Second Ice-Breaking Journey:
Response to International Trade Demands
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 1, 2013
Summary: We are pleased that the Lien-Xi Summit will build on the previously established foundation for cross-strait relations, as well as offer new hope. Lien Chan's first ice-breaking trip opened new horizons for cross-Strait relations. We hope his second ice-breaking journey will increase the international influence of Chinese from both sides of the Strait. The clouds have parted. The moon is visible. Cross-strait relations are a little clearer, and people enjoy a little more peace of mind.
Full Text below:
Honorary KMT Chairman Lien Chan led a diverse delegation to the Chinese mainland and met with top leaders. The trip is now officially over. This major cross-Strait event took place on the eve of a forthcoming Mainland power transfer. Xi Jinping will soon take over as general secretary. Everyone has high expectations for reform. Reform of the bureaucratic ethos, as well as institutional reform of the State Council, are already on the agenda. The political agenda is full. The Mainland continues to seize the initiative by extending invitations to visit. This clearly illustrates the new generation of leaders' concern for cross-Strait relations. It also provides powerful support for peaceful development across the Taiwan Strait.
Recall the outcome of the first, pioneering Lien-Hu Summit seven years ago. We think the Lien-Xi Summit will be hailed as the "Second Ice-Breaking Journey."
Since President Ma took office, cross-strait relations have indeed made unprecedented progress. The two sides have engaged in high-level strategic dialogue. This is undoubtedly the foundation for their new mode of communication. For example, the 2005 Lien-Hu Summit offered five hopes for the future. These established a new cross-Strait political atmosphere for President Ma when he took office. It laid a foundation for the structural framework above. To be fair, the past few years have witnessed tremendous changes in the international and cross-strait environment. These have rendered the old cross-strait exchange mechanisms inadequate. The current Lien-Xi Summit affirms the personnel and their policies in the wake of the two sides' power transfers. How to improve cross-strait relations at the strategic level, is undoubtedly the most pressing issue.
We we hail the Lien-Xi Summit as a second icebreaking journey. Only five years have passed, but already we face another structural imbalance in cross-strait relations. A prudent strategic response must be found.
Think back to 2005, to the first Lien-Hu Summit. Storm clouds shrouded the Taiwan Strait. Politicians on Taiwan failed to reconcile themselves to an increasingly powerful Chinese mainland. As a result, Taiwan was gradually marginalized in the international arena. It was no longer first among the Four Asian Tigers. The first Lien-Hu Summit cut the cross-Strait Gordian Knot. It enabled Taiwan to take the first step toward the reestablishment of cross-strait and international relations.
Since 2008 the international political and economic landscape has undergone unprecedented upheavals. These have led to shakeups in the international power structure and ever more intense international power struggles. The emergence of the G2 has changed the unipolar power system. It has contributed to the United States' official launching of trade negotiations with the Asian-Pacific region, as well as with the EU. The plight of the PIIGS has threatened the EU with disintegration. In our own neighborhood, the Asian-Pacific and Indo-Pacific nations are on the rise. Mainland China has replaced Japan as the world's second-largest economy. It has surpassed the United States as the world's largest trading nation. Japan and South Korea have announced the launch of free trade agreement negotiations. On the other hand, disputes over sovereignty in the East China Sea and South China Sea are rapidly heating up. The result has been nationalist antagonisms. In Washington, Japanese Prime Minister Abe accused the Chinese mainland of territorial aggression. This amounted to a resurgence of Japanese militarism. Mainland Chinese and Japanese planes and ships in the Diaoyutai Island waters are on the brink of military engagment.
Fortunately, amidst this rapidly changing landscape, cross-Strait relations have evolved. The simple exchange requirements of the past have gradually expanded. They now include the financial industry, ECFA, investment protection, and the protection of intellectual property. A comprehensive economic partnership has taken shape. We are a key member of the East Asian international community. Yet our role in the face of advancing regional economic integration and sovereignty disputes remains limited. President Ma's "East China Sea Peace Initiative" may seem like common sense. But it has attracted little interest within the international community. The short film released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs appears to be directed at the home audience. The same is true of its "rebalancing" policy. Taiwan finds itself in an awkward situation. Aside from announcing an unrealistic hope of joining the RIMPAC Economic Partnership Agreement in eight years, it has little to say.
As a major economy in the Asian-Pacific region, Taiwan must find a way to integrate itself into ASEAN and the Mainland China-led regional economic integration, as soon as possible. The Economic Cooperation Agreement negotiations with Singapore and New Zealand are proceeding smoothly. But progress remains slow, and have failed to keep pace with overall regional economic liberalization. As a party to major disputes in the East China Sea and the South China Sea, Taiwan must make itself heard during dispute settlement talks.
During the Lien-Xi Summit, the two sides reaffirmed the political basis for cross-Strait relations. They suggested that private sector think tanks begin discussing a peace agreement, and engaging in political dialogue over military confidence building measures. This is consistent with strategic goals. We think high-level political dialogue between the two sides should address international and regional tensions and cooperation. We must seek an entry point. Lien Chan spoke of a balanced, equal, and effective political framework, applicable to international trade.
We are pleased that the Lien-Xi Summit will build on the previously established foundation for cross-strait relations, as well as offer new hope. Lien Chan's first ice-breaking trip opened new horizons for cross-Strait relations. We hope his second ice-breaking journey will increase the international influence of Chinese from both sides of the Strait. The clouds have parted. The moon is visible. Cross-strait relations are a little clearer, and people enjoy a little more peace of mind.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2013.03.01
社論－二次破冰 有助因應國際經貿新局
本報訊
國民黨榮譽主席連戰所率領的各界人士代表團，在與中國大陸前後任最高領導人會面之後，已經正式結束訪問。此一兩岸之間的大事，在中國大陸即將召開事關權力傳承的兩會前夕進行，尤其是習近平接任總書記一職不久，各方對改革的期望甚殷，而有關官僚風氣的革新，以及國務院機構改革大部制的推展，都已經提上日程。在政治日程繁重之際，對岸仍主動邀訪，這清楚的說明了中共新一代領導人對當前兩岸關係的重視，也為台海和平發展的前景，提供了有力的條件。
回顧七年多前首次的「連胡會」所開創的成果，我們認為，此次的「連習會」可喻為二次破冰之旅。
自從馬總統上任以來，兩岸關係的確取得了前所未見的進展，而雙方的高層戰略對話，無疑是構建這種新的交流模式的主要基礎，譬如二○○五年連胡會所提出的五項願景，為馬總統上任以來所締造的兩岸新局，奠定了樑柱之基。但是，持平而論，過去幾年也見證了國際和兩岸環境的巨大變化，使得舊的兩岸交流模式，在適用上已出現不足。這次連習會的意義，除了近來雙方因權力傳承、需要在人事及政策上再確認外，如何自戰略的層次上改善兩岸關係，無疑是更迫切的思考。
我們之所以把連習會喻為二次破冰，乃是因為短短的近五年之間，兩岸關係再度面臨結構失衡的現象，必須從戰略的角度，審慎應對，找出解答。
猶記二○○五年連胡初會之際，兩岸風雲密布，台灣由於無法與逐漸強大的中國大陸和解，國際座標逐漸邊緣化，四小龍的光環盡失。首次連胡會的意義，不惟為兩岸之間的癥結，打造了開啟之鑰，更為兩岸關係和台灣的國際互動，提供了初步的連結。
然而，自二○○八年以來，國際政經版圖出現了空前的巨變，推動國際進一步整合的動力，以及對抗拉扯的張力也同步擴大。G2的出現，改變了單極國際體系的運作模式，也促成了美國正式啟動和亞太地區以及歐盟的自由貿易談判，而歐豬國家的困境，卻引發歐盟是否解體的問題。至於鄰近地區，亞太以及印太周邊國家的崛起勢頭日盛，中國大陸在取代日本成為全球第二大經濟體後，又超越美國成為全球最大貿易國，中日韓三國宣布啟動自由貿易協議的談判；但另一方面，東海和南海的主權爭議也快速升溫，造成民族主義的對抗情緒，日本安倍首相在美國首都華盛頓批評大陸侵佔領土，宣布日本再起，中日兩國的機艦在釣魚台海域瀕臨接戰。
所幸的是，在此一瞬息萬變的大潮流裡，兩岸關係已從過去單純對三通四流的要求，逐漸擴及金融業務的開展、ＥＣＦＡ、投保與智財權的保護等，至今全面的經濟伙伴關係已略具雛形。但是，不幸的是，做為東亞國際社會的主要成員國之一，不論是面對推進區域經濟整合的動力或是主權爭議的張力，台灣的角色依然平淡。馬總統所提的《東海和平倡議》，內容平實理性，但是在國際上卻乏人問津，外交部出版的短片，似乎也只能針對國人做出說明。同樣的，對美國新的「亞洲再平衡」政策，台灣的角色也顯得尷尬，除了宣布不切實際的八年加入環太經濟伙伴協議的目標外，似乎沒有太多的連結點。
作為亞太地區的重要經濟體，台灣必需儘速找到融入以東協和中國大陸主導的區域經濟整合的辦法；目前與新加坡和紐西蘭的經濟合作協議談判固然順利，但是緩不濟急，趕不上整體區域經濟自由化的進展。作為東海及南海爭端最主要的當事國，在相關的爭端解決機制中，台灣必須發聲。
連習會中，雙方再度確認兩岸關係的政治基礎，提出由民間智庫展開有關和平協議、軍事互信等議題的政治對話，也都符合雙方的戰略設計。我們以為，現階段兩岸之間的高層政治對話，應針對前述國際區域環境所發生的分與合的張力，找到切入的著力點，而連戰所提的平衡、對等、有效的政治框架，可以優先適用於國際經貿領域。
我們欣見連習會在兩岸關係既有的基礎之上，提出新的期許，連戰首次破冰之旅，曾為兩岸關係帶來了柳暗花明之效；對二次破冰，我們更期待兩岸華人能在國際舞台上尋找到更多可以發揮影響力的可能性；雲開見月，使得兩岸關係更清澈安心。
Thursday, February 28, 2013
Tuesday, February 26, 2013
Number Four Nuclear Power Plant: DPP Lip Service to a Public Referendum
Number Four Nuclear Power Plant:
DPP Lip Service to a Public Referendum
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 27, 2013
Summary: Public opposition to nuclear power is increasing day by day. The administration and the legislature have approved a public referendum on whether to halt construction on the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant (4NPP). But surprise, surprise. The DPP, which has for decades demanded for a referendum on nuclear power, suddenly began hemming and hawing. Chairman Su Tseng-chang even said that no referendum on 4NPP was necessary, and that President Ma could simply hand down the order.
Full Text below:
Public opposition to nuclear power is increasing day by day. The administration and the legislature have approved a public referendum on whether to halt construction on the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant (4NPP). But surprise, surprise. The DPP, which has for decades demanded for a referendum on nuclear power, suddenly began hemming and hawing. Chairman Su Tseng-chang even said that no referendum on 4NPP was necessary, and that President Ma could simply hand down the order.
This argument is absurd. The DPP has long boasted it would spare no effort honoring the "Will of the People." It has long equated public referenda with holy edicts. The "Public Referendum on 4NPP" is virtually the DPP's calling card. The government intends to resolve the dispute by holding a public referendum on whether to retain or eliminate the 4NPP. the DPP should be applauding enthusiastically. So why is it instead insisting that "The President can simply issue an executive order?"
Can it be that the DPP was bluffing all along? Can it be that it was merely paying lip service to the "Will of the People?" Can it be that it was shrilly demanding a public referendum, while hoping a public referendum would never actually come to pass, and force it to show its hand? Was it merely putting on a show? Was it merely using a public referendum as a tool to manipulate public sentiment? Was it indifferent to whether a serious public policy controversy was resolved or not?
This is not all. The Green Camp is also demanding three peculiar pre-conditions before it will agree to a public referendum on the 4NPP. One. It is demanding an amendment to the Referendum Act, lowering the referendum threshold. Two. It is demanding a change in the wording of the referendum, from "Do you support a construction halt?" to "Do you support continued construction?" Three. It is demanding that most voters on Taiwan be disqualified from voting in the referendum. It is demanding that participation in the referendum be limited to residents of Xinbei City. Its demands are both incomprehensible and unjustifiable.
The current Referendum Law stipulates that referendum issues require a quorum consisting of over half the electorate, and the approval of over half the valid ballots cast. Only then can the referendum pass muster. This threshold, which is not terribly high, was set by the Chen administration, when it authored its "Referendum Law." The main reason so many past referenda on Taiwan have failed to pass, is that they were phony issues. They were nothing more than political footballs to be demagogued during election campaigns. That is why the public refused to participate in them. That is why they failed to meet the minimum threshold. The 4NPP is a major issue vital to the national interest. Here is an opportunity for enthusiastic citizen participation in a referendum that would truly highlight public sentiment. Why would one amend the law at this time, and lower the threshold, unless one's intention is to play fast and loose with the rule of law, "customizing" the law to one's own liking?
Furthermore, the government has already spent over 300 billion dollars building the 4NPP, every cent of which came out of the hide of the people. Whether to retain or eliminate the 4NPP has a huge impact on electricity prices and their future livelihood. This is definitely not a matter that affects only a single village or a single city. Of course it must be a collective decision. Of course it cannot be treated as merely a regional referendum, held only in Xinbei City. Now consider the wording of the referendum. The choice of "halt construction" or "continue construction" may indeed have positive or negative implications. But the public on Taiwan is not that ignorant. If the premise of the referendum is sufficiently clear, if information is sufficiently accessible, and if the public is not stampeded into a premature conclusion, the results will conform to the peoples actual feelings. Therefore, what justification do politicians have to confuse the public about the issue at stake?
The attitude of the ruling party is clear. It hopes to continue construction and eventually operate the 4NPP in a safe and secure manner. But because many people have doubts, the Ma administration has left the decision up to the people as a whole. It is letting the people decide the fate of the FNPP through a referendum. It is letting the entire community participate in the referendum. This decision is surely better than merely sitting back and watching the opposition DPP and anti-nuclear groups engage in pressure group warfare and turning Taiwan into a powder keg. It is far more responsible. We hope that this will be a public referendum in which the people participate enthusiastically. Regardless what the outcome turns out to be, we hope everyone will respect the collective decision of the people.
This newspaper was the first media organization to advocate a resolution of the 4NPP controversy via a referendum. Public referenda are the last resort for democratic societies attempting to resolve social differences. Having said that, we must recognize the limits to referenda. Referenda can ask only simple "yes" or "no" questions. They cannot ask more complex questions. They cannot tell people how to get from point A to point B. Even if the result of the referendum is that the people choose to continue construction on the 4NPP, it does not mean that disputes over the 4NPP will subside. Any negligence on the part of Taipower, or continued provocation by opponents of the 4NPP, could cause the flames of war to spread. In fact, if the public on Taiwan really wants to resolve the problem, it should change its focus from nuclear safety to non-nuclear power generation. That will require expert calculations and an active search for alternatives. That is not something a referendum can resolve. That will require combined governmental and private efforts.
The current wave of anti-nuclear sentiment includes many fresh faces from the middle-class. They are concerned about environment, both for themselves and for future generations. For them, unlike for the DPP, controversy over nuclear power generation is not a political tool. This is an encouraging phenomenon. They realize the waffling DPP cannot be trusted. They are keeping the DPP at arm's lenght. That is why the DPP's recent anti-nuclear initiatives have been so feeble.
Think about it. When Su Tseng-chang was premier, he approved over 40 billion dollars for the 4NPP. Now however, he is demanding a halt to its construction. The DPP has demand a public referendum on the 4NPP for decades. Now that the KMT has actually agreed to just such a referendum, the DPP is suddenly insisting that "No referendum is needed." Is the DPP merely caught in a contradiction? Or is the DPP at the end of its rope?
民進黨對核四公投前恭後倨
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.02.27 03:31 am
民間反核聲浪日漸強大，府院共同拍板將核四停建議題交付公投。未料，一向力挺公投的民進黨卻反而開始游移搖擺，主席蘇貞昌甚至說，核四不必公投，馬總統直接下令停工即可。
此種論調，讓人匪夷所思。民進黨一向歌頌「人民意志」不遺餘力，且奉「全民公投」如聖旨，「核四公投」亦是民進黨的招牌飯；如今政府要將爭議交付公投，由全民決定核四存廢，民進黨應該鼓掌叫好才對，為何反而說「總統下令即可」？
難道民進黨是「葉公好龍」，嘴巴上高喊民意、高呼公投，其實不願以公投與民意攤牌？或者其目的只在「項莊舞劍」，把民意和公投當成戲法來耍，並不關心問題的解決與否。
不僅如此，綠營還針對核四公投另外提出了幾項奇特的條件，包括：一，要求修改「公投法」，降低公投過關門檻；二，將公投題目由「是否支持停建」改為「是否支持續建」；三，不可全台公投，應僅限由「新北市」公民投票等。這些主張，恐均令人難以理解與苟同。
現行「公投法」規定，公投議題需有半數以上公民投票，並有過半以上有效票同意，公投才算過關。這樣的門檻，其實出自扁政府所製訂的「公投法」，並不算高。台灣過去多次公投無法過關，主要是因為絕大多數屬於「假議題」，目的是用來「綁選舉」炒熱選情，故而引不起民眾的參與興趣，而無法達到投票門檻。核四是全民利益切身相關的重大議題，有機會呼喚公民熱烈參與，形成一個真正展現民意的公投；此時若特意去修法降低門檻，除了「量身打造」的意圖太鮮明，不也在玩弄法制嗎？
再說，核四是政府花費三千多億興建，全出自民脂民膏；且核四興廢事關日後民生電價至鉅，這絕非一鄉一市之事，當然應由全民共同決定，而不能只在新北市舉辦地域性公投。至於公投題目的擬訂，「停建」或「續建」之措詞，確實可能給予民眾正向或負向之暗示。但台灣民眾並不愚昧，如果在公投前提供給民眾的資訊足夠完整而透明，且經過充分溝通而不是刻意煽動，兩者得到的結果應不會有太多出入。那麼，政治人物有必要藉此來混淆民眾的認知嗎？
執政黨的態度其實相當清楚：要在安全無虞的前提下續建核四，並使之運轉。但因為許多民眾對此有鉅大的疑慮，因此馬政府把決定權交給全民，讓人民透過公投來決定核四的命運，然後整個社會共同承擔公投的結果。這樣的選擇，至少比坐視在野黨及反核團體在那裡不斷施壓，讓整個台灣處於壓力鍋似的緊張狀態，要顯得負責得多。我們也期待這是一個全民熱烈參與的有效公投，不論結局如何，大家都能尊重人們共同的選擇。
本報是率先主張核四爭議以公投方式解決的媒體，因為這是民主社會解決社會歧見的最後手段。但話說回來，我們也必須承認：公投的效用其實有其極限。公投僅能顯示簡單的「是」或「否」，卻不能回答更複雜的問題，更不能為人們指出從甲地到乙地的路徑應如何行進。即使這次公投的結果是人民選擇續建核四，也不表示核四的紛爭至此將全然平息；因為台電的任何疏忽，或反對者的持續挑釁，都可能使戰火延燒。事實上，台灣真正要解決的，是如何走向真正的「從核安到非核」；那需要專家更精密地評估與計算，同時更積極地尋找替代方案；那條路，就不是公投所能解決，而需要政府和民間更努力地溝通與思考。
這波的反核聲浪，出現不少中產階級的清新臉孔，其關懷更著重家園的維護及下一代的生存環境，與先前民進黨作為政治工具的反核訴求不同，這是可喜現象。正因為如此，他們知道立場反反覆覆的民進黨並不可靠，並設法與之保持距離，這也是民進黨此次反核表現得如此虛弱的原因所在。
試想：蘇貞昌任內通過四百多億核四預算，現在卻在喊停建；民進黨歷年發動過多少回核四公投，現在竟對國民黨提議的核四公投說「不必」。這是民進黨圖窮匕現的自我矛盾？或者已是黔驢技窮？
DPP Lip Service to a Public Referendum
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 27, 2013
Summary: Public opposition to nuclear power is increasing day by day. The administration and the legislature have approved a public referendum on whether to halt construction on the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant (4NPP). But surprise, surprise. The DPP, which has for decades demanded for a referendum on nuclear power, suddenly began hemming and hawing. Chairman Su Tseng-chang even said that no referendum on 4NPP was necessary, and that President Ma could simply hand down the order.
Full Text below:
Public opposition to nuclear power is increasing day by day. The administration and the legislature have approved a public referendum on whether to halt construction on the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant (4NPP). But surprise, surprise. The DPP, which has for decades demanded for a referendum on nuclear power, suddenly began hemming and hawing. Chairman Su Tseng-chang even said that no referendum on 4NPP was necessary, and that President Ma could simply hand down the order.
This argument is absurd. The DPP has long boasted it would spare no effort honoring the "Will of the People." It has long equated public referenda with holy edicts. The "Public Referendum on 4NPP" is virtually the DPP's calling card. The government intends to resolve the dispute by holding a public referendum on whether to retain or eliminate the 4NPP. the DPP should be applauding enthusiastically. So why is it instead insisting that "The President can simply issue an executive order?"
Can it be that the DPP was bluffing all along? Can it be that it was merely paying lip service to the "Will of the People?" Can it be that it was shrilly demanding a public referendum, while hoping a public referendum would never actually come to pass, and force it to show its hand? Was it merely putting on a show? Was it merely using a public referendum as a tool to manipulate public sentiment? Was it indifferent to whether a serious public policy controversy was resolved or not?
This is not all. The Green Camp is also demanding three peculiar pre-conditions before it will agree to a public referendum on the 4NPP. One. It is demanding an amendment to the Referendum Act, lowering the referendum threshold. Two. It is demanding a change in the wording of the referendum, from "Do you support a construction halt?" to "Do you support continued construction?" Three. It is demanding that most voters on Taiwan be disqualified from voting in the referendum. It is demanding that participation in the referendum be limited to residents of Xinbei City. Its demands are both incomprehensible and unjustifiable.
The current Referendum Law stipulates that referendum issues require a quorum consisting of over half the electorate, and the approval of over half the valid ballots cast. Only then can the referendum pass muster. This threshold, which is not terribly high, was set by the Chen administration, when it authored its "Referendum Law." The main reason so many past referenda on Taiwan have failed to pass, is that they were phony issues. They were nothing more than political footballs to be demagogued during election campaigns. That is why the public refused to participate in them. That is why they failed to meet the minimum threshold. The 4NPP is a major issue vital to the national interest. Here is an opportunity for enthusiastic citizen participation in a referendum that would truly highlight public sentiment. Why would one amend the law at this time, and lower the threshold, unless one's intention is to play fast and loose with the rule of law, "customizing" the law to one's own liking?
Furthermore, the government has already spent over 300 billion dollars building the 4NPP, every cent of which came out of the hide of the people. Whether to retain or eliminate the 4NPP has a huge impact on electricity prices and their future livelihood. This is definitely not a matter that affects only a single village or a single city. Of course it must be a collective decision. Of course it cannot be treated as merely a regional referendum, held only in Xinbei City. Now consider the wording of the referendum. The choice of "halt construction" or "continue construction" may indeed have positive or negative implications. But the public on Taiwan is not that ignorant. If the premise of the referendum is sufficiently clear, if information is sufficiently accessible, and if the public is not stampeded into a premature conclusion, the results will conform to the peoples actual feelings. Therefore, what justification do politicians have to confuse the public about the issue at stake?
The attitude of the ruling party is clear. It hopes to continue construction and eventually operate the 4NPP in a safe and secure manner. But because many people have doubts, the Ma administration has left the decision up to the people as a whole. It is letting the people decide the fate of the FNPP through a referendum. It is letting the entire community participate in the referendum. This decision is surely better than merely sitting back and watching the opposition DPP and anti-nuclear groups engage in pressure group warfare and turning Taiwan into a powder keg. It is far more responsible. We hope that this will be a public referendum in which the people participate enthusiastically. Regardless what the outcome turns out to be, we hope everyone will respect the collective decision of the people.
This newspaper was the first media organization to advocate a resolution of the 4NPP controversy via a referendum. Public referenda are the last resort for democratic societies attempting to resolve social differences. Having said that, we must recognize the limits to referenda. Referenda can ask only simple "yes" or "no" questions. They cannot ask more complex questions. They cannot tell people how to get from point A to point B. Even if the result of the referendum is that the people choose to continue construction on the 4NPP, it does not mean that disputes over the 4NPP will subside. Any negligence on the part of Taipower, or continued provocation by opponents of the 4NPP, could cause the flames of war to spread. In fact, if the public on Taiwan really wants to resolve the problem, it should change its focus from nuclear safety to non-nuclear power generation. That will require expert calculations and an active search for alternatives. That is not something a referendum can resolve. That will require combined governmental and private efforts.
The current wave of anti-nuclear sentiment includes many fresh faces from the middle-class. They are concerned about environment, both for themselves and for future generations. For them, unlike for the DPP, controversy over nuclear power generation is not a political tool. This is an encouraging phenomenon. They realize the waffling DPP cannot be trusted. They are keeping the DPP at arm's lenght. That is why the DPP's recent anti-nuclear initiatives have been so feeble.
Think about it. When Su Tseng-chang was premier, he approved over 40 billion dollars for the 4NPP. Now however, he is demanding a halt to its construction. The DPP has demand a public referendum on the 4NPP for decades. Now that the KMT has actually agreed to just such a referendum, the DPP is suddenly insisting that "No referendum is needed." Is the DPP merely caught in a contradiction? Or is the DPP at the end of its rope?
