戲法；那正是李登輝與陳水扁的前車之鑑。

據聞民進黨仍將以《台灣前途決議文》為「對中政策」，恐有待三思。須知，蔡英文的新論述是稱「在中華民國現行憲政體制下，推動兩岸關係」，而不是「在台灣前途決議文下，推動兩岸關係」。決議文與中華民國憲法有重大牴觸之處：

一、決議文稱，台灣是一主權獨立的國家。但依據憲法及引伸的法律，中華民國是主權獨立的國家，台灣則是中華民國的自由地區，而非另成主權獨立的國家。二、決議文主張「揚棄『一個中國』的主張」，但現行憲法則有「中華民國觀點」的「一個中國」（亦即，不是北京所稱的「一個中國」），而主張並引伸為「憲法一中／一國兩區／一中各表」。三、何況，《台獨黨綱》若不廢除或凍結，問題仍是無解。

也就是說，蔡英文若宣示「中華民國現行憲政體制推動論」，即不可再回到《台灣前途決議文》的借殼上市之路，那是一個死胡同，何況她畢竟不是說：「在台灣前途決議文下，推動兩岸關係。」

歷史的糾葛，現實的纏繞。對台灣言，中華民國與中華民國憲法都是一個資產，也是一個承當與責任。借殼上市，是只想利用資產，但不願也不敢承當責任；可是，若不願或不敢承當責任，亦不可能享用資產。眼前的例子是：不承認「中華民國光復台灣」，就要被說成「以中共為中流砥柱的抗日戰爭光復了台灣」。但若據理力爭中華民國「光復」台灣，焦點自然會轉移到屹立於台灣的中華民國。亦即，當中華民國自棄於「中華」，「民國」的力量即受損傷。

愈台獨，台灣的力量愈受損傷。扁政府操弄正名制憲時，美國政府即公開指出，台獨不能豐富台灣的民主內涵與利益。事實上，台獨已絕無可能實現，徒為撕裂台灣的凶器。且台獨亦不啻切斷了台灣與對岸十三億人對話的前提。相對而言，若回到「中華」，美國便不愁「麻煩製造者」，台灣內部可努力修補裂痕，台灣與十三億對岸人口也可相互維持一個起碼的善意。從這次抗日史觀辯論即可看出，抗戰、蔣介石、光復、中華民國地位等等歷史辯證，皆是台灣在兩岸深水區競合關係的重要力量根源。在兩岸關係上，中華民國須有自信：「不搞台獨，堅持民主。愈中華，民國愈有力量！」

何況，民進黨若重返執政，必須求救於中華民國，求救於九二共識。