Our Cross-Strait Path will Determine Our Destiny

Our Cross-Strait Path will Determine Our Destiny
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 26, 2013

Summary: Yesterday morning Ang Lee won the Academy Award. Yesterday afternoon, the Ma administration announced that the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant would be submitted to a popular referendum. These events nearly eclipsed the Lien-Xi Summit in Beijing, but they did not diminish its significance.

Full Text below:

Yesterday morning Ang Lee won the Academy Award. Yesterday afternoon, the Ma administration announced that the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant would be submitted to a popular referendum. These events nearly eclipsed the Lien-Xi Summit in Beijing, but they did not diminish its significance.

Lien Chan has repeatedly stressed that his current visit is merely "revisiting old times." He has said that he is "not representing any political party or organization." The Presidential Office said President Ma did not entrust Lien Chan with any specific tasks, but that he was happy to see Lien Chan visit the Mainland as a private citizen. This is usually the blessing that an outsider gives an insider.

The tone which Ma and Lien set for the Lien-Xi Summit is certainly unusual. Viewed pessimistically, it implies that the Ma administration expects little if anything new from the Lien-Xi Summit. Viewed optimistically, Lien Chan is free from official encumbrances. He can speak for himself. He is not bound by any Ma administration or KMT shackles. The Ma administration can then, at its own discretion, take advantage of any opportunity that might arise to make a political overture to Beijing.

Yesterday the Lien-Xi Summit convened. The initial expectation was that Lien and Xi would use the occasion to announce a new cross-Strait policy. Now it seems, they will merely offer pleasantries and generalities. There has been no mention of new developments. There has been no mention even of "exploring political relations under special circumstances in which the two sides have yet to be reunified," as mentioned in the CCP 18th Party Congress Political Report. Nor has there been any mention of any other issues. Lien Chan declared that the summit was not being held for the sake of any particular political party's selfish, short term interests. Instead, he said the things that neither the Ma administration nor the Beijing authorities dared to say or could say. This is worth contemplating.

Lien Chan mentioned the CCP 18th Party Congress Political Report and other related documents. He referred to passages such as "exploring political relations under special circumstances in which the two sides have yet to be reunified," "taking the two sides' existing provisions as a point of departure," "seeking points of linkage," and "making fair and reasonable arrangements." Lien praised these as both realistic and visionary. He said he felt precisely the same way. Had Lien Chan attended the summit as an envoy of the Ma administration, or of the KMT, he would have found it impossible to publicly endorse such views. He would have been in no position to express himself so freely.

Furthermore, Lien Chan said he hoped the two sides could use these views as a point of departure, explore them in depth, arrive at a consensus, and establish a balanced, equal, and effective (pre-reunification) political framework." Lien Chan first endorsed Beijing's call for "exploring political relations under special circumstances in which the two sides have yet to be reunified," "making a fair and reasonable arrangements," and "using the two sides' existing provisions as a point of departure." Only then did he propose that the two sides establish a "balanced, equal, and effective (pre-reunification) political framework."

Both sides face a dilemma. Beijing's reasoning is often vague. For example, what exactly does "yet to be reunified" mean? What exactly do "special circumstances" refer to? This is why Taipei is afraid and unwilling to set forth any concrete proposals in response. Taipei is afraid of falling into a trap. For example, Beijing spoke of "exploring political relations under special circumstances in which the two sides have yet to be reunified." But do these "special circumstances" mean that "Republic of China and the People's Republic are equal?" Beijing has yet to say. Consider another example: "using the two sides' existing provisions as a point of departure." Beijng has yet to say "using the two sides' existing constitutions as a point of departure." That is why many on Taiwan may be willing to endorse "exploring political relations under special circumstances in which the two sides have yet to be reunified." But few expect concrete results. As a result, many on Taiwan simply refuse to listen to such proposals from Beijing. Lien Chan, on the other hand, is attempting to explore the practical significance of these vague concepts and thinking about how to implement them in the real world.

Lien Chan said, "History led to 1949, and the split between authorities on the two sides. This is an objective fact." He then said, "Political differences between the two sides remain. On the one hand, we (the two sides) have divided rule and mutual respect. On the other hand, we must increase cooperation, and seek a win-win scenario." Lien said that "under these special circumstances, the two sides' have different interpretations of the meaning of "one China." But both sides can "seek a shared framework of one China, while holding different interpretations of the definition of one China."

Beijing often advances vague proposals regarding "one China." Lien Chan apparently feels that failure to clarify the political realities of agreements and disagreements over the definition of one China, makes it impossible to implement such proposals. Lien and Xi met in private for 30 minutes. We are confident the two will be able to offer a clearer explanation.

Lien Chan held back somewhat. But what he said was unprecedented in its frankness and depth. Had Lien Chan been Ma Ying-jeou's envoy, he could not have expressed himself so bluntly. Lien Chan has credibilty with the public on both sides. He is also an icon of the Blue Camp on Taiwan. Lien Chan has been frank in expressing his views on cross-Strait policy. His views ought to be considered the bottom line consensus on Taiwan. This is a serious issue that the two sides must face. Lien Chan was not a representative of the Ma administration. In point of fact, he was a representative of something far bigger and far more significant.

