Bo Xilai Case: China Dream Remains a Distant Dream
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
August 30, 2013
Summary: Today's CCP places the party above the law. The party cannot permit the law to control the party. Xi Jingpin wanted the "party to control the party." This is all the result of "one -party dictatorship." This is why there is no "partisan politics." This is why there is no "tripartite separation of powers." This is why there is no "justice." The Bo Xilai trial was a "copy of the West." But it merely inverted cause and effect. It merely adopted the external trappings. The Bo Xilai case tells us that the Chinese mainland remains a long way from its "China Dream."
Full text below:
During the five day long Bo Xilai trial, the Mainland authorities made considerable progress in terms of due process. Leave aside the larger economic and political backdrop for the moment. Look only at the adversarial process within the courtroom. The process was clearly orderly. The prosecution's arguments were reasonable. The defense said everything that needed to be said. The proceedings were directly webcast by microbloggers. Could this mark the beginning of future CCP judicial reform?
Consider the conduct of the justice system. The conduct of the Bo Xilai trial was very different from the 1967 trial of Bo Xilai's father Bo Yibo. Back then, a single document, "The Confession and Surrender of Bo Yibo, Liu Lan Tao, An Ziwen, Yang Hsien-chen" led to the persecution of Bo Yibo. Bo Yibo's wife Hu Ming, Bo Xilai's mother, committed suicide while in custody. The conduct of the Bo Xilai trial also differs from the 1962 persecution of Xi Jinping's father Xi Zhongxun, who was accused of writing an "anti-party novel" entitled "Liu Chih-tan." That case did not even go to trial. Instead an "ad hoc committee" branded Xi a member of an "anti-party group." Xi Zhongxun was imprisoned for 16 years. Over 60,000 people were implicated. The conduct of the Bo Xilai case also differed from the Liu Shaoqi case and the Peng Dehuai case.
The CCP's Criminal Law and Criminal Procedures Act were hastily during the 1980 "Gang of Four" trial. Before that one could say there was no such thing as justice. Evidence was one-sided smears. Courts were "Ad Hoc Committees." There were even "public trials," which were essentially lynch mobs. The Jinan Intermediate People's Court trial of Bo Xilai by contrast, was webcast live by microbloggers. That is amazing progress.
Bo Xilai's retraction of his previous confession may have taken Mainland authorities by surprise. But Bo's retraction makes him the defendant who has contributed the most to criminal justice in the history of the Chinese Communist Party. Bo Xilai was a closely watched, high-profile official. During this trial, prosecution and defense arguments were webcast live by microbloggers. This enabled the public on the Mainland to undestand for the first time, that in a court of law the defendant and the government enjoy equal standing. Their human rights must be respected and upheld. Even after Bo Xilai retracted his confession, the trial continued to be webcast live. The trial was lengthened to five days. One cannot deny that this was a significant achievement for the CCP justice system. It may have been a case of someone riding a tiger finding it difficult to dismount. But it merits affirmation nonetheless.
This was a Trial of the Century. It showed that the CCP authorities know what the civilized world expects from a criminal trial. It attempted to meet those expectations under the watchful eyes of the world. This trial should enable the CCP to better understand why the Mainland's justice system failed to meet required. To meet such stanards requires more than a pro forma, bootlegged version of a Western-style criminal trial.
The CCP denies the existence of "universal values." But it can not deny that "justice" is the highest judicial value. During this trial, they wanted to show that "socialism embodies the rule of law." But that too shows that "justice" is a "universal value." The result however was still not credible. The Chinese Communist Party does not deny the value of "democracy." But it also says it "will not imitate the West." By implication it was affirming "socialism with Chinese characteristics." It was taking another road to "democracy." But that is not a workable option .
The mainstream believes "justice" must be based on the "tripartite separation of powers." The "tripartite separation of powers" must be based on the possibility of "partisan politics." A "one -party dictatorship" cannot ensure the "tripartite separation of powers." Without the "tripartite separation of powers" it is impossible to ensure "justice." The Chinese Communist Party wants on the one hand to uphold the "four cardinal principles." But it wants on the other hand the "rule by law." This is asking for the impossible .
A CCP public security system that is not independent and impartial, violates human rights. It also creates a crisis in national governance. Take the Bo Xilai case. It involves three problems. The first problem was corruption. The Bo Xilai case was exposed because Wang Lijun went to the U.S. Consulate in Chengdu. Corruption was uncovered first. Corruption in this case was overwhelming. Gu Kailai committed murder. Twelve years ago she purchased a "Nice Fontaine St George's Villa" that still belongs to her. The second problem was abuse of authority. Bo Xilai was investigated only because the Gu Kailai case failed to follow procedure and relieved Wang Lijun of his post. This was "abuse of authority." But at the same time they found that Bo's "waving of the red flag to expose corruption" led to many false prosecutions. The third problem was that Wen Jiabao compared the Bo Xilai case to "Cultural Revolution errors and feudal influences." But the justice system cannot address problems at this level. As everyone knows , Bo Xilai's "leftist" maneuvers were more serious than "Gu's murder." They were more serious than the "Xu Mingsong Villa." As we can see, the Bo Xilai case was subject to political spin doctoring. Paradoxically this highlights the CCP governance crisis.
Today's CCP places the party above the law. The party cannot permit the law to control the party. Party Disciplinary Representatives have priority over public security. Therefore the party has no control over the party. Xi Jingpin wanted the "party to control the party." This is all the result of "one -party dictatorship." This is why there is no "partisan politics." This is why there is no "tripartite separation of powers." This is why there is no "justice." The Bo Xilai trial was a "copy of the West." But it merely inverted cause and effect. It merely adopted the external trappings. .
The Bo Xilai case tells us that the Chinese mainland remains a long way from its "China Dream."
從薄案看「中國夢」有多遙遠
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.08.30 01:56 am
薄案五天審理，在司法程序正義的形式表現上，有相當可觀的進步。大體上，若不問本案全貌業經政治剪裁，單就庭訊攻防而言，卻可見審方節度分明，控方論辯得體，被告也把能說的都說了；這些皆經微博文字直播，未知能否成為未來中共司法改革的起步。
就司法表現言，薄熙來案與一九六七年的薄一波案（薄熙來之父）大有不同。當年，一紙《薄一波、劉瀾濤、安子文、楊獻珍等自首叛變材料的批示》，就使薄一波等受到迫害批鬥，薄妻胡明（薄熙來之母）在關押期間自殺。薄熙來案也與一九六二年習仲勛（習近平之父）所涉「反黨小說《劉志丹》案」大有不同。該案也根本未經法院審判，而是由一個「專案委員會」將習仲勛打成「反黨集團」；習仲勛被殘害關押了十六年，當年株連者逾六萬人。當然，薄熙來案也與劉少奇案與彭德懷案大有不同，在此不贅。
中共的《刑法》與《刑事訴訟法》等，是為一九八○年審判「四人幫」始倉卒草成，前此可謂沒有司法這回事；證據只是片面之詞的「黑材料」，法院就是「專案小組」，甚至是「公審大會」。因此，此次濟南中級人民法院大審薄熙來，能發展至微博文字直播，堪謂是驚人的進步。
薄熙來的翻供可能出乎中共當局的意料，但薄的翻供卻使他已成為中共司法史上最有貢獻的被告。由於他受矚目的身分，其庭訊攻防論辯經微博文字高度真實直播，使得大陸人民首次知道，在法庭上一名被告與控方的政府其實處於對等地位，而其人權應當或可以被尊重及維護到什麼程度。尤其，在薄熙來翻供後，法庭仍然維持直播，且將庭訊延長至五天，這不能不說是中共司法表現的重大成就；縱使是由於騎虎難下，亦值肯定。
這場世紀大審顯示，中共當局知道一場合乎文明世界價值的司法審理應當有何種規格，並力圖在世人眼前表現出那樣的規格。經由這場審理，中共應更能理解，大陸的司法表現為何無法符合那樣的標準，以及要作到那樣的規格標準，不能只是在程序形式上搬演一場山寨版的西方式審理而已。
中共諱言「普世價值」，卻不能否認「公正」乃司法的最高價值。這場審理，若是意欲證明「社會主義法治」也能體現「司法公正」的「普世價值」，其結果是仍不具可信性。猶如中共亦不否定「民主」的價值，卻又稱「不照搬西方那一套」，言下意謂「有中國特色的社會主義」另有一條實現「民主」之路。然而，恐怕也是此路不通。
以司法論，普世主流理論認為，「司法公正」必須建立在「三權分立」之上，而「三權分立」的可能性又必須建立在「政黨政治」之上。因為，「一黨專政」就絕無可能「三權分立」，沒有「三權分立」也就不可能有「司法公正」。所以，中共一方面要「四個堅持」，另一方面又要「以法治國」，無異緣木求魚。
公檢法體系不能獨立公正，對中共而言，非但侵害人權，更有國家治理的危機。以薄案的三個層次為例。第一個層次是貪汙：但薄案爆開是因王立軍奔赴成都美國領事館，而不是先查出貪汙。貪汙情節在本案是喧賓奪主，若非谷開來殺人，十二年前所購「尼斯楓丹‧聖喬治別墅」現在還是她的。第二個層次是行政犯罪：本案僅追究薄熙來因谷案未循程序即逕免王立軍職等情節，謂為「濫用職權」。但同時發現薄在「唱紅打黑」涉及許多冤錯假案，卻未見下文。第三個層次在路線：溫家寶將薄案喻為「文革的錯誤／封建的影響」，但司法卻不能處理這個層次的問題。盡人皆知，薄熙來的「左」的操作，比「谷開來殺人」嚴重，也比「徐明送別墅」嚴重。由此可見，薄案全貌經過政治剪裁的避重就輕，反而凸顯了中共國家治理的危機。
今日的中共，黨大於法。且因黨不容法來管黨（中紀委先於公檢法），所以黨也管不住黨（習近平倡「黨要管黨」）。這皆是緣於「一黨專政」，所以沒有「政黨政治」，所以沒有「三權分立」，所以也沒有「司法公正」。此次薄案審理，演出了一個「照搬西方那一套」的法庭，卻只是買櫝還珠、東施效顰而已。
省思薄案，即知中國大陸距「中國夢」仍然遙遠。
Thursday, August 29, 2013
Wednesday, August 28, 2013
Taipower Losses Scrape Bottom
Taipower Losses Scrape Bottom
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
August 29, 2013
Summary: Taiwan electricity rates are too low. People realize this. They would be willing to pay a reasonable price to achieve industrial growth and environmental balance. Unfortunately the government and Taipower electricity rates are black box operations. This ensures that electricity rate hikes remain opaque, and low value-added industries cannot be replaced. Taipower has gone from "honorable loser" to a "necessary evil." Will these endless losses ever hit bottom?
Full text below:
The Ministry of Economic Affairs has announced an October electricty rate hike. The magnitude of the hike is less than announced previously. For families and small shops the threshold will not be raised. But over ten million users will feel the price increases. The new program defers to consumer sentiment. It raises the excessively low rates for industrial electricity, making them more reasonable. Overall Taipower rates remain among Asia's lowest, but alas are no help to business competitiveness. Taipower remains on the brink of collapse -- a money pit.
Taipower finds itself trapped and immobilized. The Number Four Nuclear Power Plant remains a hot potato. The liberalization of the energy industry and the promotion of green energy have fiascoes, like the proverbial blind men struggling to discern the shape of an elephant. Taiwan's political and business environment is deformed. Well-intentioned policies invariably attract unscrupulous politicians. State-owned enterprises have long transformed benefits into exclusive slush funds. As a result Taipower losses have skyrocketed. Realistic constraints are vital. The cure must fit the disease. Rate hikes are better than nothing, but that is about all they are.
Should electricity rates be hiked? The public already knows the answer. The principle is "user pays." What should be paid, will be paid. If international fuel prices increase, users will have to pay no matter how much it hurts. The problem lies with the Ministry of Economic Affairs, which determines rate hikes. Taipower must tell the public whether our electricity is expensive or cheap, and how that is determined. Has Taipower done its utmost to run an efficient and responsible business?
Anti-nuclear sentiment is on the rise. One issue urgently in need of discussion, is the impact of different fuels on electricity prices. Politicians have played fast and loose with this issue, and misled the public. They talk only of safety. They ignore the reality of rising international fuel prices. They single out nuclear power as dangerous. They ignore the fact that natural gas prices are several times higher. They ignore the impact dependence on natural gas would have on electricity rates. When the opposition was in power, it rushed to complete the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant. It now conveniently blanks out this fact. It now blames Number Four Nuclear Power Plant problems on the incompetence of the ruling party. It now politicizes the issue and incites public discontent over rate hikes.
Energy prices have long failed to reflect true market rates. State-owned enterprises have long been indifferent to losses because they are passed on to others. These are the reasons Taipower losses have become a black hole that can never be filled. Those in charge will retire at age 65. Losses are listed in the ledger, then passed on to others. They are not factored into the individual official's job performance. Under such conditions, how can anyone know how well they performed? How can anyone know how much was lost?
The current rate hikes mean that in one year Taipower will receive 50 billion NT in revenue. But even this cannot save Taipower from bankruptcy. On Father's Day this year the temperature reached a high of 39.3 degrees Centigrade. Taipower's reserve capacity is inadequate, and could lead to power outages at any moment. The public must understand this crisis. Residential electricity users may be dissatisfied with the rate hikes. But they must also appreciate the plight of lower echelon Taipower staff on the firing line, how hard they work making emergency repairs. They must be reminded of the fact that the electricity on that day was produced by high-priced gas-fired electrical power generation. Green Energy contribution to the power supply in the form of wind power was less than one percent. This is the reality. The public must not listen only to the bleatings of anti-nuclear Green Energy charlatans.
The deterioration of the power grid is Taipower's most intractable problem. Given Taiwan's power supply environment, nuclear power, coal, fire and other forms of "coolie labor" base load generating capacity must reach 65%. Only then can it achieve stability and economy. But current base load generating capacity is barely 40%. Summer peak load generating capacity requires the use of expensive gas turbines and fossil fuel. Therefore a closer look this electrical pricing scheme shows that Taipower's operational loss situation remains unchanged.
Times have changed. Policies must also change. For example, industrial electricity rate concessions for high value-added industry do not work. Industries long dependent on low rates lack the motivation to conserve. A capital cost of over 3 NT, brings a return of less than 1 NT in off-peak electricity prices. The result is that cast iron foundries, fabric dyeing, and other low value-added industries refuse to shut down or restructure. How can this be justifed?
The current price hikes are too conservative. As a result, the government forces taxpayers to subsidize Taipower's losses. On top of which the deficit is increased. Government subsidies unjustly force the public as a whole to subsidize major energy users. The government prices energy far below international standards. This reduces business awareness of the need to enhance their competitiveness.
