Beijing vs. Washington: Taipei Should Contemplate a New Strategy

Beijing vs. Washington: Taipei Should Contemplate a New Strategy
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 7, 2013

Summary: The government under the leadership of President Ma must enlighten the public. It must lead public opinion. It must insist that Taiwan is part of China, but not a province of the People's Republic of China. It must insist that we are both Taiwanese and Chinese, but not citizens of the People's Republic of China. It must make a distinction between nationality, ethnicity, and political authority. It must argue that Taiwan also has rights and responsibilities vis a vis the future of China as a whole. It must refuse to be a tool of containment in the hands of foreign forces. It must refuse to be a tool to hobble Mainland China's development. It must return to the middle way. It must oppose Communism, but not China. What could possibly be wrong with such an approach?

Full text below:

During an interview with AFP in New York, ROC Representative to the United States King Pu-tsung stressed the importance of maintaining a trilateral balance between Washington, Beijing, and Taipei. He said "Taiwan needs the strong support of the United States, because the United States is an important ally. But care should be taken in handling relations with Mainland China, because the Mainland is now Taiwan's largest trading partner." When dealing with Mainland China, Taipei upholds the 1992 consensus and "one China, different interpretations." King said "What we have is strategic ambiguity. Upholding the Republic of China is our best shield. Taiwan still needs a strong defensive capability." King concluded that "We have our own pragmatic way of survival."

King Pu-tsung's job in the United States is to maintain and expand the interests of the Republic of China. It is to represent and reflect the policies of President Ma Ying-jeou. Consider what King said. He said that upholding the Republic of China is our best shield. He said that Taipei upholds the 1992 consensus. He said that Taipei must balance its relationship with Washington and Beijing, and that Taipei has its own pragmatic way of survival. These remarks deserve affirmation. But some of the views he expressed may call for closer scrutiny. For example, his remarks about strategic ambiguity in Taipei's arms purchases, and President Ma's remark that he would sacrifice himself before relinquishing Taiwan's sovereignty. People back home may disagree with his remarks and his wording.

First of all, King Pu-tsung's use of the term "Taiwan's sovereignty" is imprecise and could provoke controversy. Secondly, for years politicians and academics on Taiwan have parroted the rhetoric of U.S. hegemony. They use academic terms such as soft power, smart power, strategic ambiguity, and tactical clarity. These terms are not without meaning. But to a considerable degree they sacrifice our own political primacy and rhetorical initiative. Terms such as strategic ambiguity, tactical clarity, or vice-versa, are political jargon. Taipei's room for maneuver is actually quite limited. President Ma Ying-jeou's strategy is actually quite clear. It is to remain close to Washington, friendly with Tokyo, and at peace with Beijing, while continuing to improve cross-Strait relations. Representative King's talk of strategic ambiguity is dubious.

King Pu-tsung has admitted in interviews that he must be careful what he says. The outside world will assume that what he says represents the views of President Ma. He spoke of Washington's perspective on cross-Strait relations. On the one hand, Washington hopes that the two sides will continue to improve relations. On the other hand, it worries that the two sides will become too chummy too soon. This newspaper recently published an editorial noting how Washington wants the two sides to improve relations, reduce tensions, and maintain a dynamic equilibrium with the status quo, but only as Washington defines it. It does not want to be kept in the dark. It does not want any surprises. It wants everyone to be on the same page. Simply put, Washington will not allow Taiwan independence, nor will it allow Beijing to use force. The two sides may reconcile, but they will not be allowed to cooperate. Washington's policies are all motivated by self-interest.

We know this to be the case. Therefore to uphold the interests of the Republic of China, and to ensure a bright future for the Chinese people as a whole, Taipei must do what it must, and not do what it must not. Consider arms purchases. Taipei must have the ability to defend itself. It must demonstrate a determination to defend itself. But it cannot bear the burden of a cross-Strait arms race. Merely acting as a tool of Washington's policy of containing Mainland China's development is also contrary to the larger cause of the Chinese people as a whole. Given continuous improvements in cross-Strait relations, military procurement should be reduced. We must make more efficient use of limited resources. Taipei may even wish to consider the development of offensive weapons. But we should publicly promise never to be the first to use them. The international factors may be complex. But it would be both cheap and effective. It would be better than having Washington's fingers around one's throat on every issue that arises.

Washington does not want to any accidents or surprises. So why can't Taipei expect the same from Washington? Washington wants to control every last detail. Washington knows that improved cross-Strait relations is not a bad thing. But the three parties' interests do not always coincide. Washington can and may undermine improved cross-Strait relations. So should Washington be informed in advance, during, or afterwards? To what extent should Washington be informed? These questions call for diplomatic skill and political wisdom. This is all "Introduction to Political Science 101." Politicians and diplomats may not always speak the truth, at least the complete truth. But they must not tell outright lies.

