United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
October 14, 2015
Executive Summary: It is now time for a showdown. Chu and Hung should participate in frank talks. They should acknowledge their past responsibility and assume future responsibility. They should each bear a share of responsibility. Some think that a Chu-Hung ticket is the answer. But if Chu eventually replaces Hung, we hope Chu will be able to mollify Hung. We hope that Hung will be able to touch the hearts of the public. If Hung Hsiu-chu withdraws with honor, if we see her campaigning enthusiastically on behalf of Chu and her party comrades, that would be a genuine sight to see. That would have quite an emotional impact.
Full Text Below:
The weekend Chu vs. Hung showdown is three and a half days away. No one knows what the outcome will be, or whether there is still room to maneuver.
How did this dilemma arise? How can it be dealt with? Four perspectives should be considered. One. The KMT now finds itself in a precarious situation. Who is to blame? Two. What are the pros and cons of replacing Hung? Three. Should Zhu and Hung meet privately, or hold a public debate? Four. What should happen after the showdown?
As matters stand, the KMT may be in for a major election defeat. Worse, the party could even disintegrate. Who is responsible for this state of affairs? The answer can be divided into two parts: before and after. First, the Ma government failed to win the hearts and minds of the people. The Ma vs. Wang internal power struggle divided the party. This is the reason the Kuomintang is where it is today. Next, Eric Chu left people with the impression he would run for president. But to everyone's astonishment, he backed out. Meanwhile KMT party princes were either fighting each other or too afraid to step up to the plate. Hung Hsiu-chu declared her candidacy to goad the party princes into throwing their hats in the ring. Who knew her campaign would catch fire? Later however, Hung Hsiu-chu's "air and ground campaigns" fell short of expectations. She was unable to fulfill the role of "centrist mainstay". She was unable to offer a coat tails effect. Her numbers remained low. Defeat appeared inevitable. Therefore responsibility falls on Ma Ying-jeou for his failed governance, on Eric Chu for his dithering, and on Hung Hsiu-chu for her campaign performance.
Now consider the pros and cons of replacing Hung. Hung Hsiu-chu must realize that if the situation were not critical, Eric Chu would probably not attempt to replace Hung. Eric Chu must realize that trashing party primary procedures to replace Hung might not resolve the current crisis. But it would definitely leave a black mark on the Republic of China's democratic history. Therefore Hung Hsiu-chu must realize that the KMT Central Committee's move to replace her is actually a last resort. Eric Chu must realize that replacing Hung and substituting himself will undermine both the KMT's election prospects and the nation's democratic values. It will probably not hurt the DPP. But it will probably inflict serious harm on the KMT.
Therefore, to resolve this impasse, both Chu and Hung must assume complete responsibility for this situation of their own making. They must not blame each other and refuse to acknowledge their own complicity. Only then can they begin to discuss whether to "replace Hung". and if so, how. As matters stand, the Kuomintang has no good moves in this chess game. The key remains Chu and Hung. What is in their hearts? What do they see for the future? In other words, what happens next depends on these two, and what they decide to do.
Rumor has it the two have arrived at an impass. Chu wants a dialogue in private. Hung wants a debate in public. She wants an opportunity to explain her cross-Strait policy.
Hung Hsiu-chu's election momentum stalled because her air and ground campaigns lost headway. Controversy denied her the opportunity to explain her cross-Strait policy stance. That is what Hung finds most intolerable.
Blue and green camp thinking on cross-Strait policy cover a broad spectrum. Presidential candidates from both parties seek to appeal to the broadest possible spectrum. They seek to differentiate themselves from the rival party's presidential candidate. Therefore, when they broaden their own appeal, they must seek the greatest consensus, within their own camp and among the public. Hung Hsiu-chu lost momentum not because her campaign rhetoric fell outside the blue camp spectrum. She lost momentum because how she positioned herself provoked controversy.
The green camp spectrum ranges from championing the Taiwan independence party platform, to citing the Resolution on Taiwan's Future, to "defending the Republic of China's existing constitutional framework", to "freezing the Taiwan independence party platform". The blue camp spectrum ranges from championing "eventual unification", to advocating "one China, same interpretation", to adhering to the "1992 consensus" and "one China, different interpretations", to "no unification, no independence, no use of force", to citing a "de jure independent Taiwan". Tsai Ing-wen has chosen to "defend the current ROC constitutional framework". That is how she has positioned herself. That is no accident. But if Hung Hsiu-chu positioned herself as an advocate of "eventual reunification", that was an accident. Because Hung has said on other occasions, that "I am not pro-reunification". That shows that she understands the importance of her own positioning on Taiwan's political spectrum.