Taiwan electricity rates are too low. People realize this. They would be willing to pay a reasonable price to achieve industrial growth and environmental balance. Unfortunately the government and Taipower electricity rates are black box operations. This ensures that electricity rate hikes remain opaque, and low value-added industries cannot be replaced. Taipower has gone from "honorable loser" to a "necessary evil." Will these endless losses ever hit bottom?
台電無代價的虧損伊於胡底
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.08.29 05:05 am
經濟部宣布十月電價調漲，漲幅低於稍早宣布的幅度，並針對家庭及小商店拉高了不調漲的度數門檻，使一千多萬民生用戶免受漲價之苦。新方案充分照顧了民生用戶的感受，而調整偏低的工業用電，也多少有合理化的用心。但從大局看，台灣電價維持「亞鄰最低價」卻無助競爭力，台電瀕臨倒閉的危機依舊存在，電力結構還是「賣一度虧一度」。
台電之所以陷入今天動彈不得的處境，除了核四的燙手山芋外，主要是電業自由化及綠色能源風潮在推動上的瞎子摸象。在台灣扭曲的政商環境下，任何立意良好的政策都引來無恥政客的鯨吞蠶食；長期扮演利益轉換「大水庫」角色的國營事業則被當成禁臠，導致台電的虧損劇增。若不實事求是，直接針對病灶下手，調漲電價只是聊勝於無。
其實，電價該不該調，民眾心中自有一把尺。基於「使用者付費」原則，該繳的費用不會不繳；而若是國際燃料價格上漲，每個用戶再痛也得付。問題是，主導費率調整的經濟部、台電公司必須誠實告訴社會大眾：我們的電價是貴或便宜，究竟是怎麼算的？台電團隊確實盡到了有效而負責的經營嗎？
正當反核聲浪高漲，最該討論的，就是使用不同燃料所產生的電力，對電價有何影響？偏偏這部份的討論，卻遭到政客的操弄和誤導。他們一味空泛地談安全，撇開國際燃料價格上漲的事實不談；一味指責核能危險，卻不說天然氣的價格高出幾倍，乃至對電價影響如何。在野黨毫不在乎自己執政時如何撥款核四要求趕工，卻把核四一舉推給執政黨的無能，也導致民眾對電價調升的政治化與情緒化反應。
能源價格長期未能合理化，加上國營事業長期不在乎「虧損遞移」，是造成台電虧損到「黑洞」般難以填補的原因。反正主事者滿六十五歲退休，虧損列入帳面移交，又不計入個人經營績效；在這種情況下，績效好又如何？虧損累累又如何？
這次漲價，一年可為台電挹注五百億元收入；但即使如此，台電仍無法解脫瀕臨破產的命運。以今年父親節當天高溫達三十九點三度的供電環境看，台電備轉容量隨時可能不足而導致斷電，這是民眾必須了解的危機。因此，用電戶再不滿意電價，也該了解在火線上冒險搶修線路的基層台電員工有多辛苦。必須提醒的是，當天的電力，是靠著高價的燃氣發電撐場面，綠色能源風電的比率根本不到百分之一。面對這樣的事實，國人不能偏聽那些口頭反核者隨意吹噓綠能神效的氣球。
基載電力結構惡化，是台電最難解的問題。以台灣的供電環境，核電、燃煤、火力等所謂「做苦工」的基載電力，必須要達到六成五，才可能達成供電的穩定與低廉。但現在的情況是，基載電力僅勉強達到四成，夏天超載的用電都必須仰賴高價的氣渦輪、燃油供應。因此，細看這次電價方案，台電「虧本經營」的景況，其實沒有任何改變。
再者，一些時空環境已經變化的政策，也必須要大修。例如，工業用電的低價優惠，高附加價值產業並不買帳，而依賴低電價的產業，卻因此長期缺乏節能更新動機。成本達三塊多、卻只售不到一元的離峰電價，造成鑄鐵、染整等低附加價值產業不肯撤走或轉型，這說得過去嗎？
這次漲價調得小心翼翼，其結果，必然是政府要以納稅的人錢來補貼台電的虧損。這除使政府赤字益形惡化，更將產生全民補貼能源使用大戶的不公不義問題；而台灣電價遠低於國際水準，也將不斷降低企業提升競爭力的警覺。
台灣電價偏低，其實民眾都瞭解，也願意負擔合理的電價來達成產業成長與環境保護的平衡。遺憾的是，政府和台電對電價諱莫如深，造成電力價格始終不透明、低附加價值產業無法汰換。而台電從「光榮慘業」淪為「必要之惡」，這種無代價的虧損，伊於胡底？
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
August 29, 2013
Summary: Taiwan electricity rates are too low. People realize this. They would be willing to pay a reasonable price to achieve industrial growth and environmental balance. Unfortunately the government and Taipower electricity rates are black box operations. This ensures that electricity rate hikes remain opaque, and low value-added industries cannot be replaced. Taipower has gone from "honorable loser" to a "necessary evil." Will these endless losses ever hit bottom?
Full text below:
The Ministry of Economic Affairs has announced an October electricty rate hike. The magnitude of the hike is less than announced previously. For families and small shops the threshold will not be raised. But over ten million users will feel the price increases. The new program defers to consumer sentiment. It raises the excessively low rates for industrial electricity, making them more reasonable. Overall Taipower rates remain among Asia's lowest, but alas are no help to business competitiveness. Taipower remains on the brink of collapse -- a money pit.
Taipower finds itself trapped and immobilized. The Number Four Nuclear Power Plant remains a hot potato. The liberalization of the energy industry and the promotion of green energy have fiascoes, like the proverbial blind men struggling to discern the shape of an elephant. Taiwan's political and business environment is deformed. Well-intentioned policies invariably attract unscrupulous politicians. State-owned enterprises have long transformed benefits into exclusive slush funds. As a result Taipower losses have skyrocketed. Realistic constraints are vital. The cure must fit the disease. Rate hikes are better than nothing, but that is about all they are.
Should electricity rates be hiked? The public already knows the answer. The principle is "user pays." What should be paid, will be paid. If international fuel prices increase, users will have to pay no matter how much it hurts. The problem lies with the Ministry of Economic Affairs, which determines rate hikes. Taipower must tell the public whether our electricity is expensive or cheap, and how that is determined. Has Taipower done its utmost to run an efficient and responsible business?
Anti-nuclear sentiment is on the rise. One issue urgently in need of discussion, is the impact of different fuels on electricity prices. Politicians have played fast and loose with this issue, and misled the public. They talk only of safety. They ignore the reality of rising international fuel prices. They single out nuclear power as dangerous. They ignore the fact that natural gas prices are several times higher. They ignore the impact dependence on natural gas would have on electricity rates. When the opposition was in power, it rushed to complete the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant. It now conveniently blanks out this fact. It now blames Number Four Nuclear Power Plant problems on the incompetence of the ruling party. It now politicizes the issue and incites public discontent over rate hikes.
Energy prices have long failed to reflect true market rates. State-owned enterprises have long been indifferent to losses because they are passed on to others. These are the reasons Taipower losses have become a black hole that can never be filled. Those in charge will retire at age 65. Losses are listed in the ledger, then passed on to others. They are not factored into the individual official's job performance. Under such conditions, how can anyone know how well they performed? How can anyone know how much was lost?
The current rate hikes mean that in one year Taipower will receive 50 billion NT in revenue. But even this cannot save Taipower from bankruptcy. On Father's Day this year the temperature reached a high of 39.3 degrees Centigrade. Taipower's reserve capacity is inadequate, and could lead to power outages at any moment. The public must understand this crisis. Residential electricity users may be dissatisfied with the rate hikes. But they must also appreciate the plight of lower echelon Taipower staff on the firing line, how hard they work making emergency repairs. They must be reminded of the fact that the electricity on that day was produced by high-priced gas-fired electrical power generation. Green Energy contribution to the power supply in the form of wind power was less than one percent. This is the reality. The public must not listen only to the bleatings of anti-nuclear Green Energy charlatans.
The deterioration of the power grid is Taipower's most intractable problem. Given Taiwan's power supply environment, nuclear power, coal, fire and other forms of "coolie labor" base load generating capacity must reach 65%. Only then can it achieve stability and economy. But current base load generating capacity is barely 40%. Summer peak load generating capacity requires the use of expensive gas turbines and fossil fuel. Therefore a closer look this electrical pricing scheme shows that Taipower's operational loss situation remains unchanged.
Times have changed. Policies must also change. For example, industrial electricity rate concessions for high value-added industry do not work. Industries long dependent on low rates lack the motivation to conserve. A capital cost of over 3 NT, brings a return of less than 1 NT in off-peak electricity prices. The result is that cast iron foundries, fabric dyeing, and other low value-added industries refuse to shut down or restructure. How can this be justifed?
The current price hikes are too conservative. As a result, the government forces taxpayers to subsidize Taipower's losses. On top of which the deficit is increased. Government subsidies unjustly force the public as a whole to subsidize major energy users. The government prices energy far below international standards. This reduces business awareness of the need to enhance their competitiveness.
Taiwan electricity rates are too low. People realize this. They would be willing to pay a reasonable price to achieve industrial growth and environmental balance. Unfortunately the government and Taipower electricity rates are black box operations. This ensures that electricity rate hikes remain opaque, and low value-added industries cannot be replaced. Taipower has gone from "honorable loser" to a "necessary evil." Will these endless losses ever hit bottom?
台電無代價的虧損伊於胡底
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.08.29 05:05 am
經濟部宣布十月電價調漲，漲幅低於稍早宣布的幅度，並針對家庭及小商店拉高了不調漲的度數門檻，使一千多萬民生用戶免受漲價之苦。新方案充分照顧了民生用戶的感受，而調整偏低的工業用電，也多少有合理化的用心。但從大局看，台灣電價維持「亞鄰最低價」卻無助競爭力，台電瀕臨倒閉的危機依舊存在，電力結構還是「賣一度虧一度」。
台電之所以陷入今天動彈不得的處境，除了核四的燙手山芋外，主要是電業自由化及綠色能源風潮在推動上的瞎子摸象。在台灣扭曲的政商環境下，任何立意良好的政策都引來無恥政客的鯨吞蠶食；長期扮演利益轉換「大水庫」角色的國營事業則被當成禁臠，導致台電的虧損劇增。若不實事求是，直接針對病灶下手，調漲電價只是聊勝於無。
其實，電價該不該調，民眾心中自有一把尺。基於「使用者付費」原則，該繳的費用不會不繳；而若是國際燃料價格上漲，每個用戶再痛也得付。問題是，主導費率調整的經濟部、台電公司必須誠實告訴社會大眾：我們的電價是貴或便宜，究竟是怎麼算的？台電團隊確實盡到了有效而負責的經營嗎？
正當反核聲浪高漲，最該討論的，就是使用不同燃料所產生的電力，對電價有何影響？偏偏這部份的討論，卻遭到政客的操弄和誤導。他們一味空泛地談安全，撇開國際燃料價格上漲的事實不談；一味指責核能危險，卻不說天然氣的價格高出幾倍，乃至對電價影響如何。在野黨毫不在乎自己執政時如何撥款核四要求趕工，卻把核四一舉推給執政黨的無能，也導致民眾對電價調升的政治化與情緒化反應。
能源價格長期未能合理化，加上國營事業長期不在乎「虧損遞移」，是造成台電虧損到「黑洞」般難以填補的原因。反正主事者滿六十五歲退休，虧損列入帳面移交，又不計入個人經營績效；在這種情況下，績效好又如何？虧損累累又如何？
這次漲價，一年可為台電挹注五百億元收入；但即使如此，台電仍無法解脫瀕臨破產的命運。以今年父親節當天高溫達三十九點三度的供電環境看，台電備轉容量隨時可能不足而導致斷電，這是民眾必須了解的危機。因此，用電戶再不滿意電價，也該了解在火線上冒險搶修線路的基層台電員工有多辛苦。必須提醒的是，當天的電力，是靠著高價的燃氣發電撐場面，綠色能源風電的比率根本不到百分之一。面對這樣的事實，國人不能偏聽那些口頭反核者隨意吹噓綠能神效的氣球。
基載電力結構惡化，是台電最難解的問題。以台灣的供電環境，核電、燃煤、火力等所謂「做苦工」的基載電力，必須要達到六成五，才可能達成供電的穩定與低廉。但現在的情況是，基載電力僅勉強達到四成，夏天超載的用電都必須仰賴高價的氣渦輪、燃油供應。因此，細看這次電價方案，台電「虧本經營」的景況，其實沒有任何改變。
再者，一些時空環境已經變化的政策，也必須要大修。例如，工業用電的低價優惠，高附加價值產業並不買帳，而依賴低電價的產業，卻因此長期缺乏節能更新動機。成本達三塊多、卻只售不到一元的離峰電價，造成鑄鐵、染整等低附加價值產業不肯撤走或轉型，這說得過去嗎？
這次漲價調得小心翼翼，其結果，必然是政府要以納稅的人錢來補貼台電的虧損。這除使政府赤字益形惡化，更將產生全民補貼能源使用大戶的不公不義問題；而台灣電價遠低於國際水準，也將不斷降低企業提升競爭力的警覺。
台灣電價偏低，其實民眾都瞭解，也願意負擔合理的電價來達成產業成長與環境保護的平衡。遺憾的是，政府和台電對電價諱莫如深，造成電力價格始終不透明、低附加價值產業無法汰換。而台電從「光榮慘業」淪為「必要之惡」，這種無代價的虧損，伊於胡底？
Tuesday, August 27, 2013
Will Social Unrest Return to the Streets?
Will Social Unrest Return to the Streets?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
August 26, 2013
Summary: The administration always waits until after the fact to communicate with the public. The legislature views "harmony" as more important than convening sessions. The Control Yuan feels it "may as well close up shop." The opposition DPP is content to watch as the ruling party embarrasses itself. This leads to political impotence. This leads to street protests. The machinery of state becomes the tail wagging the dog. Those truly lost, are society's silent majority.
Full text below:
Last year's protests against the demolition of Wenlin Yuan continue. This year street protests on Taiwan have proliferated. People from all walks of life are concerned about nuclear power generation. Up to 200,000 White Shirts have appeared on Ketegelan Boulevard. Protestors include opponents of the demolition of Ta Pu and opponents of the eastward relocation of the Tainan railway line. They even include opponents of media cartels and TISA. This shows that discontent on Taiwan is prompting a new wave of protests.
Some of the protests fall outside the framework of traditional ideological struggles. Today the Green Camp is no longer able to lead these protestors around by the nose. It can no longer manipulate them or support them from behind the scenes. Some protestors have kept their distance from the DPP. They have refused to allow the DPP to participate, in order to "avoid contamination." Social protests today are more autonomous. They are increasingly depoliticized. This is gratifying indeed. But some protests are immoral and irrationa. Neverthelss the ruling and opposition parties have failed to respond to them. This has exposed the emptiness and impotence of Taiwan's politics.