Today the two sides' strengths and weaknesses are obvious. Times have changed. Time is clearly not on Taipei's side. Obstinately refusing to reunify will only lead to annihilation. Relying on Washington is no answer. Taiwan independence can only lead to war. Being reunified under Beijng's terms would be tough to swallow. Blindly yielding to pressure from Beijing could lead to covert abuse. After much thought, it would seem that a rational love for Taiwan requires everyone to endure hardship, set ambitious goals, vow to return to the Chinese mainland, and seek a way out through an economic strategy for China as a whole. The government under the leadership of President Ma must enlighten the public. It must lead public opinion. It must insist that Taiwan is part of China, but not a province of the People's Republic of China. It must insist that we are both Taiwanese and Chinese, but not citizens of the People's Republic of China. It must make a distinction between nationality, ethnicity, and political authority. It must argue that Taiwan also has rights and responsibilities vis a vis the future of China as a whole. It must refuse to be a tool of containment in the hands of foreign forces. It must refuse to be a tool to hobble Mainland China's development. It must return to the middle way. It must oppose Communism, but not China. What could possibly be wrong with such an approach?

在中美之間 台灣應隨時勢思考新戰略
2013-02-07
中國時報

我駐美代表金溥聰日前在紐約接受法新社訪問，強調台灣在美國和中國大陸之間維持三邊平衡的重要性，他並表示，「台灣需要美國的強力支持，因為美國是重要的盟邦；但也須審慎處理和中國大陸的關係，因為現在大陸是台灣最大的貿易夥伴。」在面對中國大陸時，台灣主張九二共識和一中各表，「我們有的是在策略上模糊的空間，（而）堅持中華民國是我們最佳的防護罩，」「台灣方面仍須具備非常強大的防禦能力來自保。」結論是「我們有自己務實的生存之道。」

金溥聰在美的工作重點是維護、拓展中華民國的利益，並代表、反映馬英九總統的政策；其相關談話內容，比如說堅持中華民國是我們的最佳防護罩，台灣主張維持九二共識，必須妥善、平衡處理其與美國和中國大陸之間的關係，台灣要有自己務實的求生之道等等都是值得肯定之處。但某些觀點或許還有一些思辨的空間，比如說台灣所採取的戰略模糊與對美軍購，以及馬總統即使犧牲自己也不會放棄台灣主權等等。國內對這些談話及用字就可能有一些不同的聲音。

首先，金溥聰代表所稱台灣主權用字不夠精準恐怕引起爭議；其次，這些年來，台灣的政界、學界常常跟著美國霸權，使用一些學術名詞，如軟實力、巧實力，或戰略模糊、戰術清晰等等，雖然不能說是完全沒有意義，但在相當程度上已經失掉了自己的主體性及話語權。所謂的戰略模糊、戰術清晰（或反向為之）都是政治語言（political jargon），台灣能夠揮灑的空間其實相當有限，馬英九總統的戰略其實相當清楚，就是親美、友日、和中，持續改善兩岸關係。金代表的戰略模糊說法顯然還有討論空間。

金溥聰在訪談中也承認，自己講話要非常小心，因為外界會認為他代表馬總統的看法，提到美國在兩岸關係上一方面希望兩岸持續改善關係，但又擔心雙方走得太近、太快，這和本報日前社論所提，美方只希望兩岸持續改善關係、降低緊張、維持由其所界定的動態平衡與現狀，不願自己被蒙在鼓裡，不要有任何驚訝與意外的看法完全一致。簡單的說，美國不准台灣獨立、不讓中共動武，只要兩岸和解、但又不准雙方合作，美方的一切政策作為仍是出於自利的考慮。

既然如此，出於維護中華民國利益，甚至基於整個民族未來發展的考慮，台灣自然也該為所當為、有所不為。就以對美軍購來說，台灣確實要有適度自衛的能力，展現自我防衛的決心，但台灣顯然無法承擔兩岸軍備競賽的結果，而做為美國圍堵中國發展的工具也有違民族大義；在兩岸關係不斷改善的前提下，軍購數量當然應該有所調整，把資源做更有效運用。台灣甚至不妨考慮發展具攻擊性的武器，但可公開承諾不會首先使用，雖然其中國際因素複雜，但既省錢又有效，總比凡事被美國掐著脖子好些。

再說美國不希望有任何意外和驚嚇，台灣又何嘗不能用同樣的標準來要求美國？華府希望能夠掌握相關細節，其實兩岸關係改善的進程讓美國適度理解並非完全壞事，但由於三方利益未必完全吻合，美國又有能力與可能破壞兩岸關係的發展，所以到底是讓美國於事前、事中或事後知道，或讓美方了解到什麼樣的程度，這就有賴高超的外交技巧與政治智慧。政治學入門的一個基本概念：政治人物及外交官可以不講真話，或至少不是全部的真話，但是不可講假話或許可供參考。

如今，兩岸強弱易勢，時移勢轉，時間看來對台灣只會更為不利，而偏安江左只會滅亡，依靠美國不是辦法，獨立只會引發戰爭，被統又不甘心，一味的曲從北京壓力，又怕被關門打狗。左思右想，看來理性的愛台灣，大家就該臥薪嘗膽、恢弘志氣、誓言躍馬中原、經略中國大陸或為一條出路。如果馬總統及其領導的政府能夠教化、引領民意，堅持台灣是中國的一部分，但不是中華人民共和國的一省，我們既是台灣人也是中國人，但又不是中華人民共和國的子民，把國家、民族與政權區別對待，主張台灣對中國的未來也有一分責任與權利，堅持不做外國勢力圍堵、限制中國發展的工具，重新回到反共而不反華的中道立場，豈不甚好？