United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 4, 2015
Executive Summary: Indications are that the Democratic Progressive Party is likely to return to power in 2016. Beijing's strategic goal in cross-Strait relations, will be to take advantage of this fact to resolve the problem of Taiwan independence. This will be a key performance indicator for Xi Jinping's cross-Strait policy.
Full Text Below:
Indications are that the Democratic Progressive Party is likely to return to power in 2016. Beijing's strategic goal in cross-Strait relations, will be to take advantage of this fact to resolve the problem of Taiwan independence. This will be a key performance indicator for Xi Jinping's cross-Strait policy.
The 2016 election has increased Beijing's determination to resolve the problem of Taiwan independence. Two reasons come to mind. One. Beijing must counter DPP "backdoor listing" and "spiritual Taiwan independence". The KMT's one China, different interpretations, no reunification, no independence, no use force stance is also moving Taiwan closer to de jure Taiwan independence. If Beijing cannot reverse this trend, then "spiritual Taiwan independence" and "de jure Taiwan independence" will lead to cross-Strait "peaceful separation". Two. Beijing may be able to solve this problem. If the DPP returns to power, Beijing may apply pressure. If the DPP regime cannot resist Beijing's pressure, it may be forced to yield on Taiwan independence. This is highly likely.
In other words, for Xi Jinping, "spiritual Taiwan independence" and de jure Taiwan independence are so advanced the problem is insoluble. Therefore if Beijing can pressure the DPP regime, 2016 will become a golden opportunity to resolve the problem of Taiwan independence, once and for all. Do DPP leaders from top to bottom, really imagine that mere lip service to "maintaining the status quo" will render Beijing helpless? If so, they have badly miscalculated and are mired in self-delusion.
The key, as always, is the 1992 consensus. Xi Jinping has affirmed that the 1992 consensus is the political foundation for peaceful cross-Strait relations. He says that "If the foundation is not secure, the earth will move and the mountains will shake". Beijing officials have continued to stress the importance of the framework. Ma Xiaoguang and Zhang Zhijun have said that if without the 1992 Consensus, the institutionalized cross-strait negotiation mechanism would disintegrate. Cross-Strait exchanges could even end. A reporter asked whether Tsai Ing-wen's "maintaining the status quo" is equivalent to "accepting the 1992 consensus". Ma Xiaoguang said "On the fundamental issue (of the 1992 Consensus), any responsible party must provide a clear answer". In other words, the 1992 consensus is it.
Beijing constantly stresses the 1992 Consensus. It warns of "collapse" without it. But Tsai persists in evading the term. This makes it even harder for Beijing to give Tsai a free pass, and even harder for Tsai Ing-wen to utter them. The 1992 Consensus has become hostage in a war of escalating rhetoric. It is accumulating unpredictable "earth-shaking" energy.
If we wish to avoid a head-on collision, there must be timely track change. If Xi Jinping backs down on the 1992 consensus, how can he face Washington? How can he face the public on the Mainland? How can he allow himself to be perceived as a political coward by green and blue alike? Expecting Xi Jinping to back down on the 1992 Consensus is impossible.
Expecting Tsai Ing-wen to accept these terms is also difficult. But consider the global strategic picture. If cross-Strait exchanges end, Xi Jinping need only rethink cross-Strait policy. By contrast, if Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP return to power, and cross-Strait exchanges end, politically and economically, the earth will move and the mountains will shake. This is especially true since Taiwan is undergoing a structural level economic crisis. If cross-Strait exchanges end, the crisis will be even more severe. An end to cross-Strait exchanges will inflict far greater damage on Taiwan than on the Mainland. Therefore if one has to guess, Tsai Ing-wen is the one will yield. It is not difficult to understand why. It is not that the DPP lacks determination. It is that the DPP will have no choice.
The DPP cannot pretend that as long as it stops short of de jure independence and the "rectification of names" and the "authoring of a new constitution", that Beijing will be unable to retaliate. The DPP must realize that even if it belatedly accepts the 1992 Consensus, it will be lucky if Beijing refrains from further action. Having been given an inch, Beijing could well decide to take a mile. It might well demand the abolition of the Taiwan independence party platform. Therefore, if the DPP wants to hold the line at the 1992 consensus and one China, different interpretations, it must not overplay its hand. It must leave well enough alone, and thereby gain a little breathing space.
How should the DPP go about accepting the 1992 Consensus? We suggest that it "recognize" the 1992 Consensus, under the aegis of the current ROC constitutional framework. One. This would be fully consistent with Tsai Ing-wen's "promotion of cross-Strait relations under the current ROC constitutional framework". Two. The term "recognize" is less explicit than "accept". Three. The adoption of such terminology, would enable the DPP to transition from Taiwan independence, backdoor listing, and move toward one China, different interpretations and a farsighted Big Roof concept of China.