Closer examination of these street protests reveals that each has its own agenda. Some White Shirts have formed a "10,000 people bid farewell to Chung-chiu." Theirs was largely an expression of sentiments. Other protest banners invariably begin with "We Oppose... " signifying their opposition to specific policies. They can be further subdivided into several categories. The first category opposes the exercise of public authority, based on personal interests. Examples include those opposed to the demolition of Wenlin Yuan, Ta Pu, and the eastward relocation of the Tainan railway line. These pertain to land expropriation. The second category of protestor is concerned about human lives, safety, and rights. Examples include those demanding the abolition of nuclear power and those protesting abuse within the military. These protests are more universal in their concerns. The third category of protestor is concerned about the Chinese mainland. Examples include those opposed to TISA and media monopolies. These have "anti-China" overtones. Members of these protest movements often overlap.
In mature democracies, different public interests expressing different views is normal. It is nothing to be concerned about. Take Taiwan. White Shirts constitute the largest number of protestors on Ketegelan Boulevard. They have the greatest influence, But if one examines their motives, their moderate behavior, and their single-mindedness, one realizes they are the least worrisome of all. These protestors include the "Mothers Alliance for the Oversight of Nuclear Power Plants." These protestors are all examples of rational expression of opinion. By contrast, the anti-Ta Pu protestors are considered "outsider" by the local residents. They have escalated their protests to the point where they are demanding the "dismantling of government." They even forced their way into the Interior Ministry. They even used "civil disobedience" to rationalize their conduct. They have made the public uneasy.
Social protests have returned to the streets of Taiwan. The most intriguing question is: Why? Take the categories of protests listed above. The third category of protestor is motivated by "anti-China" hatred. This is a continuation of traditional Green Camp political protests. The other two categories exhibit greater diversity, both in their concerns and their constituency. They show greater autonomy, but also involve considerable danger. Regardless, together they reflect a failure in the machinery of state. This failure forces people to speak out and vent their anger in the streets.
This failure of the machinery of state refers to more than the executive branch and Ma's leadership. It includes central and local government representative bodies. It includes the opposition parties. All are caught up in negativity, regression, or passivity. Simply put, the government is either less and less able or less and less concerned about solving peoples' problems. This includes cross-ministry and cross-party entities. Long-standing parochialism and selfishness has created problems. This has led to hampered coordination, limited cooperation, and even outright Schadenfreude. This has prevented government and opposition agencies from responding effectively to public expectations. They have tied each other up in knots, making it impossible to get anything done. The ruling party must be alert to this, and the opposition must as well.
The most obvious example is the retention or abolition of nuclear power plants. A public referendum should be a last resort in a democracy. But the opposition DPP has made its calculations, and is dragging its feet. The public is not even getting the chance to vote in a referendum. Take TISA for example. Only the legislature can effectively resolve the issue. But the legislature remains deadlocked. Therefore the ruling and opposition parties should demand a "Ma Su Debate" to ensure that it becomes a reality. In recent years, Taiwan resembles a magician who swallows poison. He uses the most extreme methods in his magic act. Every time his thrilling tricks depletes everyones' energy. In the end, he may even lose his own life.
The administration always waits until after the fact to communicate with the public. The legislature views "harmony" as more important than convening sessions. The Control Yuan feels it "may as well close up shop." The opposition DPP is content to watch as the ruling party embarrasses itself. This leads to political impotence. This leads to street protests. The machinery of state becomes the tail wagging the dog. Those truly lost, are society's silent majority.
社會抗爭何以重新在街頭興起？
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.08.26 02:53 am
延續去年的文林苑反都更行動，今年以來，台灣的街頭抗爭活動有日益加劇的趨勢。從全民不分階層皆關注的反核運動，到凱道廿萬白衫軍的湧現；包括反大埔拆遷、反台南鐵路東移事件，乃至反媒體壟斷聯盟、反服貿行動聯盟的活動，都顯示台灣社會的不滿情緒正在經歷新一波的大爆發。
值得注意的是，其中有些抗爭行動，已超乎傳統政治意識形態之爭，不再像過去一樣能由綠營一手主導、操控或幕後支援。甚至，有些活動非常有意識地與民進黨保持距離，拒絕其參與，以免受到「汙染」。從「去政治化」的角度看，社會抗議活動的「自主化」傾向，確有可喜之處；然而，從若干抗爭行動流於泛道德化且無限上綱，而朝野均無力對應，也讓人看到台灣政治虛無及失能的危機。
仔細觀察，這些街頭示威活動，主題其實各不相同。其中，除了白衫軍的動員是以「萬人送仲丘」的感性訴求為號召外，其他運動幾乎無一例外地標舉「反」的旗號，指名要打倒特定的政策。若進一步細分，大約可歸為幾類：一是從個人權益觀點對抗公權力的行使，如文林苑、大埔和台南鐵路東移抗爭，皆與土地徵收有關；二是關於生命安全和基本人權的議題，如核四存廢之爭和軍中凌虐問題，具有更大的普遍性；三是基於對中國大陸的不安，如反服貿、反媒體壟斷皆均帶有「反中」色彩，成員也有重疊。
在成熟民主國家，代表不同利益或意見的民眾組合發出不同聲音，原本是很正常的事，也毋需過度憂慮。以台灣的情況看，凱道白衫軍示威的人數雖然最多，聲勢最大，但以其活動之理性、節制和聚焦看，其實反而最不值得擔憂。包括「媽媽監督核電廠聯盟」合唱反核，也都屬理性的意見表達。倒是像反大埔事件，除被當地人指為「外來」，更將行動上綱至「拆政府」，乃至實際「攻入」內政部，甚至引「公民不服從運動」合理化自己的行為，則讓其他民眾感到不安。
社會抗議行動重回台灣街頭，更耐人咀嚼的部分，其實是它的成因。從上述幾類示威來看，第三類因「反中」而發的抗爭，比較是延續了綠營傳統的政治抗爭調性；其餘兩類，都顯示台灣社會關注的議題和動員成分更為多元，有更大的自主性，但也有不小的危險。但無論如何，它們所共同反映的，都是國家機器運作的失效，而迫使人民必須在街頭找尋自己發聲或宣洩的管道。
這裡所謂「國家機器」的失效，不單單是指馬政府領導的行政部門，還包括中央與地方的代議機構，更包括在野政黨扮演的政治角色，都陷於一種消極、退化，或旁觀的狀態。簡單地說，政府解決問題的能力退化或對人民變得漠不關心，包括跨部門、跨政黨間因為長期的本位主義和自私心理作祟，而怠於協調、吝於合作，甚至存心想看對手出糗；其結果，不僅朝野各部門均無法對人民的期待作出有效的反應，更將彼此打結卡死，無法運作。這點，不僅執政黨必須深切自覺，反對黨更應高度警惕。
最明顯的例子是，若要決定核四的存廢，「公投」應該是體制內最後的民主手段了，但在反對黨的精算和牽拖下，人民卻連公投的門票都拿不到。以服貿協議為例，唯一有效的管道是立法部門的決議，但此一管道又被協商制度鎖死，因此朝野須另闢「馬蘇大辯論」的蹊徑，以維持演出的進行。這幾年，台灣政治像一個表演吞毒藥的術士，每次都要用最極端的手法、用最驚險的步數來耗光大家的能量；最後，可能把自己的性命也賠了進去。
如果行政部門總是要等到事後才溝通，如果立法部門覺得「和諧」比開會重要，如果監察院覺得自己「關了比較好」，如果在野黨覺得坐視執政黨出糗就可以了；如此，政治力虛無的結果，就是把發言權讓位給街頭抗爭者，使國家機器淪為「尾巴搖狗」。而真正失落的，則是社會中沉默的大多數。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
August 26, 2013
Summary: The administration always waits until after the fact to communicate with the public. The legislature views "harmony" as more important than convening sessions. The Control Yuan feels it "may as well close up shop." The opposition DPP is content to watch as the ruling party embarrasses itself. This leads to political impotence. This leads to street protests. The machinery of state becomes the tail wagging the dog. Those truly lost, are society's silent majority.
Full text below:
Last year's protests against the demolition of Wenlin Yuan continue. This year street protests on Taiwan have proliferated. People from all walks of life are concerned about nuclear power generation. Up to 200,000 White Shirts have appeared on Ketegelan Boulevard. Protestors include opponents of the demolition of Ta Pu and opponents of the eastward relocation of the Tainan railway line. They even include opponents of media cartels and TISA. This shows that discontent on Taiwan is prompting a new wave of protests.
Some of the protests fall outside the framework of traditional ideological struggles. Today the Green Camp is no longer able to lead these protestors around by the nose. It can no longer manipulate them or support them from behind the scenes. Some protestors have kept their distance from the DPP. They have refused to allow the DPP to participate, in order to "avoid contamination." Social protests today are more autonomous. They are increasingly depoliticized. This is gratifying indeed. But some protests are immoral and irrationa. Neverthelss the ruling and opposition parties have failed to respond to them. This has exposed the emptiness and impotence of Taiwan's politics.
Closer examination of these street protests reveals that each has its own agenda. Some White Shirts have formed a "10,000 people bid farewell to Chung-chiu." Theirs was largely an expression of sentiments. Other protest banners invariably begin with "We Oppose... " signifying their opposition to specific policies. They can be further subdivided into several categories. The first category opposes the exercise of public authority, based on personal interests. Examples include those opposed to the demolition of Wenlin Yuan, Ta Pu, and the eastward relocation of the Tainan railway line. These pertain to land expropriation. The second category of protestor is concerned about human lives, safety, and rights. Examples include those demanding the abolition of nuclear power and those protesting abuse within the military. These protests are more universal in their concerns. The third category of protestor is concerned about the Chinese mainland. Examples include those opposed to TISA and media monopolies. These have "anti-China" overtones. Members of these protest movements often overlap.
In mature democracies, different public interests expressing different views is normal. It is nothing to be concerned about. Take Taiwan. White Shirts constitute the largest number of protestors on Ketegelan Boulevard. They have the greatest influence, But if one examines their motives, their moderate behavior, and their single-mindedness, one realizes they are the least worrisome of all. These protestors include the "Mothers Alliance for the Oversight of Nuclear Power Plants." These protestors are all examples of rational expression of opinion. By contrast, the anti-Ta Pu protestors are considered "outsider" by the local residents. They have escalated their protests to the point where they are demanding the "dismantling of government." They even forced their way into the Interior Ministry. They even used "civil disobedience" to rationalize their conduct. They have made the public uneasy.
Social protests have returned to the streets of Taiwan. The most intriguing question is: Why? Take the categories of protests listed above. The third category of protestor is motivated by "anti-China" hatred. This is a continuation of traditional Green Camp political protests. The other two categories exhibit greater diversity, both in their concerns and their constituency. They show greater autonomy, but also involve considerable danger. Regardless, together they reflect a failure in the machinery of state. This failure forces people to speak out and vent their anger in the streets.
This failure of the machinery of state refers to more than the executive branch and Ma's leadership. It includes central and local government representative bodies. It includes the opposition parties. All are caught up in negativity, regression, or passivity. Simply put, the government is either less and less able or less and less concerned about solving peoples' problems. This includes cross-ministry and cross-party entities. Long-standing parochialism and selfishness has created problems. This has led to hampered coordination, limited cooperation, and even outright Schadenfreude. This has prevented government and opposition agencies from responding effectively to public expectations. They have tied each other up in knots, making it impossible to get anything done. The ruling party must be alert to this, and the opposition must as well.
The most obvious example is the retention or abolition of nuclear power plants. A public referendum should be a last resort in a democracy. But the opposition DPP has made its calculations, and is dragging its feet. The public is not even getting the chance to vote in a referendum. Take TISA for example. Only the legislature can effectively resolve the issue. But the legislature remains deadlocked. Therefore the ruling and opposition parties should demand a "Ma Su Debate" to ensure that it becomes a reality. In recent years, Taiwan resembles a magician who swallows poison. He uses the most extreme methods in his magic act. Every time his thrilling tricks depletes everyones' energy. In the end, he may even lose his own life.
The administration always waits until after the fact to communicate with the public. The legislature views "harmony" as more important than convening sessions. The Control Yuan feels it "may as well close up shop." The opposition DPP is content to watch as the ruling party embarrasses itself. This leads to political impotence. This leads to street protests. The machinery of state becomes the tail wagging the dog. Those truly lost, are society's silent majority.
社會抗爭何以重新在街頭興起？
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.08.26 02:53 am
延續去年的文林苑反都更行動，今年以來，台灣的街頭抗爭活動有日益加劇的趨勢。從全民不分階層皆關注的反核運動，到凱道廿萬白衫軍的湧現；包括反大埔拆遷、反台南鐵路東移事件，乃至反媒體壟斷聯盟、反服貿行動聯盟的活動，都顯示台灣社會的不滿情緒正在經歷新一波的大爆發。
值得注意的是，其中有些抗爭行動，已超乎傳統政治意識形態之爭，不再像過去一樣能由綠營一手主導、操控或幕後支援。甚至，有些活動非常有意識地與民進黨保持距離，拒絕其參與，以免受到「汙染」。從「去政治化」的角度看，社會抗議活動的「自主化」傾向，確有可喜之處；然而，從若干抗爭行動流於泛道德化且無限上綱，而朝野均無力對應，也讓人看到台灣政治虛無及失能的危機。
仔細觀察，這些街頭示威活動，主題其實各不相同。其中，除了白衫軍的動員是以「萬人送仲丘」的感性訴求為號召外，其他運動幾乎無一例外地標舉「反」的旗號，指名要打倒特定的政策。若進一步細分，大約可歸為幾類：一是從個人權益觀點對抗公權力的行使，如文林苑、大埔和台南鐵路東移抗爭，皆與土地徵收有關；二是關於生命安全和基本人權的議題，如核四存廢之爭和軍中凌虐問題，具有更大的普遍性；三是基於對中國大陸的不安，如反服貿、反媒體壟斷皆均帶有「反中」色彩，成員也有重疊。
在成熟民主國家，代表不同利益或意見的民眾組合發出不同聲音，原本是很正常的事，也毋需過度憂慮。以台灣的情況看，凱道白衫軍示威的人數雖然最多，聲勢最大，但以其活動之理性、節制和聚焦看，其實反而最不值得擔憂。包括「媽媽監督核電廠聯盟」合唱反核，也都屬理性的意見表達。倒是像反大埔事件，除被當地人指為「外來」，更將行動上綱至「拆政府」，乃至實際「攻入」內政部，甚至引「公民不服從運動」合理化自己的行為，則讓其他民眾感到不安。
社會抗議行動重回台灣街頭，更耐人咀嚼的部分，其實是它的成因。從上述幾類示威來看，第三類因「反中」而發的抗爭，比較是延續了綠營傳統的政治抗爭調性；其餘兩類，都顯示台灣社會關注的議題和動員成分更為多元，有更大的自主性，但也有不小的危險。但無論如何，它們所共同反映的，都是國家機器運作的失效，而迫使人民必須在街頭找尋自己發聲或宣洩的管道。
這裡所謂「國家機器」的失效，不單單是指馬政府領導的行政部門，還包括中央與地方的代議機構，更包括在野政黨扮演的政治角色，都陷於一種消極、退化，或旁觀的狀態。簡單地說，政府解決問題的能力退化或對人民變得漠不關心，包括跨部門、跨政黨間因為長期的本位主義和自私心理作祟，而怠於協調、吝於合作，甚至存心想看對手出糗；其結果，不僅朝野各部門均無法對人民的期待作出有效的反應，更將彼此打結卡死，無法運作。這點，不僅執政黨必須深切自覺，反對黨更應高度警惕。
最明顯的例子是，若要決定核四的存廢，「公投」應該是體制內最後的民主手段了，但在反對黨的精算和牽拖下，人民卻連公投的門票都拿不到。以服貿協議為例，唯一有效的管道是立法部門的決議，但此一管道又被協商制度鎖死，因此朝野須另闢「馬蘇大辯論」的蹊徑，以維持演出的進行。這幾年，台灣政治像一個表演吞毒藥的術士，每次都要用最極端的手法、用最驚險的步數來耗光大家的能量；最後，可能把自己的性命也賠了進去。
如果行政部門總是要等到事後才溝通，如果立法部門覺得「和諧」比開會重要，如果監察院覺得自己「關了比較好」，如果在野黨覺得坐視執政黨出糗就可以了；如此，政治力虛無的結果，就是把發言權讓位給街頭抗爭者，使國家機器淪為「尾巴搖狗」。而真正失落的，則是社會中沉默的大多數。
The Difference between Statesmen and Politicians
The Difference between Statesmen and Politicians
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
August 27, 2013
Summary: Nineteenth century American pastor James Freeman Clarke said "A politician thinks of the next election; a statesman of the next generation." DPP Chairman Su Tseng-chang refused to participate in the great debate over TISA. He dodged reporters' questions. Chairman Su is clearly a typical politician.
