United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
April 21, 2016
Executive Summary: Tsai Ing-wen must be able to lead the DPP. Otherwise how can she possibly lead “this nation”? Tsai Ing-wen prefers to avoid using the term “Republic of China”. Tsai Ing-wen does lacks even the courage to affirm or deny the Republic of China. How can she possibly offer an enduring vision for the nation? If Tsai Ing-wen wants to offer the nation a vision, she should present them with the vision of her leading the reformation of the DPP.
Full Text Below:
National leaders provide people with two forms of sustenance. First, they provide a vision for the nation's future. Second, they provide leadership, i.e., the wherewithal to realize their vision. It is now less than 30 days to May 20. What has Tsai Ing-wen given us so far?
First consider the matter of national vision. Tsai Ing-wen says she accepts “the historical fact that in 1992, talks led to a common understanding". Yet she refuses to accept the term, “1992 Consensus”. She flagrantly contradicts herself. She has consequently failed to reaffirm the constitution, destabilized cross-Strait relations, and left people on Taiwan bereft of any national vision. Will her ambivalent flip-flopping reassure Taiwan independence advocates that she shares their vision? Will it reassure defenders of the Republic of China that she shares their vision?
Internally, the 1992 Consensus involves constitutional interpretations. Externally, it involves cross-Strait relations. Neither constitutes the whole of government, but together they constitute its backbone. Tsai Ing-wen cannot even screw up the courage to affirm or deny the 1992 Consensus. How can she possibly talk about a national vision?
If she intends to recognize the 1992 Consensus, she should offer a reason for recognizing it. If she intends to reject the 1992 Consensus, she should offer a reason for rejecting it. But she can hardly "promote cross-Strait relations under the Republic of China's existing constitutional framework", even as she rejects the 1992 Consensus. She cannot claim to be "maintaining the status quo", even as she rejects the 1992 Consensus. What sort of national vision can Tsai Ing-wen offer the people under such a self-contradictory framework?
Now consider the matter of leadership. Tsai Ing-wen is party chairperson. She is forbidding political appointees from simultaneously serving as party officials. She is attempting to sever relations between political appointees and the DPP. She wants to undermine support for the DPP. She wants to bypass the DPP. But doing so will make it difficult for her to lead the DPP. Tsai Ing-wen will be unable to lead the DPP. Tsai's failure to reaffirm the constitutional framework, and failure to formulate a coherent cross-Strait policy will make sound governance under a Tsai government impossible.
The vice presidential candidate is one of Tsai's cabinet appointees. This enables the Tsai Ing-wen administration to avoid DPP and ideological influences. The "Oversight Regulations for Agreements between Two Countries” can become the
“Oversight Regulations for Agreements between the Two Sides of the Strait”. The "self-executing provisions" were also Tsai Ing-wen's doing.
Unfortunately the Kenyan case let the cat out of the bag. Legislative Yuan Speaker Su Chia-chuan led the way. He spun the tale according to the "two states theory". Green camp legislators demanded sanctions and incited hatred against “China”, i.e., Mainland China. Tsai Ing-wen's Facebook page used the term "Mainland China". Su Chia-chuan and green camp legislators however used the term "China”. The Tsai Ing-wen administration adopted a low-profile. But the DPP legislative caucus and the party insisted on raising a stink. Loose cannons were everywhere. Merely changing the name of the "Oversight Regulations for Agreements between Two Countries” to the “Oversight Regulations for Agreements between the Two Sides of the Strait” did not put everyone in the DPP on the same page.
In fact the deadlock over the 1992 Consensus was mere spillover from DPP and green camp infighting. Does the public on Taiwan in fact oppose the 1992 Consensus? Does it even understand the 1992 Consensus? Does it understand the two sides' positions, and the meaning of good will? Is the public truly willing to bear the consequences of shattering the 1992 Consensus? Tsai Ing-wen must make the case for the above claims. This may be Annette Lu's cue to tell Tsai Ing-wen what she should say on May 20.
Tong Cheng-yuan, who advocates freezing the Taiwan independence party platform, will be Tsai Ing-wen's Executive Yuan spokesperson. Chen Tian-jy, who continues to support ECFA, will be the Tsai Ing-wen's National Development Council chairman. Blue camp officials David Lee and Chang Hsiao-yue will hold down the diplomatic and cross-Strait border posts. These appointments are intended to prove that Tsai will not depart entirely from the cross-Strait framework established by the 1992 Consensus. Yet she remains ambivalent about the 1992 Consensus. Bullets are flying within the DPP and the green camp, because it lacks an authoritative leader.