Lai Ching-teh can say, "Of course I advocate Taiwan independence!" But Tsai Ing-wen cannot. If at this juncture she were to make "Taiwan independence" her campaign theme, she could inspire a "replace Tsai" wave within the DPP. Lai Ching-teh has not demanded that Tsai Ing-wen wage an election campaign based on Taiwan independence. Nor has he demanded that Tsai debate him over whether Taiwan independence is "mainstream opinion". Hung Hsiu-chu however, has demanded that Eric Chu debate whether "one China, same interpretation" and "eventual reunification" are "mainstream opinion", in public, and have polls determine the winner. This suggests that Hung Hsiu-chu still does not understand her own role in her election plight.
It is now time for a showdown. Chu and Hung should participate in frank talks. They should acknowledge their past responsibility and assume future responsibility. They should each bear a share of responsibility. Some think that a Chu-Hung ticket is the answer. But if Chu eventually replaces Hung, we hope Chu will be able to mollify Hung. We hope that Hung will be able to touch the hearts of the public. If Hung Hsiu-chu withdraws with honor, if we see her campaigning enthusiastically on behalf of Chu and her party comrades, that would be a genuine sight to see. That would have quite an emotional impact.
Chu and Hung must not leave a scene of unbearable devastation in their wake. If they can understand and acknowledge their own responsibility in this affair and reach an accord, they can leave behind a legacy worthy of emulation, and the people of Taiwan will be moved.
可分前後兩段說。先說前段：馬政府的治理未得民心， 或未獲人民理解，且發生馬王內鬥等自我撕裂之事， 這是國民黨陷於今日劣勢之根源。接著， 朱立倫原來予人將出馬競選總統的印象，竟又抽腿， 而國民黨內天王因被內鬥羈絆或怯戰， 遂使洪秀柱的參選從拋磚引玉轉至弄假成真。至於後段： 洪秀柱在空戰及陸戰上的表現不如預期，支撐不起「中流砥柱」 的角色，黨則輔選不力，選情趨低不起，甚至可以預見崩盤之敗。 因此，論責任，馬英九的治理，朱立倫的猶豫， 及洪秀柱的選戰表現皆有責任。
倘非情勢到了危亡地步，朱立倫應當不至於粗暴換柱。 朱立倫方面則應認知，倘以撤銷初選的手段換柱，摧毀了初選， 未必能化解當前的危急， 且將在中華民國民主發展史上留下一永久傷痕。因而， 洪秀柱必須認知，黨中央要換柱實是出自萬不得已； 朱立倫亦必須認知，換柱對自己、對選情及對民主價值， 皆是未必傷敵反而自傷的「七傷拳」。
首先朱洪皆必須誠實承擔自己造成今日情勢之責任， 不能只怪罪對方而看不到自己的過失；然後，兩人始能對「 是否換柱」及「如何換柱」之操作作出正確的因應。眼前的國民黨， 雖是千頭萬緒沒有一步是好棋之境， 但朱洪兩人的心意及眼界仍是具決定性的推進因素。也就是說， 下一步情勢如何發展，仍然繫於兩人的一念之間。
雙方總統候選人，必須盡量開拓自我陣營光譜的最大容量， 並與對方總統候選人形成差異性的市場區隔。因此， 在放大己方光譜的同時，亦必須以自己陣營及社會民眾的最大共識， 為選舉論述的落點。洪秀柱的失著，並非她的主張不在藍營光譜內， 而在她選擇的落點極有爭議。
中華民國現行憲政體制推動論」，到「凍結台獨黨綱」 的主張者均有。在藍營的光譜上，「終極統一」、「一中同表」、「 九二共識／一中各表」、「不統／不獨／不武」，到「法理獨台」 的主張者均有。如今，蔡英文選擇了「 現行中華民國憲政體制推動論」作為她的落點，不意外； 而洪秀柱若是選擇了「終極統一」為落點，則是意外。因為， 洪也說過「我不是統派」， 可見她對光譜上落點的選擇並非沒有感覺。
但蔡英文若在此時以「台獨」為競選主題，恐怕也會引起民進黨內「 換英」的風潮；且也未聞賴清德要迫蔡英文以主張「台獨」 來打選戰，亦未聞賴清德要與蔡英文辯論台獨是否「主流民意」。 但是，洪秀柱卻主張，要與朱立倫就「一中同表」、「終極統一」 是否「主流民意」舉行公開辯論，且就辯論結果辦理民調以分勝負。 此事似乎顯示，洪秀柱仍然不知選情至此要在自己身上找原因。
各自承認自己此前的責任，也各自承當此後的責任， 並據以相互安排合乎比例的分擔責任角色。有人認為，「朱進柱留」 也許仍是較佳方案；但如果仍是「朱進柱去」的結局， 我們希望朱立倫能感動洪秀柱，並希望洪秀柱也能感動台灣人民。 在洪秀柱「光榮演說」退場後，會再看到她回到大選場中奔走， 為朱立倫及她的黨同志熱情助選。這將是何等境界， 又將是何等效應？