Full text below:
Nineteenth century American pastor James Freeman Clarke said "A politician thinks of the next election; a statesman of the next generation." DPP Chairman Su Tseng-chang refused to participate in the great debate over TISA. He dodged reporters' questions. Chairman Su is clearly a typical politician.
What constitutes the well-being of the next generation? Does the just signed TISA count? Chairman Su argues that TISA seriously undermines our national security, job security, and social order. He insists this is an agreement harmful to Taiwan, that sells out Taiwan. Clearly it was a major issue, one that affects the dignity, autonomy, and happiness of 23 million citizens of the Republic of China. Much is at stake. The agreement affects not just this generation, but the next generation, perhaps even the generation after that. On this point, Chairman Su agrees. Since he does, why not stand up on stage and accept questions by reporters from the four newspapers and one news service seated below? Yet Chairman Su remains tight-lipped.
According to news reports, Chairman Su was convinced that the media had preconceived positions on the issue, and he was afraid of walking into a trap. Su was probably thinking of media support for TISA. But there are 23 million people on Taiwan. Some support TISA. Some oppose it. And didn't Chairman Su say it was his intent to support the service industry, to help Taiwan? Now a rare opportunity has come along. Reporters from four newspapers and one news service sit in the audience. Here is a perfect opportunity for you to display your eloquence. Here is your chance to expound your "phony TISA, actual sell out of Taiwan" thesis. Here is your chance to demolish these "preconceived positions" in front of everyone. Here is your chance to show these "preconceived positions" for what they are, incapable of withstanding close scrutiny. What reason is there to fear walking into a trap? Unless of course Chairman Su is still under the spell of McCarthyism, seeing Reds under the bed, and impervious to reason. In which case, why fear walking into a trap? He has already painted himself into a corner.
Next, consider the media perspective. Reporters from four newspapers and one news service do not speak with a single voice. They would not simply sit in the audience asking questions. They wanted to participate, to ask questions, because they hoped to hear what different people had to say about TISA, so that the truth could emerge. Chairman Su was fearful. To ensure that the debate took place, the presidential office reluctantly agreed to participate. But lest Chairman Su forget, the next day's news would write about and comment on this major issue, taking up several pages. Yet he pretended not to see, not to hear, and refused to respond. What sort of attitude was this, except laughable self-deception?
Let us back up for a moment. Is the Fourth Estate really so terrifying? Chairman Su, suppose you become the Democratic Progressive Party's candidate for the 2016 presidential election? When you participate in a TV debate, will you be afraid of the media's "preconceived positions?" Will you be afraid of walking into a trap? Will you do as you did during the recent TISA debate? Will you refuse to allow any media organizations other than PTV to participate? Will you forbid all questions from reporters? We certainly hope not.
A presidential term is four years long. How will it impact the public on Taiwan? What about TISA? Once TISA is signed into law, its impact will persist for 8 years, 10 years, perhaps longer. It is of immensely greater importance than a presidential election. Yet Chairman Su refused to reporters' questions. But when the presidential election rolls around, it is suddenly okay for reporters to ask questions again. Chairman Su, why is that? What is your motivation? Personal power and status? Or the well-being of the nation? What do you care about? Do you care about the chaos you incited over national security, job security, and social order? Or do you care only about a four-year term as president?
Another reason why Chairman Su refused to allow reporters to ask questions may have to do with former DPP Chairman Tsai Ing-wen. Three years ago, the ruling and opposition parties organized a "Two Yings Debate" over ECFA. Reporters were forbidden to ask questions then as well. You cited that precedent. Were you afraid of losing twice in one battle?
The Two Yings Debate forbade reporters to ask questions. Frankly, that was a defect in an otherwise important policy debate. If the public and the media could have joined the war of words on stage, the result would have been even more satisfactory.
Furthermore, what former Chairman Tsai lacked back then, Chairman Su could make up for. But you failed to consider this. Instead you were afraid that former Chairman Tsai would not appear before certain "designated media." This time however, it is your turn. Now all you can do is suffer in silence.
What's worse? Losing to President Ma was no problem. He will not be running for president again anyway. But losing to former Chairman Tsai, that would be a catastrophe. During the DPP party chairman election next year, she could be your rival. She could end up as the 2016 presidential candidate for the Democratic Progressive Party. For you it is a tightrope walk, all the way. Put bluntly, the outcome of the "lose-lose battle" is your individual responsibility. It has nothing to do with TISA.
In short, TISA has an impact on future cross-Strait development. Politically, economically, and socially, it is having a critical impact. At this juncture, we hope that opposition party Chairman Su Tseng-chang is not using every trick in the book merely to cling to his personal power, personal status, and personal interests. We hope that he is actually concerned about the well-being of 23 million people.
After all, Taiwan has no shortage of politicians. What it lacks is statesmen.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2013.08.27
社論－政治家與政客的差別
本報訊
19世紀美國一位牧師克拉克（James Freeman Clarke）說過，「政治家與政客的區別在於，政治家著眼於下一代的福祉，而政客，只看下一次的選舉」。在服貿辯論的大舞台上，民進黨主席蘇貞昌拒絕媒體參與、迴避第四權提問，從這件事上看得出來，蘇主席就是一典型政客。
什麼事情是下一代的福祉，已經簽署的《兩岸服務貿易協議》算不算？蘇主席之前認為，服貿協議嚴重影響台灣國安、就業、社會秩序等等，總之，在他看來，這是一個害台、賣台的協議。這麼大的議題，與台灣2300萬人民的這一代、下一代，甚至下下一代的尊嚴、自主與幸福，都至為攸關。這一點，蘇主席應該可以認同。既然認同，為何不能站在台上，坦然接受台下4報1社的提問？蘇主席迄今仍諱莫如深。
根據報載，蘇主席認為，「媒體有預設立場，怕墮入圈套」。所謂「預設立場」，大概指的是支持服貿協議簽署的媒體。試問，台灣2300萬人民，挺服貿者有之，反服貿者亦有之，蘇主席苦口婆心、想方設法，不就是要戳破「挺服貿、助台灣」的假象嗎？如此難得，台下有4報1社的媒體菁英，您不正好一展滔滔雄辯之才，力數「假服貿、真賣台」的理論與例證，一一駁斥這些「預設立場」，讓全民看看，這些預設立場如同摧枯拉朽、不堪一擊，又何懼「圈套」之有？除非，蘇主席提的依舊是「恐共、畏共、懼共」的陳言老套，無法以理服人，果真如此，也不必別人下什麼套，自己就把自己套死了。
其次，站在媒體的立場，4報1社既非只有一種聲音，也不是當天非坐在台下發問不可，之所以願意參與、提問，就是希望能從方方面面的角度來看服貿協議，讓真理愈辯愈明。既然蘇主席有所顧忌，府方為了讓辯論成局，也勉強同意，但蘇主席不要忘了，第二天見刊的報導分析，難道不會寫、不會評論，那可是幾個全版操作的大議題，您就只當沒看到、沒聽到，所以也不用回應了，是這個邏輯嗎？如果是，那是可笑，是自欺欺人。
退一步說，被第四權提問如果這麼可怕，試問蘇主席，假設您代表民進黨參選2016年總統大選，到了電視辯論的時候，就不怕有「預設立場」的媒體設下圈套？是不是也要比照這次服貿辯論，除了公視以外，不准其他媒體參與，禁止所有媒體發問呢？應該不至於吧。
總統一任，對台灣老百姓的影響也就是4年，服貿協議呢？一旦簽署生效，影響的是8年、10年，甚至更久，一個比選總統還大的事，蘇主席居然拒絕媒體提問，到了總統大選，媒體又突然可以發問了，請問蘇主席，您為的是什麼？是個人權位，還是國家福祉？您關心的是什麼？是您念茲在茲因服貿協議簽署所扯出來的國安、就業、社會秩序等種種亂象，還是4年一任的總統大位？
另一個蘇主席不准媒體提問的理由，可能與民進黨前主席蔡英文有關。朝野兩黨3年多前就ECFA議題舉辦「雙英論戰」，當時沒有媒體發問，您要求援例辦理；還有，不知道您是否怕「一戰雙輸」？
雙英論戰沒有媒體發問，坦白講，是美中不足之處，一個重大政策的論證，除了台上兩人唇槍舌戰之外，如果還有代表輿論的媒體加入，豈不更為周延。
更進一步說，蔡前主席當年沒做到的，恰是蘇主席可以補強的，可您慮不及此，反倒怕當年對蔡前主席下套不成的「特定媒體」，這次對您下套了，那您豈不成了吃了黃蓮的啞巴。
尤有甚者，輸給馬總統也就算了，反正他也不會再出來選總統了，輸給蔡前主席，可就不划算了，因為明年民進黨黨主席競選，她可是個勁敵，更何況，2016年誰代表民進黨參選總統，對您更是步步為營輸不得。所謂「一戰雙輸」，說穿了，還是以個人勝負為己任、置服貿危安於度外。
總之，服貿協議對兩岸未來的發展，從政治面、經濟面，到社會面、文化面，在在發揮其關鍵性的影響，值此關鍵時刻，我們衷心期待在野的蘇貞昌主席不是想盡辦法、用盡手?q，只為了保有一己的權力、地位或利益站在台上，而是真正為2300萬老百姓謀福祉、興大利去辯、去爭。
畢竟，台灣不缺少政客，缺的是政治家！
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
August 27, 2013
Summary: Nineteenth century American pastor James Freeman Clarke said "A politician thinks of the next election; a statesman of the next generation." DPP Chairman Su Tseng-chang refused to participate in the great debate over TISA. He dodged reporters' questions. Chairman Su is clearly a typical politician.
Full text below:
Nineteenth century American pastor James Freeman Clarke said "A politician thinks of the next election; a statesman of the next generation." DPP Chairman Su Tseng-chang refused to participate in the great debate over TISA. He dodged reporters' questions. Chairman Su is clearly a typical politician.
What constitutes the well-being of the next generation? Does the just signed TISA count? Chairman Su argues that TISA seriously undermines our national security, job security, and social order. He insists this is an agreement harmful to Taiwan, that sells out Taiwan. Clearly it was a major issue, one that affects the dignity, autonomy, and happiness of 23 million citizens of the Republic of China. Much is at stake. The agreement affects not just this generation, but the next generation, perhaps even the generation after that. On this point, Chairman Su agrees. Since he does, why not stand up on stage and accept questions by reporters from the four newspapers and one news service seated below? Yet Chairman Su remains tight-lipped.
According to news reports, Chairman Su was convinced that the media had preconceived positions on the issue, and he was afraid of walking into a trap. Su was probably thinking of media support for TISA. But there are 23 million people on Taiwan. Some support TISA. Some oppose it. And didn't Chairman Su say it was his intent to support the service industry, to help Taiwan? Now a rare opportunity has come along. Reporters from four newspapers and one news service sit in the audience. Here is a perfect opportunity for you to display your eloquence. Here is your chance to expound your "phony TISA, actual sell out of Taiwan" thesis. Here is your chance to demolish these "preconceived positions" in front of everyone. Here is your chance to show these "preconceived positions" for what they are, incapable of withstanding close scrutiny. What reason is there to fear walking into a trap? Unless of course Chairman Su is still under the spell of McCarthyism, seeing Reds under the bed, and impervious to reason. In which case, why fear walking into a trap? He has already painted himself into a corner.
Next, consider the media perspective. Reporters from four newspapers and one news service do not speak with a single voice. They would not simply sit in the audience asking questions. They wanted to participate, to ask questions, because they hoped to hear what different people had to say about TISA, so that the truth could emerge. Chairman Su was fearful. To ensure that the debate took place, the presidential office reluctantly agreed to participate. But lest Chairman Su forget, the next day's news would write about and comment on this major issue, taking up several pages. Yet he pretended not to see, not to hear, and refused to respond. What sort of attitude was this, except laughable self-deception?
Let us back up for a moment. Is the Fourth Estate really so terrifying? Chairman Su, suppose you become the Democratic Progressive Party's candidate for the 2016 presidential election? When you participate in a TV debate, will you be afraid of the media's "preconceived positions?" Will you be afraid of walking into a trap? Will you do as you did during the recent TISA debate? Will you refuse to allow any media organizations other than PTV to participate? Will you forbid all questions from reporters? We certainly hope not.
A presidential term is four years long. How will it impact the public on Taiwan? What about TISA? Once TISA is signed into law, its impact will persist for 8 years, 10 years, perhaps longer. It is of immensely greater importance than a presidential election. Yet Chairman Su refused to reporters' questions. But when the presidential election rolls around, it is suddenly okay for reporters to ask questions again. Chairman Su, why is that? What is your motivation? Personal power and status? Or the well-being of the nation? What do you care about? Do you care about the chaos you incited over national security, job security, and social order? Or do you care only about a four-year term as president?