Compare today with the year 2000 under Chen Shui-bian. Before the election, the DPP issued its "Resolution on Taiwan's Future" and "five noes". By contrast, Tsai Ing-wen cannot break the deadlock over the 1992 Consensus within her own party. Tsai Ing-wen wants "no provocations, and no accidents". But if the loose cannons in the DPP legislative caucus play bad cop, they will present the biggest obstacle to Tsai Ing-wen's governance.
Tsai Ing-wen must be able to lead the DPP. Otherwise how can she possibly lead “this nation”? Tsai Ing-wen prefers to avoid using the term “Republic of China”. Tsai Ing-wen does lacks even the courage to affirm or deny the Republic of China. How can she possibly offer an enduring vision for the nation? If Tsai Ing-wen wants to offer the nation a vision, she should present them with the vision of her leading the reformation of the DPP.
就是要建構國家的憧憬。二、領導力， 就是要具備足以實現此種憧憬的才能。距五二○已不到三十天， 蔡英文給了我們什麼？
一九九二年會談歷史事實所達成的共同認知與諒解」，卻拒絕接受「 九二共識」四字，充分呈現其自相矛盾； 也因此致使憲政認同不能確立，兩岸關係基礎動搖， 國家憧憬亦失憑藉。這種曖昧搖擺的立場， 豈能給台獨支持者增加什麼想像力？ 又豈能給支持中華民國者增加什麼想像力？
這二者雖非國家政務的全部，卻是最重要的脊樑部分。 蔡英文如果連「九二共識」四個字都拿不起、放不下， 奢談什麼憧憬？
也應有不接受的理由。但若說「在中華民國現行憲政體制下， 推動兩岸關係」，卻不接受九二共識；或主張「維持現狀」， 卻不接受九二共識，這皆不成理由。在如此不能自圓其說的架構下， 蔡英文給了人們什麼憧憬？給了大家什麼想像力？
試圖切割行政團隊與民進黨的關聯，以架空民進黨；但這種想要「 繞過民進黨」的作法，卻亦顯現她將陷難以有效「領導」 民進黨的困境。蔡英文若不能穩固對民進黨的領導， 即無以確立憲政認同及兩岸政策，也就不能建立「穩健執政」 的國家願景。
兩國論」來詮釋事態，綠委的「制裁說」、「仇中論」此起彼落。 蔡英文在臉書稱「中國大陸」，蘇嘉全及綠委則爭相攻擊「中國」。 由此可見。蔡英文雖全力塑造行政團隊的「低調」風格， 但民進黨在立法院及黨這兩塊的「高調」自走砲所在多有。 僅是把監督條例由「兩國」改稱「兩岸」， 顯不能齊一民進黨的口徑。
蔡英文若說：台灣的民意真正反對九二共識， 或真正瞭解九二共識在兩岸各自的「原則」與「善意」， 或真正願意承擔九二共識一旦破局後可能發生的不可估量的後果； 無論是以上的哪一種主張，她皆必須提出足以說服國人的論證。 這也許正是呂秀蓮建議蔡英文應為五二○演說辦公聽會的道理。
現在仍支持ＥＣＦＡ」的陳添枝為國發會主委， 又以李大維及張小月兩名藍軍為外交和兩岸前哨， 此皆顯示她無意全然背離「九二共識」的兩岸架構。 但她之所以又與「九二共識」若即若離， 則是因她在面對散彈四射的民進黨及綠營內部時左支右絀， 沒有一言九鼎的領導力。
台灣前途決議文》，並以「四不一沒有」開局；但今日的蔡英文， 卻沒有能力使民進黨及綠營為她打開「九二共識」的僵局。今後， 這個以「不挑釁／無意外」為著眼而建立的行政團隊， 與民進黨在立法院及黨內的自走砲，如何各自扮演「黑臉／白臉」 的競合關係，就成了蔡英文政治操作上的最大考驗。
蔡英文避稱中華民國的慣用詞）。 一個對中華民國扛不起又丟不掉的蔡英文， 必無可能建構可大可久的國家憧憬。因此， 蔡英文可給國人的最大想像力， 應是她必須表現出能夠引領民進黨轉型的領導力。