民進黨對核四公投前恭後倨
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.02.27 03:31 am
民間反核聲浪日漸強大，府院共同拍板將核四停建議題交付公投。未料，一向力挺公投的民進黨卻反而開始游移搖擺，主席蘇貞昌甚至說，核四不必公投，馬總統直接下令停工即可。
此種論調，讓人匪夷所思。民進黨一向歌頌「人民意志」不遺餘力，且奉「全民公投」如聖旨，「核四公投」亦是民進黨的招牌飯；如今政府要將爭議交付公投，由全民決定核四存廢，民進黨應該鼓掌叫好才對，為何反而說「總統下令即可」？
難道民進黨是「葉公好龍」，嘴巴上高喊民意、高呼公投，其實不願以公投與民意攤牌？或者其目的只在「項莊舞劍」，把民意和公投當成戲法來耍，並不關心問題的解決與否。
不僅如此，綠營還針對核四公投另外提出了幾項奇特的條件，包括：一，要求修改「公投法」，降低公投過關門檻；二，將公投題目由「是否支持停建」改為「是否支持續建」；三，不可全台公投，應僅限由「新北市」公民投票等。這些主張，恐均令人難以理解與苟同。
現行「公投法」規定，公投議題需有半數以上公民投票，並有過半以上有效票同意，公投才算過關。這樣的門檻，其實出自扁政府所製訂的「公投法」，並不算高。台灣過去多次公投無法過關，主要是因為絕大多數屬於「假議題」，目的是用來「綁選舉」炒熱選情，故而引不起民眾的參與興趣，而無法達到投票門檻。核四是全民利益切身相關的重大議題，有機會呼喚公民熱烈參與，形成一個真正展現民意的公投；此時若特意去修法降低門檻，除了「量身打造」的意圖太鮮明，不也在玩弄法制嗎？
再說，核四是政府花費三千多億興建，全出自民脂民膏；且核四興廢事關日後民生電價至鉅，這絕非一鄉一市之事，當然應由全民共同決定，而不能只在新北市舉辦地域性公投。至於公投題目的擬訂，「停建」或「續建」之措詞，確實可能給予民眾正向或負向之暗示。但台灣民眾並不愚昧，如果在公投前提供給民眾的資訊足夠完整而透明，且經過充分溝通而不是刻意煽動，兩者得到的結果應不會有太多出入。那麼，政治人物有必要藉此來混淆民眾的認知嗎？
執政黨的態度其實相當清楚：要在安全無虞的前提下續建核四，並使之運轉。但因為許多民眾對此有鉅大的疑慮，因此馬政府把決定權交給全民，讓人民透過公投來決定核四的命運，然後整個社會共同承擔公投的結果。這樣的選擇，至少比坐視在野黨及反核團體在那裡不斷施壓，讓整個台灣處於壓力鍋似的緊張狀態，要顯得負責得多。我們也期待這是一個全民熱烈參與的有效公投，不論結局如何，大家都能尊重人們共同的選擇。
本報是率先主張核四爭議以公投方式解決的媒體，因為這是民主社會解決社會歧見的最後手段。但話說回來，我們也必須承認：公投的效用其實有其極限。公投僅能顯示簡單的「是」或「否」，卻不能回答更複雜的問題，更不能為人們指出從甲地到乙地的路徑應如何行進。即使這次公投的結果是人民選擇續建核四，也不表示核四的紛爭至此將全然平息；因為台電的任何疏忽，或反對者的持續挑釁，都可能使戰火延燒。事實上，台灣真正要解決的，是如何走向真正的「從核安到非核」；那需要專家更精密地評估與計算，同時更積極地尋找替代方案；那條路，就不是公投所能解決，而需要政府和民間更努力地溝通與思考。
這波的反核聲浪，出現不少中產階級的清新臉孔，其關懷更著重家園的維護及下一代的生存環境，與先前民進黨作為政治工具的反核訴求不同，這是可喜現象。正因為如此，他們知道立場反反覆覆的民進黨並不可靠，並設法與之保持距離，這也是民進黨此次反核表現得如此虛弱的原因所在。
試想：蘇貞昌任內通過四百多億核四預算，現在卻在喊停建；民進黨歷年發動過多少回核四公投，現在竟對國民黨提議的核四公投說「不必」。這是民進黨圖窮匕現的自我矛盾？或者已是黔驢技窮？
Monday, February 25, 2013
Our Cross-Strait Path will Determine Our Destiny
Our Cross-Strait Path will Determine Our Destiny
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 26, 2013
Summary: Yesterday morning Ang Lee won the Academy Award. Yesterday afternoon, the Ma administration announced that the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant would be submitted to a popular referendum. These events nearly eclipsed the Lien-Xi Summit in Beijing, but they did not diminish its significance.
Full Text below:
Yesterday morning Ang Lee won the Academy Award. Yesterday afternoon, the Ma administration announced that the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant would be submitted to a popular referendum. These events nearly eclipsed the Lien-Xi Summit in Beijing, but they did not diminish its significance.
Lien Chan has repeatedly stressed that his current visit is merely "revisiting old times." He has said that he is "not representing any political party or organization." The Presidential Office said President Ma did not entrust Lien Chan with any specific tasks, but that he was happy to see Lien Chan visit the Mainland as a private citizen. This is usually the blessing that an outsider gives an insider.
The tone which Ma and Lien set for the Lien-Xi Summit is certainly unusual. Viewed pessimistically, it implies that the Ma administration expects little if anything new from the Lien-Xi Summit. Viewed optimistically, Lien Chan is free from official encumbrances. He can speak for himself. He is not bound by any Ma administration or KMT shackles. The Ma administration can then, at its own discretion, take advantage of any opportunity that might arise to make a political overture to Beijing.
Yesterday the Lien-Xi Summit convened. The initial expectation was that Lien and Xi would use the occasion to announce a new cross-Strait policy. Now it seems, they will merely offer pleasantries and generalities. There has been no mention of new developments. There has been no mention even of "exploring political relations under special circumstances in which the two sides have yet to be reunified," as mentioned in the CCP 18th Party Congress Political Report. Nor has there been any mention of any other issues. Lien Chan declared that the summit was not being held for the sake of any particular political party's selfish, short term interests. Instead, he said the things that neither the Ma administration nor the Beijing authorities dared to say or could say. This is worth contemplating.
Lien Chan mentioned the CCP 18th Party Congress Political Report and other related documents. He referred to passages such as "exploring political relations under special circumstances in which the two sides have yet to be reunified," "taking the two sides' existing provisions as a point of departure," "seeking points of linkage," and "making fair and reasonable arrangements." Lien praised these as both realistic and visionary. He said he felt precisely the same way. Had Lien Chan attended the summit as an envoy of the Ma administration, or of the KMT, he would have found it impossible to publicly endorse such views. He would have been in no position to express himself so freely.
Furthermore, Lien Chan said he hoped the two sides could use these views as a point of departure, explore them in depth, arrive at a consensus, and establish a balanced, equal, and effective (pre-reunification) political framework." Lien Chan first endorsed Beijing's call for "exploring political relations under special circumstances in which the two sides have yet to be reunified," "making a fair and reasonable arrangements," and "using the two sides' existing provisions as a point of departure." Only then did he propose that the two sides establish a "balanced, equal, and effective (pre-reunification) political framework."
Both sides face a dilemma. Beijing's reasoning is often vague. For example, what exactly does "yet to be reunified" mean? What exactly do "special circumstances" refer to? This is why Taipei is afraid and unwilling to set forth any concrete proposals in response. Taipei is afraid of falling into a trap. For example, Beijing spoke of "exploring political relations under special circumstances in which the two sides have yet to be reunified." But do these "special circumstances" mean that "Republic of China and the People's Republic are equal?" Beijing has yet to say. Consider another example: "using the two sides' existing provisions as a point of departure." Beijng has yet to say "using the two sides' existing constitutions as a point of departure." That is why many on Taiwan may be willing to endorse "exploring political relations under special circumstances in which the two sides have yet to be reunified." But few expect concrete results. As a result, many on Taiwan simply refuse to listen to such proposals from Beijing. Lien Chan, on the other hand, is attempting to explore the practical significance of these vague concepts and thinking about how to implement them in the real world.
Lien Chan said, "History led to 1949, and the split between authorities on the two sides. This is an objective fact." He then said, "Political differences between the two sides remain. On the one hand, we (the two sides) have divided rule and mutual respect. On the other hand, we must increase cooperation, and seek a win-win scenario." Lien said that "under these special circumstances, the two sides' have different interpretations of the meaning of "one China." But both sides can "seek a shared framework of one China, while holding different interpretations of the definition of one China."
Beijing often advances vague proposals regarding "one China." Lien Chan apparently feels that failure to clarify the political realities of agreements and disagreements over the definition of one China, makes it impossible to implement such proposals. Lien and Xi met in private for 30 minutes. We are confident the two will be able to offer a clearer explanation.
Lien Chan held back somewhat. But what he said was unprecedented in its frankness and depth. Had Lien Chan been Ma Ying-jeou's envoy, he could not have expressed himself so bluntly. Lien Chan has credibilty with the public on both sides. He is also an icon of the Blue Camp on Taiwan. Lien Chan has been frank in expressing his views on cross-Strait policy. His views ought to be considered the bottom line consensus on Taiwan. This is a serious issue that the two sides must face. Lien Chan was not a representative of the Ma administration. In point of fact, he was a representative of something far bigger and far more significant.
Beijing may not have been happy to hear Lien Chan expressing such views. But Lien Chan expressed agreement with Xi Jinping's declaration that "one's path determines one's destiny." The cross-Strait path must not be for the sake of any one political party's selfish, short term interests.
兩岸警句：道路決定命運
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.02.26 04:11 am
昨天上午李安獲奧斯卡金像獎，及昨天下午馬政府宣布核四訴諸公投的消息，幾乎淹沒了北京連習會的新聞，但並不能減損這場兩岸高峰會的意義。
行前，連戰方面一再強調此行只是「走春訪舊」，「不代表任何政黨或團體」；總統府方面則稱，馬總統對連戰此行「並未託付特定任務」，但對連戰此行以「民間身分」訪問大陸樂觀其成。「樂觀其成」一語，通常是用在局外人對局內人的祝福。
馬連二人如此定調雙方在「連習會」的關係，確非尋常。倘就消極面看，似顯示馬政府對此次連習會的創新與發展未抱太大期望；但若就積極面看，則連戰既擺脫了「代表馬政府或國民黨」的身分羈絆，也許就取得了自由發言的較大空間，而馬政府也可藉此對北京作出政治試探。
從昨日連習會公開的訊息看出，原來被認為將藉此會宣示重大兩岸政策綱領的習近平，竟只見寒暄及泛泛之論；非但未聞什麼創見，連中共十八大報告所言「探討尚未統一特殊情況下的兩岸政治關係」等議題亦未論及。相對而言，連戰的表述，如他自稱「不是為了一黨一己之私，一地一時之利」，反而說出了一些馬政府與北京當局皆不敢說或不便說的話，啟人深思。
連戰說，他認為，中共十八大政治報告及相關文件中提到的「探討尚未統一特殊情況下的兩岸政治關係」、「從兩岸現行規定出發」、「尋找一個中國的連結點」、「作出合情合理的安排」等觀點，皆是「既正視現實，又高瞻遠矚的見解」，並表示對此「深有同感」。倘若連戰是以馬政府或國民黨代表的身分赴會，即不可能公開贊同此類觀點，也不會有如此發言的自由空間。
然而，再進一步，連戰則說，希望兩岸能從這些觀點上出發，展開探討，累積共識，「建立（尚未統一的）一種平衡、對等、有效的政治架構」。這是因為連戰先贊同了北京所稱「探討尚未統一特殊情況下的兩岸政治關係，作出合情合理的安排」，及「從兩岸現行規定出發」等語，始能提出在兩岸「建立（尚未統一的）一種平衡、對等、有效的政治架構」。
兩岸的困局在於：北京的論述往往失諸空泛，例如「尚未統一」究何所指？「特殊情況」又作何論？因此台灣不願也不敢對這些空泛的論述提出落實的主張，以免墜入陷阱。例如，北京稱「探討尚未統一特殊情況下的兩岸政治關係」，卻不能將此種「特殊情況」落實到「中華民國與中華人民共和國平衡對等」的現實；又如，北京稱「從兩岸現行規定出發」，卻不能落實到「從兩岸現行憲法出發」的現實。因此，即使台灣不乏有人贊同「探討尚未統一特殊情況下的兩岸政治關係」之理念，卻很少有人對此一理念的落實懷抱期待。所以，對於北京的提議，台灣往往只知拒絕或擱置；但連戰此次則嘗試探究這些空泛概念的實際意義及如何落實。
連戰說：「歷史造成了一九四九年的兩岸當局互不隸屬，這是客觀的事實。」再稱：「在雙方的政治分歧仍然存在之際，我們（兩岸）一方面分工治理、相互尊重，一方面加強合作、謀求雙贏。」又稱：「在當前特殊情況下，兩岸對『一個中國』各有不同表述，但雙方完全可以『求一中架構之同，存一中涵義之異』。」
北京常持「一個中國」的空泛主張，但連戰顯然認為，若不能在政治現實上釐清「一個中國的同與異」，則一切議題皆不可能落實。應可相信，在連習二人單獨會面的三十分鐘中，雙方可能有更直率的剖析。
連戰雖仍語帶保留，但其言論內容已是前所未有的直率與深入。連戰此行若是「馬英九的代表」，即不可能說得如此直白；而連戰是兩岸公認的可以信服的人物，亦為台灣泛藍主流的重要標誌，如今連戰坦率地表達了他的兩岸觀點，應可視為台灣民意的共識與底線，這是兩岸皆必須嚴肅正視者。連戰此行不代表馬政府，但其實有更大與更高的代表性。
客觀而論，北京當局可能並未預見也並不樂見連戰表達這類的觀點；但連戰既表達贊同習近平所說的「道路決定命運」，則兩岸的道路，應當即是「不為一黨一己之私，不為一時一地之利」的道路！
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 26, 2013
Summary: Yesterday morning Ang Lee won the Academy Award. Yesterday afternoon, the Ma administration announced that the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant would be submitted to a popular referendum. These events nearly eclipsed the Lien-Xi Summit in Beijing, but they did not diminish its significance.
Full Text below:
Yesterday morning Ang Lee won the Academy Award. Yesterday afternoon, the Ma administration announced that the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant would be submitted to a popular referendum. These events nearly eclipsed the Lien-Xi Summit in Beijing, but they did not diminish its significance.
Lien Chan has repeatedly stressed that his current visit is merely "revisiting old times." He has said that he is "not representing any political party or organization." The Presidential Office said President Ma did not entrust Lien Chan with any specific tasks, but that he was happy to see Lien Chan visit the Mainland as a private citizen. This is usually the blessing that an outsider gives an insider.
The tone which Ma and Lien set for the Lien-Xi Summit is certainly unusual. Viewed pessimistically, it implies that the Ma administration expects little if anything new from the Lien-Xi Summit. Viewed optimistically, Lien Chan is free from official encumbrances. He can speak for himself. He is not bound by any Ma administration or KMT shackles. The Ma administration can then, at its own discretion, take advantage of any opportunity that might arise to make a political overture to Beijing.
Yesterday the Lien-Xi Summit convened. The initial expectation was that Lien and Xi would use the occasion to announce a new cross-Strait policy. Now it seems, they will merely offer pleasantries and generalities. There has been no mention of new developments. There has been no mention even of "exploring political relations under special circumstances in which the two sides have yet to be reunified," as mentioned in the CCP 18th Party Congress Political Report. Nor has there been any mention of any other issues. Lien Chan declared that the summit was not being held for the sake of any particular political party's selfish, short term interests. Instead, he said the things that neither the Ma administration nor the Beijing authorities dared to say or could say. This is worth contemplating.
Lien Chan mentioned the CCP 18th Party Congress Political Report and other related documents. He referred to passages such as "exploring political relations under special circumstances in which the two sides have yet to be reunified," "taking the two sides' existing provisions as a point of departure," "seeking points of linkage," and "making fair and reasonable arrangements." Lien praised these as both realistic and visionary. He said he felt precisely the same way. Had Lien Chan attended the summit as an envoy of the Ma administration, or of the KMT, he would have found it impossible to publicly endorse such views. He would have been in no position to express himself so freely.
Furthermore, Lien Chan said he hoped the two sides could use these views as a point of departure, explore them in depth, arrive at a consensus, and establish a balanced, equal, and effective (pre-reunification) political framework." Lien Chan first endorsed Beijing's call for "exploring political relations under special circumstances in which the two sides have yet to be reunified," "making a fair and reasonable arrangements," and "using the two sides' existing provisions as a point of departure." Only then did he propose that the two sides establish a "balanced, equal, and effective (pre-reunification) political framework."
Both sides face a dilemma. Beijing's reasoning is often vague. For example, what exactly does "yet to be reunified" mean? What exactly do "special circumstances" refer to? This is why Taipei is afraid and unwilling to set forth any concrete proposals in response. Taipei is afraid of falling into a trap. For example, Beijing spoke of "exploring political relations under special circumstances in which the two sides have yet to be reunified." But do these "special circumstances" mean that "Republic of China and the People's Republic are equal?" Beijing has yet to say. Consider another example: "using the two sides' existing provisions as a point of departure." Beijng has yet to say "using the two sides' existing constitutions as a point of departure." That is why many on Taiwan may be willing to endorse "exploring political relations under special circumstances in which the two sides have yet to be reunified." But few expect concrete results. As a result, many on Taiwan simply refuse to listen to such proposals from Beijing. Lien Chan, on the other hand, is attempting to explore the practical significance of these vague concepts and thinking about how to implement them in the real world.
Lien Chan said, "History led to 1949, and the split between authorities on the two sides. This is an objective fact." He then said, "Political differences between the two sides remain. On the one hand, we (the two sides) have divided rule and mutual respect. On the other hand, we must increase cooperation, and seek a win-win scenario." Lien said that "under these special circumstances, the two sides' have different interpretations of the meaning of "one China." But both sides can "seek a shared framework of one China, while holding different interpretations of the definition of one China."
Beijing often advances vague proposals regarding "one China." Lien Chan apparently feels that failure to clarify the political realities of agreements and disagreements over the definition of one China, makes it impossible to implement such proposals. Lien and Xi met in private for 30 minutes. We are confident the two will be able to offer a clearer explanation.
Lien Chan held back somewhat. But what he said was unprecedented in its frankness and depth. Had Lien Chan been Ma Ying-jeou's envoy, he could not have expressed himself so bluntly. Lien Chan has credibilty with the public on both sides. He is also an icon of the Blue Camp on Taiwan. Lien Chan has been frank in expressing his views on cross-Strait policy. His views ought to be considered the bottom line consensus on Taiwan. This is a serious issue that the two sides must face. Lien Chan was not a representative of the Ma administration. In point of fact, he was a representative of something far bigger and far more significant.
Beijing may not have been happy to hear Lien Chan expressing such views. But Lien Chan expressed agreement with Xi Jinping's declaration that "one's path determines one's destiny." The cross-Strait path must not be for the sake of any one political party's selfish, short term interests.
兩岸警句：道路決定命運
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.02.26 04:11 am
昨天上午李安獲奧斯卡金像獎，及昨天下午馬政府宣布核四訴諸公投的消息，幾乎淹沒了北京連習會的新聞，但並不能減損這場兩岸高峰會的意義。
行前，連戰方面一再強調此行只是「走春訪舊」，「不代表任何政黨或團體」；總統府方面則稱，馬總統對連戰此行「並未託付特定任務」，但對連戰此行以「民間身分」訪問大陸樂觀其成。「樂觀其成」一語，通常是用在局外人對局內人的祝福。
馬連二人如此定調雙方在「連習會」的關係，確非尋常。倘就消極面看，似顯示馬政府對此次連習會的創新與發展未抱太大期望；但若就積極面看，則連戰既擺脫了「代表馬政府或國民黨」的身分羈絆，也許就取得了自由發言的較大空間，而馬政府也可藉此對北京作出政治試探。
從昨日連習會公開的訊息看出，原來被認為將藉此會宣示重大兩岸政策綱領的習近平，竟只見寒暄及泛泛之論；非但未聞什麼創見，連中共十八大報告所言「探討尚未統一特殊情況下的兩岸政治關係」等議題亦未論及。相對而言，連戰的表述，如他自稱「不是為了一黨一己之私，一地一時之利」，反而說出了一些馬政府與北京當局皆不敢說或不便說的話，啟人深思。
連戰說，他認為，中共十八大政治報告及相關文件中提到的「探討尚未統一特殊情況下的兩岸政治關係」、「從兩岸現行規定出發」、「尋找一個中國的連結點」、「作出合情合理的安排」等觀點，皆是「既正視現實，又高瞻遠矚的見解」，並表示對此「深有同感」。倘若連戰是以馬政府或國民黨代表的身分赴會，即不可能公開贊同此類觀點，也不會有如此發言的自由空間。
然而，再進一步，連戰則說，希望兩岸能從這些觀點上出發，展開探討，累積共識，「建立（尚未統一的）一種平衡、對等、有效的政治架構」。這是因為連戰先贊同了北京所稱「探討尚未統一特殊情況下的兩岸政治關係，作出合情合理的安排」，及「從兩岸現行規定出發」等語，始能提出在兩岸「建立（尚未統一的）一種平衡、對等、有效的政治架構」。
兩岸的困局在於：北京的論述往往失諸空泛，例如「尚未統一」究何所指？「特殊情況」又作何論？因此台灣不願也不敢對這些空泛的論述提出落實的主張，以免墜入陷阱。例如，北京稱「探討尚未統一特殊情況下的兩岸政治關係」，卻不能將此種「特殊情況」落實到「中華民國與中華人民共和國平衡對等」的現實；又如，北京稱「從兩岸現行規定出發」，卻不能落實到「從兩岸現行憲法出發」的現實。因此，即使台灣不乏有人贊同「探討尚未統一特殊情況下的兩岸政治關係」之理念，卻很少有人對此一理念的落實懷抱期待。所以，對於北京的提議，台灣往往只知拒絕或擱置；但連戰此次則嘗試探究這些空泛概念的實際意義及如何落實。
連戰說：「歷史造成了一九四九年的兩岸當局互不隸屬，這是客觀的事實。」再稱：「在雙方的政治分歧仍然存在之際，我們（兩岸）一方面分工治理、相互尊重，一方面加強合作、謀求雙贏。」又稱：「在當前特殊情況下，兩岸對『一個中國』各有不同表述，但雙方完全可以『求一中架構之同，存一中涵義之異』。」
北京常持「一個中國」的空泛主張，但連戰顯然認為，若不能在政治現實上釐清「一個中國的同與異」，則一切議題皆不可能落實。應可相信，在連習二人單獨會面的三十分鐘中，雙方可能有更直率的剖析。
連戰雖仍語帶保留，但其言論內容已是前所未有的直率與深入。連戰此行若是「馬英九的代表」，即不可能說得如此直白；而連戰是兩岸公認的可以信服的人物，亦為台灣泛藍主流的重要標誌，如今連戰坦率地表達了他的兩岸觀點，應可視為台灣民意的共識與底線，這是兩岸皆必須嚴肅正視者。連戰此行不代表馬政府，但其實有更大與更高的代表性。
客觀而論，北京當局可能並未預見也並不樂見連戰表達這類的觀點；但連戰既表達贊同習近平所說的「道路決定命運」，則兩岸的道路，應當即是「不為一黨一己之私，不為一時一地之利」的道路！
Sunday, February 24, 2013
Two Cannots and One Must Not
Two Cannots and One Must Not
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 20, 2013
Summary: Can the Lien-Xi Summit discuss and explore cross-strait political relations under special circumstances in which the two sides have yet to be reunified? Can it make fair and reasonable arrangements? Hopefully the two sides will consult this newspaper's "big roof concept of China." This concept is fully consistent with the aforementioned four conditions: "yet to be reunified, special circumstances, political relations, fair and reasonable." It also falls entirely within the scope of one China.
Full Text below:
Today, just before Lien Chan and Xi Jinping met each other, let us consider what the future of cross-Strait relations might be.
As we see it, the two sides are constrained by "Two Cannots" and one "Must Not." The Taiwan side is constrained by Two Cannots. 1. Taiwan independence cannot succeed. Taiwan independence is impossible. Therefore Taiwan independence is not an option. 2. The Republic of China cannot exercise authority over Mainland China. It cannot realistically assert that it is the sole authority over all China. If it attempts to do so, it could end up devoured by the People's Republic of China. The Mainland side is constrained by One Must Not. Even if it can to eliminate the Republic of China by force, consider the price it paid for the June 4 Tiananmen Square Incident. If Beijing actually eradicated the Republic of China by force, the political price would be inestimable.
Take the Two Cannots. The public on Taiwan and the Republic of China government must find a way to be part of one China. Take the One Must Not. Beijing must adopt peaceful means when dealing with the Republic of China. The main test for peace is democracy. In other words, Beijing must not use force to eliminate the Republic of China. It must adopt inclusive democratic means to deal with and coexist with the ROC.
The Two Cannots and the One Must Not are preconditions. That is why the Chinese Communist Party 18th Party Congress concluded that it must "evaluate the special circumstances under the two sides have yet to be reunified, and make fair and reasonable arrangements." In this, it demonstrated considerable vision. It must first make fair and reasonable arrangements in response to special circumstances in which the two sides have yet to be reunified. Otherwise how can it champion fair and reasonable reunification? How can it persude people to accept reunificaton?
Beijing advocates reunification. But it must not use force to eliminate the Republic of China. It must use democratic means to deal with special, yet to be reunified, cross-Strait circumstances. In other words, it must acknowledge the special circumstances under which the Republic of China and the People's Republic of China coexist, side by side. It must attempt to establish a framework for cross-Strait political relations under special circumstances in which the two sides have yet to be reunified. It must persuade people on Taiwan to agree that the Republic of China is part of China, under special circumstances in which the two sides have yet to be reunifed. Otherwise how can Beijing persuade people on Taiwan to think of themselves as Chinese. How can they speak of reunification?
Conversely, many on Taiwan are terrified to discuss reunification. But the matter of reunification will not go away merely because they are afraid and avoid it. The public on Taiwan cannot wish away the matter of reunification. They must seek instead to manage and moderate the reunification process. They must not evade the issue of one China. They should seek a foothold for the Republic of China within the scope of one China. The public on Taiwan avoids discussion of cross-Strait political relations. But they would be better advised to actively set conditions for cross-Strait political relations. In other words, they should seek to establish fair and reasonable cross-Strait political relations under special circumstances in which the two sides have yet to be reunified. Such political relations would of course recognize the Republic of China. Otherwise, how could they be fair and reasonable?
Beijing has made cross-Strait political relations under special circumstances in which the two sides have yet to be reunified its official cross-Strait policy. It realizes that no resolution to cross-Strait relations is possible in the near term. It realizes that no resolution can be achieved by force or by political and economic coercion. Therefore the two sides must adopt a long-term perspective. They must acknowledge the reality of special circumstances, and seek to establish fair and reasonable political relations, as a framework for cross-Strait peace and stability in the interim. In other words, the focus of cross-Strait policy should shift from far off goal of reunification, to the long term process of reunification. .
Beijing opposes Taiwan independence under special circumstances in which the two sides have yet to be reunified. But it cannot deny the existence of the Republic of China. The Republic of China is not Taiwan independence. The Republic of China is China. It is also a republic. The Republic of China opposes forcible or undemocratic reunification. Therefore it must seek fair and reasonable cross-Strait political relations under special circumstance in which the two sides have yet to be reunified. It should seek to manage and moderate the reunification process. The ROC must seize the bully pulpit and set the agenda. It must establish fair and reasonable political relations under special circumstances in which the two sides have yet to be reunified. Otherwise that agenda will be set by someone else.
Can the Lien-Xi Summit discuss and explore cross-strait political relations under special circumstances in which the two sides have yet to be reunified? Can it make fair and reasonable arrangements? Hopefully the two sides will consult this newspaper's "big roof concept of China." This concept is fully consistent with the aforementioned four conditions: "yet to be reunified, special circumstances, political relations, fair and reasonable." It also falls entirely within the scope of one China.
The big roof concept of China means that under a big roof China, the Republic of China is democratic China, while the People's Republic of China is socialist China. Both are part of China. Both belong to a big roof concept of China whose sovereignty is shared and unified.