If Tsai Ing-wen raises this possibility during her election campaign, she may avoid being caught in a passive posture, and subjected to pressure from Beijing. Beijing has responded positively. We have reason to hope that Beijing will revert to the "one China, different interpretations" and 1992 Consensus that Hu mentioned during the 2008 Bush Hu hotline exchange. This would forestall the further spread of "spiritual Taiwan independence" and de jure Taiwan independence. This would enhance win-win cross-strait relations and eliminate the problem of Taiwan independence.
Tsai Ing-wen and Beijing need a new way to interpret the 1992 consensus. That is the only way for 2016.
聯合／為九二共識在二○一六找出路
2015-10-04 03:39:10 聯合報 聯合報社論
跡象顯示：面對民進黨可能重返執政，北京在二○一六年兩岸關係的戰略目標，將是利用此一節點深化解決台獨問題，這將是習近平給北京團隊在兩岸政務上所定的ＫＰＩ（關鍵績效指標）。
對 北京言，二○一六年欲深化解決台獨問題，理由有二。一、必須解決：民進黨採「借殼上市／心靈台獨」的路線，國民黨的「一中各表／不統／不獨／不武」亦趨近 「法理獨台」。北京如果不能扭轉此一逆勢，即成「心靈台獨」及「法理獨台」合股的兩岸「和平分裂」之局。二、可能解決：民進黨若重返執政，提供了北京可以 挾制的情勢；民進黨政府如果抵擋不住北京的挾制，即有在台獨立場上退讓的可能性，且預估此可能性甚高。
也就是說，對習近平言，台灣問題既 走向「心靈台獨／法理獨台」，已至不能不解決的地步，若又出現可以挾制民進黨政府的情勢，北京自然會將二○一六視為必須深化解決台獨問題的節點，不會錯 失。如今，民進黨上下倘若認為只要空言「維持現狀」，就可使北京找不到可作的題目，將是對情勢的根本誤判，自欺欺人。
關鍵仍在九二共識四 個字。習近平說，九二共識是兩岸關係和平發展的共同政治基礎，「基礎不牢／地動山搖」；此一架構，已由北京涉台官員不斷地深化夯實。張志軍與馬曉光相繼表 示，如果沒有九二共識此一政治基礎，兩岸制度化協商機制將告坍塌，兩岸關係亦可能觸礁擱淺。甚至，記者問：可否將蔡英文所說的「維持現狀」等同於「接受九 二共識」？馬曉光說：「在（九二共識）這個根本問題上，任何負責任的政黨都必須作出明確回答」。也就是說：九二共識，就是這四個字。
北京不斷在「九二共識」四字上加碼，「坍塌論」已告確立，但蔡英文仍始終迴避此四字。這使得北京更不能收回這四字，而蔡英文也更難啟齒接受這四字。九二共識這四個字遂在這種相互增強的乒乓動作中，蓄積了「地動山搖」的莫測能量。
如果不想發生火車對撞的場景，必須有一邊適時轉轍。習近平若收回九二共識四字，他在美國面前如何抬得起頭？對內又如何站得住腳？更何況亦被綠的看破手腳，被藍的視作政治怯懦。就種種主客觀情勢看，要習近平丟掉這四個字的可能性不大。
當 然，要蔡英文接受這四個字也不易。不過，估算世局情勢，兩岸若就此破局，習近平只須在兩岸政策上打掉重練；但蔡英文若重返執政而面對撕裂的兩岸，將會面臨 台灣整個政經情勢的地動山搖。何況，台灣又進入結構性的經濟危機，如果兩岸復見風興浪作，將是雪上加霜，火上加油。盱衡情勢，兩岸破局對台灣的損傷更大， 也就是台灣更承受不起。因此，若猜測屆時在「九二共識」四字上退讓的或許是蔡英文，其因由亦不難理解。不是民進黨不想守，而是守不住。
民 進黨不可自欺欺人地認為「只要不操作法理台獨、正名制憲」，北京奈我何？須知，北京若在「只要民進黨接受九二共識」下，就告暫時煞車，那對民進黨已是一個 不錯的局面。因為，待攻下九二共識後，北京仍有可能得寸進尺，再以《台獨黨綱》作題目。因此，民進黨若先守住「九二共識／一中各表」，也許可對北京釋出 「莫為已甚／適可而止」的訊號，爭取緩衝喘息的時空。
