The Official Cross-Strait Communications Channel Must Remain Open

The Official Cross-Strait Communications Channel Must Remain Open
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 165, 2015

Executive Summary: The fourth meeting between cross-Strait affairs directors Hsia and Zhang has concluded. Mainland tourist transit provisions were the issue of greatest concern. Taipei proposed a compromise that straightened out the flight path. Unfortunately it failed to meet with Mainland requirements. Overall however, the Hsia Zhang meeting was highly significant.

Full Text Below:

The fourth meeting between cross-Strait affairs directors Hsia and Zhang has concluded. Mainland tourist transit provisions were the issue of greatest concern. Taipei proposed a compromise that straightened out the flight path. Unfortunately it failed to meet with Mainland requirements. Overall however, the Hsia Zhang meeting was highly significant.

One. Cross-Strait affairs directors meeting is important for cross-Strait relations. Official heads from both sides are able to call on each other, sit down with each other, and negotiate with each other face to face. Such scenes were unthinkable during Cold War era military confrontation. Chiang Ching-kuo's "three noes" policy made them impossible. Lee Teng-hui's “two-states theory”, which froze cross-Strait relations, made them impossible. Chen Shui-bian's “rectification of names and authoring of a new constitution”, which aggravated cross-Strait conflict, made them impossible. Ma Ying-jeou and Xi Jinping created this official communications channel, which itself is a guarator of peace. It is an historic achievement for which Xi Jinping and Ma Ying-jeou will be remembered.

Two. The channel is important for communications. Consider the MTP smartcard dispute. The Mainland unilaterally implemented it without communicating with us in advance. Hsia Li-yan raised solemn objections to it during the Hsia Zhang meeting. He hoped that the two sides would discuss such important developments in advance. Zhang Zhijun provided reporters background on the MTP smartcard issue. He explained that it was merely a response to Taiwan compatriots, Taiwan businessmen, and Mainland students who requested a more streamlined form of cross-Strait ID. Rumors arose that the Mainland would reduce the number of Mainland tourists allowed to visit Taiwan before the election. Zhang Zhijun responed during the Hsia Zhang meeting. He said "There is no such policy". Face to face communications clarify news reports much more effectively than pieces of paper.

Three. The most recent Hsia Zhang meeting was much more personal than past meetings. Zhang Zhijun visited Kinmen in May. Hsia Li-yan personally stood at the hotel entrance to greet Zhang. As host, Hsia demonstrated consideration for his guest. During the most recent Hsia Zhang meeting, Zhang again greeted Hsia at the hotel entrance. He also arranged for an evening tour of the Pearl River. The atmosphere was cordial. The two used the opportunity to improve understanding and develop a personal friendship. Increased trust will facilitate future consultations and negotiations.

Green camp red-baiting makes "cozying up to" Mainland officials highly risky. KMT politicians and officials are terrified of being labeld "soft on Communism". They usually draw a clear line between official and private interactions with Mainland officials. In fact, this creates barriers to communication. in fact, personal relationships are often the lubricant during official intergovernmental exchanges. They ensure trust, improve communications, and reduce misunderstandings.

Four. The KMT remains mired in internal struggle. The DPP by contrast, has solid momentum. It is optimistic about its election prospects. Next year, it may well find itself the ruling party. Observers are concerned. Will the current Hsia Zhang meeting be the last cross-Strait directors meeting ever held? The framework Hsia and Zhang established was not based on the outcome of the upcoming presidential election. Hsia personally invited Zhang to visit Taiwan at the appropriate time. Zhang magnanimously accepted. Hsia said the first half of next year would be a good time.

Hsia Li-yan's invitation was correct and necessary. One. It showed that Hsia was concerned about the national interest rather than partisan interest. He was bolstering "institutionalized negotiations" and "official interactions". He did not assume that the channel would be affected by the election outcome. Two. If the KMT wins the election, a third Hsia Zhang meeting is a forgone conclusion. But even if the KMT loses the election, President Ma still has four months left in his term. He must stay the course. He must continue his cross-Strait policy. The KMT is still the ruling party. It has a responsibility to ensure sound cross-Strait relations. It must not abandon this responsibility merely because it loses an election. Three. This gives the Mainland and the DPP a buffer. If Tsai Ing-wen persists in rejecting the 1992 consensus, any meeting between cross-Strait directors under the DPP will be unlikely indeed.

Suppose a Hsia Zhang meeting is convened in the first half of next year? It would give the Mainland another chance to assess the cross-Strait situation in the wake of the election. The DPP could use the Hsia Zhang meeting to test the waters. If this official communications channel is severed because the Democratic Progressive Party has assumed power, Taiwan and the Mainland will both suffer.

After President Ma took office in 2008, consultations between the SEF and ARATS resumed. As many as 11 meetings were held and 23 agreements signed. Cross-Strait relations improved significantly. In February 2014, unofficial talks between the two associations were made official. Progress was made, step by step. As Hsia Li-yan said, "Building a mountain is a monumental task". The KMT has nearly completed the task. Will the DPP destroy the KMT's achievement next year out of petty selfishness? Will it destroy this hard-won official communications channel? If it does, ordinary people on both sides of the Strait will be the biggest losers.