兩個不可能與一個不可以
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.02.25 03:03 am
在今日連戰與習近平互會之前，雙方可將兩岸未來情勢作一想像。
我們認為，兩岸的未來，有兩個不可能，與一個不可以。對台灣言，有「兩個不可能」：一、台獨不可能，所以台獨已非選項；二、「一個中國是中華民國」亦不可能，若採此途，最後可能在困迫又不合理的情勢下被「一個中國是中華人民共和國」所吞滅。大陸則有「一個不可以」，即不可以用武力消滅中華民國；試想，一個六四天安門事件的帳就難以償付了，倘若北京真以武力將民主政體中華民國消滅，其政治債務更將永難清償。
在「兩個不可能」之下，台灣或中華民國必須在「一個中國」的範圍中找到立足點。另在「一個不可以」之下，北京唯有採取和平的方法面對中華民國，而和平的方法最主要的檢驗標準即是民主；也就是說，北京既不可用武力消滅中華民國，唯一的辦法就是必須以民主的方法來包容及對待中華民國。
在「兩個不可能與一個不可以」之下，中共十八大所楬櫫的「探討尚未統一特殊情況下的兩岸政治關係，作出合情合理的安排」，即顯得有其見地。因為，若不能先就「尚未統一的特殊情況，作出合情合理的安排」，如何會有「合情合理的統一」，又如何教人接受「統一」？
北京主張「統一」，但若不可能（不可以）用武力消滅中華民國，即必須用民主的方法來處理「尚未統一」的兩岸關係，也就是必須正視「中華民國與中華人民共和國」對等並立的「特殊情況」，以設法在此一架構上建立「尚未統一特殊情況下的兩岸政治關係」。畢竟，若不能在「尚未統一」的「特殊情況下」，使台灣人民先認同「中華民國是一部分的中國」，將如何使台灣人民自我認同為「中國人」，更如何奢言「統一」？
另一頭，台灣怕談「統一」，但「統一」的議題卻不會因畏懼或逃避而消失。台灣若不能塗銷「統一」議題，即應設法操持與節制統一議題；亦因此，非但不須逃避「一個中國」的題目，更應在「一個中國」的範圍內找到中華民國的立足點。同理，台灣與其避談「兩岸政治關係」，其實不如對「兩岸政治關係」提出條件與主張，也就是應當爭取在「尚未統一的特殊情況」中，建構「合情合理的兩岸政治關係」。而此一「政治關係」，當然應以涵容中華民國為要件，捨此豈有可能合情合理？
北京既將「尚未統一特殊情況下的兩岸政治關係」，作為一個正式的兩岸政策議題，即意味著已經認知到，兩岸的終局解決絕非短期可以獲致，更絕非憑藉武力或政經暴力所能獲致；因此，雙方皆應有從長計議的打算，在相互尊重「特殊情況」的共識下，建立一種「合情合理的政治關係」，以作為兩岸「尚未統一」和平穩定的互動平台。也就是說，兩岸應將政策焦點，由「統一」的久遠目標，轉移至「尚未統一」的長期過程。
在「尚未統一的特殊情況下」，北京反台獨，但不能抹殺中華民國，因為中華民國不是台獨，而是「中華」及「民國」；相對而言，中華民國若反對武力統一或不民主的統一，就更應爭取「尚未統一特殊情況下的合情合理的兩岸政治關係」，用為操持及節制統一議題的憑藉。倘若中華民國不能在「尚未統一的特殊情況下」，經由「合情合理的政治關係」取得話語權及節制權，則情勢即可能照著別人的劇本演出。
如果今日連習會論及「探討尚未統一特殊情況下的兩岸政治關係，作出合情合理的安排」，希望雙方皆能參考本報社論所提出的「大屋頂中國論」；因為，此論完全符合「尚未統一／特殊情況／政治關係／合情合理」四個條件，亦在「一個中國」的範圍之內。
大屋頂中國：在大屋頂中國下，中華民國是民主中國，中華人民共和國是社會主義中國，兩者皆是一部分的中國，同屬主權相互含蘊並共同合成的「一個（大屋頂）中國」。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 20, 2013
Summary: Can the Lien-Xi Summit discuss and explore cross-strait political relations under special circumstances in which the two sides have yet to be reunified? Can it make fair and reasonable arrangements? Hopefully the two sides will consult this newspaper's "big roof concept of China." This concept is fully consistent with the aforementioned four conditions: "yet to be reunified, special circumstances, political relations, fair and reasonable." It also falls entirely within the scope of one China.
Full Text below:
Today, just before Lien Chan and Xi Jinping met each other, let us consider what the future of cross-Strait relations might be.
As we see it, the two sides are constrained by "Two Cannots" and one "Must Not." The Taiwan side is constrained by Two Cannots. 1. Taiwan independence cannot succeed. Taiwan independence is impossible. Therefore Taiwan independence is not an option. 2. The Republic of China cannot exercise authority over Mainland China. It cannot realistically assert that it is the sole authority over all China. If it attempts to do so, it could end up devoured by the People's Republic of China. The Mainland side is constrained by One Must Not. Even if it can to eliminate the Republic of China by force, consider the price it paid for the June 4 Tiananmen Square Incident. If Beijing actually eradicated the Republic of China by force, the political price would be inestimable.
Take the Two Cannots. The public on Taiwan and the Republic of China government must find a way to be part of one China. Take the One Must Not. Beijing must adopt peaceful means when dealing with the Republic of China. The main test for peace is democracy. In other words, Beijing must not use force to eliminate the Republic of China. It must adopt inclusive democratic means to deal with and coexist with the ROC.
The Two Cannots and the One Must Not are preconditions. That is why the Chinese Communist Party 18th Party Congress concluded that it must "evaluate the special circumstances under the two sides have yet to be reunified, and make fair and reasonable arrangements." In this, it demonstrated considerable vision. It must first make fair and reasonable arrangements in response to special circumstances in which the two sides have yet to be reunified. Otherwise how can it champion fair and reasonable reunification? How can it persude people to accept reunificaton?
Beijing advocates reunification. But it must not use force to eliminate the Republic of China. It must use democratic means to deal with special, yet to be reunified, cross-Strait circumstances. In other words, it must acknowledge the special circumstances under which the Republic of China and the People's Republic of China coexist, side by side. It must attempt to establish a framework for cross-Strait political relations under special circumstances in which the two sides have yet to be reunified. It must persuade people on Taiwan to agree that the Republic of China is part of China, under special circumstances in which the two sides have yet to be reunifed. Otherwise how can Beijing persuade people on Taiwan to think of themselves as Chinese. How can they speak of reunification?
Conversely, many on Taiwan are terrified to discuss reunification. But the matter of reunification will not go away merely because they are afraid and avoid it. The public on Taiwan cannot wish away the matter of reunification. They must seek instead to manage and moderate the reunification process. They must not evade the issue of one China. They should seek a foothold for the Republic of China within the scope of one China. The public on Taiwan avoids discussion of cross-Strait political relations. But they would be better advised to actively set conditions for cross-Strait political relations. In other words, they should seek to establish fair and reasonable cross-Strait political relations under special circumstances in which the two sides have yet to be reunified. Such political relations would of course recognize the Republic of China. Otherwise, how could they be fair and reasonable?
Beijing has made cross-Strait political relations under special circumstances in which the two sides have yet to be reunified its official cross-Strait policy. It realizes that no resolution to cross-Strait relations is possible in the near term. It realizes that no resolution can be achieved by force or by political and economic coercion. Therefore the two sides must adopt a long-term perspective. They must acknowledge the reality of special circumstances, and seek to establish fair and reasonable political relations, as a framework for cross-Strait peace and stability in the interim. In other words, the focus of cross-Strait policy should shift from far off goal of reunification, to the long term process of reunification. .
Beijing opposes Taiwan independence under special circumstances in which the two sides have yet to be reunified. But it cannot deny the existence of the Republic of China. The Republic of China is not Taiwan independence. The Republic of China is China. It is also a republic. The Republic of China opposes forcible or undemocratic reunification. Therefore it must seek fair and reasonable cross-Strait political relations under special circumstance in which the two sides have yet to be reunified. It should seek to manage and moderate the reunification process. The ROC must seize the bully pulpit and set the agenda. It must establish fair and reasonable political relations under special circumstances in which the two sides have yet to be reunified. Otherwise that agenda will be set by someone else.
Can the Lien-Xi Summit discuss and explore cross-strait political relations under special circumstances in which the two sides have yet to be reunified? Can it make fair and reasonable arrangements? Hopefully the two sides will consult this newspaper's "big roof concept of China." This concept is fully consistent with the aforementioned four conditions: "yet to be reunified, special circumstances, political relations, fair and reasonable." It also falls entirely within the scope of one China.
The big roof concept of China means that under a big roof China, the Republic of China is democratic China, while the People's Republic of China is socialist China. Both are part of China. Both belong to a big roof concept of China whose sovereignty is shared and unified.
兩個不可能與一個不可以
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.02.25 03:03 am
在今日連戰與習近平互會之前，雙方可將兩岸未來情勢作一想像。
我們認為，兩岸的未來，有兩個不可能，與一個不可以。對台灣言，有「兩個不可能」：一、台獨不可能，所以台獨已非選項；二、「一個中國是中華民國」亦不可能，若採此途，最後可能在困迫又不合理的情勢下被「一個中國是中華人民共和國」所吞滅。大陸則有「一個不可以」，即不可以用武力消滅中華民國；試想，一個六四天安門事件的帳就難以償付了，倘若北京真以武力將民主政體中華民國消滅，其政治債務更將永難清償。
在「兩個不可能」之下，台灣或中華民國必須在「一個中國」的範圍中找到立足點。另在「一個不可以」之下，北京唯有採取和平的方法面對中華民國，而和平的方法最主要的檢驗標準即是民主；也就是說，北京既不可用武力消滅中華民國，唯一的辦法就是必須以民主的方法來包容及對待中華民國。
在「兩個不可能與一個不可以」之下，中共十八大所楬櫫的「探討尚未統一特殊情況下的兩岸政治關係，作出合情合理的安排」，即顯得有其見地。因為，若不能先就「尚未統一的特殊情況，作出合情合理的安排」，如何會有「合情合理的統一」，又如何教人接受「統一」？
北京主張「統一」，但若不可能（不可以）用武力消滅中華民國，即必須用民主的方法來處理「尚未統一」的兩岸關係，也就是必須正視「中華民國與中華人民共和國」對等並立的「特殊情況」，以設法在此一架構上建立「尚未統一特殊情況下的兩岸政治關係」。畢竟，若不能在「尚未統一」的「特殊情況下」，使台灣人民先認同「中華民國是一部分的中國」，將如何使台灣人民自我認同為「中國人」，更如何奢言「統一」？
另一頭，台灣怕談「統一」，但「統一」的議題卻不會因畏懼或逃避而消失。台灣若不能塗銷「統一」議題，即應設法操持與節制統一議題；亦因此，非但不須逃避「一個中國」的題目，更應在「一個中國」的範圍內找到中華民國的立足點。同理，台灣與其避談「兩岸政治關係」，其實不如對「兩岸政治關係」提出條件與主張，也就是應當爭取在「尚未統一的特殊情況」中，建構「合情合理的兩岸政治關係」。而此一「政治關係」，當然應以涵容中華民國為要件，捨此豈有可能合情合理？
北京既將「尚未統一特殊情況下的兩岸政治關係」，作為一個正式的兩岸政策議題，即意味著已經認知到，兩岸的終局解決絕非短期可以獲致，更絕非憑藉武力或政經暴力所能獲致；因此，雙方皆應有從長計議的打算，在相互尊重「特殊情況」的共識下，建立一種「合情合理的政治關係」，以作為兩岸「尚未統一」和平穩定的互動平台。也就是說，兩岸應將政策焦點，由「統一」的久遠目標，轉移至「尚未統一」的長期過程。
在「尚未統一的特殊情況下」，北京反台獨，但不能抹殺中華民國，因為中華民國不是台獨，而是「中華」及「民國」；相對而言，中華民國若反對武力統一或不民主的統一，就更應爭取「尚未統一特殊情況下的合情合理的兩岸政治關係」，用為操持及節制統一議題的憑藉。倘若中華民國不能在「尚未統一的特殊情況下」，經由「合情合理的政治關係」取得話語權及節制權，則情勢即可能照著別人的劇本演出。
如果今日連習會論及「探討尚未統一特殊情況下的兩岸政治關係，作出合情合理的安排」，希望雙方皆能參考本報社論所提出的「大屋頂中國論」；因為，此論完全符合「尚未統一／特殊情況／政治關係／合情合理」四個條件，亦在「一個中國」的範圍之內。
大屋頂中國：在大屋頂中國下，中華民國是民主中國，中華人民共和國是社會主義中國，兩者皆是一部分的中國，同屬主權相互含蘊並共同合成的「一個（大屋頂）中國」。
Friday, February 22, 2013
Professionalism and Politics: Two Facets of the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant
Professionalism and Politics:
Two Facets of the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 23, 2013
Summary: In democracies, the people are the bosses. The people have the final say. The controversy over the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant over the past twenty years has involved engineering problems. But the government never underwent the entire policy formulation process, from either a professional or political perspective. This led to our current plight, in which we cannot enjoy a moment's peace. By now, short-term pain is preferable to long-term pain. A storm is brewing over to nuclear power generation. For once, let the pain lead to a final outcome.
Full Text below:
The new cabinet has assumed power. The Legislative Yuan has convened a new session. This is the second anniversary of the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant additional budget, as well as Japan's Fukushima nuclear disaster. Public opposition to nuclear power generation is increasing. Protest marches demanding the abolition of nuclear power are about to begin throughout Taiwan. Protestors are even coordinating with supporters overseas. Even more worrisome, the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant issue has become a political football. There is virtually no room for rational debate. How is one to make any sense of the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant mess? One must first arrive at a decision that meets with the approval of the general public, because this issue is everyones' concern.
Planning for the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant resumed in 1992. Tender offers were made in 1995. Ground-breaking began in 1999. During that time, Taiwan has never had a moment's peace. Opponents have been motivated by moral and ideological objections as well as political opportunism. The public has paid an incalculable price. The Jiang Cabinet must now deal with the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant mess, and the anti-nuclear political storm. It must carry out the policy formuation process in full, without any shortcuts. It must put professionalism first and politics last. It must end over 20 years of wrangling over the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant.
Professionalism means doing everything to ascertain whether the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant can be successfully completed, and whether it will be safe after completion. The professional aspects must be addressed first. This is essential to any subsequent political management. The Number Four Nuclear Power Plant must be certified as safe by industry professionals. Only then can it begin commercial operation and provide parallel power generation. Only if the public remains skeptical, should a public referendum be held. Can industry professionals eliminate concerns about the safety of the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant? If they cannot, then the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant should not even exist, in which case there will be no need for a referendum.
The Number Four Nuclear Power Plant was originally supposed to be a turnkey operation. If successful, the quality would be assured, and any risk would be borne by the winning bidder. But the decision was made to use subcontractors. The risk must now be born by Taipower. Taipower officials were overly ambitious in their design goals. They lacked experience. They received no assistance from consultants. These factors greatly increased the difficulty of construction for this specialized nuclear power plant. Many interface conflicts and accuracy and stability problems had to be overcome. These led to the current halt in construction.
Taipower admits that it cannot solve the problems on its own. The Number Four Nuclear Power Plant has already cost 300 billion NTD. It is not far from completion. Naturally Taipower hopes the project than be brought back to life. Can internationally respected experts be found, to serve as project consultants, and cut the Gordian Knot? They may charge a high price. But progress is slow. Would a large, internationally respected company be willing to take charge of the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant and endorse its safety? That remains in question.
Taipower does not have the final say over whether the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant is safe. Nor will debates between academics and street protests yield valid conclusions. Only a rigorous testing program can. The program must test every system. It must then test hundreds of other systems. In particular, it must test the compatibility between instrumentation and controls at 40,000 points. Issues with the design, equipment, and construction must be resolved. Only then can the plant begin commercial operations without concern for safety. The Number Four Nuclear Power Plant cannot proceed with commissioning tests. That is why it is making virtually no progress.
President Ma has declared that "without nuclear safety, there can be no nuclear power." He wants to reassure the public. He has suggested inviting impartial international bodies to assess the situation. But finding impartial international bodies is easier said than done. One has come to the fore -- the nuclear power industry World Association of Nuclear Operators. But WANO is unsuitable. Years ago, before the Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant accident, WANO gave it its seal of approval. Taipower is also a WANO member. Alas, WANO lacks credibility.
Can a miracle worker be found to cure the ills of the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant? Can he help to pass rigorous commissioning tests? Can he guarantee that commercial operation would be safe? The public still has doubts about nuclear power generation. If it is unprepared to accept the possibility of an irreversible catastrophe, then the final stage of public policy formulation -- a public referendum -- will be essential.
The key to a public referendum is a critical discussion of all the factors. The public must be fully informed. The first thing the public must be informed about is the cost. Once nuclear power generation has been ruled out, electricity price hikes are guaranteed. But so far polls have only tracked fluctuations in support for non-nuclear power generation. They have totally ignored the matter of electricity rates. This gap must be addressed before an referendum can be held. This task cannot be performed by the official energy generation entity. It must be something that anyone can verify by accessing a national database. Only this will have the necessary credibility, and avoid the trap of intimidation via high electricity rates.
Next is the issue of power supply security. Taiwan has a single, independent power grid. This is the biggest worry in a non-nuclear power generation scenario. Summer electricity peaks, destruction of transmission loops by hurricanes, and maintenance for aging units will lead to power shortages. If people vote for non-nuclear power generation in a referendum, they must be psychologically prepared for a less secure power supply. Cross-Strait relations are warming. The government must be prepared to buy electricity from the Mainland. It must prepare for a difficult breakthrough in public thinking regarding Taiwan's independent power grid. Northern Fujian's Fuding Industry Plant is about to begin commercial operations. Fuqing has four units in two nuclear power plants. Their capacity is equal to two of Taiwan's Number Three Nuclear Power Plants. If they could provide Taiwan power through a submarine cable, it would at least ease our power shortage worries.
In democracies, the people are the bosses. The people have the final say. The controversy over the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant over the past twenty years has involved engineering problems. But the government never underwent the entire policy formulation process, from either a professional or political perspective. This led to our current plight, in which we cannot enjoy a moment's peace. By now, short-term pain is preferable to long-term pain. A storm is brewing over to nuclear power generation. For once, let the pain lead to a final outcome.
專業與政治：核四問題的兩個面向
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.02.23 01:58 am
隨著新內閣上任、立法院新會期開議、核四追加預算以及日本福島核災兩周年，民間反核氛圍愈見凝重，不但廢核遊行在全台將次第登場，甚至還海外跨國串連；更令人憂慮的是，核四議題已流於民粹，幾無溝通空間。如何從核四困境中理出頭緒，從而做出具民意基礎的抉擇，應是全民的共同關切。
核四計畫從八十一年恢復、八十四年招標、八十八年動工，其間擾攘幾乎從未有一刻停息過；不管是基於道德、理念的反核，或為了在政治上從中漁利而反，皆讓台灣社會付出難以估算的巨大代價。江內閣面對核四、非核的風浪，其職責在於務必應將公共政策的決策程序完整走完，先專業面，後政治面，俾為二十多年的核四紛爭畫下句點。
所謂專業面，是盡一切可能確認核四能否完工、能否排除安全疑慮；專業面先走完，則是為後續的政治處理準備要件。若核四在專業上經確認安全無虞，可以商轉、併聯發電，但民眾仍然存疑，那才有舉行公投的充分條件；但若在專業面得知核四安全疑慮無法排除，核四即不能存在，也就沒有接續公投的問題。
核四最早曾以統包（turn-key）招標，若成功，品質、風險由得標廠商負責；如今，卻因故改採分包後，風險已轉由自己承擔；在設計陳義過高、經驗不足，又無顧問公司協助下，大大增加了特殊型核電廠施工難度，在介面衝突、準確性、穩定性等方面有待克服之處極多，以致目前已處在實質停工狀態。
台電承認，靠自己無法解決問題，但核四已花了三千億，離完工目標已不遠，當然希望能救回來；因此在國際上苦尋能扮華佗角色的總顧問解開病灶，雖然開出天價，但進度有限；有信譽、也有技術能力的國際大廠是否願意接下這筆生意為核四安全背書，是個疑問。
專業面的核四安全認定，不是台電說了算，也不是學者辯論、街頭遊行可以獲致結論，只有經過嚴謹的「試運轉測試」程序一個途徑。先測試每個系統，再將百餘系統之間、尤其儀控達四萬個節點的相容關係進行完整測試，找出設計、設備、及施工上的所有問題，才能確認商轉有無安全疑慮。目前核四即因試運轉測試階段走不下去，幾乎全無進度。
馬總統揭示「沒有核安，就沒有核電」的原則，為確保國人放心，還特別提出「邀請公正的國際機構評估」的加乘保險構想，但找「公正的國際機構」談何容易？至少已浮上檯面、由核電產業界組成的「世界核能發電協會（ＷＡＮＯ）」即不適宜，福島核電廠事故前是ＷＡＮＯ多年評估的優等生，何況台電也是ＷＡＮＯ成員，恐怕缺乏公信力。
如果核四找到華佗相救克服病灶，完成嚴苛的試運轉測試，證實商轉發電安全無虞，但民眾仍認為核電存有「不確定性」，深怕萬一的不可逆災難而不擬接受，那就恐怕必須進入公共政策最後一個程序──公投。
公投最關鍵的是「討論元素」必須完備，且需充分告知民眾資訊，首先是價格。排除核電之後的能源結構，電價上漲是一定的，但迄今幾份民調都只有是否選擇非核的民意漲落，完全不談價格，這個缺口必須在公投前精算、補上；且這個工作也不能由官方能源單位做，而是任何人都可以進國家資料庫拿公開的數據演算，這才有公信力可言，也可避免「以高電價恫嚇」的陷阱。
其次是供電安全。台灣的單一、獨立電網是非核後供電的最大隱憂，一遇上夏日用電尖峰、風災破壞輸電回路、機組歲修……都將導致供電吃緊。若民眾公投選擇非核，就須對供電安全降低有心理準備。兩岸關係緩解，政府也該有向大陸買電、突破台灣獨立電網困難的思考準備；福建北部即將完工商轉的福鼎、福清兩個核電廠的四個機組，等於台灣兩個核三的滿載發電量，若可透過海底電纜支援台灣供電，至少可讓缺電憂慮得以緩解。
民主國家，人民是頭家，人民說了算。核四過去二十餘年的紛擾除了工程上的問題，政府從未堅定地一次走完專業面及政治面的決策程序，遂導致紛爭此落彼起，永無寧日。事到如今，長痛不如短痛，即將登場的非核風暴，讓我們一次痛出個結果。
Two Facets of the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 23, 2013
Summary: In democracies, the people are the bosses. The people have the final say. The controversy over the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant over the past twenty years has involved engineering problems. But the government never underwent the entire policy formulation process, from either a professional or political perspective. This led to our current plight, in which we cannot enjoy a moment's peace. By now, short-term pain is preferable to long-term pain. A storm is brewing over to nuclear power generation. For once, let the pain lead to a final outcome.
Full Text below:
The new cabinet has assumed power. The Legislative Yuan has convened a new session. This is the second anniversary of the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant additional budget, as well as Japan's Fukushima nuclear disaster. Public opposition to nuclear power generation is increasing. Protest marches demanding the abolition of nuclear power are about to begin throughout Taiwan. Protestors are even coordinating with supporters overseas. Even more worrisome, the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant issue has become a political football. There is virtually no room for rational debate. How is one to make any sense of the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant mess? One must first arrive at a decision that meets with the approval of the general public, because this issue is everyones' concern.
Planning for the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant resumed in 1992. Tender offers were made in 1995. Ground-breaking began in 1999. During that time, Taiwan has never had a moment's peace. Opponents have been motivated by moral and ideological objections as well as political opportunism. The public has paid an incalculable price. The Jiang Cabinet must now deal with the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant mess, and the anti-nuclear political storm. It must carry out the policy formuation process in full, without any shortcuts. It must put professionalism first and politics last. It must end over 20 years of wrangling over the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant.
Professionalism means doing everything to ascertain whether the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant can be successfully completed, and whether it will be safe after completion. The professional aspects must be addressed first. This is essential to any subsequent political management. The Number Four Nuclear Power Plant must be certified as safe by industry professionals. Only then can it begin commercial operation and provide parallel power generation. Only if the public remains skeptical, should a public referendum be held. Can industry professionals eliminate concerns about the safety of the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant? If they cannot, then the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant should not even exist, in which case there will be no need for a referendum.
The Number Four Nuclear Power Plant was originally supposed to be a turnkey operation. If successful, the quality would be assured, and any risk would be borne by the winning bidder. But the decision was made to use subcontractors. The risk must now be born by Taipower. Taipower officials were overly ambitious in their design goals. They lacked experience. They received no assistance from consultants. These factors greatly increased the difficulty of construction for this specialized nuclear power plant. Many interface conflicts and accuracy and stability problems had to be overcome. These led to the current halt in construction.
Taipower admits that it cannot solve the problems on its own. The Number Four Nuclear Power Plant has already cost 300 billion NTD. It is not far from completion. Naturally Taipower hopes the project than be brought back to life. Can internationally respected experts be found, to serve as project consultants, and cut the Gordian Knot? They may charge a high price. But progress is slow. Would a large, internationally respected company be willing to take charge of the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant and endorse its safety? That remains in question.
Taipower does not have the final say over whether the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant is safe. Nor will debates between academics and street protests yield valid conclusions. Only a rigorous testing program can. The program must test every system. It must then test hundreds of other systems. In particular, it must test the compatibility between instrumentation and controls at 40,000 points. Issues with the design, equipment, and construction must be resolved. Only then can the plant begin commercial operations without concern for safety. The Number Four Nuclear Power Plant cannot proceed with commissioning tests. That is why it is making virtually no progress.
President Ma has declared that "without nuclear safety, there can be no nuclear power." He wants to reassure the public. He has suggested inviting impartial international bodies to assess the situation. But finding impartial international bodies is easier said than done. One has come to the fore -- the nuclear power industry World Association of Nuclear Operators. But WANO is unsuitable. Years ago, before the Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant accident, WANO gave it its seal of approval. Taipower is also a WANO member. Alas, WANO lacks credibility.
Can a miracle worker be found to cure the ills of the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant? Can he help to pass rigorous commissioning tests? Can he guarantee that commercial operation would be safe? The public still has doubts about nuclear power generation. If it is unprepared to accept the possibility of an irreversible catastrophe, then the final stage of public policy formulation -- a public referendum -- will be essential.
The key to a public referendum is a critical discussion of all the factors. The public must be fully informed. The first thing the public must be informed about is the cost. Once nuclear power generation has been ruled out, electricity price hikes are guaranteed. But so far polls have only tracked fluctuations in support for non-nuclear power generation. They have totally ignored the matter of electricity rates. This gap must be addressed before an referendum can be held. This task cannot be performed by the official energy generation entity. It must be something that anyone can verify by accessing a national database. Only this will have the necessary credibility, and avoid the trap of intimidation via high electricity rates.
Next is the issue of power supply security. Taiwan has a single, independent power grid. This is the biggest worry in a non-nuclear power generation scenario. Summer electricity peaks, destruction of transmission loops by hurricanes, and maintenance for aging units will lead to power shortages. If people vote for non-nuclear power generation in a referendum, they must be psychologically prepared for a less secure power supply. Cross-Strait relations are warming. The government must be prepared to buy electricity from the Mainland. It must prepare for a difficult breakthrough in public thinking regarding Taiwan's independent power grid. Northern Fujian's Fuding Industry Plant is about to begin commercial operations. Fuqing has four units in two nuclear power plants. Their capacity is equal to two of Taiwan's Number Three Nuclear Power Plants. If they could provide Taiwan power through a submarine cable, it would at least ease our power shortage worries.
