Tsai Ing-wen Signals Beijing, Falls Short

Tsai Ing-wen Signals Beijing, Falls Short
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 3, 2015

Executive Summary: Many suspect that Tsai Ing-wen has not really embraced the ROC. Nevertheless the DPP's actions move it closer to the Republic of China. The DPP must join the public in supporting the ROC. It must refrain from accusing others of "not loving Taiwan ". If the DPP does this, the public will affirm it. The Mainland will also give any DPP course changes due consideration.

Full Text Below:

The outcome of the 2016 election is now virtually certain. KMT presidential candidate Eric Chu does not expect to win. He is merely attempting to preserve KMT strength in the Legislative Yuan to check the power of the DPP. Tsai Ing-wen has not allowed the prospect of victory to go to her head. During the opening ceremony for her campaign headquarters, she conceded that "The DPP is not synonymous with Taiwan, and the KMT is not synonymous with the Republic of China". On a highly symbolic occasion, she issued a statement with far-reaching political implications, provoking considerable debate. Tsai Ing-wen is apparently no longer campaigning against the Kuomintang, but rather sending a signal to Beijing.

Tsai Ing-wen's motive for her novel rhetoric is obvious. She is attempting to shatter the KMT's long-held monopoly on the political symbolism surrounding the “Republic of China”. She wants the chance to spin the meaning of the Republic of China. She conceded that "The Democratic Progressive Party is not synonymous with Taiwan". By doing so, she relinquished the Democratic Progressive Party's long-held monopoly on the political symbolism surrounding “Taiwan”. Tsai Ing-wen's rhetoric has long been random and haphazard. Public perception of Tsai Ing-wen as someone who merely issues hollow rhetoric runs deep. As a result, public skepticism about her Road to Damascus conversion persists. Eric Chu notes that the DPP has not nullified the Taiwan independence party platform, and that Tsai Ing-wen was the author of the "two states theory”. He warned that if DPP gains control of the central government in addition to local governments, and the executive as well as the legislature, it will implement de facto Taiwan independence or an "independent Taiwan". This will result in cross-Strait military conflict. He warned blue camp supporters that the Republic of China may face extinction.

Tsai Ing-wen reacted swiftly to Chu's criticisms. She said Chu's remarks were non sequiturs, and that he was playing the intimidation card.

In fact, Chu's suspicions are well founded. So why did Tsai play this trump card? Was Tsai addressing voters on Taiwan? Or was she addressing Beijing, on the other side of the Strait? Was she  attempting to exploit her newfound recognition of the "Republic of China" and the “constitutional framework of the Republic of China”? The Mainland insists that "The two sides of the Strait constitute one China”. DPP refusal to recognize the 1992 consensus could make "the earth move and the mountains shake". Given all this, her motives should be crystal clear.

Tsai Ing-wen has signaled her intentions to Beijing. She seeks face-saving middle ground outside the 1992 consensus. She seeks to avoid DPP vs CCP clash over the 1992 consensus and cross-Strait relations. Tsai Ing-wen's course remains fuzzy. Can she move toward the "constitutional one China" advanced by Frank Hsieh? Tsai Ing-wen's recent rhetoric appears to be paving the way toward the "constitutional one China” that Frank Hsieh advanced in 2000.

Tsai Ing-wen has yet to utter the phrase "constitutional one China". But she has emphasized the "ROC constitutional framework". She has embraced the "Republic of China". She has closed in on the "constitutional one China" concept. Tsai Ing-wen may be taking into consideration the Mainland's position. She may be suggesting a compromise and making a goodwill gesture.

When Tsai Ing-wen visited the US, she pledged to "maintain the status quo" and defend the "ROC constitutional framework". This won Washington's approval. Her next goal is to sweeten the pot and win Beijing's approval.

Suppose Tsai Ing-wen goes further and advocates a "constitutional one China"? Will the Mainland accept a "constitutional one China" or "quasi-constitutional one China" in lieu of the 1992 consensus? That remains to be seen. But the Mainland will undeniably see this development in a positive light.

So far the Mainland response to the elections has been restrained. It has not taken any drastic actions in response to the prospect of a Tsai Ing-wen presidency. On the one hand, the time may not be right. On on the other hand, the Mainland may still be considering the implications of Tsai Ing-wen's signal.

Tsai Ing-wen has not responded recklessly to the Mainland's warning that "the earth will move and the mountains will shake". We urge Tsai Ing-wen to keep an open mind, to fine tune her rhetoric, to narrow any differences and broaden any agreements with the Mainland. Tsai Ing-wen has recently demonstrated restraint regarding Taiwan independence. She has embraced the Republic of China. This should at least prevent the worst possible outcome, a military conflict between the two sides.

But this merely passively maintains cross-Strait relations. At best this prevents relations from descending into the abyss. This pro forma, preliminary course change, will at most maintain the status quo. It will not improve cross-Strait relations.

Tsai Ing-wen has begun a course change. She must now step up the pace. She must now consolidate the change. She must enable both Taiwan and the Mainland to feel the change. Tsai Ing-wen is now embracing the Republic of China. She must prove that she is not merely paying it pro forma lip service. She must demonstrate a deeper understanding of Taiwan's interests and the importance of cross-Strait peace. She must transcend personal ideology and walk the walk. Tsai Ing-wen must behave like a president elect. She must make cross-Strait peace her top priority. She must ensure that the hard-won cross-Strait peace is not lost.

