Kenyan Repatriation and the Broken Window Effect

Kenyan Repatriation and the Broken Window Effect
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 16, 2016

Executive Summary: The 1992 Consensus enabled the Ma Xi summit. But "maintaining the status quo" cannot ensure the repatriation of scam artists to Taiwan. Tsai Ing-wen cannot afford willfulness during her administration. Perhaps it is not too late for her to change her mind.

Full Text Below:

If cross-Strait relations were a building, it would now have a broken window. The Kenyan government  arrested a number of Taiwanese scam artists. Beijing had them extradited to the Mainland, provoking condemnation from both the ruling and opposition parties. But on closer examination, this is more than just a simple criminal case. It is one loaded with political repercussions.

Beijing has adopted smoke screen tactics. In distant Africa, it has repeatedly released smoke screens. First it resumed diplomatic relations with Gambia. Then it arrested Taiwanese scam artists in Kenya. Because these incidents occurred far away, the psychological impact on Taiwan should have been more muted. But they may have exceeded Beijing's expectations. The Internet reaches far and wide. Images of Kenyan police breaking into houses were conveyed to millions of homes on Taiwan via cell phone. Many on Taiwan experienced the tension of the scene as if first hand.

Gambia was purely a diplomatic incident. Beijing choose a country that had already severed diplomatic relations with Taiwan two years ago. It was a relatively mild warning. The Mainland rattled its sabre ever so slightly as a deterrent. But the Kenyan case was far more substantial and real. First, eight Taiwanese scam artists were extradited. Then another 37 were caught in the dragnet. Kenya was more than saber rattling psychological intimidation.

Beijing's moves were not intended as justification for applying pressure to Taiwan. Resumption of diplomatic relations with Gambia could be interpreted a number of ways. Beijing could deny that it was issuing a warning to recently elected Taiwanese leaders. It could say the same about the extradition of Taiwanese scam artists. After all, Beijing was investigating a crime. Many of the victims were from the Mainland. It would be easy for the Mainland to argue that it was simply seeing justice done. When the Taiwan Affairs Office published the names of the victims during its press conference, it was arguing just that.

Here is the problem. Five years ago the Philippine government arrested a number of Taiwanese scam artists. Taipei and Beijing had an understanding. Taiwanese criminals would be returned to Taiwan. Mainland criminals would be returned to the Mainland. Now that understanding has been shattered. This is a new cross-Strait scenario. Even the man in the street gets it. This change in the political climate hinges on the 1992 Consensus. Since early March, Xi Jinping and a long line of Mainland leaders appeale to the new regime. But Tsai Ing-wen ignored them. She refused to respond. She refused to answer. Perhaps this is why Beijing is turning the screws.

Why has Beijing allowed this "broken window" in cross-Strait relations? Does it expect Tsai to recognize the 1992 Consensus in her inaugural address? Is this a way of applying pressure? Or has it given up on Tsai altogether, and resorting to drastic measures? When it comes to this issue, a miss is as good as a mile.

The "broken windows theory” says that once a single window is broken, eventually every window will be broken. This principle applies not just to crime. It also applies to politics. Beijing has been making moves for nearly half a month. In particular, it has shattered precedent by arresting Taiwanese criminals. Appeals regarding Mainland victims may move people. But the arrests have nevertheless provoked anger over ROC sovereignty, human rights, and jurisdiction. Tsai Ing-wen is about to be inaugurated. Yet Beijing has escalated confrontation in advance. Why not allow Tsai Ing-wen to comment on the 1992 Consensus first? Has it make it more difficult for Tsai Ing-wen to reverse her position?

What is Beijing's logic? Did Beijing anticipate the condemnation and grief emanating from Taiwan  beforehand? Is this their cross-Strait "new normal"? If so, then Beijing has amended the "peaceful development" strategy it has practiced for the past few years. If so, then it intends to add conflict to peace, and give Taiwan a taste of the razor's edge. Tsai Ing-wen has yet to show her hand. If Beijing acts too hastily, it could make the problem worse. After all, President Ma is still in office. When the Mainland extradites Taiwanese to the Mainland, even Ma Ying-jeou must condemn its action, and Tsai Ing-wen will follow suit. Is the Mainland not concerned about the pros and cons?

Let us leave the domestic uproar aside for the moment. The Kenyan case involves crime, jurisdiction, emotions, hatred, even disputes over sovereignty. All of them bring us back to the 1992 Consensus. For the past five years, the Mainland has returned Taiwanese scam artists to Taiwan, because the 1992 Consensus provides for separate jurisdictions vis a vis criminal prosecutions. Now Beijing has suddenly reversed itself, all because Tsai Ing-wen persists in being evasive about the 1992 Consensus.