In democracies, the people are the bosses. The people have the final say. The controversy over the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant over the past twenty years has involved engineering problems. But the government never underwent the entire policy formulation process, from either a professional or political perspective. This led to our current plight, in which we cannot enjoy a moment's peace. By now, short-term pain is preferable to long-term pain. A storm is brewing over to nuclear power generation. For once, let the pain lead to a final outcome.
專業與政治：核四問題的兩個面向
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.02.23 01:58 am
隨著新內閣上任、立法院新會期開議、核四追加預算以及日本福島核災兩周年，民間反核氛圍愈見凝重，不但廢核遊行在全台將次第登場，甚至還海外跨國串連；更令人憂慮的是，核四議題已流於民粹，幾無溝通空間。如何從核四困境中理出頭緒，從而做出具民意基礎的抉擇，應是全民的共同關切。
核四計畫從八十一年恢復、八十四年招標、八十八年動工，其間擾攘幾乎從未有一刻停息過；不管是基於道德、理念的反核，或為了在政治上從中漁利而反，皆讓台灣社會付出難以估算的巨大代價。江內閣面對核四、非核的風浪，其職責在於務必應將公共政策的決策程序完整走完，先專業面，後政治面，俾為二十多年的核四紛爭畫下句點。
所謂專業面，是盡一切可能確認核四能否完工、能否排除安全疑慮；專業面先走完，則是為後續的政治處理準備要件。若核四在專業上經確認安全無虞，可以商轉、併聯發電，但民眾仍然存疑，那才有舉行公投的充分條件；但若在專業面得知核四安全疑慮無法排除，核四即不能存在，也就沒有接續公投的問題。
核四最早曾以統包（turn-key）招標，若成功，品質、風險由得標廠商負責；如今，卻因故改採分包後，風險已轉由自己承擔；在設計陳義過高、經驗不足，又無顧問公司協助下，大大增加了特殊型核電廠施工難度，在介面衝突、準確性、穩定性等方面有待克服之處極多，以致目前已處在實質停工狀態。
台電承認，靠自己無法解決問題，但核四已花了三千億，離完工目標已不遠，當然希望能救回來；因此在國際上苦尋能扮華佗角色的總顧問解開病灶，雖然開出天價，但進度有限；有信譽、也有技術能力的國際大廠是否願意接下這筆生意為核四安全背書，是個疑問。
專業面的核四安全認定，不是台電說了算，也不是學者辯論、街頭遊行可以獲致結論，只有經過嚴謹的「試運轉測試」程序一個途徑。先測試每個系統，再將百餘系統之間、尤其儀控達四萬個節點的相容關係進行完整測試，找出設計、設備、及施工上的所有問題，才能確認商轉有無安全疑慮。目前核四即因試運轉測試階段走不下去，幾乎全無進度。
馬總統揭示「沒有核安，就沒有核電」的原則，為確保國人放心，還特別提出「邀請公正的國際機構評估」的加乘保險構想，但找「公正的國際機構」談何容易？至少已浮上檯面、由核電產業界組成的「世界核能發電協會（ＷＡＮＯ）」即不適宜，福島核電廠事故前是ＷＡＮＯ多年評估的優等生，何況台電也是ＷＡＮＯ成員，恐怕缺乏公信力。
如果核四找到華佗相救克服病灶，完成嚴苛的試運轉測試，證實商轉發電安全無虞，但民眾仍認為核電存有「不確定性」，深怕萬一的不可逆災難而不擬接受，那就恐怕必須進入公共政策最後一個程序──公投。
公投最關鍵的是「討論元素」必須完備，且需充分告知民眾資訊，首先是價格。排除核電之後的能源結構，電價上漲是一定的，但迄今幾份民調都只有是否選擇非核的民意漲落，完全不談價格，這個缺口必須在公投前精算、補上；且這個工作也不能由官方能源單位做，而是任何人都可以進國家資料庫拿公開的數據演算，這才有公信力可言，也可避免「以高電價恫嚇」的陷阱。
其次是供電安全。台灣的單一、獨立電網是非核後供電的最大隱憂，一遇上夏日用電尖峰、風災破壞輸電回路、機組歲修……都將導致供電吃緊。若民眾公投選擇非核，就須對供電安全降低有心理準備。兩岸關係緩解，政府也該有向大陸買電、突破台灣獨立電網困難的思考準備；福建北部即將完工商轉的福鼎、福清兩個核電廠的四個機組，等於台灣兩個核三的滿載發電量，若可透過海底電纜支援台灣供電，至少可讓缺電憂慮得以緩解。
民主國家，人民是頭家，人民說了算。核四過去二十餘年的紛擾除了工程上的問題，政府從未堅定地一次走完專業面及政治面的決策程序，遂導致紛爭此落彼起，永無寧日。事到如今，長痛不如短痛，即將登場的非核風暴，讓我們一次痛出個結果。
Thursday, February 21, 2013
Past Accomplishments and Future Developments: Can Lien-Xi Summit Transcend Lien-Hu Summit?
Past Accomplishments and Future Developments:
Can Lien-Xi Summit Transcend Lien-Hu Summit?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 22, 2013
Summary: The 2005 Lien-Hu Summit made a significant historical contribution. Let us hope that the 2013 Lien-Xi and Lien-Hu Summits do more than commemorate past accomplishments. Let us hope they faciliate future developments, and lead the two sides toward a new realm. The 2005 Lien-Hu Summit changed the world. The 2013 Lien-Xi Summit should move heaven and earth. The Lien-Xi Summit could even surpass the Lien-Hu Summit. At the very least it must not retreat or turn back the clock. We hope both sides do their utmost to create a new future for cross-Strait relations.
Full Text below:
Honorary KMT Chairman Lien Chan has accepted an invitation to visit the Chinese mainland this Sunday.
This will be the first time that CCP Secretary-General Xi Jinping has met Lien Chan. It will be the last time PRC President Hu Jintao meets Lien Chan in his official capacity. According to reports, it is the first time the CCP General Secretary and the PRC President have ever separately hosted the same visiting VIP. In the past, one person always assumed two roles. The CCP General Secretary would also serve as PRC President.
As we all know, today's cross-Strait relations are built on a foundation established during the 2005 Lien-Hu Summit. Beijing is about to undergo a handover of power. They have invited Lien Chan to raise the curtain on cross-Strait interaction. Incoming and outgoing party and national leaders Xi Jinping and Hu Jintao will meet with Lien separately. This means that in Beijing's eyes, the 2013 Lian-Xi Summit recalls the 2005 Lien-Hu Summit, and heralds future developments. We hope the summit commemorates past accomplishments, but even more, we hope it facilitates future developments.
First consider past accomplishments. On the Beijing side, the cross-Strait policy promoted by the Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping teams' is reflected in the CCP's 18th Party Congress Political Report. Generally speaking, Hu laid down the rules and Xi followed them. But the 18th Party Congress Cross-Strait Political Report includes a great deal of unfinished business. Therefore it lies somewhere between "past accomplishments" and "future developments." On the Taipei side, Lien Chan in 2005 was Chairman of the Kuomintang. Today in 2013, Lien Chan is merely an Honorary Chairman. Lien Chan is one step removed from both the KMT as a political party, and the KMT as the ruling government. Lien Chan is conveying the Ma Ying-jeou team's policy stance to Beijing. But he also hopes to express his own ideas about cross-Strait relations. Lien will inevitably find himself on the horns of a dilemma, caught between commemorating his past accomplishments and conveying a message affecting future developments.
The upcoming Lien-Xi and Lien-Hu summits commemorate past accomplishments. But more importantly, we hope they will facilitate future developments. During the upcoming summit Xi Jinping will discuss cross-Strait policy, for the very first time. This will set the tone. Lien Chan, as one of the two pioneers of the 2005 Lien-Hu Summit, will share his hopes for future cross-Strait relations. This will both commemorate past accomplishments and facilitate future developments. Take past accomplishments. This summit commemorates the past accomplishments of the 2005 "Five Hopes for Peaceful Development." Take future developments. On the one hand, we see unfinished business from 2005. On the other hand, we anticipate a breakthrough, to future developments that transcend the accomplishments of 2005.
If what we seek is future developments that transcend past limitations, then the agenda of the summit is clear. It must focus on the CCP 18th Party Congress Political Report. It must focus on "Exploring the special case of cross-Strait political relations under conditions in which the two sides have yet to be reunified." We must combine this reasoning with Beijing's "taking the two sides' existing provisions (i.e., constitutions) as our point of departure." We must "seek a link that joins the two sides into one China." Under this framework, the two sides can shift the focus from "reunification" to "yet to be reunified" cross-Strait relations. We can "make reasonable arrangements." We can use "a reasonable process to guide cross-Strait interaction, in a better direction."
This framework constitutes the "special circumstances under which the two sides have yet to be reunified." This is the issue we ought to address. We have amended the past "reunification or bust theory" to "making reasonable arrangements." This has corrected past unilateralism. The "special circumstances under which the two sides have yet to be reunified" refers of course to the "special circumstances under which the ROC and the PRC have yet to be reunified." If we can create a "yet to be reunified but reasonable" framework, this will relieve Beijing of the burden to "reunify." It will also relieve Taipei of the need for handwringing over "Taiwan independence."
Reunification vs. independence struggles force Beijing to cope with reunification, and Taipei to cope with Taiwan independence. We must change our thinking, and focus on the "yet to be reunified relationship," The two sides will then be able to move towards a more stable and positive future. We must make the transition to the next significant stage of cross-Strait relations. We must ensure "peaceful development" under "yet to be reunified special circumstances." Only then will the Lian-Xi Summit and Lien-Hu Summit commemorate past accomplishments, and faciliate future developments.
International attention is focused on the cross-Strait summit. The person with the most freedom of action and ability to transcend limitations is Lien Chan. Xi Jinping, Hu Jintao, and "remote participant" Ma Ying-jeou are bound by their job positions. Even if they want to achieve a breakthrough, they may be afraid to or unable to speak. Lien Chan alone is free and without constraints. Only he has credibility with the public on both sides. Therefore, we hope Lien Chan will take advantage of his freedom and lack of constraints, to transcend the framework of the government and political parties. We hope he will convey the aspirations of the people on both sides, and help leaders on both sides blaze a new trail for cross-Strait relations.
The 2005 Lien-Hu Summit made a significant historical contribution. Let us hope that the 2013 Lien-Xi and Lien-Hu Summits do more than commemorate past accomplishments. Let us hope they faciliate future developments, and lead the two sides toward a new realm. The 2005 Lien-Hu Summit changed the world. The 2013 Lien-Xi Summit should move heaven and earth. The Lien-Xi Summit could even surpass the Lien-Hu Summit. At the very least it must not retreat or turn back the clock. We hope both sides do their utmost to create a new future for cross-Strait relations.
傳承與發展：連習會能否超越連胡會
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.02.22 04:24 am
國民黨榮譽主席連戰應邀在周日率團訪問大陸。
這是中共總書記習近平就任後首次會見連戰，亦將是中華人民共和國國家主席胡錦濤任內最後一次會見連戰。據稱，這也是中共總書記與中國國家主席首次「各自分別」接見同一外賓，以前向來是以一人兼二職（總書記兼國家主席）會客。
眾所皆知，今日的兩岸關係是二○○五年「連胡會」奠定的基礎，北京方面在此主政團隊交接的時刻，選擇以邀訪連戰來開啟兩岸互動的序幕，且由習近平、胡錦濤黨政新舊領導人分別會見，應可顯示在北京的意念中，此次二○一三年的「連習會」，是二○○五年「連胡會」的傳承與發展。我們對此會的期望則是：固應重傳承，但更當重發展。
先言「傳承」。對大陸而言，胡錦濤團隊與習近平團隊的兩岸政策已反映於中共十八大的政治報告中，在大格局上雖是胡規習隨，但十八大的兩岸報告畢竟仍有諸多「未竟事宜」，所以是處在「傳承」與「發展」之間。在台灣而言，則二○○五年的連戰是國民黨主席，但如今二○一三年的連戰則是「榮譽主席」，無論於政黨或政府，連戰皆已隔了一層，連戰此行在傳達馬英九團隊政策立場與表達自己的主張之間，難免會陷於「傳承」與「傳遞」的兩難。
所以，此次的連習會與連胡會雖有「傳承」之意，但我們期望能夠多往「發展」的方向推進。此次會面，習近平將首次對其兩岸政策提出論述，有開宗明義之效；連戰亦可望以二○○五年連胡會創始者的身分，表達對於兩岸新局的期許，有承先啟後之功。就傳承言，此會是總結二○○五年「和平發展五願景」的時際；就發展言，則一方面可檢視二○○五年以來未竟之功，另一方面亦當尋求突破及超越二○○五年架構的新道路。
我們認為，若求發展及突破，此次會面議題的切入點，應當寓於中共十八大政治報告所說「探討尚未統一特殊情況下的兩岸政治關係」這段論述之中，再配合北京所言「從兩岸現行規定（憲法）出發」，及「尋找一個中國的連結點」等觀點；在此一架構之下，兩岸若能從「統一」的議題上，轉移至經營「尚未統一」的兩岸關係，「作出合情合理的安排」，即可引導兩岸之互動「從合理的過程，通向改良之目的」。
此一架構是將「尚未統一的特殊情況」視為一個應當面對的新課題，亦即修正了過去存在的「唯統一論」；且也主張「作出合情合理安排」，亦即修正了過去存在的「單邊主義」。而所謂的「尚未統一特殊情況」，應即是指「中華民國與中華人民共和國尚未統一的特殊情況」；若能據此營造一個「尚未統一之合情合理的架構」，將可使北京減輕「統一」的負擔，亦可使台灣緩解「台獨」的爭議。
其實，陷於統獨爭議中，北京為統一所困，台灣則糾纏於台獨；若能改變思考，將心意投注於「尚未統一」關係之經營，兩岸即可能走向更穩定與正向的未來。若能因此使未來相當階段的兩岸關係，落實在「尚未統一特殊情況」的「和平發展」上，則此次「連習會」及「連胡會」，就不僅是「傳承」而已，而是有其可以期待的「發展」。
在此次國際矚目的兩岸盛會中，最具自由及超然地位者應是連戰。習近平及胡錦濤，與「會外參與者」馬英九，皆因職位角色而受拘束，他們即使希望有所突破及發展，卻可能亦有不敢言或不能言者；唯連戰的角色最為自由及超然，亦較能獲得兩岸多數民眾的信服，因此我們寄望連戰在會中能發揮其較具自由的超然地位，跳出政權及政黨的框架，傳達兩岸人民的心聲，協助兩岸領導人為下階段的兩岸關係開闢出新的道路。
二○○五年的連胡會有其重大歷史貢獻，我們寄望此次二○一三年的連習會及連胡會，在「傳承」之外，更有「發展」，引領兩岸未來走向新境界。二○○五年連胡會有扭轉乾坤之效，二○一三年的連習會更應有新闢天地之功；連習會大有超越連胡會的空間，至少絕不可出現反動與倒退，期望雙方參與者皆能竭心盡力，為兩岸未來開創新局。
Can Lien-Xi Summit Transcend Lien-Hu Summit?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 22, 2013
Summary: The 2005 Lien-Hu Summit made a significant historical contribution. Let us hope that the 2013 Lien-Xi and Lien-Hu Summits do more than commemorate past accomplishments. Let us hope they faciliate future developments, and lead the two sides toward a new realm. The 2005 Lien-Hu Summit changed the world. The 2013 Lien-Xi Summit should move heaven and earth. The Lien-Xi Summit could even surpass the Lien-Hu Summit. At the very least it must not retreat or turn back the clock. We hope both sides do their utmost to create a new future for cross-Strait relations.
Full Text below:
Honorary KMT Chairman Lien Chan has accepted an invitation to visit the Chinese mainland this Sunday.
This will be the first time that CCP Secretary-General Xi Jinping has met Lien Chan. It will be the last time PRC President Hu Jintao meets Lien Chan in his official capacity. According to reports, it is the first time the CCP General Secretary and the PRC President have ever separately hosted the same visiting VIP. In the past, one person always assumed two roles. The CCP General Secretary would also serve as PRC President.
As we all know, today's cross-Strait relations are built on a foundation established during the 2005 Lien-Hu Summit. Beijing is about to undergo a handover of power. They have invited Lien Chan to raise the curtain on cross-Strait interaction. Incoming and outgoing party and national leaders Xi Jinping and Hu Jintao will meet with Lien separately. This means that in Beijing's eyes, the 2013 Lian-Xi Summit recalls the 2005 Lien-Hu Summit, and heralds future developments. We hope the summit commemorates past accomplishments, but even more, we hope it facilitates future developments.
First consider past accomplishments. On the Beijing side, the cross-Strait policy promoted by the Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping teams' is reflected in the CCP's 18th Party Congress Political Report. Generally speaking, Hu laid down the rules and Xi followed them. But the 18th Party Congress Cross-Strait Political Report includes a great deal of unfinished business. Therefore it lies somewhere between "past accomplishments" and "future developments." On the Taipei side, Lien Chan in 2005 was Chairman of the Kuomintang. Today in 2013, Lien Chan is merely an Honorary Chairman. Lien Chan is one step removed from both the KMT as a political party, and the KMT as the ruling government. Lien Chan is conveying the Ma Ying-jeou team's policy stance to Beijing. But he also hopes to express his own ideas about cross-Strait relations. Lien will inevitably find himself on the horns of a dilemma, caught between commemorating his past accomplishments and conveying a message affecting future developments.
The upcoming Lien-Xi and Lien-Hu summits commemorate past accomplishments. But more importantly, we hope they will facilitate future developments. During the upcoming summit Xi Jinping will discuss cross-Strait policy, for the very first time. This will set the tone. Lien Chan, as one of the two pioneers of the 2005 Lien-Hu Summit, will share his hopes for future cross-Strait relations. This will both commemorate past accomplishments and facilitate future developments. Take past accomplishments. This summit commemorates the past accomplishments of the 2005 "Five Hopes for Peaceful Development." Take future developments. On the one hand, we see unfinished business from 2005. On the other hand, we anticipate a breakthrough, to future developments that transcend the accomplishments of 2005.
If what we seek is future developments that transcend past limitations, then the agenda of the summit is clear. It must focus on the CCP 18th Party Congress Political Report. It must focus on "Exploring the special case of cross-Strait political relations under conditions in which the two sides have yet to be reunified." We must combine this reasoning with Beijing's "taking the two sides' existing provisions (i.e., constitutions) as our point of departure." We must "seek a link that joins the two sides into one China." Under this framework, the two sides can shift the focus from "reunification" to "yet to be reunified" cross-Strait relations. We can "make reasonable arrangements." We can use "a reasonable process to guide cross-Strait interaction, in a better direction."
This framework constitutes the "special circumstances under which the two sides have yet to be reunified." This is the issue we ought to address. We have amended the past "reunification or bust theory" to "making reasonable arrangements." This has corrected past unilateralism. The "special circumstances under which the two sides have yet to be reunified" refers of course to the "special circumstances under which the ROC and the PRC have yet to be reunified." If we can create a "yet to be reunified but reasonable" framework, this will relieve Beijing of the burden to "reunify." It will also relieve Taipei of the need for handwringing over "Taiwan independence."
Reunification vs. independence struggles force Beijing to cope with reunification, and Taipei to cope with Taiwan independence. We must change our thinking, and focus on the "yet to be reunified relationship," The two sides will then be able to move towards a more stable and positive future. We must make the transition to the next significant stage of cross-Strait relations. We must ensure "peaceful development" under "yet to be reunified special circumstances." Only then will the Lian-Xi Summit and Lien-Hu Summit commemorate past accomplishments, and faciliate future developments.
International attention is focused on the cross-Strait summit. The person with the most freedom of action and ability to transcend limitations is Lien Chan. Xi Jinping, Hu Jintao, and "remote participant" Ma Ying-jeou are bound by their job positions. Even if they want to achieve a breakthrough, they may be afraid to or unable to speak. Lien Chan alone is free and without constraints. Only he has credibility with the public on both sides. Therefore, we hope Lien Chan will take advantage of his freedom and lack of constraints, to transcend the framework of the government and political parties. We hope he will convey the aspirations of the people on both sides, and help leaders on both sides blaze a new trail for cross-Strait relations.
The 2005 Lien-Hu Summit made a significant historical contribution. Let us hope that the 2013 Lien-Xi and Lien-Hu Summits do more than commemorate past accomplishments. Let us hope they faciliate future developments, and lead the two sides toward a new realm. The 2005 Lien-Hu Summit changed the world. The 2013 Lien-Xi Summit should move heaven and earth. The Lien-Xi Summit could even surpass the Lien-Hu Summit. At the very least it must not retreat or turn back the clock. We hope both sides do their utmost to create a new future for cross-Strait relations.
傳承與發展：連習會能否超越連胡會
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.02.22 04:24 am
國民黨榮譽主席連戰應邀在周日率團訪問大陸。
這是中共總書記習近平就任後首次會見連戰，亦將是中華人民共和國國家主席胡錦濤任內最後一次會見連戰。據稱，這也是中共總書記與中國國家主席首次「各自分別」接見同一外賓，以前向來是以一人兼二職（總書記兼國家主席）會客。
眾所皆知，今日的兩岸關係是二○○五年「連胡會」奠定的基礎，北京方面在此主政團隊交接的時刻，選擇以邀訪連戰來開啟兩岸互動的序幕，且由習近平、胡錦濤黨政新舊領導人分別會見，應可顯示在北京的意念中，此次二○一三年的「連習會」，是二○○五年「連胡會」的傳承與發展。我們對此會的期望則是：固應重傳承，但更當重發展。
先言「傳承」。對大陸而言，胡錦濤團隊與習近平團隊的兩岸政策已反映於中共十八大的政治報告中，在大格局上雖是胡規習隨，但十八大的兩岸報告畢竟仍有諸多「未竟事宜」，所以是處在「傳承」與「發展」之間。在台灣而言，則二○○五年的連戰是國民黨主席，但如今二○一三年的連戰則是「榮譽主席」，無論於政黨或政府，連戰皆已隔了一層，連戰此行在傳達馬英九團隊政策立場與表達自己的主張之間，難免會陷於「傳承」與「傳遞」的兩難。
所以，此次的連習會與連胡會雖有「傳承」之意，但我們期望能夠多往「發展」的方向推進。此次會面，習近平將首次對其兩岸政策提出論述，有開宗明義之效；連戰亦可望以二○○五年連胡會創始者的身分，表達對於兩岸新局的期許，有承先啟後之功。就傳承言，此會是總結二○○五年「和平發展五願景」的時際；就發展言，則一方面可檢視二○○五年以來未竟之功，另一方面亦當尋求突破及超越二○○五年架構的新道路。
我們認為，若求發展及突破，此次會面議題的切入點，應當寓於中共十八大政治報告所說「探討尚未統一特殊情況下的兩岸政治關係」這段論述之中，再配合北京所言「從兩岸現行規定（憲法）出發」，及「尋找一個中國的連結點」等觀點；在此一架構之下，兩岸若能從「統一」的議題上，轉移至經營「尚未統一」的兩岸關係，「作出合情合理的安排」，即可引導兩岸之互動「從合理的過程，通向改良之目的」。
此一架構是將「尚未統一的特殊情況」視為一個應當面對的新課題，亦即修正了過去存在的「唯統一論」；且也主張「作出合情合理安排」，亦即修正了過去存在的「單邊主義」。而所謂的「尚未統一特殊情況」，應即是指「中華民國與中華人民共和國尚未統一的特殊情況」；若能據此營造一個「尚未統一之合情合理的架構」，將可使北京減輕「統一」的負擔，亦可使台灣緩解「台獨」的爭議。
其實，陷於統獨爭議中，北京為統一所困，台灣則糾纏於台獨；若能改變思考，將心意投注於「尚未統一」關係之經營，兩岸即可能走向更穩定與正向的未來。若能因此使未來相當階段的兩岸關係，落實在「尚未統一特殊情況」的「和平發展」上，則此次「連習會」及「連胡會」，就不僅是「傳承」而已，而是有其可以期待的「發展」。
在此次國際矚目的兩岸盛會中，最具自由及超然地位者應是連戰。習近平及胡錦濤，與「會外參與者」馬英九，皆因職位角色而受拘束，他們即使希望有所突破及發展，卻可能亦有不敢言或不能言者；唯連戰的角色最為自由及超然，亦較能獲得兩岸多數民眾的信服，因此我們寄望連戰在會中能發揮其較具自由的超然地位，跳出政權及政黨的框架，傳達兩岸人民的心聲，協助兩岸領導人為下階段的兩岸關係開闢出新的道路。
二○○五年的連胡會有其重大歷史貢獻，我們寄望此次二○一三年的連習會及連胡會，在「傳承」之外，更有「發展」，引領兩岸未來走向新境界。二○○五年連胡會有扭轉乾坤之效，二○一三年的連習會更應有新闢天地之功；連習會大有超越連胡會的空間，至少絕不可出現反動與倒退，期望雙方參與者皆能竭心盡力，為兩岸未來開創新局。
Too Fat Cabinet Needs Slimming Down
Too Fat Cabinet Needs Slimming Down
China Times editorial
Taipei, Taiwan, ROC
A Translation
February 20, 2013
Summary: The government has been undergoing restructuring for over a year. Prior to this wave of restructuring, the Executive Yuan Organization Law remained untouched for nearly six decades. But times have changed. Ministry business has expanded. The number of ministries has steadily grown to 37. Nominally the government still has only "eight ministries and two commissions." But overly complex and rigid government organizational structures long ceased to fulfill real world needs.
Full Text below:
The government has been undergoing restructuring for over a year. Prior to this wave of restructuring, the Executive Yuan Organization Law remained untouched for nearly six decades. The only change occurred in 1980, when the Ministry of Judicial Administration was renamed the Ministry of Justice. But times have changed. Ministry business has expanded. The number of ministries has steadily grown to 37. Nominally the government still has only "eight ministries and two commissions." But overly complex and rigid government organizational structures long ceased to fulfill real world needs.
Premier Yu Kuo-hwa began looking into governmental restructuring in 1987. Now, 26 years later, we have had 14 premiers. Last year the show finally took to the road. But we still have a long way to go before everything is in motion. According to the Executive Yuan, once restructuring is complete, the number of ministries will be reduced from 37 to 29. The number of Grade Three agencies will be reduced from 279 to 70 bureaus and departments. But such weight reduction programs notwithstanding, the government remains in the "obese" category.
The goal of restructuring is to cost reduction and performance enhancement. But the Executive Yuan's restructuring program increases the number of political appointees from 91 to 92, even though it reduces the total number of ministries. It increases the number of civil service positions from 162,792 to a 173,000, the maximum specified by the Central Government Total Personnel Law. The total number of civil servants will not necesssarily be reduced. According to the latest Ministry of Civil Service figures, last year the number of civil servants reached an eight year high of 345,861. Compare this to 2011, when the central government increased the number by 556.
Consider the system design. Current blueprints call for the establishment of an Environmental Protection Administration and a Ministry of Culture. It attempts to address the problem of non-unified authority. But too many political considerations remain. It still lacks a clear theoretical rationale. For example, it preserves the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission, the Veterans Affairs Commission, Council for Indigenous Peoples, and the Council for Hakka Affairs. But it downgrades the National Council on Physical Fitness, which is charged with ensuring the physical fitness of the nation, and places it under the authority of the Ministry of Education. It downgrades the Nuclear Energy Commission, which is charged with overseeing nuclear safety, from a Grade Two agency to a Grade Three Agency. It is difficult to see the logic behind these trade-offs.