Another reason why Chairman Su refused to allow reporters to ask questions may have to do with former DPP Chairman Tsai Ing-wen. Three years ago, the ruling and opposition parties organized a "Two Yings Debate" over ECFA. Reporters were forbidden to ask questions then as well. You cited that precedent. Were you afraid of losing twice in one battle?
The Two Yings Debate forbade reporters to ask questions. Frankly, that was a defect in an otherwise important policy debate. If the public and the media could have joined the war of words on stage, the result would have been even more satisfactory.
Furthermore, what former Chairman Tsai lacked back then, Chairman Su could make up for. But you failed to consider this. Instead you were afraid that former Chairman Tsai would not appear before certain "designated media." This time however, it is your turn. Now all you can do is suffer in silence.
What's worse? Losing to President Ma was no problem. He will not be running for president again anyway. But losing to former Chairman Tsai, that would be a catastrophe. During the DPP party chairman election next year, she could be your rival. She could end up as the 2016 presidential candidate for the Democratic Progressive Party. For you it is a tightrope walk, all the way. Put bluntly, the outcome of the "lose-lose battle" is your individual responsibility. It has nothing to do with TISA.
In short, TISA has an impact on future cross-Strait development. Politically, economically, and socially, it is having a critical impact. At this juncture, we hope that opposition party Chairman Su Tseng-chang is not using every trick in the book merely to cling to his personal power, personal status, and personal interests. We hope that he is actually concerned about the well-being of 23 million people.
After all, Taiwan has no shortage of politicians. What it lacks is statesmen.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2013.08.27
社論－政治家與政客的差別
本報訊
19世紀美國一位牧師克拉克（James Freeman Clarke）說過，「政治家與政客的區別在於，政治家著眼於下一代的福祉，而政客，只看下一次的選舉」。在服貿辯論的大舞台上，民進黨主席蘇貞昌拒絕媒體參與、迴避第四權提問，從這件事上看得出來，蘇主席就是一典型政客。
什麼事情是下一代的福祉，已經簽署的《兩岸服務貿易協議》算不算？蘇主席之前認為，服貿協議嚴重影響台灣國安、就業、社會秩序等等，總之，在他看來，這是一個害台、賣台的協議。這麼大的議題，與台灣2300萬人民的這一代、下一代，甚至下下一代的尊嚴、自主與幸福，都至為攸關。這一點，蘇主席應該可以認同。既然認同，為何不能站在台上，坦然接受台下4報1社的提問？蘇主席迄今仍諱莫如深。
根據報載，蘇主席認為，「媒體有預設立場，怕墮入圈套」。所謂「預設立場」，大概指的是支持服貿協議簽署的媒體。試問，台灣2300萬人民，挺服貿者有之，反服貿者亦有之，蘇主席苦口婆心、想方設法，不就是要戳破「挺服貿、助台灣」的假象嗎？如此難得，台下有4報1社的媒體菁英，您不正好一展滔滔雄辯之才，力數「假服貿、真賣台」的理論與例證，一一駁斥這些「預設立場」，讓全民看看，這些預設立場如同摧枯拉朽、不堪一擊，又何懼「圈套」之有？除非，蘇主席提的依舊是「恐共、畏共、懼共」的陳言老套，無法以理服人，果真如此，也不必別人下什麼套，自己就把自己套死了。
其次，站在媒體的立場，4報1社既非只有一種聲音，也不是當天非坐在台下發問不可，之所以願意參與、提問，就是希望能從方方面面的角度來看服貿協議，讓真理愈辯愈明。既然蘇主席有所顧忌，府方為了讓辯論成局，也勉強同意，但蘇主席不要忘了，第二天見刊的報導分析，難道不會寫、不會評論，那可是幾個全版操作的大議題，您就只當沒看到、沒聽到，所以也不用回應了，是這個邏輯嗎？如果是，那是可笑，是自欺欺人。
退一步說，被第四權提問如果這麼可怕，試問蘇主席，假設您代表民進黨參選2016年總統大選，到了電視辯論的時候，就不怕有「預設立場」的媒體設下圈套？是不是也要比照這次服貿辯論，除了公視以外，不准其他媒體參與，禁止所有媒體發問呢？應該不至於吧。
總統一任，對台灣老百姓的影響也就是4年，服貿協議呢？一旦簽署生效，影響的是8年、10年，甚至更久，一個比選總統還大的事，蘇主席居然拒絕媒體提問，到了總統大選，媒體又突然可以發問了，請問蘇主席，您為的是什麼？是個人權位，還是國家福祉？您關心的是什麼？是您念茲在茲因服貿協議簽署所扯出來的國安、就業、社會秩序等種種亂象，還是4年一任的總統大位？
另一個蘇主席不准媒體提問的理由，可能與民進黨前主席蔡英文有關。朝野兩黨3年多前就ECFA議題舉辦「雙英論戰」，當時沒有媒體發問，您要求援例辦理；還有，不知道您是否怕「一戰雙輸」？
雙英論戰沒有媒體發問，坦白講，是美中不足之處，一個重大政策的論證，除了台上兩人唇槍舌戰之外，如果還有代表輿論的媒體加入，豈不更為周延。
更進一步說，蔡前主席當年沒做到的，恰是蘇主席可以補強的，可您慮不及此，反倒怕當年對蔡前主席下套不成的「特定媒體」，這次對您下套了，那您豈不成了吃了黃蓮的啞巴。
尤有甚者，輸給馬總統也就算了，反正他也不會再出來選總統了，輸給蔡前主席，可就不划算了，因為明年民進黨黨主席競選，她可是個勁敵，更何況，2016年誰代表民進黨參選總統，對您更是步步為營輸不得。所謂「一戰雙輸」，說穿了，還是以個人勝負為己任、置服貿危安於度外。
總之，服貿協議對兩岸未來的發展，從政治面、經濟面，到社會面、文化面，在在發揮其關鍵性的影響，值此關鍵時刻，我們衷心期待在野的蘇貞昌主席不是想盡辦法、用盡手?q，只為了保有一己的權力、地位或利益站在台上，而是真正為2300萬老百姓謀福祉、興大利去辯、去爭。
畢竟，台灣不缺少政客，缺的是政治家！
Monday, August 26, 2013
Taipei-Washington Arms Sales: Disarmament Will Not Win Over the Public on Taiwan
Taipei-Washington Arms Sales: Disarmament Will Not Win Over the Public on Taiwan
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
August 24, 2013
Summary: Beijing is promoting the "China Dream" and "the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation." Cross-Strait relations are gradually entering deep water. The ultimate solution for cross-Strait relations cannot be to force Taipei to disarm. One can force people to relinquish their guns, but not their hearts. Do so, and the Taiwan Strait tragedy will make "China Dream" and "the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation" impossible. Therefore instead of urging Washington to halt arms sales to Taipei, why not win people over by means of democracy and civilization?
Full text below:
When Mainland Chinese Defence Minister Chang Wanquan visited the US, he made a proposal to U.S. Defense Secretary Charles Hagel. If Washington would halt arms sales to Taipei, Beijing would consider changing its military deployment. Chang Wanquan proposed also setting up a "special task force" to facilitate communications and resolve obstacles.
According to Beijing, Hagel said the establishment of a working group was a good idea. But Pentagon officials deny that he made any such statement.
So-called "changing its military deployment" refers mainly to missiles pointed at Taiwan. In fact "withdrawing missiles in exchange for halting arms sales" is not a new idea. Jiang Zemin made just such a proposal to President Bush, but Bush did not respond. In June this year, Xi Jinping mentioned this to Obama, but Obama also failed to respond. This however, was the first time Beijing ever proposed setting up a "special task force" to address the matter of arms sales. That caught everyones' attention.
Let us summarize the situation. One. Chang Wanquan confirmed that the Mainland has in fact deployed missiles against Taiwan. At times Beijing has claimed its missiles were not aimed at Taiwan, that they were purely defensive deployments. Other times Beijing has claimed that they were not directed at the public on Taiwan, but at Taiwan independence. Two. Chang Wanquan said Beijing is willing to change its military deployment provided it receives concessions from Washington. This contradicts what Beijing said about military sovereignty and independence in the past. Three. Talk of establishing a "special task force" with Washington could be interpreted as Beijing acquiescing to Washington's intervention in the cross-Strait military situation.
Therefore, if Washington and Beijing actually establish a "special task force," Beijing could use it to pressure Washington into halting arms sales to Taipei. But Washington could use it to demand "co-management" of the cross-Strait military situation. Therefore, if the two sides actually do establish a "special task force," it could be more than merely a "Yes you will halt arms sales" vs. "No I won't" debating forum. It could become a platform for bilateral discussions on the big picture. When that happens, the direction the "Task Force" takes may be difficult to predict. Washington says it is unaware of the "special task force" proposal. Its behavior suggests that any such "special task force" would not be able to discuss sovereignty issues.
Actually, Beijing's perception of Washington's arms sales to Taipei as a major issue is misguided, at least from the perspective of cross-Strait relations. One. The Taipei Washinton arms sales relationship is non-aggressive. If one advocates the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations and the absence of conflict, it does not even having any defensive role. Taipei Washington arms sales are mainly political symbolism. They show that cross-Strait issues involve issues of human civilization and world peace. They necessarily involve the United States and the rest of the world. Two. Beijing continues to demand that Washington halt arms sales to Taipei. It is now is proposing a "special task force." This shows that Beijing understands the value of linking cross-Strait relations to international values as well as to American values and interests. Such links are rooted in democracy and civilization. They cannot be readily divorced from each other.
The way out for Taipei and Beijing is not military conflict. The obstacle in the way of reconciliation between Taipei and Beijing is not Washington's arms sales to Taipei. Taipei and Beijing must work together towards the universal values of democracy and civilization. They must establish good relations that are in the interest of both sides. If they can do this, one day even symbolic arms sales can be discontinued.
The 1981 "Yeh Nine Articles" and the 1983 "Deng Six Points" stated that even after reunification "Taiwan can still have its own military." Deng added a condition, "As long as it does not constitute a threat to the Mainland." As we can see, thirty years ago, Beijing already knew what a military meant for Taipei. It involves both Taipei's self-confidence and cross-Strait trust. But if Taipei can still have its own military after reunification, why can't it purchase arms before reunification? How can that build Taipei's self-confidence and cross-Strait trust? Washington is selling arms to Taipei in today's cross-Strait atmosphere. Under the current diplomatic truce Taipei has retained 23 allies. For the two sides, this has become an important symbol of good will. Beijing has yet to offer a better cross-Strait policy framework. Until it does, it is unnecessary to change this beneficial status quo.
The key to cross-Strait issues is surely not arms sales. Even many on Taiwan oppose arms purchases and advocate replacing the military with an SDF. We must find a peaceful solution that does not require resort to war. That solution must be consistent with the universal values of democracy and civilization. That is not something that military deployment can fulfill. Nor is it something that Washington's arms sales to Taipei can fulfill. Therefore changing military deployment in order to halt arms sales to Taipei is irrelevant. It is the wrong prescription for the ailment.
Beijing is promoting the "China Dream" and "the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation." Cross-Strait relations are gradually entering deep water. The ultimate solution for cross-Strait relations cannot be to force Taipei to disarm. One can force people to relinquish their guns, but not their hearts. Do so, and the Taiwan Strait tragedy will make "China Dream" and "the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation" impossible. Therefore instead of urging Washington to halt arms sales to Taipei, why not win people over by means of democracy and civilization?
台美軍售問題：繳械不能說服台灣人心
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.08.24 02:57 am
中國大陸國防部長常萬全訪美，向美國國防部長海格提議稱，美國倘停止對台軍售，北京可以考慮調整軍事部署。常萬全同時建議，雙方成立「專責工作小組」進行溝通，以化解障礙。
據中方轉述海格的回應說，「成立工作小組是好建議」；但美國五角大廈官員否認此說。
所謂「調整軍事部署」，主要是指撤廢指向台灣的飛彈部署而言。其實，「撤彈換停止軍售」不是一個新主意，江澤民曾當面對小布希提出此議，但布希未作回應；今年六月，習近平又當面向歐巴馬提出，歐巴馬亦無回應。不過，這是北京首次提出雙方就軍售問題成立「專責工作小組」，引起各方注意。
此一情勢可作的初步解讀是：一、常萬全的說法再度證實，大陸的相關（主要是飛彈）軍事部署確有針對台灣者。過去北京的解釋，有時稱不是針對台灣，而是全方位的國防部署；有時則稱不是針對台灣人民，而是針對台獨。二、常萬全的說法亦指出，北京願以調整軍事部署作為與美國之交換條件；此說已與北京過去所稱主權及軍事獨立自主之說出現矛盾。三、美中成立「專責工作小組」之說，在實質上也可能被視為北京承認美國有資格介入兩岸軍事情勢的表態。
因此，美中雙方若真的成立相關「專責工作小組」，在北京言，或許欲藉為促成美國停止對台軍售的壓力機制，但美國亦可能藉為美中「共同管理」兩岸軍事情勢的平台。所以，倘若雙方真的成立「專責工作小組」，恐怕不能以為只是互嗆「你停軍售」「我不停」的口角場域，反而也可能成為雙方議論兩岸整體情勢的角力平台。屆時，「專責工作小組」的運作方向將循著誰的想像進行，恐怕難說。何況，美國方面既否認知悉「專責工作小組」的提議，反而表示其主權行為不能落為談判題目。
其實，北京將美國停止軍售視為重大課題，就兩岸關係言，似乎選錯了題目。一、台美軍售關係，不具攻擊性；至若兩岸既然皆主張和平發展，不生戰爭，甚至也就無防禦性可言。既如此，台美軍售其實主要是一種政治象徵，顯示兩岸問題畢竟是一個牽涉人類文明與世界和平的問題，不能想像與美國或世界無關，如此而已。二、北京不斷與美國爭議停止對台軍售，如今又提議共設「專責工作小組」，在在顯示北京亦知兩岸關係確與國際的價值與利益連結，也與美國的價值與利益連結，而此種連結深植於民主及文明之中，不易勉強使之剝離。
因此可知，兩岸的出路，不在軍事解決；兩岸的障礙，亦不在美國對台軍售。兩岸若能共同努力在民主及文明的普世價值與利益下營造兩岸良好關係，軍售即可能終究有一天連象徵意義也不必強留了。
早在一九八一年的《葉九條》與一九八三年的《鄧六點》，皆稱統一後「台灣可以有自己的軍隊」（鄧小平加了一句，「只是不能構成對大陸的威脅」）；可見，三十年前北京即知「軍隊」對台灣的意義，這牽涉到台灣的自信與兩岸的互信。但倘若「統一後」台灣可有軍隊，卻在「統一前」甚至不容對台軍售；則台灣的自信與兩岸的互信如何建立？其實，美國對台軍售在今日兩岸氛圍中，猶如台灣在外交休兵保住了二十三個邦交國，皆已成為兩岸善意與同理心的重要象徵，北京在未能提出更能表達善意及同理心的兩岸政策架構之前，其實不必改變此一有益亦有效的現狀。
因為，兩岸問題演化至今關鍵確實不在區區軍售，甚至在台灣也有反對軍購及主張將軍隊改為自衛隊者；而在於必須找到一個絕對不是訴諸戰爭的和平解決方案，且這個方案必須滿足民主與文明的普世價值與利益，那也就不可能靠「軍事部署」達成，亦不可能靠「美台軍售」達成。那麼，以「調整軍事部署交換停止美對台軍售」的提議，會不會顯得文不對題或藥不對症？
北京正在倡議「中國夢」及「中華民族的偉大復興」，而兩岸關係也逐漸進入深水區；兩岸關係的終極解決，不可能靠強逼台灣「繳械」而達成，因為槍砲可強繳，但人心不能強求。否則，台海若生悲劇，那將使「中國夢」與「中華民族的偉大復興」也變質變調。所以，與其催迫美國停止對台軍售，何如以民主及文明說服人心？
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
August 24, 2013
Summary: Beijing is promoting the "China Dream" and "the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation." Cross-Strait relations are gradually entering deep water. The ultimate solution for cross-Strait relations cannot be to force Taipei to disarm. One can force people to relinquish their guns, but not their hearts. Do so, and the Taiwan Strait tragedy will make "China Dream" and "the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation" impossible. Therefore instead of urging Washington to halt arms sales to Taipei, why not win people over by means of democracy and civilization?