民進黨如何接受九二共識？我們建議的論述是：「在中華民國現行憲政架構下，理解並發 展九二共識。」一、此論與蔡英文所說「在中華民國現行憲政體制下，推動兩岸關係」，是一水平移動，無縫接軌。二、「理解」較「接受」，為輕語彙。三、發展 一詞，可以帶出民進黨「台獨→借殼上市→一中各表→大屋頂中國」的國家論述新路徑，具未來性。
蔡英文若在想像中的當選談話中提出此說，或許即可免陷於被挾制的被動地位，而北京亦理當作出正面回應。而且，屆時有理由寄望北京能回到二○○八年布胡熱線所說「一中各表」的「九二共識」，以化解「心靈台獨／法理獨台」的發展，在兩岸雙贏的基礎上深化解決台獨問題。
蔡英文與北京對九二共識的新解讀，是九二共識在二○一六年的可能出路。
2015-10-04 03:39:10 聯合報 聯合報社論
跡象顯示：面對民進黨可能重返執政，北京在二○一六年兩岸關係的戰略目標，將是利用此一節點深化解決台獨問題，這將是習近平給北京團隊在兩岸政務上所定的ＫＰＩ（關鍵績效指標）。
對 北京言，二○一六年欲深化解決台獨問題，理由有二。一、必須解決：民進黨採「借殼上市／心靈台獨」的路線，國民黨的「一中各表／不統／不獨／不武」亦趨近 「法理獨台」。北京如果不能扭轉此一逆勢，即成「心靈台獨」及「法理獨台」合股的兩岸「和平分裂」之局。二、可能解決：民進黨若重返執政，提供了北京可以 挾制的情勢；民進黨政府如果抵擋不住北京的挾制，即有在台獨立場上退讓的可能性，且預估此可能性甚高。
也就是說，對習近平言，台灣問題既 走向「心靈台獨／法理獨台」，已至不能不解決的地步，若又出現可以挾制民進黨政府的情勢，北京自然會將二○一六視為必須深化解決台獨問題的節點，不會錯 失。如今，民進黨上下倘若認為只要空言「維持現狀」，就可使北京找不到可作的題目，將是對情勢的根本誤判，自欺欺人。
關鍵仍在九二共識四 個字。習近平說，九二共識是兩岸關係和平發展的共同政治基礎，「基礎不牢／地動山搖」；此一架構，已由北京涉台官員不斷地深化夯實。張志軍與馬曉光相繼表 示，如果沒有九二共識此一政治基礎，兩岸制度化協商機制將告坍塌，兩岸關係亦可能觸礁擱淺。甚至，記者問：可否將蔡英文所說的「維持現狀」等同於「接受九 二共識」？馬曉光說：「在（九二共識）這個根本問題上，任何負責任的政黨都必須作出明確回答」。也就是說：九二共識，就是這四個字。
北京不斷在「九二共識」四字上加碼，「坍塌論」已告確立，但蔡英文仍始終迴避此四字。這使得北京更不能收回這四字，而蔡英文也更難啟齒接受這四字。九二共識這四個字遂在這種相互增強的乒乓動作中，蓄積了「地動山搖」的莫測能量。
如果不想發生火車對撞的場景，必須有一邊適時轉轍。習近平若收回九二共識四字，他在美國面前如何抬得起頭？對內又如何站得住腳？更何況亦被綠的看破手腳，被藍的視作政治怯懦。就種種主客觀情勢看，要習近平丟掉這四個字的可能性不大。
當 然，要蔡英文接受這四個字也不易。不過，估算世局情勢，兩岸若就此破局，習近平只須在兩岸政策上打掉重練；但蔡英文若重返執政而面對撕裂的兩岸，將會面臨 台灣整個政經情勢的地動山搖。何況，台灣又進入結構性的經濟危機，如果兩岸復見風興浪作，將是雪上加霜，火上加油。盱衡情勢，兩岸破局對台灣的損傷更大， 也就是台灣更承受不起。因此，若猜測屆時在「九二共識」四字上退讓的或許是蔡英文，其因由亦不難理解。不是民進黨不想守，而是守不住。
民 進黨不可自欺欺人地認為「只要不操作法理台獨、正名制憲」，北京奈我何？須知，北京若在「只要民進黨接受九二共識」下，就告暫時煞車，那對民進黨已是一個 不錯的局面。因為，待攻下九二共識後，北京仍有可能得寸進尺，再以《台獨黨綱》作題目。因此，民進黨若先守住「九二共識／一中各表」，也許可對北京釋出 「莫為已甚／適可而止」的訊號，爭取緩衝喘息的時空。
民進黨如何接受九二共識？我們建議的論述是：「在中華民國現行憲政架構下，理解並發 展九二共識。」一、此論與蔡英文所說「在中華民國現行憲政體制下，推動兩岸關係」，是一水平移動，無縫接軌。二、「理解」較「接受」，為輕語彙。三、發展 一詞，可以帶出民進黨「台獨→借殼上市→一中各表→大屋頂中國」的國家論述新路徑，具未來性。
蔡英文若在想像中的當選談話中提出此說，或許即可免陷於被挾制的被動地位，而北京亦理當作出正面回應。而且，屆時有理由寄望北京能回到二○○八年布胡熱線所說「一中各表」的「九二共識」，以化解「心靈台獨／法理獨台」的發展，在兩岸雙贏的基礎上深化解決台獨問題。
蔡英文與北京對九二共識的新解讀，是九二共識在二○一六年的可能出路。
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