Taiwan has a serious problem with aging population. Long-term health care is an important issue the government must face. Long term health care is currently the responsibility of the Ministry of the Interior's social welfare system. But in the future the Ministry of Health and Welfare will be under the authority of the Department of Health, which is responsible for the health care system. The functions of the two agencies will be integrated. This represents by a significant change in thinking about long-term health care. When the Executive Yuan came up with its organizational structure, it was obviously not thinking clearly about future policy.
Restructuring will create several mega-ministries. These include the Environmental Protection Administration, which will be responsible for water resources, rivers, pollution, and national parks. The Ministry of Health and Welfare will be even more powerful. Almost everything having to do with "birth, aging, disease, and death" will be its responsibility. These agencies will more powerful, more obese, and less "flat." Their affairs will become more complex. They will become less responsive to the needs of those below. If government agencies engage in business as usual, as they did in the past, and pass the buck whenever they can, efficiency will be even lower than it was before restructuring.
Current restructuring fails to address outdated foundations, associations, and other government subsidized entities. It fails to review the poor performance of state-owned enterprises. It even fails to evaluate central and local government civil servants. As a result, central government restructuring has resulted in excess personnel who can neither be cut nor reassigned. The upgrading of the five municipalities to directly administered status touted promotions and "knighthoods." The number of posts increased by approximately 20,000. Budgets increased by 100 billion NT. As far as the general public is concerned, the restructuring has merely given civil servants a massive windfall. It has merely provided them with opportunities to advance their careers and line their pockets.
Restructuring is gradually being implemented. The attendant problems are gradually surfacing. The organizational structure remains uncertain. The multitude of agencies are fighting over funds, personnel, and positions. They are fighting over who gets upgraded. They are fighting everywhere, from the Executive Yuan to the Legislative Yuan. Once the organizational structure has been determined, everyone will sweep only the snow on their own stoop. They will not care who is supposed to be responsible for what. Take the GIO. It is being replaced by the Executive Yuan Spokesman's Office. Its only job will be to issue press releases and liase with the media. Medial liason over the national day celebration will be turned over to the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission.
Predictably, organizational restructuring amidst future organizational consolidation will be chaotic. The various ministries have problems communicating, both within and without. These problems have all surfaced, one by one. Restructuring labor pains have only just begun.
Restructruing is a continuous process of destruction followed by reorganization. It is akin to smashing a number of clay figurines and reshaping them into one. The process involves reorganization of existing structures, the placement of personnel, the simplification of decision-making, the reformation of an organizational culture. Every step must be executed correctly. Only then can one improve one's performance. Based on current plans, the scope of restructuring is too modest. Personnel have not been sufficiently streamlined. Goals remain fuzzy. Benchmarks remain unclear. In short, the government lacked ambition from day one. Naturally it was unable to offer a blueprint for the new government that would appeal to the public.
The condensation of the Taiwan Provincial Government 14 years ago failed to achieve its goals. Once the restructuring express train got moving, its sponsors should have monitored the plan. They should have indicated their targets. They should have ensured that every agency and every connection was in order. After all, if the final result does not lead in cost reductions and performance ehancements, then the entire restructuring process becomes a joke -- nay, a tragedy.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2013.02.21
社論－最肥胖的組改 有必要再瘦身
本報訊
政府組織改造上路已經一年多，在這波組改啟動之前，《行政院組織法》幾乎有一甲子沒有檢討過（僅在六十九年時將「司法行政部」改名為「法務部」）。隨著時空的變遷、業務的增加，部會數也不斷成長到卅七個；雖然名義上仍維持著「八部二會」的架構，但過度複雜與僵化的政府組織，早就不符實際的需求。
從一九八七年的行政院長俞國華開始研擬政府組改，至今已經過了廿六年、經歷了十四任閣揆；雖然終於在去年開始上路，但距離全面啟動，還有很長的一段路要走。根據政院的規畫，這次組改完成後，部會數將從現行的卅七個降為廿九個，三級機關將從目前的二七九個，精簡為七十個局署。但這樣的瘦身規模，仍舊是歷年所有組改版本中，最「肥胖」的組織架構。
組織改造的目的，無非是降低成本、提升效能。但根據政院的規畫，組改後雖然部會總數減少，但政務官的總人數將從九十一人增加為九十二人；公務員的總員額也從目前的十六萬二七九二人，改為不超過《中央政府總員額法》十七萬三千人的上限，總數並不確定會減少。根據銓敘部最新統計，去年全國公務人數達到卅四萬三八六一人，創下八年來新高；與一百年比較，中央各機關還增加了五五六人。
在制度設計方面，現行藍圖雖然設立了環資部、文化部等機關，試圖解決過去事權不統一的問題，但仍舊因為有太多的政治考量，以至於看不出明確的理論基礎和理念。如：維持僑委會、退輔會、原民會、客委會的編制，卻把攸關國民體能、國家國力的體委會降級改隸教育部、負責核安的原能會也從二級機關降為三級，實在讓人看不出取捨的邏輯何在。
此外，台灣人口老化問題嚴重，長期照護是政府必須要面對的重要問題；目前的長照政策主要是由以社工體系為主的內政部負責，但未來的衛生福利部卻是由醫療體系為主的衛生署主導；兩單位業務整合的背後，代表的是整個長照政策規畫思維的重大改變。政院在設計組織架構時，顯然並沒有先想清楚，未來的政策走向為何。
未來組改完成後，將造就幾個超級大部，如環資部管水、河流、汙染、國家公園；衛生福利部更厲害，幾乎是所有「生老病死」都歸它管。組織變高、變胖、變得不扁平化，業務變得更複雜，下情上達的路恐怕只會變得遙遠了。如果公務機關像過去一樣「等因奉此」、事事請示，效率只會比組改之前更低。
這次組改，既不處理眾多不合時宜的基金會、協會等政府捐補助單位，也未檢討績效不彰的國營事業，甚至連中央、地方的公務員都沒有完整的考量。於是乎，中央組改出現一堆無法安置裁併的冗員、閒缺；五都升格卻又大張旗鼓的升官封爵，總員額增加兩萬人、預算增加千億元。看在一般民眾眼裡，組改不過是公務員自己「大風吹」，藉機升官發財的戲碼。
組改去年陸續上路，問題已逐漸浮現。組織架構未定之時，各機關搶錢、搶人、搶職等、搶升格，從行政院鬥到立法院；組織既定之後，各人自掃門前雪，管他業務誰來做。以新聞局為例，改為行政院發言人室，業務只剩下新聞發布和聯繫，原本國慶的媒體聯繫丟給內政部、外交部、僑委會自己做。
可以預見，在未來組織整併的過程中，組織重整的混亂，各部會內外橫向聯繫差的問題，都還會逐一的浮現，組改真正的「陣痛」，恐怕現在還沒有開始。
組改，是一連串破壞、重組的過程，如同把數個泥人打碎，再重新捏成一個。其間涉及到組織的整併、人員的安置、決策流程的簡化、組織文化的再造，每一個環節都作對了，才可能達成效能提升的目標。以目前的規畫來看，組改仍然存在改革幅度太小、人員精簡不足、目標設定模糊、檢驗指標不清等問題。簡而言之，就是政府改革的企圖心自始就不足，自然沒有辦法擘畫出足以吸引民眾的新政府藍圖。
精省十四年仍未盡其功的殷鑑不遠，在組改列車啟動後，主其事者應該隨時檢視整個計畫，提出清楚可期的目標，以確保每個單位、每個環節都作對了；畢竟，如果最後的結果不是成本降低、效能提升，整個組改就會變成笑話一場；不，那將會是悲劇一場。
China Times editorial
Taipei, Taiwan, ROC
A Translation
February 20, 2013
Summary: The government has been undergoing restructuring for over a year. Prior to this wave of restructuring, the Executive Yuan Organization Law remained untouched for nearly six decades. But times have changed. Ministry business has expanded. The number of ministries has steadily grown to 37. Nominally the government still has only "eight ministries and two commissions." But overly complex and rigid government organizational structures long ceased to fulfill real world needs.
Full Text below:
The government has been undergoing restructuring for over a year. Prior to this wave of restructuring, the Executive Yuan Organization Law remained untouched for nearly six decades. The only change occurred in 1980, when the Ministry of Judicial Administration was renamed the Ministry of Justice. But times have changed. Ministry business has expanded. The number of ministries has steadily grown to 37. Nominally the government still has only "eight ministries and two commissions." But overly complex and rigid government organizational structures long ceased to fulfill real world needs.
Premier Yu Kuo-hwa began looking into governmental restructuring in 1987. Now, 26 years later, we have had 14 premiers. Last year the show finally took to the road. But we still have a long way to go before everything is in motion. According to the Executive Yuan, once restructuring is complete, the number of ministries will be reduced from 37 to 29. The number of Grade Three agencies will be reduced from 279 to 70 bureaus and departments. But such weight reduction programs notwithstanding, the government remains in the "obese" category.
The goal of restructuring is to cost reduction and performance enhancement. But the Executive Yuan's restructuring program increases the number of political appointees from 91 to 92, even though it reduces the total number of ministries. It increases the number of civil service positions from 162,792 to a 173,000, the maximum specified by the Central Government Total Personnel Law. The total number of civil servants will not necesssarily be reduced. According to the latest Ministry of Civil Service figures, last year the number of civil servants reached an eight year high of 345,861. Compare this to 2011, when the central government increased the number by 556.
Consider the system design. Current blueprints call for the establishment of an Environmental Protection Administration and a Ministry of Culture. It attempts to address the problem of non-unified authority. But too many political considerations remain. It still lacks a clear theoretical rationale. For example, it preserves the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission, the Veterans Affairs Commission, Council for Indigenous Peoples, and the Council for Hakka Affairs. But it downgrades the National Council on Physical Fitness, which is charged with ensuring the physical fitness of the nation, and places it under the authority of the Ministry of Education. It downgrades the Nuclear Energy Commission, which is charged with overseeing nuclear safety, from a Grade Two agency to a Grade Three Agency. It is difficult to see the logic behind these trade-offs.
Taiwan has a serious problem with aging population. Long-term health care is an important issue the government must face. Long term health care is currently the responsibility of the Ministry of the Interior's social welfare system. But in the future the Ministry of Health and Welfare will be under the authority of the Department of Health, which is responsible for the health care system. The functions of the two agencies will be integrated. This represents by a significant change in thinking about long-term health care. When the Executive Yuan came up with its organizational structure, it was obviously not thinking clearly about future policy.
Restructuring will create several mega-ministries. These include the Environmental Protection Administration, which will be responsible for water resources, rivers, pollution, and national parks. The Ministry of Health and Welfare will be even more powerful. Almost everything having to do with "birth, aging, disease, and death" will be its responsibility. These agencies will more powerful, more obese, and less "flat." Their affairs will become more complex. They will become less responsive to the needs of those below. If government agencies engage in business as usual, as they did in the past, and pass the buck whenever they can, efficiency will be even lower than it was before restructuring.
Current restructuring fails to address outdated foundations, associations, and other government subsidized entities. It fails to review the poor performance of state-owned enterprises. It even fails to evaluate central and local government civil servants. As a result, central government restructuring has resulted in excess personnel who can neither be cut nor reassigned. The upgrading of the five municipalities to directly administered status touted promotions and "knighthoods." The number of posts increased by approximately 20,000. Budgets increased by 100 billion NT. As far as the general public is concerned, the restructuring has merely given civil servants a massive windfall. It has merely provided them with opportunities to advance their careers and line their pockets.
Restructuring is gradually being implemented. The attendant problems are gradually surfacing. The organizational structure remains uncertain. The multitude of agencies are fighting over funds, personnel, and positions. They are fighting over who gets upgraded. They are fighting everywhere, from the Executive Yuan to the Legislative Yuan. Once the organizational structure has been determined, everyone will sweep only the snow on their own stoop. They will not care who is supposed to be responsible for what. Take the GIO. It is being replaced by the Executive Yuan Spokesman's Office. Its only job will be to issue press releases and liase with the media. Medial liason over the national day celebration will be turned over to the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission.
Predictably, organizational restructuring amidst future organizational consolidation will be chaotic. The various ministries have problems communicating, both within and without. These problems have all surfaced, one by one. Restructuring labor pains have only just begun.
Restructruing is a continuous process of destruction followed by reorganization. It is akin to smashing a number of clay figurines and reshaping them into one. The process involves reorganization of existing structures, the placement of personnel, the simplification of decision-making, the reformation of an organizational culture. Every step must be executed correctly. Only then can one improve one's performance. Based on current plans, the scope of restructuring is too modest. Personnel have not been sufficiently streamlined. Goals remain fuzzy. Benchmarks remain unclear. In short, the government lacked ambition from day one. Naturally it was unable to offer a blueprint for the new government that would appeal to the public.
The condensation of the Taiwan Provincial Government 14 years ago failed to achieve its goals. Once the restructuring express train got moving, its sponsors should have monitored the plan. They should have indicated their targets. They should have ensured that every agency and every connection was in order. After all, if the final result does not lead in cost reductions and performance ehancements, then the entire restructuring process becomes a joke -- nay, a tragedy.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2013.02.21
社論－最肥胖的組改 有必要再瘦身
本報訊
政府組織改造上路已經一年多，在這波組改啟動之前，《行政院組織法》幾乎有一甲子沒有檢討過（僅在六十九年時將「司法行政部」改名為「法務部」）。隨著時空的變遷、業務的增加，部會數也不斷成長到卅七個；雖然名義上仍維持著「八部二會」的架構，但過度複雜與僵化的政府組織，早就不符實際的需求。
從一九八七年的行政院長俞國華開始研擬政府組改，至今已經過了廿六年、經歷了十四任閣揆；雖然終於在去年開始上路，但距離全面啟動，還有很長的一段路要走。根據政院的規畫，這次組改完成後，部會數將從現行的卅七個降為廿九個，三級機關將從目前的二七九個，精簡為七十個局署。但這樣的瘦身規模，仍舊是歷年所有組改版本中，最「肥胖」的組織架構。
組織改造的目的，無非是降低成本、提升效能。但根據政院的規畫，組改後雖然部會總數減少，但政務官的總人數將從九十一人增加為九十二人；公務員的總員額也從目前的十六萬二七九二人，改為不超過《中央政府總員額法》十七萬三千人的上限，總數並不確定會減少。根據銓敘部最新統計，去年全國公務人數達到卅四萬三八六一人，創下八年來新高；與一百年比較，中央各機關還增加了五五六人。
在制度設計方面，現行藍圖雖然設立了環資部、文化部等機關，試圖解決過去事權不統一的問題，但仍舊因為有太多的政治考量，以至於看不出明確的理論基礎和理念。如：維持僑委會、退輔會、原民會、客委會的編制，卻把攸關國民體能、國家國力的體委會降級改隸教育部、負責核安的原能會也從二級機關降為三級，實在讓人看不出取捨的邏輯何在。
此外，台灣人口老化問題嚴重，長期照護是政府必須要面對的重要問題；目前的長照政策主要是由以社工體系為主的內政部負責，但未來的衛生福利部卻是由醫療體系為主的衛生署主導；兩單位業務整合的背後，代表的是整個長照政策規畫思維的重大改變。政院在設計組織架構時，顯然並沒有先想清楚，未來的政策走向為何。
未來組改完成後，將造就幾個超級大部，如環資部管水、河流、汙染、國家公園；衛生福利部更厲害，幾乎是所有「生老病死」都歸它管。組織變高、變胖、變得不扁平化，業務變得更複雜，下情上達的路恐怕只會變得遙遠了。如果公務機關像過去一樣「等因奉此」、事事請示，效率只會比組改之前更低。
這次組改，既不處理眾多不合時宜的基金會、協會等政府捐補助單位，也未檢討績效不彰的國營事業，甚至連中央、地方的公務員都沒有完整的考量。於是乎，中央組改出現一堆無法安置裁併的冗員、閒缺；五都升格卻又大張旗鼓的升官封爵，總員額增加兩萬人、預算增加千億元。看在一般民眾眼裡，組改不過是公務員自己「大風吹」，藉機升官發財的戲碼。
組改去年陸續上路，問題已逐漸浮現。組織架構未定之時，各機關搶錢、搶人、搶職等、搶升格，從行政院鬥到立法院；組織既定之後，各人自掃門前雪，管他業務誰來做。以新聞局為例，改為行政院發言人室，業務只剩下新聞發布和聯繫，原本國慶的媒體聯繫丟給內政部、外交部、僑委會自己做。
可以預見，在未來組織整併的過程中，組織重整的混亂，各部會內外橫向聯繫差的問題，都還會逐一的浮現，組改真正的「陣痛」，恐怕現在還沒有開始。
組改，是一連串破壞、重組的過程，如同把數個泥人打碎，再重新捏成一個。其間涉及到組織的整併、人員的安置、決策流程的簡化、組織文化的再造，每一個環節都作對了，才可能達成效能提升的目標。以目前的規畫來看，組改仍然存在改革幅度太小、人員精簡不足、目標設定模糊、檢驗指標不清等問題。簡而言之，就是政府改革的企圖心自始就不足，自然沒有辦法擘畫出足以吸引民眾的新政府藍圖。
精省十四年仍未盡其功的殷鑑不遠，在組改列車啟動後，主其事者應該隨時檢視整個計畫，提出清楚可期的目標，以確保每個單位、每個環節都作對了；畢竟，如果最後的結果不是成本降低、效能提升，整個組改就會變成笑話一場；不，那將會是悲劇一場。
Tuesday, February 19, 2013
Lift the Curse of Short-Lived Cabinets: Premier Jiang Understands
Lift the Curse of Short-Lived Cabinets: Premier Jiang Understands
China Times editorial
Taipei, Taiwan, ROC
A Translation
February 20, 2013
Summary: The very first day Premier Jiang Yi-huah took office, he admonished cabinet members, "Ask not how long your term of office will be. Ask how many meaningful things you can accomplish on behalf of your country during that time." His words were inspirational. But his cabinet members may not have felt much inspiration in their hearts. After all, cabinets have been reshuffled so frequently over the years. .
Full Text below:
The very first day Premier Jiang Yi-huah took office, he admonished cabinet members, "Ask not how long your term of office will be. Ask how many meaningful things you can accomplish on behalf of your country during that time." His words were inspirational. But his cabinet members may not have felt much inspiration in their hearts. After all, cabinets have been reshuffled so frequently over the years. The premiers' terms may not have become shorter. But they have most assuredly not become longer. Cabinet members are expected to resign along with the premier. So how long can they expect to be around? This is not something cabinet members can calculate on their own. They must defer to the president and the premier above, and to the public below.
Sad to say, this harsh reality is undeniable. The ROC may be a mature democracy. But it derives its ethics from tradition, and its essence from the West. As a result, it has concocted a so-called dual leadership system. It has undergone ruling party changes. The minority Democratic Progressive Party government refused to comply with the principle of majority rule. This made it impossible to establish a parliamentary system. When the majority Kuomintang returned to power, it could not ensure cooperation between the KMT leadership and the ruling KMT government. Internal rivalry within the ruling KMT led repeated cabinet reshuffles. Seventeen years after the president was first popularly elected, the sole exception was Premier Vincent Siew, who served a relatively long four year term under Lee Teng-hui. Under Chen Shui-bian and Ma Ying-jeou, the average term for the premier was one year two months to one year four months. This is not so different from Japan, with its rampant political turmoil.
During the Two Chiangs Era, premiers served four to six years. Leave aside the authoritarian era for the moment. The early part of Lee Teng-hui's presidency was a period of political turmoil. The KMT was wracked by intense internal conflict. Li Huan served as premier for only one year. This was his fate. After direct presidential elections were implemented, Vincent Siew served a solid four-year term. During his term however, Lee Teng-hui leveled veiled criticisms. He complained that Siew was indecisive in dealing with the Southeast Asian financial crisis, and that Siew often invited fiscal policy expert Chen Po-chih and others to his official residence to lay out the groundwork on his behalf. Lee invoked these criticisms against his own premier. But Chen Po-chih served as Chairman of the CEPD during the Chen Shui-bian administration. His record was mediocre. The Chen administration went through six premiers in eight years. Leave aside Tang Fei's misfortune for the moment. What about the rest? What about Yu Shyi-kun, Chang Chun-hsiung, Frank Hsieh and Su Tseng-chang? They were obviously appointed, one after another, merely to accomodate certain political realities. Ma Ying-jeou probably never imagined that terms for premiers under his adminstration would be as short as they were under the Chen administration. He intended to give Liu Chao-hsuan at least two years to show results. But Liu became collateral damage when the Lehman Brothers scandal precipitated a global financial crisis. Miraculously Liu survived, only to fall victim to Typhoon Morakot. Liu survived two years, to be replaced by political veteran Wu Den-yih. Despite Wu's re-election, political reality prevailed. He could no longer stay on as premier. He was determined to stay on, but in the end could not defy public sentiment. This year Sean Chen had a hard time. But Ma Ying-jeou had an even harder time. Jiang Yi-huah has stepped up to the plate. As Ma Ying-jeou sees it, no matter what, he must survive next year's Six Municipalities Elections. But will events unfold as he hopes? Ma Ying-jeou is afraid to say. Judging by Premier Jiang's first address in the legislature, he is as well.
Normally nations with parliamentary systems are constrained by the number of seats held by each political party. Cabinet reshuffling is constrained by political reality. This is inevitable. For example, France's Third Republic (1875-1940) underwent 103 cabinet reshuffles in 65 years. The average cabinet lasted less than eight months. The Fourth Republic (1946-1958) underwent 26 cabinet reshuffles in 12 years. The average cabinet lasted less than six months. These are all abnormal phenomenon. But on Taiwan, when the minority Chen administration was in power, the majority KMT dared not demand a no confidence vote. To mollify dissenters inside his own party, Chen kept changing premiers. By contrast, when the majority Ma administration was in power, all the minority party needed to do, was to open its mouth and denounce the Ma administration. This would panic the administration and make it replace premiers. Is this normal? This can be characterized as political reality, but it is hardly conducive to the national progress.
Premier Jiang addressed the legislature for the first time. He asked cabinet members to review their own proposals, and to present them to the public in one month. The seated cabinet members remained expressionless or pretended nothing was wrong. Did Premier Jiang really issue a military command? Or must President Ma or Chairman Ma issue such a command? Just whose commands will be obeyed? Unless Ma and Jiang are on the same page, and the party and the government are as well, chaos will prevail. Even Jiang Yi-huah, a PhD. in political science, will have trouble coping.
Now consider the Mainland's party leaders, government leaders, and military leaders. They serve at least ten years before being replaced. What can a person accomplish in ten years? Even rank novices can become old hands in ten years. Of course, the Mainland political system is totally different. The two systems cannot be compared. But from a purely managerial perspective, what mature and stable corporation changes CEOs every year? Any large corporation that passes the torch is likely to succumb to price shocks. Why else would TSMC Chairman Morris Chang return after retiring, other than to ensure effective management?
The Jiang Cabinet has stepped up to the plate. The mess left behind by Jiang's predecessors has yet to be cleaned up. Future challenges loom largeer than previously imagined. . No one wants to talk about long-term planning. The lifespan for Chen administration and Ma administration premiers has been barely over a year. Talk of plans spanning more than two years are the butt of jokes. The job is difficult, but must be done. The plans before the administration may be short-term or long-term. But all it can do is treat the symptoms. It can talk about addressing the root of the problem. But those charged with addressing the symptoms must show immediate results. Otherwise sound programs that are not yet complete will be denounced and dismissed. They will no longer enjoy political support. President Ma has put the economy first. Put bluntly, the cabinet must first provide the public with a cure that can be felt. The cure must take effect within the span of a legislative session. Otherwise, it will make no difference how good the composition of the cabinet is.
突破短命內閣魔咒 江揆須拚短期有感
2013-02-20
中國時報
新任行政院長江宜樺上任第一天，要求閣員「不要問你的任期有多久，要問你在任期中替國家做了多少有意義的事情。」這句話，講來動人心魄，然而，聽在閣員心中可能別有一番滋味；畢竟這麼些年來，內閣更迭頻繁，閣揆任期即使不是愈來愈短，但總是不長，閣員永遠只能隨閣揆總辭。到底能做多久？這個算盤不是閣員能主動操諸於己，還得上看總統與院長，下看民意與輿論。
講起來傷感，卻不能不承認這個現實，台灣雖是個民主成熟的社會，但是，台灣的民主體制既從傳統找倫理、又從西方找菁華，最後搞出一個不知道算是什麼的雙首長制，還經過政黨輪替，少數執政的民進黨政府既不遵守多數黨組閣的政治原理，無法創建一個傾向內閣制的慣例；多數執政的國民黨政府在再輪替之後的執政又無法落實黨政一體，七手八腳的多數執政依舊讓內閣更迭頻繁。民選總統後的十七年，除了李登輝選後四年用了一任四年的行政院長蕭萬長，尚稱長命之外，從陳水扁到馬英九，歷任行政院長任期平均不過一年兩個月到一年四個月，比諸日本政局之動盪，所差無幾。
兩蔣時代閣揆任期四到六年，威權時代存而不論，李登輝主政前期屬政治動盪期，國民黨內流派之爭劇烈，李煥任閣揆僅一年，是時也命也。民選之後，蕭萬長紮紮實實做了四年，這期間李登輝對他還頗有微詞，嫌他對東南亞金融風暴處理不夠明快，常在官邸找財經學者陳博志等籌畫主張，用以批評自己的院長，結果陳博志在扁政府出任經建會主委，建樹也不過爾爾。扁政府八年用掉六任五位院長，唐飛時運不濟不論，其他從游錫?、張俊雄、謝長廷、蘇貞昌，擺明了是安撫政治現實的排班輪流做。馬英九大概從沒想到自己任命的行政院長任期也如扁政府這麼短，找上劉兆玄開宗明義是要他至少兩年做出成績，雷曼兄弟引爆的全球金融風暴是非戰之罪，好不容易頂過去卻碰上莫拉克風災；挨過兩年換上熟諳政治的吳敦義，連任之際卻又抵不過政治現實，再易閣揆，他是鐵了心不想換，卻鐵不過民意，這一年，陳?難挨，馬英九更難挨；江宜樺上陣，照馬英九的想法，好歹撐到明年底的六都選舉，但能否順心？馬英九不敢講，看江揆首次院會的發言，連江揆自己都不敢講。
照正常，內閣制國家受限於政黨席次，內閣頻繁改組受限於政治現實，勢所難免，比方說，法國第三共和（一八七五~一九四○），六十五年內內閣改組一○三次，平均壽命不到八個月；第四共和（一九四六~一九五八）十二年內內閣改組廿六次，平均任期不到六個月，這都是非正常現象。然而，台灣少數黨執政（扁政府）時多數黨不敢倒閣，為了擺平黨內，閣揆拚命換；多數黨執政（馬政府）少數黨只要開口罵，閣揆還是拚命換，這正常嗎？或許這可以稱之為政治現實，但是，絕對不利於國家發展。
江揆首次院會發此言，還要閣員多想想自己的主張，並於一個月內提出，舉座閣員泰半面無表情或故做無事狀，江揆真要立下軍令狀，還得向馬總統、馬主席請令，這軍令到底聽誰的算？除非馬江一心、黨政一體，否則這亂象，就是政治博士江宜樺也難解。
看看對岸的黨政軍國家領導人，任期至少十年一換，十年能做多少事？再不熟練也能練成老手；當然，兩岸政治體制迥然有別，不能相提並論，但是，就從單純的治理原則，有哪一個成熟且穩定發展的企業ＣＥＯ一年一換？任何大企業主事者要交棒都可能成為股價震盪的重要因素，台積電董事長張忠謀退休後又回鍋所為何來？不過是為了治理績效而已。
江內閣上陣，前人的攤子還沒收攏，未來的挑戰比想像的更大，談長期規畫無人肯信，畢竟從扁政府到馬政府，歷任內閣壽命不過一年多，但凡超過兩年的規畫就是遭人譏笑的話柄，事已難做卻還是得做。眼下之計，只能長短期、標本兼治，治本者要談得夠美，但治標者得立馬就有績效，否則好的方案沒規畫完就被罵到體無完膚，事也甭做了。馬總統開口拚經濟為先，說穿了，還是要內閣先開出讓人民有感的特效藥，立法院會期內就得見效，否則內閣陣容再美亦屬枉然。
China Times editorial
Taipei, Taiwan, ROC
A Translation
February 20, 2013
Summary: The very first day Premier Jiang Yi-huah took office, he admonished cabinet members, "Ask not how long your term of office will be. Ask how many meaningful things you can accomplish on behalf of your country during that time." His words were inspirational. But his cabinet members may not have felt much inspiration in their hearts. After all, cabinets have been reshuffled so frequently over the years. .