Many suspect that Tsai Ing-wen has not really embraced the ROC. Nevertheless the DPP's actions move it closer to the Republic of China. The DPP must join the public in supporting the ROC. It must refrain from accusing others of "not loving Taiwan ". If the DPP does this, the public will affirm it. The Mainland will also give any DPP course changes due consideration.

蔡英文給北京的方向燈 正確但不夠 2015年11月03日 中國時報 2016選戰勝負幾乎已定，國民黨提名參選人朱立倫已無求勝之心，只求在立法院保留元氣，未來能夠制衡民進黨。但蔡英文並未被勝利的氛圍沖昏頭，卻在競選總部成立大會拋出「民進黨不等於台灣，國民黨也不等於中華民國」新論述。她在具高度象徵意義的場合，發表具高度政治意涵的談話，實足堪玩味。看來，蔡英文這場選戰不再以國民黨為對手，而是針對北京發出政治訊號。 解析蔡英文的論述可以理解，她企圖切斷國民黨長期以來對中華民國政治意象的獨占，分享對中華民國的接近與詮釋權，她又提出「民進黨不等於台灣」，則是讓出民進黨長期以來對台灣政治意象的獨占。由於蔡英文的表述太過跳躍，社會對蔡英文「空心」的刻板印象又太深，台灣內部對這兩句話普遍抱持質疑。朱立倫就以民進黨未廢除「台獨黨綱」，蔡英文又是「兩國論」製造者為出發警告，如果民進黨從中央到地方，從行政到立法全面完全執政，就會實質推動台獨或獨台、製造兩岸衝突，他警告藍營支持者，中華民國將面臨還存不存在的危險。 蔡英文也很快就回應了朱立倫的批評，語意中流露朱立倫沒有跟上節拍，還在打已無效的「恐嚇牌」。 朱立倫的主觀質疑並非沒有依據，但蔡英文為何打出這張「王牌」？如果蔡英文表述的對象不是台灣內部，而是海峽對岸北京，企圖藉對「中華民國」的認同與對中華民國憲政體制的堅持，與大陸堅持的「兩岸一中」相連結，解決民進黨拒絕承認九二共識所可能製造的「地動山搖」危機，她的動機就豁然開朗了。 蔡英文不無對北京打方向燈的意圖，示意她想要在九二共識以外，尋找中間論述做為兩岸在九二共識以外的緩衝帶，避免民共因為九二共識的歧異，而在兩岸關係上對撞。雖然蔡英文的摸索路徑仍然模糊，但如果以謝長廷曾提出的「憲法一中」做為對照，卻可以發現，蔡英文近來的論述與轉向，似乎頗有向著謝長廷在2000年提出的「憲法一中」鋪路的味道。 蔡英文雖然尚未直接說出「憲法一中」，但她一方面強調「憲政體制」，一方面擁抱「中華民國」，加總起來，與「憲法一中」概念的距離已經拉近，這未嘗不是蔡英文考慮大陸立場後的讓步與善意。 這樣的論述模式，蔡英文訪美透過「維持現狀」與「中華民國憲政體制」這兩張牌，已爭取到美國的認同，下一個目標就是如何添加元素，創造出北京可以接受的論述。 當然，就算蔡英文真的進一步走到了「憲法一中」框架，大陸方面能否接受「憲法一中」或「類憲法一中」做為九二共識的替代品，仍有待觀察。但不能輕率否認大陸從正向角度解讀的可能性。 大陸到目前為止對台灣選舉的態度尚稱自制，並未對蔡英文執政的可能性，發動震撼性的攻勢，一方面可能是時機未到，另一方面，也可能意味陸方可能正在消化解讀蔡英文釋出的訊息。 蔡英文並未輕率應對大陸的「地動山搖」警告，但我們仍要敦促蔡英文，要繼續抱持開放的態度，保持論述面的動態調整，以更大程度減少與陸方的差異，擴大交集與共識。我們相信，蔡英文近來已展現出對台獨的自抑與對中華民國的擁抱，當可最低程度保持兩岸關係不向兵戎相見的最壞狀況發展。 但這仍只能消極的確保兩岸關係，不要如墜深淵式的「向下沉淪」，卻不可能僅憑形式的、初步的轉向，就達到「維持現狀」的效果，遑論奢求兩岸關係「向上提升」。 蔡英文應在目前初步轉向的行動基礎上，加大步伐去「深化」、甚至「固化」其轉向，讓台灣內部與大陸都看得到，蔡英文擁抱中華民國，不是策略面的「假戲」，而是深刻認知台灣利益與兩岸和平重要性後，超越個人意識形態後的「真做」。蔡英文必須認真以準國家領導人高度，把兩岸和平調整做為她治國的最優先項，努力確保兩岸好不容易建立起來的和平交流成果不致崩壞。 雖然還是有很多人不相蔡英文真心擁抱中華民國，但只要民進黨能在行動端，多一步向中華民國光譜靠攏，並願意與社會大眾分享台灣的政治意象，不輕易質疑他方是否「愛台灣」，相信社會會給予肯定，中國大陸對民進黨這樣的調整，也應至少給予觀察的空間。