Professionalism and Politics: Two Facets of the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant

Professionalism and Politics:
Two Facets of the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 23, 2013

Summary: In democracies, the people are the bosses. The people have the final say. The controversy over the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant over the past twenty years has involved engineering problems. But the government never underwent the entire policy formulation process, from either a professional or political perspective. This led to our current plight, in which we cannot enjoy a moment's peace. By now, short-term pain is preferable to long-term pain. A storm is brewing over to nuclear power generation. For once, let the pain lead to a final outcome.

Full Text below:

The new cabinet has assumed power. The Legislative Yuan has convened a new session. This is the second anniversary of the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant additional budget, as well as Japan's Fukushima nuclear disaster. Public opposition to nuclear power generation is increasing. Protest marches demanding the abolition of nuclear power are about to begin throughout Taiwan. Protestors are even coordinating with supporters overseas. Even more worrisome, the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant issue has become a political football. There is virtually no room for rational debate. How is one to make any sense of the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant mess? One must first arrive at a decision that meets with the approval of the general public, because this issue is everyones' concern.

Planning for the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant resumed in 1992. Tender offers were made in 1995. Ground-breaking began in 1999. During that time, Taiwan has never had a moment's peace. Opponents have been motivated by moral and ideological objections as well as political opportunism. The public has paid an incalculable price. The Jiang Cabinet must now deal with the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant mess, and the anti-nuclear political storm. It must carry out the policy formuation process in full, without any shortcuts. It must put professionalism first and politics last. It must end over 20 years of wrangling over the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant.

Professionalism means doing everything to ascertain whether the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant can be successfully completed, and whether it will be safe after completion. The professional aspects must be addressed first. This is essential to any subsequent political management. The Number Four Nuclear Power Plant must be certified as safe by industry professionals. Only then can it begin commercial operation and provide parallel power generation. Only if the public remains skeptical, should a public referendum be held. Can industry professionals eliminate concerns about the safety of the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant? If they cannot, then the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant should not even exist, in which case there will be no need for a referendum.

The Number Four Nuclear Power Plant was originally supposed to be a turnkey operation. If successful, the quality would be assured, and any risk would be borne by the winning bidder. But the decision was made to use subcontractors. The risk must now be born by Taipower. Taipower officials were overly ambitious in their design goals. They lacked experience. They received no assistance from consultants. These factors greatly increased the difficulty of construction for this specialized nuclear power plant. Many interface conflicts and accuracy and stability problems had to be overcome. These led to the current halt in construction.

Taipower admits that it cannot solve the problems on its own. The Number Four Nuclear Power Plant has already cost 300 billion NTD. It is not far from completion. Naturally Taipower hopes the project than be brought back to life. Can internationally respected experts be found, to serve as project consultants, and cut the Gordian Knot? They may charge a high price. But progress is slow. Would a large, internationally respected company be willing to take charge of the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant and endorse its safety? That remains in question.

Taipower does not have the final say over whether the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant is safe. Nor will debates between academics and street protests yield valid conclusions. Only a rigorous testing program can. The program must test every system. It must then test hundreds of other systems. In particular, it must test the compatibility between instrumentation and controls at 40,000 points. Issues with the design, equipment, and construction must be resolved. Only then can the plant begin commercial operations without concern for safety. The Number Four Nuclear Power Plant cannot proceed with commissioning tests. That is why it is making virtually no progress.

President Ma has declared that "without nuclear safety, there can be no nuclear power." He wants to reassure the public. He has suggested inviting impartial international bodies to assess the situation. But finding impartial international bodies is easier said than done. One has come to the fore -- the nuclear power industry World Association of Nuclear Operators. But WANO is unsuitable. Years ago, before the Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant accident, WANO gave it its seal of approval. Taipower is also a WANO member. Alas, WANO lacks credibility.

Can a miracle worker be found to cure the ills of the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant? Can he help to pass rigorous commissioning tests? Can he guarantee that commercial operation would be safe? The public still has doubts about nuclear power generation. If it is unprepared to accept the possibility of an irreversible catastrophe, then the final stage of public policy formulation -- a public referendum -- will be essential.

The key to a public referendum is a critical discussion of all the factors. The public must be fully informed. The first thing the public must be informed about is the cost. Once nuclear power generation has been ruled out, electricity price hikes are guaranteed. But so far polls have only tracked fluctuations in support for non-nuclear power generation. They have totally ignored the matter of electricity rates. This gap must be addressed before an referendum can be held. This task cannot be performed by the official energy generation entity. It must be something that anyone can verify by accessing a national database. Only this will have the necessary credibility, and avoid the trap of intimidation via high electricity rates.

Next is the issue of power supply security. Taiwan has a single, independent power grid. This is the biggest worry in a non-nuclear power generation scenario. Summer electricity peaks, destruction of transmission loops by hurricanes, and maintenance for aging units will lead to power shortages. If people vote for non-nuclear power generation in a referendum, they must be psychologically prepared for a less secure power supply. Cross-Strait relations are warming. The government must be prepared to buy electricity from the Mainland. It must prepare for a difficult breakthrough in public thinking regarding Taiwan's independent power grid. Northern Fujian's Fuding Industry Plant is about to begin commercial operations. Fuqing has four units in two nuclear power plants. Their capacity is equal to two of Taiwan's Number Three Nuclear Power Plants. If they could provide Taiwan power through a submarine cable, it would at least ease our power shortage worries.