Beijing may not have been happy to hear Lien Chan expressing such views. But Lien Chan expressed agreement with Xi Jinping's declaration that "one's path determines one's destiny." The cross-Strait path must not be for the sake of any one political party's selfish, short term interests.

兩岸警句：道路決定命運
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.02.26 04:11 am

昨天上午李安獲奧斯卡金像獎，及昨天下午馬政府宣布核四訴諸公投的消息，幾乎淹沒了北京連習會的新聞，但並不能減損這場兩岸高峰會的意義。

行前，連戰方面一再強調此行只是「走春訪舊」，「不代表任何政黨或團體」；總統府方面則稱，馬總統對連戰此行「並未託付特定任務」，但對連戰此行以「民間身分」訪問大陸樂觀其成。「樂觀其成」一語，通常是用在局外人對局內人的祝福。

馬連二人如此定調雙方在「連習會」的關係，確非尋常。倘就消極面看，似顯示馬政府對此次連習會的創新與發展未抱太大期望；但若就積極面看，則連戰既擺脫了「代表馬政府或國民黨」的身分羈絆，也許就取得了自由發言的較大空間，而馬政府也可藉此對北京作出政治試探。

從昨日連習會公開的訊息看出，原來被認為將藉此會宣示重大兩岸政策綱領的習近平，竟只見寒暄及泛泛之論；非但未聞什麼創見，連中共十八大報告所言「探討尚未統一特殊情況下的兩岸政治關係」等議題亦未論及。相對而言，連戰的表述，如他自稱「不是為了一黨一己之私，一地一時之利」，反而說出了一些馬政府與北京當局皆不敢說或不便說的話，啟人深思。

連戰說，他認為，中共十八大政治報告及相關文件中提到的「探討尚未統一特殊情況下的兩岸政治關係」、「從兩岸現行規定出發」、「尋找一個中國的連結點」、「作出合情合理的安排」等觀點，皆是「既正視現實，又高瞻遠矚的見解」，並表示對此「深有同感」。倘若連戰是以馬政府或國民黨代表的身分赴會，即不可能公開贊同此類觀點，也不會有如此發言的自由空間。

然而，再進一步，連戰則說，希望兩岸能從這些觀點上出發，展開探討，累積共識，「建立（尚未統一的）一種平衡、對等、有效的政治架構」。這是因為連戰先贊同了北京所稱「探討尚未統一特殊情況下的兩岸政治關係，作出合情合理的安排」，及「從兩岸現行規定出發」等語，始能提出在兩岸「建立（尚未統一的）一種平衡、對等、有效的政治架構」。

兩岸的困局在於：北京的論述往往失諸空泛，例如「尚未統一」究何所指？「特殊情況」又作何論？因此台灣不願也不敢對這些空泛的論述提出落實的主張，以免墜入陷阱。例如，北京稱「探討尚未統一特殊情況下的兩岸政治關係」，卻不能將此種「特殊情況」落實到「中華民國與中華人民共和國平衡對等」的現實；又如，北京稱「從兩岸現行規定出發」，卻不能落實到「從兩岸現行憲法出發」的現實。因此，即使台灣不乏有人贊同「探討尚未統一特殊情況下的兩岸政治關係」之理念，卻很少有人對此一理念的落實懷抱期待。所以，對於北京的提議，台灣往往只知拒絕或擱置；但連戰此次則嘗試探究這些空泛概念的實際意義及如何落實。

連戰說：「歷史造成了一九四九年的兩岸當局互不隸屬，這是客觀的事實。」再稱：「在雙方的政治分歧仍然存在之際，我們（兩岸）一方面分工治理、相互尊重，一方面加強合作、謀求雙贏。」又稱：「在當前特殊情況下，兩岸對『一個中國』各有不同表述，但雙方完全可以『求一中架構之同，存一中涵義之異』。」

北京常持「一個中國」的空泛主張，但連戰顯然認為，若不能在政治現實上釐清「一個中國的同與異」，則一切議題皆不可能落實。應可相信，在連習二人單獨會面的三十分鐘中，雙方可能有更直率的剖析。

連戰雖仍語帶保留，但其言論內容已是前所未有的直率與深入。連戰此行若是「馬英九的代表」，即不可能說得如此直白；而連戰是兩岸公認的可以信服的人物，亦為台灣泛藍主流的重要標誌，如今連戰坦率地表達了他的兩岸觀點，應可視為台灣民意的共識與底線，這是兩岸皆必須嚴肅正視者。連戰此行不代表馬政府，但其實有更大與更高的代表性。

客觀而論，北京當局可能並未預見也並不樂見連戰表達這類的觀點；但連戰既表達贊同習近平所說的「道路決定命運」，則兩岸的道路，應當即是「不為一黨一己之私，不為一時一地之利」的道路！