Full text below:
When Mainland Chinese Defence Minister Chang Wanquan visited the US, he made a proposal to U.S. Defense Secretary Charles Hagel. If Washington would halt arms sales to Taipei, Beijing would consider changing its military deployment. Chang Wanquan proposed also setting up a "special task force" to facilitate communications and resolve obstacles.
According to Beijing, Hagel said the establishment of a working group was a good idea. But Pentagon officials deny that he made any such statement.
So-called "changing its military deployment" refers mainly to missiles pointed at Taiwan. In fact "withdrawing missiles in exchange for halting arms sales" is not a new idea. Jiang Zemin made just such a proposal to President Bush, but Bush did not respond. In June this year, Xi Jinping mentioned this to Obama, but Obama also failed to respond. This however, was the first time Beijing ever proposed setting up a "special task force" to address the matter of arms sales. That caught everyones' attention.
Let us summarize the situation. One. Chang Wanquan confirmed that the Mainland has in fact deployed missiles against Taiwan. At times Beijing has claimed its missiles were not aimed at Taiwan, that they were purely defensive deployments. Other times Beijing has claimed that they were not directed at the public on Taiwan, but at Taiwan independence. Two. Chang Wanquan said Beijing is willing to change its military deployment provided it receives concessions from Washington. This contradicts what Beijing said about military sovereignty and independence in the past. Three. Talk of establishing a "special task force" with Washington could be interpreted as Beijing acquiescing to Washington's intervention in the cross-Strait military situation.
Therefore, if Washington and Beijing actually establish a "special task force," Beijing could use it to pressure Washington into halting arms sales to Taipei. But Washington could use it to demand "co-management" of the cross-Strait military situation. Therefore, if the two sides actually do establish a "special task force," it could be more than merely a "Yes you will halt arms sales" vs. "No I won't" debating forum. It could become a platform for bilateral discussions on the big picture. When that happens, the direction the "Task Force" takes may be difficult to predict. Washington says it is unaware of the "special task force" proposal. Its behavior suggests that any such "special task force" would not be able to discuss sovereignty issues.
Actually, Beijing's perception of Washington's arms sales to Taipei as a major issue is misguided, at least from the perspective of cross-Strait relations. One. The Taipei Washinton arms sales relationship is non-aggressive. If one advocates the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations and the absence of conflict, it does not even having any defensive role. Taipei Washington arms sales are mainly political symbolism. They show that cross-Strait issues involve issues of human civilization and world peace. They necessarily involve the United States and the rest of the world. Two. Beijing continues to demand that Washington halt arms sales to Taipei. It is now is proposing a "special task force." This shows that Beijing understands the value of linking cross-Strait relations to international values as well as to American values and interests. Such links are rooted in democracy and civilization. They cannot be readily divorced from each other.
The way out for Taipei and Beijing is not military conflict. The obstacle in the way of reconciliation between Taipei and Beijing is not Washington's arms sales to Taipei. Taipei and Beijing must work together towards the universal values of democracy and civilization. They must establish good relations that are in the interest of both sides. If they can do this, one day even symbolic arms sales can be discontinued.
The 1981 "Yeh Nine Articles" and the 1983 "Deng Six Points" stated that even after reunification "Taiwan can still have its own military." Deng added a condition, "As long as it does not constitute a threat to the Mainland." As we can see, thirty years ago, Beijing already knew what a military meant for Taipei. It involves both Taipei's self-confidence and cross-Strait trust. But if Taipei can still have its own military after reunification, why can't it purchase arms before reunification? How can that build Taipei's self-confidence and cross-Strait trust? Washington is selling arms to Taipei in today's cross-Strait atmosphere. Under the current diplomatic truce Taipei has retained 23 allies. For the two sides, this has become an important symbol of good will. Beijing has yet to offer a better cross-Strait policy framework. Until it does, it is unnecessary to change this beneficial status quo.
The key to cross-Strait issues is surely not arms sales. Even many on Taiwan oppose arms purchases and advocate replacing the military with an SDF. We must find a peaceful solution that does not require resort to war. That solution must be consistent with the universal values of democracy and civilization. That is not something that military deployment can fulfill. Nor is it something that Washington's arms sales to Taipei can fulfill. Therefore changing military deployment in order to halt arms sales to Taipei is irrelevant. It is the wrong prescription for the ailment.
Beijing is promoting the "China Dream" and "the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation." Cross-Strait relations are gradually entering deep water. The ultimate solution for cross-Strait relations cannot be to force Taipei to disarm. One can force people to relinquish their guns, but not their hearts. Do so, and the Taiwan Strait tragedy will make "China Dream" and "the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation" impossible. Therefore instead of urging Washington to halt arms sales to Taipei, why not win people over by means of democracy and civilization?
台美軍售問題：繳械不能說服台灣人心
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.08.24 02:57 am
中國大陸國防部長常萬全訪美，向美國國防部長海格提議稱，美國倘停止對台軍售，北京可以考慮調整軍事部署。常萬全同時建議，雙方成立「專責工作小組」進行溝通，以化解障礙。
據中方轉述海格的回應說，「成立工作小組是好建議」；但美國五角大廈官員否認此說。
所謂「調整軍事部署」，主要是指撤廢指向台灣的飛彈部署而言。其實，「撤彈換停止軍售」不是一個新主意，江澤民曾當面對小布希提出此議，但布希未作回應；今年六月，習近平又當面向歐巴馬提出，歐巴馬亦無回應。不過，這是北京首次提出雙方就軍售問題成立「專責工作小組」，引起各方注意。
此一情勢可作的初步解讀是：一、常萬全的說法再度證實，大陸的相關（主要是飛彈）軍事部署確有針對台灣者。過去北京的解釋，有時稱不是針對台灣，而是全方位的國防部署；有時則稱不是針對台灣人民，而是針對台獨。二、常萬全的說法亦指出，北京願以調整軍事部署作為與美國之交換條件；此說已與北京過去所稱主權及軍事獨立自主之說出現矛盾。三、美中成立「專責工作小組」之說，在實質上也可能被視為北京承認美國有資格介入兩岸軍事情勢的表態。
因此，美中雙方若真的成立相關「專責工作小組」，在北京言，或許欲藉為促成美國停止對台軍售的壓力機制，但美國亦可能藉為美中「共同管理」兩岸軍事情勢的平台。所以，倘若雙方真的成立「專責工作小組」，恐怕不能以為只是互嗆「你停軍售」「我不停」的口角場域，反而也可能成為雙方議論兩岸整體情勢的角力平台。屆時，「專責工作小組」的運作方向將循著誰的想像進行，恐怕難說。何況，美國方面既否認知悉「專責工作小組」的提議，反而表示其主權行為不能落為談判題目。
其實，北京將美國停止軍售視為重大課題，就兩岸關係言，似乎選錯了題目。一、台美軍售關係，不具攻擊性；至若兩岸既然皆主張和平發展，不生戰爭，甚至也就無防禦性可言。既如此，台美軍售其實主要是一種政治象徵，顯示兩岸問題畢竟是一個牽涉人類文明與世界和平的問題，不能想像與美國或世界無關，如此而已。二、北京不斷與美國爭議停止對台軍售，如今又提議共設「專責工作小組」，在在顯示北京亦知兩岸關係確與國際的價值與利益連結，也與美國的價值與利益連結，而此種連結深植於民主及文明之中，不易勉強使之剝離。
因此可知，兩岸的出路，不在軍事解決；兩岸的障礙，亦不在美國對台軍售。兩岸若能共同努力在民主及文明的普世價值與利益下營造兩岸良好關係，軍售即可能終究有一天連象徵意義也不必強留了。
早在一九八一年的《葉九條》與一九八三年的《鄧六點》，皆稱統一後「台灣可以有自己的軍隊」（鄧小平加了一句，「只是不能構成對大陸的威脅」）；可見，三十年前北京即知「軍隊」對台灣的意義，這牽涉到台灣的自信與兩岸的互信。但倘若「統一後」台灣可有軍隊，卻在「統一前」甚至不容對台軍售；則台灣的自信與兩岸的互信如何建立？其實，美國對台軍售在今日兩岸氛圍中，猶如台灣在外交休兵保住了二十三個邦交國，皆已成為兩岸善意與同理心的重要象徵，北京在未能提出更能表達善意及同理心的兩岸政策架構之前，其實不必改變此一有益亦有效的現狀。
因為，兩岸問題演化至今關鍵確實不在區區軍售，甚至在台灣也有反對軍購及主張將軍隊改為自衛隊者；而在於必須找到一個絕對不是訴諸戰爭的和平解決方案，且這個方案必須滿足民主與文明的普世價值與利益，那也就不可能靠「軍事部署」達成，亦不可能靠「美台軍售」達成。那麼，以「調整軍事部署交換停止美對台軍售」的提議，會不會顯得文不對題或藥不對症？
北京正在倡議「中國夢」及「中華民族的偉大復興」，而兩岸關係也逐漸進入深水區；兩岸關係的終極解決，不可能靠強逼台灣「繳械」而達成，因為槍砲可強繳，但人心不能強求。否則，台海若生悲劇，那將使「中國夢」與「中華民族的偉大復興」也變質變調。所以，與其催迫美國停止對台軍售，何如以民主及文明說服人心？
Friday, August 23, 2013
Improved Domestic Policy Must Follow Improved Diplomatic Relations
Improved Domestic Policy Must Follow Improved Diplomatic Relations
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
August 23, 2013
Summary: President Ma's "He Yi Project" state visits may not have won him much public support. But Ma seems pleased with the results. These diplomatic missions may have helped President Ma regain some of his former confidence. But they are unlikely to diminish public dissatisfaction over his mishandling of domestic affairs. The President should take heart and redouble his efforts on the domestic front. He should now ensure that the public feels the same improvement in domestic affairs.
Full text below:
President Ma's "He Yi Project" state visits may not have won him much public support. But Ma seems pleased with the results. For example, he said Taipei-Washington consultations on economic and security matters are "even better than before the severing of diplomatic relations." These diplomatic missions may have helped President Ma regain some of his former confidence. But they are unlikely to diminish public dissatisfaction over his mishandling of domestic affairs. Diplomatic relations have been normalized and improved. The President should take heart and redouble his efforts on the domestic front. He should now ensure that the public feels the same improvement in domestic affairs.
Before his visit, President Ma's approval ratings hit rock bottom. He was unable to implement policy. He was heckled wherever he went. The Hung Chung-chiu case led to the resignation of two defense ministers in one week. It is no exaggeration to say that for President Ma each day went by like a year. It was under these conditions that he chose to lead a delegation on overseas visits. He chose to try his hand at diplomacy instead of domestic policy. From a political perspective, it was indeed necessary.
President Ma noted several achievements of his visits. It was the first time an ROC president visited Haiti. Ma attended the inauguration of Paraguay's new president Horacio Cartes. He visited the three Caribbean "Saint" nations: St. Lucia, St. Vincent, and St. Kitts and Nevis. Now that Ma has completed these visits, all that remains is to visit our African allies Sao Tome and Principe. This will round out his tour of all 23 allied nations.
Consider what he accomplished during his visits. While transiting New York he visited the CCBA, the New York University School of Law, and the 9/11 Memorial. Previous transits through the United States were deliberately low-keyed. In that respect, this was indeed something of a breakthrough. Breakfast with New York Mayor Michael Bloomberg also carried symbolic meaning. Ma visited Haiti, Paraguay, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Saint Kitts and five other countries. Overseas Chinese gave him a warm welcome. Heads of State offered him every hospitality. Compared to being heckled everywhere back home, he must have felt extremely grateful.
But a head of state's accomplishments cannot be based entirely on diplomacy. If he or she is strong on diplomacy and weak on domestic policy, that means an imbalance. In fact, if one looks closely, Washington did not allow President Ma to do whatever he wanted on the streets of America. He was not allowed to attend public meetings with American officials, or to call upon them. He was not allowed to hold interviews with accompanying reporters. He did not make citizens of the ROC particularly proud or happy. Enthusiastic interaction with friendly nations, the issuance of joint communiques, and the signing of treaties departed little from diplomatic protocol. These allies are located far from the ROC. Their reception may have been enthusiastic. Their treatment may have been respectful. But to the public they remain rainbows in the sky.
Firming up bilateral friendships is the least a head of state can do for his country. The reception President Ma received during his visits was an improvement. But what did it do for the country, really? Such visits cannot be for the benefit of the president alone, so he can bask in glory. They must yield concrete results. In this sense, the public experienced little benefit. President Ma became concerned about the approaching typhoon and returned to Taiwan early. That too was necessary. He had no choice but to personally defuse those bombs that might blow up in his face.
For starters, regarding matters of state, President Ma has often criticized the opposition DPP for a lack of good faith, for sidelining the constitutional framework, and for undermining the legitimacy the National Affairs Conference. This suggests that Ma has the desire to convene a National Affairs Conference. But domestic issues have clearly degenerated to where every issue leads to deadlock. President Ma is impotent in the face of vicious ruling vs. opposition party power struggles. He does not even bother to seek public support. His response to the prospect of a National Affairs Conference remains lukewarm. How should the people feel when they witness this?