The 1992 Consensus enabled the Ma Xi summit. But "maintaining the status quo" cannot ensure the repatriation of scam artists to Taiwan. Tsai Ing-wen cannot afford willfulness during her administration. Perhaps it is not too late for her to change her mind.

肯亞遣返案的政治破窗效應
2016-04-16聯合報

兩岸關係若是一幢建築物，如今已被砸出一個破窗。北京將在肯亞涉及詐騙犯罪的台籍嫌疑人，運用與肯亞的外交引渡直接遣送大陸，招來朝野同聲譴責。但深一層看，這並非只是一件單純的刑事案件，還有意在言外的政治弦聲。

北京採用的是一種狼煙戰術，在遙遠的非洲逐次升起煙幕：先是與甘比亞復交，接著在肯亞直接押解台籍詐騙犯；由於事發地遠在天邊，對台灣而言，心理衝擊應不會陡然驟升。但這次事件可能超過北京的估計，由於網路無遠弗屆，肯亞警方破門而入的鏡頭靠著一只手機傳入台灣千家萬戶，讓許多台灣民眾感受到現場的張力。

甘比亞是純外交事件，選一個已跟台灣斷交兩年多的國家建交，其實算是溫和的示警，只是稍露劍鋒讓對手心裡一懾，如此而已。但肯亞案卻放進了真人實事，先是八名涉案台灣人被押返，其後再將另外三十七人一網打盡，這就不是劍未出鞘的心理威嚇而已。

北京預留了此舉並非壓迫台灣的辯解空間。甘比亞復交可以顧左右而言他，稱這不是對候任領導人的警告；遣送詐騙台客亦然，畢竟是在查辦犯罪，畢竟大陸有眾多受害者，大陸不難辯駁這是純粹的司法正義，國台辦記者會臚列一干大陸民眾受害情節，就是這個論調。

問題是，雙方自五年前菲律賓破獲的詐騙案起，即有「兩岸人員分流」的默契，台灣的歸台灣，大陸的遣回大陸。現在規則被打破，無非就是衝著兩岸的新情勢而來，連市井小民都能推想：這一切皆因「九二共識」的變數而起。對於北京自三月初開始由習近平以降各領導人此起彼落對於「九二共識」的呼籲，蔡英文竟然不動聲色，不置一詞，這也許是北京設法加壓的原因。

如今的問題在於，北京任令兩岸「破窗」，究竟是因為還在期待蔡英文在其就職演說中認了「九二共識」，因而略施手段加壓；或者它已不對蔡英文心存幻想，乾脆釜底抽薪？這個判斷，如果失之毫釐，其結果將差之千里。

正如「破窗」理論所預設的，窗子破了一扇，終將引致所有窗子都被砸爛，這不只是犯罪的原理，政治上也如此。北京近半個多月來接連出手，尤其是這次破壞慣例逮人，儘管大陸民眾受害可憐的說詞頗能動之以情，但台灣方面第一時間對主權、人權及司法管轄權的群情激憤，也已被攪動起來。讓人不解的是，正當蔡英文的就職演說才要登場，北京提前發動這場押解事件升高對峙，豈非讓蔡英文的「九二共識」更說不出口？如此，會不會反而阻斷了蔡英文迴旋轉身的可能？

由此反推北京的邏輯，倘若此事件台灣的譴責與悲憤都早在北京事前的估計中，這就是他們想要塑造的兩岸「新常態」；這顯示，北京決定修正過去演繹與實踐了多年的「和平發展」戰略，有意要在和平之中摻入衝突元素，讓台灣品嘗一下剃刀邊緣的滋味。然而，蔡英文畢竟還未揭底牌，北京若過度操切，反而可能讓問題弄得更難以收拾。畢竟，此際仍是馬總統執政，大陸押人遣送的作法，第一時間連馬英九都不能不跳出來譴責，然後由蔡英文跟進譴責；其中得失如何，難道已不遑計較？

撇開國內沸沸揚揚的情緒不談，這次肯亞案將犯罪、管轄、情緒、憎恨，甚至上綱到了主權的糾葛，終歸都須回到「九二共識」議題上進行省察。蔡英文應當如此琢磨：近五年以來，大陸將海外逮捕的台籍詐騙犯皆交台灣解回，正是「九二共識」所拓墾出來「司法管轄權」！而如今北京突然收回，亦是因為她至今依舊對「九二共識」閃爍其辭。

「九二共識」可以撐起「馬習會」，「維持現狀」卻請不回詐騙犯。蔡英文的執政光景，似不宜任性而行。或許，轉念不過一瞬，一切猶未為晚！