Full Text below:
The very first day Premier Jiang Yi-huah took office, he admonished cabinet members, "Ask not how long your term of office will be. Ask how many meaningful things you can accomplish on behalf of your country during that time." His words were inspirational. But his cabinet members may not have felt much inspiration in their hearts. After all, cabinets have been reshuffled so frequently over the years. The premiers' terms may not have become shorter. But they have most assuredly not become longer. Cabinet members are expected to resign along with the premier. So how long can they expect to be around? This is not something cabinet members can calculate on their own. They must defer to the president and the premier above, and to the public below.
Sad to say, this harsh reality is undeniable. The ROC may be a mature democracy. But it derives its ethics from tradition, and its essence from the West. As a result, it has concocted a so-called dual leadership system. It has undergone ruling party changes. The minority Democratic Progressive Party government refused to comply with the principle of majority rule. This made it impossible to establish a parliamentary system. When the majority Kuomintang returned to power, it could not ensure cooperation between the KMT leadership and the ruling KMT government. Internal rivalry within the ruling KMT led repeated cabinet reshuffles. Seventeen years after the president was first popularly elected, the sole exception was Premier Vincent Siew, who served a relatively long four year term under Lee Teng-hui. Under Chen Shui-bian and Ma Ying-jeou, the average term for the premier was one year two months to one year four months. This is not so different from Japan, with its rampant political turmoil.
During the Two Chiangs Era, premiers served four to six years. Leave aside the authoritarian era for the moment. The early part of Lee Teng-hui's presidency was a period of political turmoil. The KMT was wracked by intense internal conflict. Li Huan served as premier for only one year. This was his fate. After direct presidential elections were implemented, Vincent Siew served a solid four-year term. During his term however, Lee Teng-hui leveled veiled criticisms. He complained that Siew was indecisive in dealing with the Southeast Asian financial crisis, and that Siew often invited fiscal policy expert Chen Po-chih and others to his official residence to lay out the groundwork on his behalf. Lee invoked these criticisms against his own premier. But Chen Po-chih served as Chairman of the CEPD during the Chen Shui-bian administration. His record was mediocre. The Chen administration went through six premiers in eight years. Leave aside Tang Fei's misfortune for the moment. What about the rest? What about Yu Shyi-kun, Chang Chun-hsiung, Frank Hsieh and Su Tseng-chang? They were obviously appointed, one after another, merely to accomodate certain political realities. Ma Ying-jeou probably never imagined that terms for premiers under his adminstration would be as short as they were under the Chen administration. He intended to give Liu Chao-hsuan at least two years to show results. But Liu became collateral damage when the Lehman Brothers scandal precipitated a global financial crisis. Miraculously Liu survived, only to fall victim to Typhoon Morakot. Liu survived two years, to be replaced by political veteran Wu Den-yih. Despite Wu's re-election, political reality prevailed. He could no longer stay on as premier. He was determined to stay on, but in the end could not defy public sentiment. This year Sean Chen had a hard time. But Ma Ying-jeou had an even harder time. Jiang Yi-huah has stepped up to the plate. As Ma Ying-jeou sees it, no matter what, he must survive next year's Six Municipalities Elections. But will events unfold as he hopes? Ma Ying-jeou is afraid to say. Judging by Premier Jiang's first address in the legislature, he is as well.
Normally nations with parliamentary systems are constrained by the number of seats held by each political party. Cabinet reshuffling is constrained by political reality. This is inevitable. For example, France's Third Republic (1875-1940) underwent 103 cabinet reshuffles in 65 years. The average cabinet lasted less than eight months. The Fourth Republic (1946-1958) underwent 26 cabinet reshuffles in 12 years. The average cabinet lasted less than six months. These are all abnormal phenomenon. But on Taiwan, when the minority Chen administration was in power, the majority KMT dared not demand a no confidence vote. To mollify dissenters inside his own party, Chen kept changing premiers. By contrast, when the majority Ma administration was in power, all the minority party needed to do, was to open its mouth and denounce the Ma administration. This would panic the administration and make it replace premiers. Is this normal? This can be characterized as political reality, but it is hardly conducive to the national progress.
Premier Jiang addressed the legislature for the first time. He asked cabinet members to review their own proposals, and to present them to the public in one month. The seated cabinet members remained expressionless or pretended nothing was wrong. Did Premier Jiang really issue a military command? Or must President Ma or Chairman Ma issue such a command? Just whose commands will be obeyed? Unless Ma and Jiang are on the same page, and the party and the government are as well, chaos will prevail. Even Jiang Yi-huah, a PhD. in political science, will have trouble coping.
Now consider the Mainland's party leaders, government leaders, and military leaders. They serve at least ten years before being replaced. What can a person accomplish in ten years? Even rank novices can become old hands in ten years. Of course, the Mainland political system is totally different. The two systems cannot be compared. But from a purely managerial perspective, what mature and stable corporation changes CEOs every year? Any large corporation that passes the torch is likely to succumb to price shocks. Why else would TSMC Chairman Morris Chang return after retiring, other than to ensure effective management?
The Jiang Cabinet has stepped up to the plate. The mess left behind by Jiang's predecessors has yet to be cleaned up. Future challenges loom largeer than previously imagined. . No one wants to talk about long-term planning. The lifespan for Chen administration and Ma administration premiers has been barely over a year. Talk of plans spanning more than two years are the butt of jokes. The job is difficult, but must be done. The plans before the administration may be short-term or long-term. But all it can do is treat the symptoms. It can talk about addressing the root of the problem. But those charged with addressing the symptoms must show immediate results. Otherwise sound programs that are not yet complete will be denounced and dismissed. They will no longer enjoy political support. President Ma has put the economy first. Put bluntly, the cabinet must first provide the public with a cure that can be felt. The cure must take effect within the span of a legislative session. Otherwise, it will make no difference how good the composition of the cabinet is.
突破短命內閣魔咒 江揆須拚短期有感
2013-02-20
中國時報
新任行政院長江宜樺上任第一天，要求閣員「不要問你的任期有多久，要問你在任期中替國家做了多少有意義的事情。」這句話，講來動人心魄，然而，聽在閣員心中可能別有一番滋味；畢竟這麼些年來，內閣更迭頻繁，閣揆任期即使不是愈來愈短，但總是不長，閣員永遠只能隨閣揆總辭。到底能做多久？這個算盤不是閣員能主動操諸於己，還得上看總統與院長，下看民意與輿論。
講起來傷感，卻不能不承認這個現實，台灣雖是個民主成熟的社會，但是，台灣的民主體制既從傳統找倫理、又從西方找菁華，最後搞出一個不知道算是什麼的雙首長制，還經過政黨輪替，少數執政的民進黨政府既不遵守多數黨組閣的政治原理，無法創建一個傾向內閣制的慣例；多數執政的國民黨政府在再輪替之後的執政又無法落實黨政一體，七手八腳的多數執政依舊讓內閣更迭頻繁。民選總統後的十七年，除了李登輝選後四年用了一任四年的行政院長蕭萬長，尚稱長命之外，從陳水扁到馬英九，歷任行政院長任期平均不過一年兩個月到一年四個月，比諸日本政局之動盪，所差無幾。
兩蔣時代閣揆任期四到六年，威權時代存而不論，李登輝主政前期屬政治動盪期，國民黨內流派之爭劇烈，李煥任閣揆僅一年，是時也命也。民選之後，蕭萬長紮紮實實做了四年，這期間李登輝對他還頗有微詞，嫌他對東南亞金融風暴處理不夠明快，常在官邸找財經學者陳博志等籌畫主張，用以批評自己的院長，結果陳博志在扁政府出任經建會主委，建樹也不過爾爾。扁政府八年用掉六任五位院長，唐飛時運不濟不論，其他從游錫?、張俊雄、謝長廷、蘇貞昌，擺明了是安撫政治現實的排班輪流做。馬英九大概從沒想到自己任命的行政院長任期也如扁政府這麼短，找上劉兆玄開宗明義是要他至少兩年做出成績，雷曼兄弟引爆的全球金融風暴是非戰之罪，好不容易頂過去卻碰上莫拉克風災；挨過兩年換上熟諳政治的吳敦義，連任之際卻又抵不過政治現實，再易閣揆，他是鐵了心不想換，卻鐵不過民意，這一年，陳?難挨，馬英九更難挨；江宜樺上陣，照馬英九的想法，好歹撐到明年底的六都選舉，但能否順心？馬英九不敢講，看江揆首次院會的發言，連江揆自己都不敢講。
照正常，內閣制國家受限於政黨席次，內閣頻繁改組受限於政治現實，勢所難免，比方說，法國第三共和（一八七五~一九四○），六十五年內內閣改組一○三次，平均壽命不到八個月；第四共和（一九四六~一九五八）十二年內內閣改組廿六次，平均任期不到六個月，這都是非正常現象。然而，台灣少數黨執政（扁政府）時多數黨不敢倒閣，為了擺平黨內，閣揆拚命換；多數黨執政（馬政府）少數黨只要開口罵，閣揆還是拚命換，這正常嗎？或許這可以稱之為政治現實，但是，絕對不利於國家發展。
江揆首次院會發此言，還要閣員多想想自己的主張，並於一個月內提出，舉座閣員泰半面無表情或故做無事狀，江揆真要立下軍令狀，還得向馬總統、馬主席請令，這軍令到底聽誰的算？除非馬江一心、黨政一體，否則這亂象，就是政治博士江宜樺也難解。
看看對岸的黨政軍國家領導人，任期至少十年一換，十年能做多少事？再不熟練也能練成老手；當然，兩岸政治體制迥然有別，不能相提並論，但是，就從單純的治理原則，有哪一個成熟且穩定發展的企業ＣＥＯ一年一換？任何大企業主事者要交棒都可能成為股價震盪的重要因素，台積電董事長張忠謀退休後又回鍋所為何來？不過是為了治理績效而已。
江內閣上陣，前人的攤子還沒收攏，未來的挑戰比想像的更大，談長期規畫無人肯信，畢竟從扁政府到馬政府，歷任內閣壽命不過一年多，但凡超過兩年的規畫就是遭人譏笑的話柄，事已難做卻還是得做。眼下之計，只能長短期、標本兼治，治本者要談得夠美，但治標者得立馬就有績效，否則好的方案沒規畫完就被罵到體無完膚，事也甭做了。馬總統開口拚經濟為先，說穿了，還是要內閣先開出讓人民有感的特效藥，立法院會期內就得見效，否則內閣陣容再美亦屬枉然。
Monday, February 18, 2013
New Cabinet's Economic Policy Must Clear Five Hurdles
New Cabinet's Economic Policy Must Clear Five Hurdles
United Daily News editorial
Taipei, Taiwan, ROC
A Translation
February 19, 2013
Summary: The new cabinet took office yesterday. Neither Premier Jiang Yi-huah nor Vice Premier Mao Chi-kuo have any fiscal policy experience. But everyone hopes this will not hamper their ability to lead the cabinet, reverse the Sean Chen Cabinet's image of impotence, and open new doors for Taiwan's economy.
Full Text below:
The new cabinet took office yesterday. Neither Premier Jiang Yi-huah nor Vice Premier Mao Chi-kuo have any fiscal policy experience. But everyone hopes this will not hamper their ability to lead the cabinet, reverse the Sean Chen Cabinet's image of impotence, and open new doors for Taiwan's economy.
We have been greeted by more and more positive economic news. This has raised public expectations for the new year. But the situation remains in flux, both domestically and abroad. The new cabinet hopes to open new doors for the economy. It hopes to gain public trust and support. But to do so it must first overcome five hurdles.
The first hurdle is international economic variables. The international economic and fiscal policy situation has recently improved. But numerous variables remain. Central banks the world over are engaging in quantitative easing. National economies are benefitting from rising stock indices, rising housing and other asset prices. Demand is increasing, and so is trade. But the Eurozone may undergo negative growth. The U.S. economy is still undergoing long-term correction. The effectiveness of quantitative easing is diminishing, and the attendant risks are increasing. Emerging markets, including Mainland China, are still unable to fulfill the role of economic locomotive. Last month the International Monetary Fund (IMF) cut global economic growth this year to 3.5%. This is only slightly higher than 2012, and shows that economic recovery is still a long way off.
Since Japanese Prime Minister Abe took office, he has been pushing for a devaluation of the yen. This has dramatically increased the risk of an international currency war. Recently the U.S. government endorsed Abe's economic policies. This means the pressure to revalue currencies is directed straight at the RMB, the number one target among emerging nation currencies. The NTD will probably be caught in the crossfire. Given these variables, the new cabinet must demonstrate resilience, in order to stabilize the economy and restore its vitality.
The second hurdle is the challenge of free trade. Nations the world over are attempting to accelerate their economic recovery. To this end, they are aggressively promoting free trade agreements (FTAs). In his first State of the Union Address since his reelection, U.S. President Barack Obama declared that he would sign an FTA with the EU, in June of this year. Negotiations should be complete two years from now. This will create the world's largest free trade zone. In other words, the United States led "Trans-Pacific Economic Partnership Agreement" (TPP) for 2015, the ASEAN and China led Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), and the US-EU FTA, may soon take shape. Therefore the new cabinet must negotiate an FTA. One the one hand, it must wrap up negotiations as soon as possible on the ECFA agreement on trade in goods and services, on the ROC-Singapore FTA, and on the ROC-New Zealand FTA. On the other hand, it must promote, full force, the "Free Trade Zone Pilot Program," and enable the ROC to participate in the TPP and the RCEP. This is critical if we wish to avoid marginalization.
The third hurdle is economic restructuring. Taiwan's economy is in part the victim of short-term sentiment. But it is also the victim of structural problems, including over-reliance on export-led economic growth, on "orders from Taiwan, with production overseas," and on the low-cost, low-value-added OEM export model. We may benefit from the global economic recovery. The economic growth figures may look pretty. But the employment opportunities will remain limited. Salaries will remain frozen. Most people will experience no economic benefits. Taiwan's economic growth model has reached a stage where it must change. The Ma administration has been in office for over four years. It has promoted economic restructuring. But it has left the impression that it is all talk and no action, that it is all flash and no substance. The result has been a weakening of the government's role at the helm and economic drift. This has led to a loss of confidence in the government. The new cabinet must learn these lessons. It must revolutionize its thinking and practices. It must offer businesses and the public a clear direction for the future. It must build consensus, and thereby lead Taiwan's economic transformation.
The fourth hurdle is to promote the construction of infrastructure. The Ma administration has touted its "Twelve Love for Taiwan Infrastructure Projects." But over the past four years, government fiscal difficulties and poor execution have left the public with an ambiguous impression regarding these twelve infrastructure projects. Consider major projects such as the aviation city and digital convergence. They have gone nowhere. They have not merely failed to promote economic growth. They have been a drag on economic performance, due to the lack of public investment. The cabinet is dominated by people charged with transportation and communications policy. Can the cabinet members charged with fiscal policy overcome long-standing abuses, while promoting public infrastructure construction? Can they introduce private sector economic participation? Can they demonstrate administrative competence? These will be the key indicators when evaluating the performance of the new cabinet.
The fifth hurdle is how to implement reform. Last year the Sean Chen cabinet promoted U.S. beef imports, the capital gains tax, gasoline price and electricity rate hikes. But the timing was wrong, the details were never worked out, and a consensus was never consolidated. The result was a string of setbacks. Popular support for the cabinet hit rock bottom. The impending pension reform program affects far more people. Its impact is far greater. Yet many polls show that over 70% of the public disapproves of the government's proposals for pension reform. Pension reform may lead to consumer belt-tightening. This and follow-up fiscal reforms require comprehensive responses. The new cabinet must undergo a change in mindset. It must solicit opinions. It must think in terms of a bigger pie. It must formulate a program more in character with the national interest. Only then can it create a majority consensus, and successfully promote pension reform.
The above five hurdles will be difficult to overcome. The Jiang Cabinet must be willing to engage in creative destruction. It must have relentless determination. It must have a strategy to change its method of governance. It must bear the burden of revitalizing Taiwan's economy and creating new prosperity.
新內閣為經濟開路須過五關
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.02.19 03:18 am
新內閣昨天走馬上任，各方至盼非財經背景的正副閣揆江宜樺及毛治國能領導內閣團隊，扭轉陳?內閣施政的無力感，為台灣經濟打開新的出路。
近來各種正面經濟訊息愈來愈多，也讓國人對新的一年期待更高；但環顧內外形勢變化，新內閣要為經濟開路，贏得人民信任與支持，須有過五關的本事：
第一關是國際經濟變數。近來國際經濟及金融情勢雖見好轉，但變數仍多，在全球央行量化寬鬆政策加持下，各國經濟受惠股市、房市等資產價格上揚，需求普遍增加，貿易亦轉活絡。但今年歐元區經濟仍可能負成長，美國經濟亦尚處長期調整階段，量寬政策效應遞減且風險增加；包括中國大陸在內的新興市場，則尚難扮演經濟火車頭角色。上月國際貨幣基金（ＩＭＦ）調降今年全球經濟成長率預測值至百分之三點五，僅較二○一二年略高，顯示距經濟復甦仍有長路要走。
另一方面，日本安倍首相上任後力推日圓貶值政策，大幅升高國際貨幣戰風險。最近美國政府為安倍經濟政策背書，意味貨幣升值壓力將轉到以人民幣為頭號目標的新興國家貨幣，新台幣恐難逃池魚之殃。面對多重變數，新內閣須展現應變能力，方能穩住經濟回升力道。
第二關是自由貿易挑戰。世界各國為加速經濟復甦皆積極推動自由貿易協定（ＦＴＡ）。美國歐巴馬總統在連任首度國情咨文宣布今年六月將啟動和歐盟洽簽ＦＴＡ，預定二年內完成談判，形成全球最大自貿區。換言之，到二○一五年包括美國力推的「跨太平洋經濟夥伴協定」（ＴＰＰ），東協及中國主導的「區域全面經濟夥伴關係」（ＲＣＥＰ），以及美歐ＦＴＡ可能陸續建置。因此，新內閣須在洽簽ＦＴＡ上展現行動力，一方面儘速完成ＥＣＦＡ貨品貿易和服務業貿易協議，以及台星、台紐ＦＴＡ，另方面全力落實推動「自由經濟示範區」計畫，為台灣參加ＴＰＰ及ＲＣＥＰ創備條件。這也是避免台灣經濟被邊緣化的最關鍵施政。
第三關是經濟轉型。近年台灣經濟困境除短期景氣因素外，結構性問題包括經濟成長過於依賴出口帶動，過於依賴「台灣接單、海外生產」、低成本、低附加價值的代工出口模式；因而即使受惠全球景氣復甦，經濟成長數字美化，但就業機會增加有限，薪資長期停滯，多數人民依然無感。是以，台灣經濟成長模式已到非變不可的時候。馬政府執政四年多來，在推動經濟轉型上，給人感覺就是說多做少，華而不實，以致弱化政府掌舵角色，任令經濟隨波逐流，也讓人民喪失對政府的信心。新內閣須汲取教訓，徹底改變思維與做法，讓企業及人民清楚未來努力方向與目標，凝聚集體意志，帶動台灣經濟全面轉型。
第四關是推動建設。馬政府標榜「愛台十二建設」，但四年多來，因為政府財政困難及執行力不彰，致民間對十二項建設印象模糊。而且如航空城、數位匯流等重大建設幾乎原地踏步，不僅未帶動經濟成長，反因政府公共投資不足拖累經濟表現。新內閣財經成員由交通幫掛帥，在推動公共建設上，能否革除積弊，並引進民間活力，展現令人耳目一新的執行力，是檢驗內閣施政效能的重要指標。
第五關是落實改革。過去一年陳內閣推動美牛、證所稅、油電雙漲等多項改革，但因時機不對、配套不周及共識不足，致一波三折，也讓內閣民意支持度跌到谷底。如今牽涉更廣、影響更鉅的退休年金改革箭在弦上，但多項民調顯示，超過七成民眾對政府初步提出的年金改革方案不能認同。再者，年金改革可能引發的消費緊縮效應，以及後續關聯的財稅改革，亦須有周全配套方足因應。是以，新內閣須改變思維，博採周諮，從把餅做大觀點，形塑更符全民利益的周全方案，才能凝聚多數人共識，順利推動年金改革。
以上五關，關關難過，但江內閣若有大破大立的決心，有奮進不懈的意志，有改變施政方式的策略，則未嘗不能挑起重擔，為再造台灣經濟榮景開路。
United Daily News editorial
Taipei, Taiwan, ROC
A Translation
February 19, 2013
Summary: The new cabinet took office yesterday. Neither Premier Jiang Yi-huah nor Vice Premier Mao Chi-kuo have any fiscal policy experience. But everyone hopes this will not hamper their ability to lead the cabinet, reverse the Sean Chen Cabinet's image of impotence, and open new doors for Taiwan's economy.
Full Text below:
The new cabinet took office yesterday. Neither Premier Jiang Yi-huah nor Vice Premier Mao Chi-kuo have any fiscal policy experience. But everyone hopes this will not hamper their ability to lead the cabinet, reverse the Sean Chen Cabinet's image of impotence, and open new doors for Taiwan's economy.
We have been greeted by more and more positive economic news. This has raised public expectations for the new year. But the situation remains in flux, both domestically and abroad. The new cabinet hopes to open new doors for the economy. It hopes to gain public trust and support. But to do so it must first overcome five hurdles.
The first hurdle is international economic variables. The international economic and fiscal policy situation has recently improved. But numerous variables remain. Central banks the world over are engaging in quantitative easing. National economies are benefitting from rising stock indices, rising housing and other asset prices. Demand is increasing, and so is trade. But the Eurozone may undergo negative growth. The U.S. economy is still undergoing long-term correction. The effectiveness of quantitative easing is diminishing, and the attendant risks are increasing. Emerging markets, including Mainland China, are still unable to fulfill the role of economic locomotive. Last month the International Monetary Fund (IMF) cut global economic growth this year to 3.5%. This is only slightly higher than 2012, and shows that economic recovery is still a long way off.
Since Japanese Prime Minister Abe took office, he has been pushing for a devaluation of the yen. This has dramatically increased the risk of an international currency war. Recently the U.S. government endorsed Abe's economic policies. This means the pressure to revalue currencies is directed straight at the RMB, the number one target among emerging nation currencies. The NTD will probably be caught in the crossfire. Given these variables, the new cabinet must demonstrate resilience, in order to stabilize the economy and restore its vitality.
The second hurdle is the challenge of free trade. Nations the world over are attempting to accelerate their economic recovery. To this end, they are aggressively promoting free trade agreements (FTAs). In his first State of the Union Address since his reelection, U.S. President Barack Obama declared that he would sign an FTA with the EU, in June of this year. Negotiations should be complete two years from now. This will create the world's largest free trade zone. In other words, the United States led "Trans-Pacific Economic Partnership Agreement" (TPP) for 2015, the ASEAN and China led Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), and the US-EU FTA, may soon take shape. Therefore the new cabinet must negotiate an FTA. One the one hand, it must wrap up negotiations as soon as possible on the ECFA agreement on trade in goods and services, on the ROC-Singapore FTA, and on the ROC-New Zealand FTA. On the other hand, it must promote, full force, the "Free Trade Zone Pilot Program," and enable the ROC to participate in the TPP and the RCEP. This is critical if we wish to avoid marginalization.
The third hurdle is economic restructuring. Taiwan's economy is in part the victim of short-term sentiment. But it is also the victim of structural problems, including over-reliance on export-led economic growth, on "orders from Taiwan, with production overseas," and on the low-cost, low-value-added OEM export model. We may benefit from the global economic recovery. The economic growth figures may look pretty. But the employment opportunities will remain limited. Salaries will remain frozen. Most people will experience no economic benefits. Taiwan's economic growth model has reached a stage where it must change. The Ma administration has been in office for over four years. It has promoted economic restructuring. But it has left the impression that it is all talk and no action, that it is all flash and no substance. The result has been a weakening of the government's role at the helm and economic drift. This has led to a loss of confidence in the government. The new cabinet must learn these lessons. It must revolutionize its thinking and practices. It must offer businesses and the public a clear direction for the future. It must build consensus, and thereby lead Taiwan's economic transformation.
The fourth hurdle is to promote the construction of infrastructure. The Ma administration has touted its "Twelve Love for Taiwan Infrastructure Projects." But over the past four years, government fiscal difficulties and poor execution have left the public with an ambiguous impression regarding these twelve infrastructure projects. Consider major projects such as the aviation city and digital convergence. They have gone nowhere. They have not merely failed to promote economic growth. They have been a drag on economic performance, due to the lack of public investment. The cabinet is dominated by people charged with transportation and communications policy. Can the cabinet members charged with fiscal policy overcome long-standing abuses, while promoting public infrastructure construction? Can they introduce private sector economic participation? Can they demonstrate administrative competence? These will be the key indicators when evaluating the performance of the new cabinet.
The fifth hurdle is how to implement reform. Last year the Sean Chen cabinet promoted U.S. beef imports, the capital gains tax, gasoline price and electricity rate hikes. But the timing was wrong, the details were never worked out, and a consensus was never consolidated. The result was a string of setbacks. Popular support for the cabinet hit rock bottom. The impending pension reform program affects far more people. Its impact is far greater. Yet many polls show that over 70% of the public disapproves of the government's proposals for pension reform. Pension reform may lead to consumer belt-tightening. This and follow-up fiscal reforms require comprehensive responses. The new cabinet must undergo a change in mindset. It must solicit opinions. It must think in terms of a bigger pie. It must formulate a program more in character with the national interest. Only then can it create a majority consensus, and successfully promote pension reform.
The above five hurdles will be difficult to overcome. The Jiang Cabinet must be willing to engage in creative destruction. It must have relentless determination. It must have a strategy to change its method of governance. It must bear the burden of revitalizing Taiwan's economy and creating new prosperity.