Now take Control Yuan President Wang Chien-hsuan's civil war with 19 Control Yuan Members. This involves the Five Powers Constitution and the right to retain or abolish the Control Yuan. The opposition DPP already advocates abolishing the Control Yuan. Such political storms cannot be dismissed as "tempests in a teapot." The president has argued that "The Control Yuan must exercise its powers independently." He has said he cannot interfere in its internal workings. But the Control Yuan president and the Control Yuan members are presidential nominees and appointees. Wang Chien-hsuan has already said half the Control Yuan members are beneficiaries of political rewards. Yet President Ma's only response was a phone call from abroad. His reaction left an impression of excessive timidity.
The Tai Po protests have also gotten out of control. The crowd actually made its way into the Ministry of the Interior and rioted all night. The hidden problems cannot be evaded. They include Wen Lin-yuan, opposition to the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant, and the Hung Chung-chiu case. Recent social protests have led to both quantitative and qualitative changes. They have led to public allegations that "The people do not trust the government!" and even to bold calls to "Dismantle the government!" Faced with the situation, does President Ma have the wisdom and courage to resolve intensifying social protest?
President Ma sought relief in diplomacy. But the only one who experienced relief was him. As head of state, Ma must be able to bring relief to the people. He must have the ability to dissolve people's suppressed anger. President Ma must act now. He must proceed full speed.
外交取暖後，內政更應帶給人民溫暖
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.08.23 02:52 am
馬總統「賀誼專案」出訪，不論輿論評價如何，他似自覺成果良好；例如提及台美間的經濟與安全協商，即稱「比斷交前還好」。透過外交出訪，馬總統似乎找回了自信；但要說這能化解國人對內政顛躓的忿懣，則恐怕未必。如今外交取暖既歸，總統更應敞開心胸奮發作為，讓人民也能在內政上感受到溫暖。
出訪前，馬總統民調低迷、政策推不動、走到哪都被嗆，更因洪仲丘案短短一周折損兩名國防部長；要形容馬總統當時「度日如年」，恐不為過。在這種情況下，他決定依計畫率團出訪，「換手氣兼拚外交」，從政治角度看確有必要。
這次出訪，馬總統自得之重點包括：首度成為到訪海地的中華民國總統、慶賀巴拉圭新任總統卡提斯就職，以及造訪加勒比海「三聖」國。走完此程，便僅剩非洲友邦聖多美普林西比一國，即可完成廿三邦交國「走透透」的拼圖。
檢視此次出訪成績，紐約過境之旅「漫步」在中華公所、紐約大學法學院、九一一紀念館等處，對照前幾次過境美國的刻意低調，確有突破；與紐約市長彭博之早餐會，也有其象徵意義。至於造訪海地、巴拉圭及聖露西亞、聖文森、聖克里斯多福等五國，受到僑胞、民眾的熱情歡迎，與各國元首的真誠接待，比起他在國內出巡「逢馬必嗆」的遭遇，想必使他感念在心頭。
然而，一名國家元首的政績，若完全偏倚外交表現，或是「強外交」而「弱內政」，必然失衡。事實上，深入檢視的話，美方未允許馬總統在美國街頭暢所欲言、未允其公開與美國官員之會面或通話、未同意隨團記者同步採訪等，恐未必能讓國人感到驕傲或滿意。至於與友邦元首熱情互動，乃至簽署條約或聯合公報等，均不脫例常外交儀節。這些邦交國距台灣何其遙遠，接待再熱情、規格再高，對人民而言終究是「天邊的彩虹」。
質言之，鞏固邦誼是元首出訪的基本門檻，馬總統此次受到的接待層級固有提升，但能為國家加多少分，絕不能僅以總統個人感受溫暖為已足，而要有更具體的成果展現。這點，國人則無法清楚感受。也因此，馬總統在出訪尾聲以關心颱風逼近而提前返台，實有必要；因為，真正讓他牽腸掛肚的幾個「絆馬索」，不由他親自解套不行。
首先，是國是會議問題。馬總統數度批在野黨沒誠意，還搬出憲政體制、質疑國是會議正當性等，多少已透露出他無意召開國是會議。然而，國內問題分明已到凡事窒礙、百廢待舉的地步，馬總統面對朝野惡鬥一籌莫展，卻又不思設法向民間尋求支援，一味如此冷淡回應國是會議，看在人民眼裡，又是什麼滋味？
其次，是監察院長王建?與十九監委的「大內鬥」。此事已涉及五權憲法之監察權存廢續絕的憲政問題，在野黨都已著手提案廢監院，這種風暴，豈能以「茶壺風波」等閒視之？總統雖以「監院獨立行使職權」為名，稱不宜干涉監院內部事務；然而，監院和監委均是總統提名、任命，王建?都已經嗆聲監委大半是「政治酬庸」，馬總統在海外僅以電話表達關心，未免給人畏怯之感。
再則，大埔抗爭事件竟延燒到群眾「攻入」內政部圍牆，鬧騰了一日夜，背後隱藏的問題更不容逃避。從文林苑、反核四、洪仲丘案到大埔事件，近期社會運動產生的量變與質變，均直指「人民不信任政府」，甚至膽大妄言到「拆政府」。面對此一情勢，馬總統究竟有無智慧及魄力來化解日趨激烈的社會抗議？
馬總統的外交取暖，取的只是他個人的溫暖；但作為國家元首，他必須有能力將權力的溫暖化為施政作為，散布給人民。在民眾的積鬱逐漸化為憤怒之際，馬總統恐怕得快馬加鞭拿出行動才行。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
August 23, 2013
Summary: President Ma's "He Yi Project" state visits may not have won him much public support. But Ma seems pleased with the results. These diplomatic missions may have helped President Ma regain some of his former confidence. But they are unlikely to diminish public dissatisfaction over his mishandling of domestic affairs. The President should take heart and redouble his efforts on the domestic front. He should now ensure that the public feels the same improvement in domestic affairs.
Full text below:
President Ma's "He Yi Project" state visits may not have won him much public support. But Ma seems pleased with the results. For example, he said Taipei-Washington consultations on economic and security matters are "even better than before the severing of diplomatic relations." These diplomatic missions may have helped President Ma regain some of his former confidence. But they are unlikely to diminish public dissatisfaction over his mishandling of domestic affairs. Diplomatic relations have been normalized and improved. The President should take heart and redouble his efforts on the domestic front. He should now ensure that the public feels the same improvement in domestic affairs.
Before his visit, President Ma's approval ratings hit rock bottom. He was unable to implement policy. He was heckled wherever he went. The Hung Chung-chiu case led to the resignation of two defense ministers in one week. It is no exaggeration to say that for President Ma each day went by like a year. It was under these conditions that he chose to lead a delegation on overseas visits. He chose to try his hand at diplomacy instead of domestic policy. From a political perspective, it was indeed necessary.
President Ma noted several achievements of his visits. It was the first time an ROC president visited Haiti. Ma attended the inauguration of Paraguay's new president Horacio Cartes. He visited the three Caribbean "Saint" nations: St. Lucia, St. Vincent, and St. Kitts and Nevis. Now that Ma has completed these visits, all that remains is to visit our African allies Sao Tome and Principe. This will round out his tour of all 23 allied nations.
Consider what he accomplished during his visits. While transiting New York he visited the CCBA, the New York University School of Law, and the 9/11 Memorial. Previous transits through the United States were deliberately low-keyed. In that respect, this was indeed something of a breakthrough. Breakfast with New York Mayor Michael Bloomberg also carried symbolic meaning. Ma visited Haiti, Paraguay, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Saint Kitts and five other countries. Overseas Chinese gave him a warm welcome. Heads of State offered him every hospitality. Compared to being heckled everywhere back home, he must have felt extremely grateful.
But a head of state's accomplishments cannot be based entirely on diplomacy. If he or she is strong on diplomacy and weak on domestic policy, that means an imbalance. In fact, if one looks closely, Washington did not allow President Ma to do whatever he wanted on the streets of America. He was not allowed to attend public meetings with American officials, or to call upon them. He was not allowed to hold interviews with accompanying reporters. He did not make citizens of the ROC particularly proud or happy. Enthusiastic interaction with friendly nations, the issuance of joint communiques, and the signing of treaties departed little from diplomatic protocol. These allies are located far from the ROC. Their reception may have been enthusiastic. Their treatment may have been respectful. But to the public they remain rainbows in the sky.
Firming up bilateral friendships is the least a head of state can do for his country. The reception President Ma received during his visits was an improvement. But what did it do for the country, really? Such visits cannot be for the benefit of the president alone, so he can bask in glory. They must yield concrete results. In this sense, the public experienced little benefit. President Ma became concerned about the approaching typhoon and returned to Taiwan early. That too was necessary. He had no choice but to personally defuse those bombs that might blow up in his face.
For starters, regarding matters of state, President Ma has often criticized the opposition DPP for a lack of good faith, for sidelining the constitutional framework, and for undermining the legitimacy the National Affairs Conference. This suggests that Ma has the desire to convene a National Affairs Conference. But domestic issues have clearly degenerated to where every issue leads to deadlock. President Ma is impotent in the face of vicious ruling vs. opposition party power struggles. He does not even bother to seek public support. His response to the prospect of a National Affairs Conference remains lukewarm. How should the people feel when they witness this?
Now take Control Yuan President Wang Chien-hsuan's civil war with 19 Control Yuan Members. This involves the Five Powers Constitution and the right to retain or abolish the Control Yuan. The opposition DPP already advocates abolishing the Control Yuan. Such political storms cannot be dismissed as "tempests in a teapot." The president has argued that "The Control Yuan must exercise its powers independently." He has said he cannot interfere in its internal workings. But the Control Yuan president and the Control Yuan members are presidential nominees and appointees. Wang Chien-hsuan has already said half the Control Yuan members are beneficiaries of political rewards. Yet President Ma's only response was a phone call from abroad. His reaction left an impression of excessive timidity.
The Tai Po protests have also gotten out of control. The crowd actually made its way into the Ministry of the Interior and rioted all night. The hidden problems cannot be evaded. They include Wen Lin-yuan, opposition to the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant, and the Hung Chung-chiu case. Recent social protests have led to both quantitative and qualitative changes. They have led to public allegations that "The people do not trust the government!" and even to bold calls to "Dismantle the government!" Faced with the situation, does President Ma have the wisdom and courage to resolve intensifying social protest?
President Ma sought relief in diplomacy. But the only one who experienced relief was him. As head of state, Ma must be able to bring relief to the people. He must have the ability to dissolve people's suppressed anger. President Ma must act now. He must proceed full speed.
外交取暖後，內政更應帶給人民溫暖
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.08.23 02:52 am
馬總統「賀誼專案」出訪，不論輿論評價如何，他似自覺成果良好；例如提及台美間的經濟與安全協商，即稱「比斷交前還好」。透過外交出訪，馬總統似乎找回了自信；但要說這能化解國人對內政顛躓的忿懣，則恐怕未必。如今外交取暖既歸，總統更應敞開心胸奮發作為，讓人民也能在內政上感受到溫暖。
出訪前，馬總統民調低迷、政策推不動、走到哪都被嗆，更因洪仲丘案短短一周折損兩名國防部長；要形容馬總統當時「度日如年」，恐不為過。在這種情況下，他決定依計畫率團出訪，「換手氣兼拚外交」，從政治角度看確有必要。
這次出訪，馬總統自得之重點包括：首度成為到訪海地的中華民國總統、慶賀巴拉圭新任總統卡提斯就職，以及造訪加勒比海「三聖」國。走完此程，便僅剩非洲友邦聖多美普林西比一國，即可完成廿三邦交國「走透透」的拼圖。
檢視此次出訪成績，紐約過境之旅「漫步」在中華公所、紐約大學法學院、九一一紀念館等處，對照前幾次過境美國的刻意低調，確有突破；與紐約市長彭博之早餐會，也有其象徵意義。至於造訪海地、巴拉圭及聖露西亞、聖文森、聖克里斯多福等五國，受到僑胞、民眾的熱情歡迎，與各國元首的真誠接待，比起他在國內出巡「逢馬必嗆」的遭遇，想必使他感念在心頭。
然而，一名國家元首的政績，若完全偏倚外交表現，或是「強外交」而「弱內政」，必然失衡。事實上，深入檢視的話，美方未允許馬總統在美國街頭暢所欲言、未允其公開與美國官員之會面或通話、未同意隨團記者同步採訪等，恐未必能讓國人感到驕傲或滿意。至於與友邦元首熱情互動，乃至簽署條約或聯合公報等，均不脫例常外交儀節。這些邦交國距台灣何其遙遠，接待再熱情、規格再高，對人民而言終究是「天邊的彩虹」。
質言之，鞏固邦誼是元首出訪的基本門檻，馬總統此次受到的接待層級固有提升，但能為國家加多少分，絕不能僅以總統個人感受溫暖為已足，而要有更具體的成果展現。這點，國人則無法清楚感受。也因此，馬總統在出訪尾聲以關心颱風逼近而提前返台，實有必要；因為，真正讓他牽腸掛肚的幾個「絆馬索」，不由他親自解套不行。
首先，是國是會議問題。馬總統數度批在野黨沒誠意，還搬出憲政體制、質疑國是會議正當性等，多少已透露出他無意召開國是會議。然而，國內問題分明已到凡事窒礙、百廢待舉的地步，馬總統面對朝野惡鬥一籌莫展，卻又不思設法向民間尋求支援，一味如此冷淡回應國是會議，看在人民眼裡，又是什麼滋味？
其次，是監察院長王建?與十九監委的「大內鬥」。此事已涉及五權憲法之監察權存廢續絕的憲政問題，在野黨都已著手提案廢監院，這種風暴，豈能以「茶壺風波」等閒視之？總統雖以「監院獨立行使職權」為名，稱不宜干涉監院內部事務；然而，監院和監委均是總統提名、任命，王建?都已經嗆聲監委大半是「政治酬庸」，馬總統在海外僅以電話表達關心，未免給人畏怯之感。
再則，大埔抗爭事件竟延燒到群眾「攻入」內政部圍牆，鬧騰了一日夜，背後隱藏的問題更不容逃避。從文林苑、反核四、洪仲丘案到大埔事件，近期社會運動產生的量變與質變，均直指「人民不信任政府」，甚至膽大妄言到「拆政府」。面對此一情勢，馬總統究竟有無智慧及魄力來化解日趨激烈的社會抗議？
馬總統的外交取暖，取的只是他個人的溫暖；但作為國家元首，他必須有能力將權力的溫暖化為施政作為，散布給人民。在民眾的積鬱逐漸化為憤怒之際，馬總統恐怕得快馬加鞭拿出行動才行。
Wednesday, August 21, 2013
Bo Xilai Trial, Scripted and Unscripted
Bo Xilai Trial, Scripted and Unscripted
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
August 22, 2013
Summary: Bo Xilai, a shining hero who fought corruption, has ended up in prison as the result of a policy of fighting corruption. The case has exposed high CCP official duplicity. The case has exposed the soft underbelly of modernization on Mainland China. Many on Taiwan may scoff at the Bo Xilai trial. But have we recovered the money that the Chen family embezzled from us? What progress is being made on that front? What is there for us to be so proud about?