We hope that in the event of a change in ruling parties, the official communications channel will remain open. We hope that the cross-Strait directors convene a fifth Hsia Zhang meeting in the first half of next year, a sixth such meeting in the second half of next year, and a seventh such meeting in the year after.

兩岸官方溝通平台不可斷

2015年10月16日 中國時報

第四次兩岸事務首長會議（夏張二會）落幕，最受關注的陸客中轉問題，我方雖提出了航路截彎取直的折衷安排，但並不能滿足陸方需要，最後依然留下了遺憾。但整體而言，夏張二會仍具有許多重要的意義。

首先，兩岸事務首長會議召開的本身，對兩岸關係即具有重大意義，兩岸官方首長可以官銜互稱、面對面坐下來談判兩岸事務的景象，是冷戰兩岸對峙時代兵凶戰危情勢下所不容；是蔣經國主政時「三不政策」下所不許；是李登輝主政高舉兩國論後封凍兩岸關係所不願；也是陳水扁主政下力推正名制憲、兩岸衝突加劇後所不能。馬英九與習近平卻成功的創造了此官方溝通平台，平台本身就是和平的保證，也是馬英九與習近平將來必會被人們記憶與肯定的歷史成就。

其次，平台確實發揮了重要的溝通功能，卡式台胞證的爭議，我方對陸方未與我充分溝通就片面實施，夏立言在夏張會上表達嚴正立場，並希望未來涉及兩岸重大事情，陸方應事前溝通。張志軍也對媒體說明卡式台胞證的發行背景，是回應台胞、台商與陸生希望兩岸往來證件更簡化的心聲。對於大陸在選前限縮陸客的傳言，張志軍則直接在夏張會中澄清「沒有這樣的政策」。面對面的溝通，遠比一紙新聞澄清的效果要直接而明白。

第三，這次夏張會，表現出較以往更多的人情味，今年5月夏張首會，張志軍訪金門，夏立言親至飯店門口接待，展現了主人的親切親和；而這一次夏張二會，張志軍也到飯店門口親迎，更在晚上安排珠江同遊，氣氛融洽，兩人也趁私人互動的機會培養相互的理解與情誼，當有助於相互間信任關係的累積，及後續的協商與談判。

若以綠營人士的反中邏輯，與大陸官員如此「麻吉」，很容易被扣上紅帽，國民黨的政治人物與政府官員尤其害怕被戴上紅帽，多半刻意畫出「官」、「私」之線，對與大陸官員的私人互動避之唯恐不及。這其實憑添溝通的障礙，事實上，在政府間的官員交往中，私人關係往往是公務關係的潤滑劑與催化劑，可以建立更好的信任關係，增加溝通效能並減少誤會。

第四，由於國民黨仍陷於內亂風暴，民進黨聲勢看好，明年有可能政黨輪替，外界普遍憂心，這一次的夏張會，會不會是兩岸事務首長會議的絕響？但夏立言並沒有先以總統大選的結果預設框架，仍當面邀請張志軍在適當時機回訪台灣，張也大方表示接受，夏立言並表示，明年上半年是適當時機。

夏立言的邀請是十分正確而且必要的。一則，表示夏立言是從國家利益而非政黨傾向出發，表現出鞏固「制度化協商」及「官方互動」基礎的積極性，先不預設此一機制是否受選舉影響；二則，若是國民黨勝選，則夏張三會當是順理成章，但即便國民黨敗選，馬總統仍有4個月任期，他本該有始有終、一以貫之繼續執行他的兩岸政策，國民黨還是執政黨，對兩岸關係的推進仍有責任，不能以敗選為由自暴自棄；三則，這也同時給陸方與民進黨多一個緩衝，雖然，若蔡英文繼續否定九二共識，則兩岸事務首長會議要在民進黨執政後續開的機會相當渺茫。

但明年上半年夏張若有第三會，可以讓陸方多一次機會，評估選後的兩岸情勢，也可以讓民進黨把夏張三會當成對兩岸關係試水溫，好好想想，若官方溝通平台在民進黨執政後不能繼續，會對台灣、對兩岸帶來什麼傷害。

2008年馬總統上任後恢復海基與海協兩會的協商，舉行了11次會談，簽署了23項協議，使兩岸關係大幅推進。2014年2月更把民間性質的兩岸兩會會談提升為官方層次。一點一滴的成果，有著夏立言所說「為山九仞」的嶮澀艱難，但這好不容易堆起的九仞之山，如果在明年，因為新上台的主政者黨私偏狹而功虧一簣，讓好不容易建立的官方溝通之橋斷毀，那將是兩岸關係與兩岸人民最大的損失。

我們希望，即便政黨輪替，這一個官方的溝通平台也不要因之毀去。我們期盼，不只明年上半年有兩岸事務首長五會（夏張三會），明年下半年、後年、大後年，仍有兩岸事務首長的六會、七會與無數會。