China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 1st, 2015
Executive Summary: Cross-Strait relations have developed to the stage where they can no longer go back. Tsai must set aside unrealistic expectations about choosing sides. She must act to preserve the existing cross-Strait protocols, and improve cross-Strait relations. Voters must be vigilant about the DPP's cross-Strait policy. They must apply pressure on the presidential candidates, to prevent them from leading the country in the wrong direction.
Full Text Below:
The fallout from the Ma Xi Summit has now had time to settle. The post-summit election rhetoric can now be filtered out. The elimination of political and emotional factors, now makes an accurate assessment of the Ma Xi summit possible.
The Ma Xi summit raised cross-Strait relations to a new level. Following the Ma Xi summit, the Mainland will give greater recognition to Taiwan's de facto political authority, while simultaneously insisting more firmly that the two sides are part of one China. The Mainland is concerned about cross-Strait relations in the event the Democratic Progressive Party wins the election. The Ma Xi summit is a message about the future. The carrot will be bigger, but so will the stick. Alas, DPP spin control has the public on Taiwan convinced that “Ma Ying-jeou is weak, and the KMT is pandering to the Chinese Communists".
Tsai Ing-wen has criticized the Ma Xi summit for "boxing in Taiwan's future". By itself, this is not wrong. But the "box" will not vanish merely because the DPP refuses to recoginize its existence. Nor will it disappear merely because Tsai Ing-wen is elected. If a DPP regime cannot properly handle the relationship with the Chinese mainland, the "box" will only become smaller, not bigger.
Given these risks, we must be clear in our minds. Can Tsai Ing-wen's ambiguous "maintaining the status quo" cross-Strait policy actually maintain the status quo? Can a static cross-Strait policy cope with an unsettled internal and international environment? If the Mainland "box" becomes smaller, how will the DPP respond? Will cross-Strait relations regress to the Chen Shui-bian era?
Tsai Ing-wen's political intuition is quite good. Following the Ma Xi summit, she told reporters she “would not rule out a Tsai Xi summit". Her reasoning is obvious. Opinion polls and public commentary show that most people approved of the meeting between the leaders. Some however, do not trust Ma Ying-jeou. That lowered support for the Ma Xi summit somewhat. This undoubtedly offers Tsai a golden opportunity. It enables her to take part in a future Tsai Xi summit with even greater public support, and less likelihood of reproach. If a Tsai Xi summit materializes, and resolves political and economic difficulties on Taiwan, Tsai Ing-wen could become the highest rated president since Chiang Ching-kuo.
But a Tsai Xi summit will not be the result of internal factors on Taiwan. For Tsai Ing-wen the prospect of a summit remains remote. Mainland China's rapid rise has made it increasingly confident about the Taiwan issue. Xi Jinping has taken a number of measures to advance cross-Strait relations since taking office. Such initiatives do not imply compromise. Rather they reflect concern that cross-Strait relations have stalled, and a desire to settle the Taiwan issue once and for all.
To some extent, the Mainland has already begun the process of peaceful reunification. Taiwan has avoided political negotiations. But cross-Strait political relations have already taken a giant leap forward. This is the cross-Strait status quo that Tsai Ing-wen must confront once Ma Ying-jeou steps down.
The Ma Xi summit will undoubtedly become the basis for Tsai Ing-wen era cross-Strait relations. Will Tsai be able to use the summit protocols for the two sides' leaders? Will she be able to hold cross-Strait talks as usual? If she can, then her cross-Strait policy will be considered successful. If cross-Strait exchanges are officially suspended because Tsai took power, any Tsai Xi summit will be stillborn. Public officials and private citizens on both sides will conclude that she lacks the inability to deal with cross-Strait relations.
Cross-Strait interaction has made huge strides forward. If official cross-Strait exchanges suffer a setback, the impact on Taiwan will be unbearable. Tsai Ing-wen's regime will probably end early or be crippled.
In fact, cross-Strait relations have already expanded beyond Taipei and Beijing. They now involve Asian-Pacific geopolitics. The Mainland is clearly in competition with the United States in the Asian-Pacific region. The United States has made a pivot back to Asia. It has intervened in the South China Seas in search of support from Southeast Asian countries. The Mainland, meanwhile, is promoting its One Belt, One Road, consolidating cooperative relations with Southeast Asian countries, and challenging the US led international financial and monetary order.
The Southeast Asian countries face fierce competition between Mainland China and the US. They have no desire to offend anyone. They must adopt a balanced strategy to avoid lost opportunities because they chose one side instead of the other. In fact, Taiwan faces the same dilemma. It too must seek a balance between the two. Tsai Ing-wen will bet on the United States. She will even allow herself to be used as a stalking horse against the Mainland. That will undermine the core interests of the Mainland. The impact will not be limited to cross-Strait relations. It will directly impact Taiwan's interests. Take the three major Asian allies of the US. Japan and the Philippines have sided with the United States. Relations with the Mainland, as a consequence, are frozen. South Korea chose cooperation with the Mainland. Bilateral economic and trade relations are warmer than ever. Is Taiwan prepared to suffer the consequences of the former course? Is it ready to endure the pain? The answer, clearly, is no.
Cross-Strait relations have developed to the stage where they can no longer go back. Tsai must set aside unrealistic expectations about choosing sides. She must act to preserve the existing cross-Strait protocols, and improve cross-Strait relations. Voters must be vigilant about the DPP's cross-Strait policy. They must apply pressure on the presidential candidates, to prevent them from leading the country in the wrong direction.
社論－民進黨錯估形勢 兩岸必現陣痛
2015年12月01日 04:10 主筆室
馬習會經過一段時間沉澱，
馬習會已將兩岸關係推向一個新境界，
蔡英文批評馬習會「框限台灣未來」，這句話本身並沒有錯，
面對可能的風險，我們當然應該弄清楚，蔡英文模糊的「維持現狀」
蔡英文的政治直覺其實很準確，馬習會後在回應媒體詢問時曾表白「
不過，「蔡習會」能否成局，絕非台灣內部因素決定，甚至可以說，
某種程度上說，
馬習會無疑是為蔡英文時代的兩岸關係提供了判定基準，
在兩岸互動融合大步推進的背景之下，如果兩岸官方交流出現倒退，
不僅如此，兩岸關係的好壞其實已經超出兩岸的範疇，
東南亞各國面對中美兩大國的激烈競爭，顯然誰都不想得罪，
兩岸關係發展到現階段，已經無法容許倒退，
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