新內閣為經濟開路須過五關
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.02.19 03:18 am
新內閣昨天走馬上任，各方至盼非財經背景的正副閣揆江宜樺及毛治國能領導內閣團隊，扭轉陳?內閣施政的無力感，為台灣經濟打開新的出路。
近來各種正面經濟訊息愈來愈多，也讓國人對新的一年期待更高；但環顧內外形勢變化，新內閣要為經濟開路，贏得人民信任與支持，須有過五關的本事：
第一關是國際經濟變數。近來國際經濟及金融情勢雖見好轉，但變數仍多，在全球央行量化寬鬆政策加持下，各國經濟受惠股市、房市等資產價格上揚，需求普遍增加，貿易亦轉活絡。但今年歐元區經濟仍可能負成長，美國經濟亦尚處長期調整階段，量寬政策效應遞減且風險增加；包括中國大陸在內的新興市場，則尚難扮演經濟火車頭角色。上月國際貨幣基金（ＩＭＦ）調降今年全球經濟成長率預測值至百分之三點五，僅較二○一二年略高，顯示距經濟復甦仍有長路要走。
另一方面，日本安倍首相上任後力推日圓貶值政策，大幅升高國際貨幣戰風險。最近美國政府為安倍經濟政策背書，意味貨幣升值壓力將轉到以人民幣為頭號目標的新興國家貨幣，新台幣恐難逃池魚之殃。面對多重變數，新內閣須展現應變能力，方能穩住經濟回升力道。
第二關是自由貿易挑戰。世界各國為加速經濟復甦皆積極推動自由貿易協定（ＦＴＡ）。美國歐巴馬總統在連任首度國情咨文宣布今年六月將啟動和歐盟洽簽ＦＴＡ，預定二年內完成談判，形成全球最大自貿區。換言之，到二○一五年包括美國力推的「跨太平洋經濟夥伴協定」（ＴＰＰ），東協及中國主導的「區域全面經濟夥伴關係」（ＲＣＥＰ），以及美歐ＦＴＡ可能陸續建置。因此，新內閣須在洽簽ＦＴＡ上展現行動力，一方面儘速完成ＥＣＦＡ貨品貿易和服務業貿易協議，以及台星、台紐ＦＴＡ，另方面全力落實推動「自由經濟示範區」計畫，為台灣參加ＴＰＰ及ＲＣＥＰ創備條件。這也是避免台灣經濟被邊緣化的最關鍵施政。
第三關是經濟轉型。近年台灣經濟困境除短期景氣因素外，結構性問題包括經濟成長過於依賴出口帶動，過於依賴「台灣接單、海外生產」、低成本、低附加價值的代工出口模式；因而即使受惠全球景氣復甦，經濟成長數字美化，但就業機會增加有限，薪資長期停滯，多數人民依然無感。是以，台灣經濟成長模式已到非變不可的時候。馬政府執政四年多來，在推動經濟轉型上，給人感覺就是說多做少，華而不實，以致弱化政府掌舵角色，任令經濟隨波逐流，也讓人民喪失對政府的信心。新內閣須汲取教訓，徹底改變思維與做法，讓企業及人民清楚未來努力方向與目標，凝聚集體意志，帶動台灣經濟全面轉型。
第四關是推動建設。馬政府標榜「愛台十二建設」，但四年多來，因為政府財政困難及執行力不彰，致民間對十二項建設印象模糊。而且如航空城、數位匯流等重大建設幾乎原地踏步，不僅未帶動經濟成長，反因政府公共投資不足拖累經濟表現。新內閣財經成員由交通幫掛帥，在推動公共建設上，能否革除積弊，並引進民間活力，展現令人耳目一新的執行力，是檢驗內閣施政效能的重要指標。
第五關是落實改革。過去一年陳內閣推動美牛、證所稅、油電雙漲等多項改革，但因時機不對、配套不周及共識不足，致一波三折，也讓內閣民意支持度跌到谷底。如今牽涉更廣、影響更鉅的退休年金改革箭在弦上，但多項民調顯示，超過七成民眾對政府初步提出的年金改革方案不能認同。再者，年金改革可能引發的消費緊縮效應，以及後續關聯的財稅改革，亦須有周全配套方足因應。是以，新內閣須改變思維，博採周諮，從把餅做大觀點，形塑更符全民利益的周全方案，才能凝聚多數人共識，順利推動年金改革。
以上五關，關關難過，但江內閣若有大破大立的決心，有奮進不懈的意志，有改變施政方式的策略，則未嘗不能挑起重擔，為再造台灣經濟榮景開路。
Promote the General Welfare: Jiang Cabinet Need Not March to the DPP's Drums
Promote the General Welfare:
Jiang Cabinet Need Not March to the DPP's Drums
United Daily News editorial
Taipei, Taiwan, ROC
A Translation
February 18, 2013
Summary: The Jiang Yi-huah cabinet assumed office today. Jiang is the youngest premier in the last half century. He has barely more than five years of political experience. Can he successfully oversee the ruling administration? Can he survive the diplomatic crisis? Can he help President Ma restore his tarnished reputation? These wait to be seen.
Full Text below:
The Jiang Yi-huah cabinet assumed office today. Jiang is the youngest premier in the last half century. He has barely more than five years of political experience. Can he successfully oversee the ruling administration? Can he survive the diplomatic crisis? Can he help President Ma restore his tarnished reputation? These wait to be seen.
How well will the Jiang Cabinet perform? Opinions are polarized. Some consider Jiang Yi-huah an unknown quantity, therefore they feel little empathy for him. Others consider his cabinet a breath of fresh air, therefore they have high hopes. Therefore, depending upon their expectations, people will judge the Jiang Cabinet according to very different standards. One standard will be low, the other will be high. First consider the low standard. The hope is that the new cabinet will at least stabilize the situation, and prevent Taiwan's economy from deteriorating further. Now consider the high standard. The hope is that the ruling and opposition parties will interact in a new manner that generates forward momentum, and that this will transform the political rot into something entirely new.
In other words, at worst people will see it as a failed political experiment. After all, premiers are changed annually. If this one is replaced, he will not be missed. At best, perhaps this accidental premier's new thinking and new policies will eliminate the stench surrounding Taiwan's politics. Perhaps he can break the deadlock and blaze a new trail for the ruling and opposition parties. In any case, Jiang Yi-huah has no intention of applying low standards to himself. He must apply high standards to himself, and consider the larger political picture. Only then will his political journey have positive significance. He speaks of "modern intellectuals imbued with the Confucian spirit." This is the only way to implement his goal of accession to the WTO.
Jiang is a political novice. The good thing about being a novice, is that one is not mired within the old framework and norms. One's decisions can be based on broader concerns. As for lack of experience, one can always overcome that by recruiting people with talent from all walks of life. On this point, Jiang Yi-huah must assume responsibility. The Sean Chen cabinet was troubled by internal dissent. Whether the premier was long on administrative experience was clearly not the main issue. It had a far bigger problem. The government was unable to set the policy agenda. It was constantly tripped up by the opposition DPP, and even by comrades within his own party. The result was a loss of control. This was the main reason it lost public support.
The Chen cabinet taught the Jiang cabinet an important lesson. The government must seize the initiative. It must never march to the beat of its opponents' drums. If it does so, it will find itself in a defensive posture, and unable to get anything done. Consider the issues currently on the table. Opposition to nuclear energy is one of the key planks in the Green Camp's platform. This can be interspersed with issues such as pension reform, U.S. pork imports, impeaching the president, and the luxury tax. Meanwhile, the only examples the ruling party can counter with, are the Free Trade Zone Pilot Program and the cross-Strait representative offices. These political cards are relatively weak. Therefore the Jiang Cabinet must do more. It must help people understand the government's intentions. Only then can the new cabinet show off its new thinking.
Promoting the General Welfare is one of the government's basic duties. There is nothing mysterious about it. When society encounters difficulties, when people are in need, the government must attempt to provide resources, establish a framework, change the system, and remove obstacles. This is the function of government. Is the Jiang Cabinet watching over society? Does it care for people? Have its members achieved anything of value? If so, it need not fear DPP obstructionism. It will have no trouble rehabilitating its public image.
The Jiang cabinet must be able to get things done. President Ma must change his role. Over the past year, President Ma has presided over both the KMT and the ROC central government. He failed to exercise effective leadership over the KMT legislative caucus. As a result, the cabinet encountered obstructionism. Today, a new cabinet has assumed office. President Ma may wish to relinquish some control over administrative matters, and assert greater control over the party. He can make up for lost control over the government with increased control over the party. This will enable to administration to operate more smoothly as a whole. The president may even wish to humble himself. He may even wish to transcend partisanship by inviting rival political party heads or civic leaders to discuss matters of state. This would ensure media coverage, address opposition DPP and civic group discontent, and help consolidate a public consensus.
For the Blue camp, Jiang Yi-huah rejoined the party less than six months ago. He is someone whom many are unfamiliar with, and do not understand. For the Green camp, many middle-aged DPP leaders know him from their time as students. This is a strange relationship, one that reflects President Ma's outside the box thinking. It requires a leap of faith regarding a 60s generation succession. If the Jiang cabinet can get its act together, Taiwan's politics can experience a wave of innovation. This would do more than merely promote reform within the Blue camp. It might even sweep the Green camp Formosa Incident generation lawyers into the dustbin of history. The question is whether Jiang Yi-huah can shoulder this burden.
Pragmatically speaking, what people want to see is not the ritual of a new premier taking office. What they want to see is the change this new cabinet team can make. Its demeanor may be elegant or awkward. But the Jiang Cabinet must find its own way. If it marches to the beat of its opponents' drums, it will only lose its way.
興利為先 江內閣不必隨戰鼓起舞
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.02.18 03:12 am
江宜樺領導的新內閣今天上任。作為半世紀以來最年輕的閣揆，僅有五年多從政資歷的江宜樺能否成功駕御其政府團隊，順利度過內外交迫的情勢，甚至幫助馬總統重振其低迷的聲望，讓人拭目以待。
對於江內閣的可能表現，外界的看法兩極：一種是因對江宜樺的陌生而感到冷漠，一種是因內閣的新鮮組合而抱持期待。在這種情況下，對江內閣的期望值也就產生「低標」和「高標」兩種判準。從低而言，希望新閣至少能穩住形勢，不讓台灣的經濟繼續滑向谷底；從高而言，則期待朝野從不同的衝撞及互動模式產生新的動力，把一團爛泥的政治文化帶向新的境界。
這也就是說，壞的話，民眾就當成一場失敗的政治實驗，反正年年都在換閣揆，不差這一個。好的話，也許這位意外的閣揆能以新思維及新行動化解台灣政治的惡毒煙硝，為朝野互動僵局撥探出一條新路。無論如何，希望江宜樺心中絕不作低標的計議，而須將自己放在更大的政治向度上作高標思考。如此，他的從政之路才可能產生積極意義，他自謂「具有儒家精神的現代知識分子」的入世使命也才有落實的基礎。
作為政治新鮮人，好處是比較不拘泥舊有框架與規範，決策行事可以有更寬廣的想像空間。至於經驗不足的問題，則可以藉善於用人、廣徵博問的手法來克服；這點，需要江宜樺自行拿捏。事實上，以陳?內閣任內的紛擾不斷看，閣揆是否富於行政經驗顯然不是重點；更大的癥結在，政府無法主導施政議題，不時被在野黨乃至黨內同志羈絆阻撓，弄得步調大亂，才是失去民意支持的主因。
「陳內閣」的前車之鑑，留給「江內閣」的最大教訓是：為政必須掌握主動，如果一味跟隨敵營的戰鼓起舞，勢必使自己陷於守勢，難有所成。從目前浮在檯面上的議題看，反核是綠營最主要的攻堅目標，至於年金改革、美豬進口、罷免總統案、奢侈稅等議題則將穿插進行；反觀執政黨方面，目前僅有自由經濟示範區、兩岸互設辦事處等議題可以回敬，籌碼顯得相對薄弱。因此，江內閣必須拿出更多作為，讓民眾感受到政府為民興利的用心，才可能展現新閣新局之新意。
為民「興利」，是為政的基本道理，沒有太多深奧難解之處。社會哪裡發生疑難，民間有什麼需要，政府都要設法提供資源、建立平台、變更制度乃至排除障礙，這就是政府存在的目的。如果江內閣眼睛看著社會、心裡關注著人民、手下做出些成績來，哪怕在野黨再怎麼扯後腿，也能挽回低迷的支持。
進一步說，江內閣要能放手作為，馬總統的角色恐也有調整之必要。過去一年，馬總統個人黨政雙駕，結果卻未能有效運作黨團，反使內閣施政受到阻擾。如今新閣上任，馬總統或可在政務上多鬆些手、在黨務上多加些力，如此以黨輔政，才能整部行政馬車跑得更為順暢。甚至，總統有時不妨放下身段，以超越黨派的元首身分不拘形式地邀請朝野或民間人士共商國是；那樣，不僅可廣納視聽，也可紓解在野及民間鬱氣，有助重新凝聚社會共識。
對藍營而言，重新入黨不到半年的江宜樺，是他們陌生而理解不多的同志；對綠營而言，許多民進黨中生代卻從學生時代即與他有所交往。這層奇特的交錯關係，除反映馬總統出格的用人思維，更勾勒了一個「六○年代接班」的跨越想像。若江內閣能成功奮起，將使台灣政治出現一波推陳出新，除帶動藍營內部的更迭，甚至可能讓綠營美麗島律師世代都變成歷史。問題在，江宜樺怎麼看待自己肩頭這個擔子？
務實地說，民眾要看的不是一個新閣揆上台的姿態，而是這個新內閣班子能為台灣帶來什麼改變。優雅也罷，緊張也好，江內閣都得看準自己要走的路，若陷入對手鼓聲的迷魂陣，必定迷失方向。
Jiang Cabinet Need Not March to the DPP's Drums
United Daily News editorial
Taipei, Taiwan, ROC
A Translation
February 18, 2013
Summary: The Jiang Yi-huah cabinet assumed office today. Jiang is the youngest premier in the last half century. He has barely more than five years of political experience. Can he successfully oversee the ruling administration? Can he survive the diplomatic crisis? Can he help President Ma restore his tarnished reputation? These wait to be seen.
Full Text below:
The Jiang Yi-huah cabinet assumed office today. Jiang is the youngest premier in the last half century. He has barely more than five years of political experience. Can he successfully oversee the ruling administration? Can he survive the diplomatic crisis? Can he help President Ma restore his tarnished reputation? These wait to be seen.
How well will the Jiang Cabinet perform? Opinions are polarized. Some consider Jiang Yi-huah an unknown quantity, therefore they feel little empathy for him. Others consider his cabinet a breath of fresh air, therefore they have high hopes. Therefore, depending upon their expectations, people will judge the Jiang Cabinet according to very different standards. One standard will be low, the other will be high. First consider the low standard. The hope is that the new cabinet will at least stabilize the situation, and prevent Taiwan's economy from deteriorating further. Now consider the high standard. The hope is that the ruling and opposition parties will interact in a new manner that generates forward momentum, and that this will transform the political rot into something entirely new.
In other words, at worst people will see it as a failed political experiment. After all, premiers are changed annually. If this one is replaced, he will not be missed. At best, perhaps this accidental premier's new thinking and new policies will eliminate the stench surrounding Taiwan's politics. Perhaps he can break the deadlock and blaze a new trail for the ruling and opposition parties. In any case, Jiang Yi-huah has no intention of applying low standards to himself. He must apply high standards to himself, and consider the larger political picture. Only then will his political journey have positive significance. He speaks of "modern intellectuals imbued with the Confucian spirit." This is the only way to implement his goal of accession to the WTO.
Jiang is a political novice. The good thing about being a novice, is that one is not mired within the old framework and norms. One's decisions can be based on broader concerns. As for lack of experience, one can always overcome that by recruiting people with talent from all walks of life. On this point, Jiang Yi-huah must assume responsibility. The Sean Chen cabinet was troubled by internal dissent. Whether the premier was long on administrative experience was clearly not the main issue. It had a far bigger problem. The government was unable to set the policy agenda. It was constantly tripped up by the opposition DPP, and even by comrades within his own party. The result was a loss of control. This was the main reason it lost public support.
The Chen cabinet taught the Jiang cabinet an important lesson. The government must seize the initiative. It must never march to the beat of its opponents' drums. If it does so, it will find itself in a defensive posture, and unable to get anything done. Consider the issues currently on the table. Opposition to nuclear energy is one of the key planks in the Green Camp's platform. This can be interspersed with issues such as pension reform, U.S. pork imports, impeaching the president, and the luxury tax. Meanwhile, the only examples the ruling party can counter with, are the Free Trade Zone Pilot Program and the cross-Strait representative offices. These political cards are relatively weak. Therefore the Jiang Cabinet must do more. It must help people understand the government's intentions. Only then can the new cabinet show off its new thinking.
Promoting the General Welfare is one of the government's basic duties. There is nothing mysterious about it. When society encounters difficulties, when people are in need, the government must attempt to provide resources, establish a framework, change the system, and remove obstacles. This is the function of government. Is the Jiang Cabinet watching over society? Does it care for people? Have its members achieved anything of value? If so, it need not fear DPP obstructionism. It will have no trouble rehabilitating its public image.
The Jiang cabinet must be able to get things done. President Ma must change his role. Over the past year, President Ma has presided over both the KMT and the ROC central government. He failed to exercise effective leadership over the KMT legislative caucus. As a result, the cabinet encountered obstructionism. Today, a new cabinet has assumed office. President Ma may wish to relinquish some control over administrative matters, and assert greater control over the party. He can make up for lost control over the government with increased control over the party. This will enable to administration to operate more smoothly as a whole. The president may even wish to humble himself. He may even wish to transcend partisanship by inviting rival political party heads or civic leaders to discuss matters of state. This would ensure media coverage, address opposition DPP and civic group discontent, and help consolidate a public consensus.
For the Blue camp, Jiang Yi-huah rejoined the party less than six months ago. He is someone whom many are unfamiliar with, and do not understand. For the Green camp, many middle-aged DPP leaders know him from their time as students. This is a strange relationship, one that reflects President Ma's outside the box thinking. It requires a leap of faith regarding a 60s generation succession. If the Jiang cabinet can get its act together, Taiwan's politics can experience a wave of innovation. This would do more than merely promote reform within the Blue camp. It might even sweep the Green camp Formosa Incident generation lawyers into the dustbin of history. The question is whether Jiang Yi-huah can shoulder this burden.
Pragmatically speaking, what people want to see is not the ritual of a new premier taking office. What they want to see is the change this new cabinet team can make. Its demeanor may be elegant or awkward. But the Jiang Cabinet must find its own way. If it marches to the beat of its opponents' drums, it will only lose its way.
興利為先 江內閣不必隨戰鼓起舞
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.02.18 03:12 am
江宜樺領導的新內閣今天上任。作為半世紀以來最年輕的閣揆，僅有五年多從政資歷的江宜樺能否成功駕御其政府團隊，順利度過內外交迫的情勢，甚至幫助馬總統重振其低迷的聲望，讓人拭目以待。
對於江內閣的可能表現，外界的看法兩極：一種是因對江宜樺的陌生而感到冷漠，一種是因內閣的新鮮組合而抱持期待。在這種情況下，對江內閣的期望值也就產生「低標」和「高標」兩種判準。從低而言，希望新閣至少能穩住形勢，不讓台灣的經濟繼續滑向谷底；從高而言，則期待朝野從不同的衝撞及互動模式產生新的動力，把一團爛泥的政治文化帶向新的境界。
這也就是說，壞的話，民眾就當成一場失敗的政治實驗，反正年年都在換閣揆，不差這一個。好的話，也許這位意外的閣揆能以新思維及新行動化解台灣政治的惡毒煙硝，為朝野互動僵局撥探出一條新路。無論如何，希望江宜樺心中絕不作低標的計議，而須將自己放在更大的政治向度上作高標思考。如此，他的從政之路才可能產生積極意義，他自謂「具有儒家精神的現代知識分子」的入世使命也才有落實的基礎。
作為政治新鮮人，好處是比較不拘泥舊有框架與規範，決策行事可以有更寬廣的想像空間。至於經驗不足的問題，則可以藉善於用人、廣徵博問的手法來克服；這點，需要江宜樺自行拿捏。事實上，以陳?內閣任內的紛擾不斷看，閣揆是否富於行政經驗顯然不是重點；更大的癥結在，政府無法主導施政議題，不時被在野黨乃至黨內同志羈絆阻撓，弄得步調大亂，才是失去民意支持的主因。
「陳內閣」的前車之鑑，留給「江內閣」的最大教訓是：為政必須掌握主動，如果一味跟隨敵營的戰鼓起舞，勢必使自己陷於守勢，難有所成。從目前浮在檯面上的議題看，反核是綠營最主要的攻堅目標，至於年金改革、美豬進口、罷免總統案、奢侈稅等議題則將穿插進行；反觀執政黨方面，目前僅有自由經濟示範區、兩岸互設辦事處等議題可以回敬，籌碼顯得相對薄弱。因此，江內閣必須拿出更多作為，讓民眾感受到政府為民興利的用心，才可能展現新閣新局之新意。
為民「興利」，是為政的基本道理，沒有太多深奧難解之處。社會哪裡發生疑難，民間有什麼需要，政府都要設法提供資源、建立平台、變更制度乃至排除障礙，這就是政府存在的目的。如果江內閣眼睛看著社會、心裡關注著人民、手下做出些成績來，哪怕在野黨再怎麼扯後腿，也能挽回低迷的支持。
進一步說，江內閣要能放手作為，馬總統的角色恐也有調整之必要。過去一年，馬總統個人黨政雙駕，結果卻未能有效運作黨團，反使內閣施政受到阻擾。如今新閣上任，馬總統或可在政務上多鬆些手、在黨務上多加些力，如此以黨輔政，才能整部行政馬車跑得更為順暢。甚至，總統有時不妨放下身段，以超越黨派的元首身分不拘形式地邀請朝野或民間人士共商國是；那樣，不僅可廣納視聽，也可紓解在野及民間鬱氣，有助重新凝聚社會共識。
對藍營而言，重新入黨不到半年的江宜樺，是他們陌生而理解不多的同志；對綠營而言，許多民進黨中生代卻從學生時代即與他有所交往。這層奇特的交錯關係，除反映馬總統出格的用人思維，更勾勒了一個「六○年代接班」的跨越想像。若江內閣能成功奮起，將使台灣政治出現一波推陳出新，除帶動藍營內部的更迭，甚至可能讓綠營美麗島律師世代都變成歷史。問題在，江宜樺怎麼看待自己肩頭這個擔子？
務實地說，民眾要看的不是一個新閣揆上台的姿態，而是這個新內閣班子能為台灣帶來什麼改變。優雅也罷，緊張也好，江內閣都得看準自己要走的路，若陷入對手鼓聲的迷魂陣，必定迷失方向。
Thursday, February 7, 2013
Diaoyutai Conflict: Do Not Fire the First Shot
Diaoyutai Conflict: Do Not Fire the First Shot
United Daily editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 8, 2013
Summary: The Diaoyutai Islands conflict is unpredictable. The ruling and opposition parties on Taiwan have been caught up in the controversy. 1. Su Tseng-chang visited Japan. Before leaving it was rumored that he would meet with Shintaro Ishihara, leader of the Japan Restoration Party. Upon returning, he repeatedly denied doing so. 2. On January 24, the "Quanjiafu" entered Diaoyutai waters. Some in Washington and Tokyo seem to believe this action was taken at the behest of the Ma administration, or at least with its support.
Full text below:
The Diaoyutai Islands conflict is unpredictable. The ruling and opposition parties on Taiwan have been caught up in the controversy. 1. Su Tseng-chang visited Japan. Before leaving it was rumored that he would meet with Shintaro Ishihara, leader of the Japan Restoration Party. Upon returning, he repeatedly denied doing so. 2. On January 24, the "Quanjiafu" entered Diaoyutai waters. Some in Washington and Tokyo seem to believe this action was taken at the behest of the Ma administration, or at least with its support.
If Su Tseng-chang actually planed to meet with Ishihara, that is mind-boggling. It shows that high profile politicians on Taiwan lack political awareness, to the point where they have utterly no international common sense. The Quanjiafu should be considered a civilian incident. The ROC Coast Guard ship even used its PA system to tell the PRC ocean surveillance ship that "These are Republic of China territorial waters. Please leave immediately." Yet some in the U.S. and Japan still think the Ma administration participated in a cross-Strait Diaoyutai Islands defense exercise. Japan even postponed the fishing rights negotiations between Taipei and Tokyo. As we can see, the Diaoyutai Islands conflict is complex and subtle.
The Diaoyutai Islands conflict has led to saber rattling. The US, Mainland China and Japan, which are involved in the conflict, are the world's three largest economies. The Republic of China is also part of the conflict. Currently Japan and Mainland China are exchanging verbal volleys. The number of ships and aircraft involved are increasing, both in number and in frequency of deployment. As a result of the US-Japan Security Treaty, the United States is backing Japan. Tensions among the three parties is increasing.
Japan's approach on the issue of sovereignty, is to avoid talking about it altogether, while trying to avoid conflict. Special Envoy to Beijing Natsuo Yamaguchi has suggested that "Chinese and Japanese military aircraft refrain from entering Diaoyutai airspace." That is because ocean vessel speeds are slow. Aircraft speeds are fast. A warning shot or radar lock could easily lead to a perception of hostile intent, and provoke an unintended shooting war. Yamaguchi's proposal is predicated upon "Japanese aircraft also refraining from entering Diaoyutai airspace." This could be interpreted as Japan limiting its "sovereignty." But Beijing is not impressed.
Beijing resolutely maintains that Japan must acknowledge that the sovereignty of Diaoyutai is in dispute. But hardliners in Japan refuse. To do so would be tantamount to denying Japan's sovereignty. But if Japan refuses to acknowledge that the sovereignty of the islands is in dispute, how can the two sides continue talks?
The Mainland may be waiting for a positive response from the Abe Cabinet. But it has not received one. During the general election Shinzo Abe suggested that government officials be stationed on the Diaoyutai Islands. Upon being elected prime minister, he stopped mentioning this. Who knew that on February 1, during interpolation in the House of Councillors, he would once again proclaim that "stationing government officials on the Diaoyutai Islands is one option for maintaining stability in the Diaoyutai Island waters."
If Japan actually stations government officials on the Diaoyutai Islands, the outbreak of war, unthinkable as it may be, might be inevitable.
The People's Liberation Army General Logistics Department has issued an internal report. In it, Political Commissar Liu Yuan, son of Liu Shaoqi, pointed out that to ensure long term peace and development and strategic opportunities, the PLA does not rule out "taking action when required." Li said "As a soldier one must subordinate oneself to the central government's assessment of the overall situation. Naturally that includes the central government ordering us to take strong action, and to engage in military conflict." The verbal offensive between Japan and the Mainland has already reached the point where little can be added. .
The U.S. has a security treaty with Japan. The US says it holds no position regarding the sovereignty of the Diaoyutai Islands. Yet it has long supported Japan's jurisdiction. During a press conference with the Japanese Foreign Minister, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton issued a strong statement. She said the US opposes any unilateral action against Japan's jurisdiction. When Abe visits Washington in February, he is looking forward to President Obama reiterating position.
The Chinese mainland has refuted these assertions using harsh language. It has concluded that the United States' support for Japanese control over the Diaoyutai Islands, is in fact a challenge to China's sovereignty. The US is forcing China to fight a war it does not want to fight. Abe is about to visit the United States. A cross-Strait civilian protest is brewing. Naturally it will converge on Washington to protest the activities of the United States and Japan.