In democracies, the people are the bosses. The people have the final say. The controversy over the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant over the past twenty years has involved engineering problems. But the government never underwent the entire policy formulation process, from either a professional or political perspective. This led to our current plight, in which we cannot enjoy a moment's peace. By now, short-term pain is preferable to long-term pain. A storm is brewing over to nuclear power generation. For once, let the pain lead to a final outcome.

專業與政治：核四問題的兩個面向
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.02.23 01:58 am

隨著新內閣上任、立法院新會期開議、核四追加預算以及日本福島核災兩周年，民間反核氛圍愈見凝重，不但廢核遊行在全台將次第登場，甚至還海外跨國串連；更令人憂慮的是，核四議題已流於民粹，幾無溝通空間。如何從核四困境中理出頭緒，從而做出具民意基礎的抉擇，應是全民的共同關切。

核四計畫從八十一年恢復、八十四年招標、八十八年動工，其間擾攘幾乎從未有一刻停息過；不管是基於道德、理念的反核，或為了在政治上從中漁利而反，皆讓台灣社會付出難以估算的巨大代價。江內閣面對核四、非核的風浪，其職責在於務必應將公共政策的決策程序完整走完，先專業面，後政治面，俾為二十多年的核四紛爭畫下句點。

所謂專業面，是盡一切可能確認核四能否完工、能否排除安全疑慮；專業面先走完，則是為後續的政治處理準備要件。若核四在專業上經確認安全無虞，可以商轉、併聯發電，但民眾仍然存疑，那才有舉行公投的充分條件；但若在專業面得知核四安全疑慮無法排除，核四即不能存在，也就沒有接續公投的問題。

核四最早曾以統包（turn-key）招標，若成功，品質、風險由得標廠商負責；如今，卻因故改採分包後，風險已轉由自己承擔；在設計陳義過高、經驗不足，又無顧問公司協助下，大大增加了特殊型核電廠施工難度，在介面衝突、準確性、穩定性等方面有待克服之處極多，以致目前已處在實質停工狀態。

台電承認，靠自己無法解決問題，但核四已花了三千億，離完工目標已不遠，當然希望能救回來；因此在國際上苦尋能扮華佗角色的總顧問解開病灶，雖然開出天價，但進度有限；有信譽、也有技術能力的國際大廠是否願意接下這筆生意為核四安全背書，是個疑問。

專業面的核四安全認定，不是台電說了算，也不是學者辯論、街頭遊行可以獲致結論，只有經過嚴謹的「試運轉測試」程序一個途徑。先測試每個系統，再將百餘系統之間、尤其儀控達四萬個節點的相容關係進行完整測試，找出設計、設備、及施工上的所有問題，才能確認商轉有無安全疑慮。目前核四即因試運轉測試階段走不下去，幾乎全無進度。

馬總統揭示「沒有核安，就沒有核電」的原則，為確保國人放心，還特別提出「邀請公正的國際機構評估」的加乘保險構想，但找「公正的國際機構」談何容易？至少已浮上檯面、由核電產業界組成的「世界核能發電協會（ＷＡＮＯ）」即不適宜，福島核電廠事故前是ＷＡＮＯ多年評估的優等生，何況台電也是ＷＡＮＯ成員，恐怕缺乏公信力。

如果核四找到華佗相救克服病灶，完成嚴苛的試運轉測試，證實商轉發電安全無虞，但民眾仍認為核電存有「不確定性」，深怕萬一的不可逆災難而不擬接受，那就恐怕必須進入公共政策最後一個程序──公投。

公投最關鍵的是「討論元素」必須完備，且需充分告知民眾資訊，首先是價格。排除核電之後的能源結構，電價上漲是一定的，但迄今幾份民調都只有是否選擇非核的民意漲落，完全不談價格，這個缺口必須在公投前精算、補上；且這個工作也不能由官方能源單位做，而是任何人都可以進國家資料庫拿公開的數據演算，這才有公信力可言，也可避免「以高電價恫嚇」的陷阱。

其次是供電安全。台灣的單一、獨立電網是非核後供電的最大隱憂，一遇上夏日用電尖峰、風災破壞輸電回路、機組歲修……都將導致供電吃緊。若民眾公投選擇非核，就須對供電安全降低有心理準備。兩岸關係緩解，政府也該有向大陸買電、突破台灣獨立電網困難的思考準備；福建北部即將完工商轉的福鼎、福清兩個核電廠的四個機組，等於台灣兩個核三的滿載發電量，若可透過海底電纜支援台灣供電，至少可讓缺電憂慮得以緩解。

民主國家，人民是頭家，人民說了算。核四過去二十餘年的紛擾除了工程上的問題，政府從未堅定地一次走完專業面及政治面的決策程序，遂導致紛爭此落彼起，永無寧日。事到如今，長痛不如短痛，即將登場的非核風暴，讓我們一次痛出個結果。