At this very moment, it has been rumored that the PLA Navy's fire-control radar locked onto Japanese ship movements. Japanese Defense Minister Itsunori Onodera held an emergency press conference. He said "I hope the Chinese side will restrain itself." In fact, up to now, the Mainland has taken a "fight without breaking off" approach. Its goal is to maintain the island's disputed status. As long as Japan does not station government officials on the island, the two sides' aircraft and ships can posture without fighting. Japan precipitated the crisis. Therefore Japan must defuse the crisis. If it refuses to acknowledge that the sovereignty of the islands is in dispute, no resolution is possible.
The aforementioned PLA Army General Liu Yuan said "We must have the resolve at such a time to hou fa zhi ren." The term means "to allow the other side to attack first, then seize the opportunity to counterattack and subdue them." The term "hou fa zhi ren" means not firing the first shot, and not being the one who blows up. This is the bottom line as the various parties jockey for position in the Diaoyutai Islands. This principle applies to the US, the Mainland, and Japan alike. Otherwise circumstances could lead to war, the consequences of which could be catastrophic.
At such a time, Su Tseng-chang must exercise international common sense. The Ma administration must be even more judicious in its handling of the Diaoyutai Islands conflict, and even more aware of the big picture. It must not fall victim to a stray bullet.
United Daily editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 8, 2013
Summary: The Diaoyutai Islands conflict is unpredictable. The ruling and opposition parties on Taiwan have been caught up in the controversy. 1. Su Tseng-chang visited Japan. Before leaving it was rumored that he would meet with Shintaro Ishihara, leader of the Japan Restoration Party. Upon returning, he repeatedly denied doing so. 2. On January 24, the "Quanjiafu" entered Diaoyutai waters. Some in Washington and Tokyo seem to believe this action was taken at the behest of the Ma administration, or at least with its support.
Full text below:
The Diaoyutai Islands conflict is unpredictable. The ruling and opposition parties on Taiwan have been caught up in the controversy. 1. Su Tseng-chang visited Japan. Before leaving it was rumored that he would meet with Shintaro Ishihara, leader of the Japan Restoration Party. Upon returning, he repeatedly denied doing so. 2. On January 24, the "Quanjiafu" entered Diaoyutai waters. Some in Washington and Tokyo seem to believe this action was taken at the behest of the Ma administration, or at least with its support.
If Su Tseng-chang actually planed to meet with Ishihara, that is mind-boggling. It shows that high profile politicians on Taiwan lack political awareness, to the point where they have utterly no international common sense. The Quanjiafu should be considered a civilian incident. The ROC Coast Guard ship even used its PA system to tell the PRC ocean surveillance ship that "These are Republic of China territorial waters. Please leave immediately." Yet some in the U.S. and Japan still think the Ma administration participated in a cross-Strait Diaoyutai Islands defense exercise. Japan even postponed the fishing rights negotiations between Taipei and Tokyo. As we can see, the Diaoyutai Islands conflict is complex and subtle.
The Diaoyutai Islands conflict has led to saber rattling. The US, Mainland China and Japan, which are involved in the conflict, are the world's three largest economies. The Republic of China is also part of the conflict. Currently Japan and Mainland China are exchanging verbal volleys. The number of ships and aircraft involved are increasing, both in number and in frequency of deployment. As a result of the US-Japan Security Treaty, the United States is backing Japan. Tensions among the three parties is increasing.
Japan's approach on the issue of sovereignty, is to avoid talking about it altogether, while trying to avoid conflict. Special Envoy to Beijing Natsuo Yamaguchi has suggested that "Chinese and Japanese military aircraft refrain from entering Diaoyutai airspace." That is because ocean vessel speeds are slow. Aircraft speeds are fast. A warning shot or radar lock could easily lead to a perception of hostile intent, and provoke an unintended shooting war. Yamaguchi's proposal is predicated upon "Japanese aircraft also refraining from entering Diaoyutai airspace." This could be interpreted as Japan limiting its "sovereignty." But Beijing is not impressed.
Beijing resolutely maintains that Japan must acknowledge that the sovereignty of Diaoyutai is in dispute. But hardliners in Japan refuse. To do so would be tantamount to denying Japan's sovereignty. But if Japan refuses to acknowledge that the sovereignty of the islands is in dispute, how can the two sides continue talks?
The Mainland may be waiting for a positive response from the Abe Cabinet. But it has not received one. During the general election Shinzo Abe suggested that government officials be stationed on the Diaoyutai Islands. Upon being elected prime minister, he stopped mentioning this. Who knew that on February 1, during interpolation in the House of Councillors, he would once again proclaim that "stationing government officials on the Diaoyutai Islands is one option for maintaining stability in the Diaoyutai Island waters."
If Japan actually stations government officials on the Diaoyutai Islands, the outbreak of war, unthinkable as it may be, might be inevitable.
The People's Liberation Army General Logistics Department has issued an internal report. In it, Political Commissar Liu Yuan, son of Liu Shaoqi, pointed out that to ensure long term peace and development and strategic opportunities, the PLA does not rule out "taking action when required." Li said "As a soldier one must subordinate oneself to the central government's assessment of the overall situation. Naturally that includes the central government ordering us to take strong action, and to engage in military conflict." The verbal offensive between Japan and the Mainland has already reached the point where little can be added. .
The U.S. has a security treaty with Japan. The US says it holds no position regarding the sovereignty of the Diaoyutai Islands. Yet it has long supported Japan's jurisdiction. During a press conference with the Japanese Foreign Minister, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton issued a strong statement. She said the US opposes any unilateral action against Japan's jurisdiction. When Abe visits Washington in February, he is looking forward to President Obama reiterating position.
The Chinese mainland has refuted these assertions using harsh language. It has concluded that the United States' support for Japanese control over the Diaoyutai Islands, is in fact a challenge to China's sovereignty. The US is forcing China to fight a war it does not want to fight. Abe is about to visit the United States. A cross-Strait civilian protest is brewing. Naturally it will converge on Washington to protest the activities of the United States and Japan.
At this very moment, it has been rumored that the PLA Navy's fire-control radar locked onto Japanese ship movements. Japanese Defense Minister Itsunori Onodera held an emergency press conference. He said "I hope the Chinese side will restrain itself." In fact, up to now, the Mainland has taken a "fight without breaking off" approach. Its goal is to maintain the island's disputed status. As long as Japan does not station government officials on the island, the two sides' aircraft and ships can posture without fighting. Japan precipitated the crisis. Therefore Japan must defuse the crisis. If it refuses to acknowledge that the sovereignty of the islands is in dispute, no resolution is possible.
The aforementioned PLA Army General Liu Yuan said "We must have the resolve at such a time to hou fa zhi ren." The term means "to allow the other side to attack first, then seize the opportunity to counterattack and subdue them." The term "hou fa zhi ren" means not firing the first shot, and not being the one who blows up. This is the bottom line as the various parties jockey for position in the Diaoyutai Islands. This principle applies to the US, the Mainland, and Japan alike. Otherwise circumstances could lead to war, the consequences of which could be catastrophic.
At such a time, Su Tseng-chang must exercise international common sense. The Ma administration must be even more judicious in its handling of the Diaoyutai Islands conflict, and even more aware of the big picture. It must not fall victim to a stray bullet.
Wednesday, February 6, 2013
Beijing vs. Washington: Taipei Should Contemplate a New Strategy
Beijing vs. Washington: Taipei Should Contemplate a New Strategy
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 7, 2013
Summary: The government under the leadership of President Ma must enlighten the public. It must lead public opinion. It must insist that Taiwan is part of China, but not a province of the People's Republic of China. It must insist that we are both Taiwanese and Chinese, but not citizens of the People's Republic of China. It must make a distinction between nationality, ethnicity, and political authority. It must argue that Taiwan also has rights and responsibilities vis a vis the future of China as a whole. It must refuse to be a tool of containment in the hands of foreign forces. It must refuse to be a tool to hobble Mainland China's development. It must return to the middle way. It must oppose Communism, but not China. What could possibly be wrong with such an approach?
Full text below:
During an interview with AFP in New York, ROC Representative to the United States King Pu-tsung stressed the importance of maintaining a trilateral balance between Washington, Beijing, and Taipei. He said "Taiwan needs the strong support of the United States, because the United States is an important ally. But care should be taken in handling relations with Mainland China, because the Mainland is now Taiwan's largest trading partner." When dealing with Mainland China, Taipei upholds the 1992 consensus and "one China, different interpretations." King said "What we have is strategic ambiguity. Upholding the Republic of China is our best shield. Taiwan still needs a strong defensive capability." King concluded that "We have our own pragmatic way of survival."
King Pu-tsung's job in the United States is to maintain and expand the interests of the Republic of China. It is to represent and reflect the policies of President Ma Ying-jeou. Consider what King said. He said that upholding the Republic of China is our best shield. He said that Taipei upholds the 1992 consensus. He said that Taipei must balance its relationship with Washington and Beijing, and that Taipei has its own pragmatic way of survival. These remarks deserve affirmation. But some of the views he expressed may call for closer scrutiny. For example, his remarks about strategic ambiguity in Taipei's arms purchases, and President Ma's remark that he would sacrifice himself before relinquishing Taiwan's sovereignty. People back home may disagree with his remarks and his wording.
First of all, King Pu-tsung's use of the term "Taiwan's sovereignty" is imprecise and could provoke controversy. Secondly, for years politicians and academics on Taiwan have parroted the rhetoric of U.S. hegemony. They use academic terms such as soft power, smart power, strategic ambiguity, and tactical clarity. These terms are not without meaning. But to a considerable degree they sacrifice our own political primacy and rhetorical initiative. Terms such as strategic ambiguity, tactical clarity, or vice-versa, are political jargon. Taipei's room for maneuver is actually quite limited. President Ma Ying-jeou's strategy is actually quite clear. It is to remain close to Washington, friendly with Tokyo, and at peace with Beijing, while continuing to improve cross-Strait relations. Representative King's talk of strategic ambiguity is dubious.
King Pu-tsung has admitted in interviews that he must be careful what he says. The outside world will assume that what he says represents the views of President Ma. He spoke of Washington's perspective on cross-Strait relations. On the one hand, Washington hopes that the two sides will continue to improve relations. On the other hand, it worries that the two sides will become too chummy too soon. This newspaper recently published an editorial noting how Washington wants the two sides to improve relations, reduce tensions, and maintain a dynamic equilibrium with the status quo, but only as Washington defines it. It does not want to be kept in the dark. It does not want any surprises. It wants everyone to be on the same page. Simply put, Washington will not allow Taiwan independence, nor will it allow Beijing to use force. The two sides may reconcile, but they will not be allowed to cooperate. Washington's policies are all motivated by self-interest.
We know this to be the case. Therefore to uphold the interests of the Republic of China, and to ensure a bright future for the Chinese people as a whole, Taipei must do what it must, and not do what it must not. Consider arms purchases. Taipei must have the ability to defend itself. It must demonstrate a determination to defend itself. But it cannot bear the burden of a cross-Strait arms race. Merely acting as a tool of Washington's policy of containing Mainland China's development is also contrary to the larger cause of the Chinese people as a whole. Given continuous improvements in cross-Strait relations, military procurement should be reduced. We must make more efficient use of limited resources. Taipei may even wish to consider the development of offensive weapons. But we should publicly promise never to be the first to use them. The international factors may be complex. But it would be both cheap and effective. It would be better than having Washington's fingers around one's throat on every issue that arises.
Washington does not want to any accidents or surprises. So why can't Taipei expect the same from Washington? Washington wants to control every last detail. Washington knows that improved cross-Strait relations is not a bad thing. But the three parties' interests do not always coincide. Washington can and may undermine improved cross-Strait relations. So should Washington be informed in advance, during, or afterwards? To what extent should Washington be informed? These questions call for diplomatic skill and political wisdom. This is all "Introduction to Political Science 101." Politicians and diplomats may not always speak the truth, at least the complete truth. But they must not tell outright lies.
Today the two sides' strengths and weaknesses are obvious. Times have changed. Time is clearly not on Taipei's side. Obstinately refusing to reunify will only lead to annihilation. Relying on Washington is no answer. Taiwan independence can only lead to war. Being reunified under Beijng's terms would be tough to swallow. Blindly yielding to pressure from Beijing could lead to covert abuse. After much thought, it would seem that a rational love for Taiwan requires everyone to endure hardship, set ambitious goals, vow to return to the Chinese mainland, and seek a way out through an economic strategy for China as a whole. The government under the leadership of President Ma must enlighten the public. It must lead public opinion. It must insist that Taiwan is part of China, but not a province of the People's Republic of China. It must insist that we are both Taiwanese and Chinese, but not citizens of the People's Republic of China. It must make a distinction between nationality, ethnicity, and political authority. It must argue that Taiwan also has rights and responsibilities vis a vis the future of China as a whole. It must refuse to be a tool of containment in the hands of foreign forces. It must refuse to be a tool to hobble Mainland China's development. It must return to the middle way. It must oppose Communism, but not China. What could possibly be wrong with such an approach?
在中美之間 台灣應隨時勢思考新戰略
2013-02-07
中國時報
我駐美代表金溥聰日前在紐約接受法新社訪問，強調台灣在美國和中國大陸之間維持三邊平衡的重要性，他並表示，「台灣需要美國的強力支持，因為美國是重要的盟邦；但也須審慎處理和中國大陸的關係，因為現在大陸是台灣最大的貿易夥伴。」在面對中國大陸時，台灣主張九二共識和一中各表，「我們有的是在策略上模糊的空間，（而）堅持中華民國是我們最佳的防護罩，」「台灣方面仍須具備非常強大的防禦能力來自保。」結論是「我們有自己務實的生存之道。」
金溥聰在美的工作重點是維護、拓展中華民國的利益，並代表、反映馬英九總統的政策；其相關談話內容，比如說堅持中華民國是我們的最佳防護罩，台灣主張維持九二共識，必須妥善、平衡處理其與美國和中國大陸之間的關係，台灣要有自己務實的求生之道等等都是值得肯定之處。但某些觀點或許還有一些思辨的空間，比如說台灣所採取的戰略模糊與對美軍購，以及馬總統即使犧牲自己也不會放棄台灣主權等等。國內對這些談話及用字就可能有一些不同的聲音。
首先，金溥聰代表所稱台灣主權用字不夠精準恐怕引起爭議；其次，這些年來，台灣的政界、學界常常跟著美國霸權，使用一些學術名詞，如軟實力、巧實力，或戰略模糊、戰術清晰等等，雖然不能說是完全沒有意義，但在相當程度上已經失掉了自己的主體性及話語權。所謂的戰略模糊、戰術清晰（或反向為之）都是政治語言（political jargon），台灣能夠揮灑的空間其實相當有限，馬英九總統的戰略其實相當清楚，就是親美、友日、和中，持續改善兩岸關係。金代表的戰略模糊說法顯然還有討論空間。
金溥聰在訪談中也承認，自己講話要非常小心，因為外界會認為他代表馬總統的看法，提到美國在兩岸關係上一方面希望兩岸持續改善關係，但又擔心雙方走得太近、太快，這和本報日前社論所提，美方只希望兩岸持續改善關係、降低緊張、維持由其所界定的動態平衡與現狀，不願自己被蒙在鼓裡，不要有任何驚訝與意外的看法完全一致。簡單的說，美國不准台灣獨立、不讓中共動武，只要兩岸和解、但又不准雙方合作，美方的一切政策作為仍是出於自利的考慮。
既然如此，出於維護中華民國利益，甚至基於整個民族未來發展的考慮，台灣自然也該為所當為、有所不為。就以對美軍購來說，台灣確實要有適度自衛的能力，展現自我防衛的決心，但台灣顯然無法承擔兩岸軍備競賽的結果，而做為美國圍堵中國發展的工具也有違民族大義；在兩岸關係不斷改善的前提下，軍購數量當然應該有所調整，把資源做更有效運用。台灣甚至不妨考慮發展具攻擊性的武器，但可公開承諾不會首先使用，雖然其中國際因素複雜，但既省錢又有效，總比凡事被美國掐著脖子好些。
再說美國不希望有任何意外和驚嚇，台灣又何嘗不能用同樣的標準來要求美國？華府希望能夠掌握相關細節，其實兩岸關係改善的進程讓美國適度理解並非完全壞事，但由於三方利益未必完全吻合，美國又有能力與可能破壞兩岸關係的發展，所以到底是讓美國於事前、事中或事後知道，或讓美方了解到什麼樣的程度，這就有賴高超的外交技巧與政治智慧。政治學入門的一個基本概念：政治人物及外交官可以不講真話，或至少不是全部的真話，但是不可講假話或許可供參考。
如今，兩岸強弱易勢，時移勢轉，時間看來對台灣只會更為不利，而偏安江左只會滅亡，依靠美國不是辦法，獨立只會引發戰爭，被統又不甘心，一味的曲從北京壓力，又怕被關門打狗。左思右想，看來理性的愛台灣，大家就該臥薪嘗膽、恢弘志氣、誓言躍馬中原、經略中國大陸或為一條出路。如果馬總統及其領導的政府能夠教化、引領民意，堅持台灣是中國的一部分，但不是中華人民共和國的一省，我們既是台灣人也是中國人，但又不是中華人民共和國的子民，把國家、民族與政權區別對待，主張台灣對中國的未來也有一分責任與權利，堅持不做外國勢力圍堵、限制中國發展的工具，重新回到反共而不反華的中道立場，豈不甚好？
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 7, 2013
Summary: The government under the leadership of President Ma must enlighten the public. It must lead public opinion. It must insist that Taiwan is part of China, but not a province of the People's Republic of China. It must insist that we are both Taiwanese and Chinese, but not citizens of the People's Republic of China. It must make a distinction between nationality, ethnicity, and political authority. It must argue that Taiwan also has rights and responsibilities vis a vis the future of China as a whole. It must refuse to be a tool of containment in the hands of foreign forces. It must refuse to be a tool to hobble Mainland China's development. It must return to the middle way. It must oppose Communism, but not China. What could possibly be wrong with such an approach?
Full text below:
During an interview with AFP in New York, ROC Representative to the United States King Pu-tsung stressed the importance of maintaining a trilateral balance between Washington, Beijing, and Taipei. He said "Taiwan needs the strong support of the United States, because the United States is an important ally. But care should be taken in handling relations with Mainland China, because the Mainland is now Taiwan's largest trading partner." When dealing with Mainland China, Taipei upholds the 1992 consensus and "one China, different interpretations." King said "What we have is strategic ambiguity. Upholding the Republic of China is our best shield. Taiwan still needs a strong defensive capability." King concluded that "We have our own pragmatic way of survival."
King Pu-tsung's job in the United States is to maintain and expand the interests of the Republic of China. It is to represent and reflect the policies of President Ma Ying-jeou. Consider what King said. He said that upholding the Republic of China is our best shield. He said that Taipei upholds the 1992 consensus. He said that Taipei must balance its relationship with Washington and Beijing, and that Taipei has its own pragmatic way of survival. These remarks deserve affirmation. But some of the views he expressed may call for closer scrutiny. For example, his remarks about strategic ambiguity in Taipei's arms purchases, and President Ma's remark that he would sacrifice himself before relinquishing Taiwan's sovereignty. People back home may disagree with his remarks and his wording.
First of all, King Pu-tsung's use of the term "Taiwan's sovereignty" is imprecise and could provoke controversy. Secondly, for years politicians and academics on Taiwan have parroted the rhetoric of U.S. hegemony. They use academic terms such as soft power, smart power, strategic ambiguity, and tactical clarity. These terms are not without meaning. But to a considerable degree they sacrifice our own political primacy and rhetorical initiative. Terms such as strategic ambiguity, tactical clarity, or vice-versa, are political jargon. Taipei's room for maneuver is actually quite limited. President Ma Ying-jeou's strategy is actually quite clear. It is to remain close to Washington, friendly with Tokyo, and at peace with Beijing, while continuing to improve cross-Strait relations. Representative King's talk of strategic ambiguity is dubious.
King Pu-tsung has admitted in interviews that he must be careful what he says. The outside world will assume that what he says represents the views of President Ma. He spoke of Washington's perspective on cross-Strait relations. On the one hand, Washington hopes that the two sides will continue to improve relations. On the other hand, it worries that the two sides will become too chummy too soon. This newspaper recently published an editorial noting how Washington wants the two sides to improve relations, reduce tensions, and maintain a dynamic equilibrium with the status quo, but only as Washington defines it. It does not want to be kept in the dark. It does not want any surprises. It wants everyone to be on the same page. Simply put, Washington will not allow Taiwan independence, nor will it allow Beijing to use force. The two sides may reconcile, but they will not be allowed to cooperate. Washington's policies are all motivated by self-interest.
We know this to be the case. Therefore to uphold the interests of the Republic of China, and to ensure a bright future for the Chinese people as a whole, Taipei must do what it must, and not do what it must not. Consider arms purchases. Taipei must have the ability to defend itself. It must demonstrate a determination to defend itself. But it cannot bear the burden of a cross-Strait arms race. Merely acting as a tool of Washington's policy of containing Mainland China's development is also contrary to the larger cause of the Chinese people as a whole. Given continuous improvements in cross-Strait relations, military procurement should be reduced. We must make more efficient use of limited resources. Taipei may even wish to consider the development of offensive weapons. But we should publicly promise never to be the first to use them. The international factors may be complex. But it would be both cheap and effective. It would be better than having Washington's fingers around one's throat on every issue that arises.
Washington does not want to any accidents or surprises. So why can't Taipei expect the same from Washington? Washington wants to control every last detail. Washington knows that improved cross-Strait relations is not a bad thing. But the three parties' interests do not always coincide. Washington can and may undermine improved cross-Strait relations. So should Washington be informed in advance, during, or afterwards? To what extent should Washington be informed? These questions call for diplomatic skill and political wisdom. This is all "Introduction to Political Science 101." Politicians and diplomats may not always speak the truth, at least the complete truth. But they must not tell outright lies.
Today the two sides' strengths and weaknesses are obvious. Times have changed. Time is clearly not on Taipei's side. Obstinately refusing to reunify will only lead to annihilation. Relying on Washington is no answer. Taiwan independence can only lead to war. Being reunified under Beijng's terms would be tough to swallow. Blindly yielding to pressure from Beijing could lead to covert abuse. After much thought, it would seem that a rational love for Taiwan requires everyone to endure hardship, set ambitious goals, vow to return to the Chinese mainland, and seek a way out through an economic strategy for China as a whole. The government under the leadership of President Ma must enlighten the public. It must lead public opinion. It must insist that Taiwan is part of China, but not a province of the People's Republic of China. It must insist that we are both Taiwanese and Chinese, but not citizens of the People's Republic of China. It must make a distinction between nationality, ethnicity, and political authority. It must argue that Taiwan also has rights and responsibilities vis a vis the future of China as a whole. It must refuse to be a tool of containment in the hands of foreign forces. It must refuse to be a tool to hobble Mainland China's development. It must return to the middle way. It must oppose Communism, but not China. What could possibly be wrong with such an approach?
在中美之間 台灣應隨時勢思考新戰略
2013-02-07
中國時報
我駐美代表金溥聰日前在紐約接受法新社訪問，強調台灣在美國和中國大陸之間維持三邊平衡的重要性，他並表示，「台灣需要美國的強力支持，因為美國是重要的盟邦；但也須審慎處理和中國大陸的關係，因為現在大陸是台灣最大的貿易夥伴。」在面對中國大陸時，台灣主張九二共識和一中各表，「我們有的是在策略上模糊的空間，（而）堅持中華民國是我們最佳的防護罩，」「台灣方面仍須具備非常強大的防禦能力來自保。」結論是「我們有自己務實的生存之道。」
金溥聰在美的工作重點是維護、拓展中華民國的利益，並代表、反映馬英九總統的政策；其相關談話內容，比如說堅持中華民國是我們的最佳防護罩，台灣主張維持九二共識，必須妥善、平衡處理其與美國和中國大陸之間的關係，台灣要有自己務實的求生之道等等都是值得肯定之處。但某些觀點或許還有一些思辨的空間，比如說台灣所採取的戰略模糊與對美軍購，以及馬總統即使犧牲自己也不會放棄台灣主權等等。國內對這些談話及用字就可能有一些不同的聲音。
首先，金溥聰代表所稱台灣主權用字不夠精準恐怕引起爭議；其次，這些年來，台灣的政界、學界常常跟著美國霸權，使用一些學術名詞，如軟實力、巧實力，或戰略模糊、戰術清晰等等，雖然不能說是完全沒有意義，但在相當程度上已經失掉了自己的主體性及話語權。所謂的戰略模糊、戰術清晰（或反向為之）都是政治語言（political jargon），台灣能夠揮灑的空間其實相當有限，馬英九總統的戰略其實相當清楚，就是親美、友日、和中，持續改善兩岸關係。金代表的戰略模糊說法顯然還有討論空間。
金溥聰在訪談中也承認，自己講話要非常小心，因為外界會認為他代表馬總統的看法，提到美國在兩岸關係上一方面希望兩岸持續改善關係，但又擔心雙方走得太近、太快，這和本報日前社論所提，美方只希望兩岸持續改善關係、降低緊張、維持由其所界定的動態平衡與現狀，不願自己被蒙在鼓裡，不要有任何驚訝與意外的看法完全一致。簡單的說，美國不准台灣獨立、不讓中共動武，只要兩岸和解、但又不准雙方合作，美方的一切政策作為仍是出於自利的考慮。
既然如此，出於維護中華民國利益，甚至基於整個民族未來發展的考慮，台灣自然也該為所當為、有所不為。就以對美軍購來說，台灣確實要有適度自衛的能力，展現自我防衛的決心，但台灣顯然無法承擔兩岸軍備競賽的結果，而做為美國圍堵中國發展的工具也有違民族大義；在兩岸關係不斷改善的前提下，軍購數量當然應該有所調整，把資源做更有效運用。台灣甚至不妨考慮發展具攻擊性的武器，但可公開承諾不會首先使用，雖然其中國際因素複雜，但既省錢又有效，總比凡事被美國掐著脖子好些。
再說美國不希望有任何意外和驚嚇，台灣又何嘗不能用同樣的標準來要求美國？華府希望能夠掌握相關細節，其實兩岸關係改善的進程讓美國適度理解並非完全壞事，但由於三方利益未必完全吻合，美國又有能力與可能破壞兩岸關係的發展，所以到底是讓美國於事前、事中或事後知道，或讓美方了解到什麼樣的程度，這就有賴高超的外交技巧與政治智慧。政治學入門的一個基本概念：政治人物及外交官可以不講真話，或至少不是全部的真話，但是不可講假話或許可供參考。
如今，兩岸強弱易勢，時移勢轉，時間看來對台灣只會更為不利，而偏安江左只會滅亡，依靠美國不是辦法，獨立只會引發戰爭，被統又不甘心，一味的曲從北京壓力，又怕被關門打狗。左思右想，看來理性的愛台灣，大家就該臥薪嘗膽、恢弘志氣、誓言躍馬中原、經略中國大陸或為一條出路。如果馬總統及其領導的政府能夠教化、引領民意，堅持台灣是中國的一部分，但不是中華人民共和國的一省，我們既是台灣人也是中國人，但又不是中華人民共和國的子民，把國家、民族與政權區別對待，主張台灣對中國的未來也有一分責任與權利，堅持不做外國勢力圍堵、限制中國發展的工具，重新回到反共而不反華的中道立場，豈不甚好？
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