Full text below:
Seventeen months after being removed from office, Bo Xilai is being tried by the Jinan Intermediate People's Court. He faces charges of corruption, bribery, and three counts of abuse of power. The judges have already established the framework by which he will be tried. They have already written the script. The trial is unlikely to present any surprises. More interesting is how the public, which has not read the script, will react to Bo Xilai's trial. Will a stray spark set off a powderkeg?
This could be the greatest threat to former Politburo member and Chongqing party secretary Xi Jinping's succession., Inside and outside the Communist Party, opinion regarding Bo Xilai's crimes remains polarized. There appears to be clear evidence of his corruption and abuse of power. His wife Gu Kailai has already been conviced of murder. Yet many on the Mainland still see him as a hero who "waved the red flag in order to expose corruption." They consider him a victim of an upper echelon political power struggle. That is why the case is being tried in public. The government hopes to weaken the political and social influence of Bo supporters. That is why the Mainland authorities are crossing every t and dotting every i.
Over the past 17 months, Bo Xilai has been removed from office, detained, interrogated, arrested, and prosecuted. The Chinese Communist Party Central Committee has been proceeding carefully, by the book. This is "criminal justice with Chinese characteristics." First establish the goal and the framework. Exclude all unwanted outcomes. Establish the offenses and charges. Then conduct a public hearing. The trial will take place in Jinan, Shandong, rather than Chongqing or Dalian, where Bo Xilai was originally charged. On the surface the change of venue ensures an objective and neutral investigation. In fact the motive is to avoid interference from Bo faction members and supporters. All these factors were carefully considered.
The trial was custom tailored to fit Bo Xilai. The CCP Central Committee made many arrangements to that end. They include the following. One. Once Xi Jinping came to power, he vigorously "fought corruption." The people of Chongqing praised Bo Xilai's "fight against corruption." Xi hitched a ride on this sentiment. At the same time, Xi used the fight against corruption to lash out against Bo. Two. Earlier this month, Xi Jinping ordered an investigation of Bo ally and former Politics and Law Committee member Zhou Yongkang. Zhou is accused of accumulating wealth by unfair means. Also under investigation is Bo party comrade and Central Military Commission Vice Chairman Xu Caihou. He is accused of "violating party discipline." These are preliminary moves to purge Bo allies. Three. Bo is accused of taking bribes worth over than 20 million RMB, and of embezzling over five million in public monies. Actually this is nowhere near what the Bo family has accumulated through corruption. This is to avoid Bo Xilai being sentenced to death, and to deprive him of any possibility of a political comeback.
The Chinese Communist Party allegedly has an unwritten law. Once one has become a member of the inner circle, one may not be subject to the death penalty. Politburo members who have served as senior cadres, may not be sentenced to death. Those familiar with the claim have speculated about this unwritten law. Bo Xilai will be subject to long imprisonment. At most he may be spared the death penalty. This is the most the party can do to resolved any disagreements over punishment.
In fact, a full year ago, on August 20 last year, Gu Kailai's death sentence for the murder of British businessman Neil Haywood was lifted. That day Gu Kailai praised the court's verdict as an "impartial judgment." Gu said the judgment of the court reflected extraordinary respect for reality and for life. Gu said these are profoundly Chinese traits. Bo Xilai has long been ambitious and domineering. How will he comport himself during his trial? Will he remain low-keyed, confessional, and resigned to his fate?
This is a critical period. Ths judicial drama has a pre-written script. Yet it remains hard to rule out unwelcome surprises. This is why the CCP has rejected calls that the trial be broadcast live, in its entirety. Instead, the transcript will be broadcast live and direct. This is also a "Chinese characteristics" style invention. Apparently the only way to ensure that Bo Xilai "behaves himself" at the trial, is to ensure that his son Bo Guagua remains in the United States and continues to enjoy security, wealth, and freedom. This will be traded for Bo's acquiescence to the administration of justice.
The CCP has been writing the script for Bo's live broadcast trial for the past ten months. Will today present any surprises? That depends upon Bo's willpower and mindset. Bo engaged in corruption and abuse of power. He trampled over the system. That is no longer in doubt. But will he attempt to exploit the last vestiges of his prestige in court? Will he become an embarrassment to the Mainland authorities? That remains to be seen.
This is ironic. A shining hero who fought corruption, has ended up in prison as the result of a policy of fighting corruption. The case has exposed high CCP official duplicity. Also ironic is how the Mainland has become the world's factory, yet is uses such a highly politicized, Rube Goldberg system of justice. The case has exposed the soft underbelly of modernization on Mainland China. Many on Taiwan may scoff at the Bo Xilai trial. But have we recovered the money that the Chen family embezzled from us? What progress is being made on that front? What is there for us to be so proud about?
薄熙來開審：劇本內與劇本外的觀察
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.08.22 03:47 am
遭免職後十七個月，薄熙來今天將在濟南中級法院，公開面對貪汙、收賄、濫用職權等三項罪名的審判。根據已經畫得條條框框的官方劇本中，這次的審理，似乎不可能有什麼意外的結局；比較值得觀察的，則是劇本外的群眾反應和薄熙來的聆審態度，會不會有擦槍走火演出。
作為前政治局委員和前重慶市委書記，乃至是習近平接班的最大威脅，薄熙來所犯下的罪行，不論在中共黨內或黨外，一直有頗為兩極的爭議。儘管他貪腐、濫權的事證明確，包括其妻谷開來的謀殺案件也已定罪，中國大陸仍有不少民眾視他為「唱紅打黑」的英雄，認為他是高層政治鬥爭的犧牲品。也因此，如何將此案藉由公開審判，消除政治上和社會上的「擁薄」勢力，是中共當局處心積慮步步為營的事。
十七個月來，薄熙來從免職、雙規、被捕、起訴到開庭審訊，全是依著中共黨中央的審慎計算慢慢推進。這是「中國特色」的司法：先確立目標框架，排除各種可能的後遺症，然後設定罪行及罪名，再進行公開審訊。包括開庭地點選在山東濟南，而不是薄熙來被控犯罪地點的大連或重慶，表面的說法是「異地受審」可確保調查的客觀中立，實際也是為了避免其人馬和徒眾的干擾，都經過仔細考量。
觀察這場為薄熙來「量身打造」的大審，中共中央進行了不少周邊部署工作，諸如：其一，習近平上台後雷厲推動「打貪」，一方面承接了薄熙來受重慶人民誇讚的「打黑」，一方面又可藉反貪之名反過來「打薄」。其二，習近平本月初下令，立案調查與薄熙來交好的前政法委周永康的斂財案，包括另一朋黨中央軍委副主席徐才厚遭「雙規」，都是清理「薄黨」的預備行動。其三，指控薄熙來收賄兩千多萬元人民幣，貪汙五百多萬公帑，其實遠低於薄家貪腐所得；其目的，是要避免薄熙來在司法上被判處死刑，但又要剝奪他在政治上東山再起的一切可能。
據稱，中共黨內有一條「入局不死」的默契，凡是擔任過政治局委員的高幹，不會被判處死刑。熟知內情人士猜測，在這樣的「默契」下，薄熙來可能被判較長的有期徒刑，最多也只是「死緩」，這是最能擺平黨內不同意見的處分。
事實上，整整一年之前，也就是去年的八月廿日，谷開來因謀殺英商海伍德被判處「死緩」。當天，谷開來當庭稱揚法庭「判決公正」，說判決體現了法院對法律、對現實、對生命的「特別尊重」；這些，都深具中國特色。讓人好奇的是，一向野心勃勃、霸氣外露的薄熙來，面對這次審訊，真的會在庭上表現出溫馴、認罪、聽命安排的姿態嗎？
這關鍵的一段，就是這場司法大戲在預先寫好的劇本中，難以保證完全照本宣科的最大懸念。正因為如此，中共否決了外界呼籲這場審訊「全程轉播」的要求，改為用「文字直播」——這也是「具有中國特色」的發明。從形勢判斷，唯一能確保薄熙來在審判中「就範」的力量，就是以其子薄瓜瓜在美繼續享有現有的安全、財富和自由，來交換他對司法的臣服。
無論如何，中共這一套寫了十幾個月的「審薄」大戲腳本，今天會不會有什麼驚奇的演出，端視薄熙來的意志和心理狀態而定。他的貪瀆濫權、踐踏體制，已經是無庸置疑；但他會不會利用自己的民粹餘威，在法庭上作最後一搏，當庭給中共當局一個難堪，仍有待觀察。
諷刺的是，一個光鮮的「打黑」英雄，最後變成了「打貪」政策的階下囚，這暴露的是中共高官權力的表裡不一。同樣諷刺的是，已成為世界工廠的中國大陸，竟要用如此曲折繁複的政治手段來布置這場司法審判，這暴露的則是中國大陸現代化的軟肋。話說回來，從台灣看薄案的審理，很多人可能會嗤之以鼻；但我們把扁家貪瀆案辦到錢也沒討回、人又趴趴走的地步，又有什麼驕傲可言？
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
August 22, 2013
Summary: Bo Xilai, a shining hero who fought corruption, has ended up in prison as the result of a policy of fighting corruption. The case has exposed high CCP official duplicity. The case has exposed the soft underbelly of modernization on Mainland China. Many on Taiwan may scoff at the Bo Xilai trial. But have we recovered the money that the Chen family embezzled from us? What progress is being made on that front? What is there for us to be so proud about?
Full text below:
Seventeen months after being removed from office, Bo Xilai is being tried by the Jinan Intermediate People's Court. He faces charges of corruption, bribery, and three counts of abuse of power. The judges have already established the framework by which he will be tried. They have already written the script. The trial is unlikely to present any surprises. More interesting is how the public, which has not read the script, will react to Bo Xilai's trial. Will a stray spark set off a powderkeg?
This could be the greatest threat to former Politburo member and Chongqing party secretary Xi Jinping's succession., Inside and outside the Communist Party, opinion regarding Bo Xilai's crimes remains polarized. There appears to be clear evidence of his corruption and abuse of power. His wife Gu Kailai has already been conviced of murder. Yet many on the Mainland still see him as a hero who "waved the red flag in order to expose corruption." They consider him a victim of an upper echelon political power struggle. That is why the case is being tried in public. The government hopes to weaken the political and social influence of Bo supporters. That is why the Mainland authorities are crossing every t and dotting every i.
Over the past 17 months, Bo Xilai has been removed from office, detained, interrogated, arrested, and prosecuted. The Chinese Communist Party Central Committee has been proceeding carefully, by the book. This is "criminal justice with Chinese characteristics." First establish the goal and the framework. Exclude all unwanted outcomes. Establish the offenses and charges. Then conduct a public hearing. The trial will take place in Jinan, Shandong, rather than Chongqing or Dalian, where Bo Xilai was originally charged. On the surface the change of venue ensures an objective and neutral investigation. In fact the motive is to avoid interference from Bo faction members and supporters. All these factors were carefully considered.
The trial was custom tailored to fit Bo Xilai. The CCP Central Committee made many arrangements to that end. They include the following. One. Once Xi Jinping came to power, he vigorously "fought corruption." The people of Chongqing praised Bo Xilai's "fight against corruption." Xi hitched a ride on this sentiment. At the same time, Xi used the fight against corruption to lash out against Bo. Two. Earlier this month, Xi Jinping ordered an investigation of Bo ally and former Politics and Law Committee member Zhou Yongkang. Zhou is accused of accumulating wealth by unfair means. Also under investigation is Bo party comrade and Central Military Commission Vice Chairman Xu Caihou. He is accused of "violating party discipline." These are preliminary moves to purge Bo allies. Three. Bo is accused of taking bribes worth over than 20 million RMB, and of embezzling over five million in public monies. Actually this is nowhere near what the Bo family has accumulated through corruption. This is to avoid Bo Xilai being sentenced to death, and to deprive him of any possibility of a political comeback.
The Chinese Communist Party allegedly has an unwritten law. Once one has become a member of the inner circle, one may not be subject to the death penalty. Politburo members who have served as senior cadres, may not be sentenced to death. Those familiar with the claim have speculated about this unwritten law. Bo Xilai will be subject to long imprisonment. At most he may be spared the death penalty. This is the most the party can do to resolved any disagreements over punishment.
In fact, a full year ago, on August 20 last year, Gu Kailai's death sentence for the murder of British businessman Neil Haywood was lifted. That day Gu Kailai praised the court's verdict as an "impartial judgment." Gu said the judgment of the court reflected extraordinary respect for reality and for life. Gu said these are profoundly Chinese traits. Bo Xilai has long been ambitious and domineering. How will he comport himself during his trial? Will he remain low-keyed, confessional, and resigned to his fate?
This is a critical period. Ths judicial drama has a pre-written script. Yet it remains hard to rule out unwelcome surprises. This is why the CCP has rejected calls that the trial be broadcast live, in its entirety. Instead, the transcript will be broadcast live and direct. This is also a "Chinese characteristics" style invention. Apparently the only way to ensure that Bo Xilai "behaves himself" at the trial, is to ensure that his son Bo Guagua remains in the United States and continues to enjoy security, wealth, and freedom. This will be traded for Bo's acquiescence to the administration of justice.
The CCP has been writing the script for Bo's live broadcast trial for the past ten months. Will today present any surprises? That depends upon Bo's willpower and mindset. Bo engaged in corruption and abuse of power. He trampled over the system. That is no longer in doubt. But will he attempt to exploit the last vestiges of his prestige in court? Will he become an embarrassment to the Mainland authorities? That remains to be seen.
This is ironic. A shining hero who fought corruption, has ended up in prison as the result of a policy of fighting corruption. The case has exposed high CCP official duplicity. Also ironic is how the Mainland has become the world's factory, yet is uses such a highly politicized, Rube Goldberg system of justice. The case has exposed the soft underbelly of modernization on Mainland China. Many on Taiwan may scoff at the Bo Xilai trial. But have we recovered the money that the Chen family embezzled from us? What progress is being made on that front? What is there for us to be so proud about?
薄熙來開審：劇本內與劇本外的觀察
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.08.22 03:47 am
遭免職後十七個月，薄熙來今天將在濟南中級法院，公開面對貪汙、收賄、濫用職權等三項罪名的審判。根據已經畫得條條框框的官方劇本中，這次的審理，似乎不可能有什麼意外的結局；比較值得觀察的，則是劇本外的群眾反應和薄熙來的聆審態度，會不會有擦槍走火演出。
作為前政治局委員和前重慶市委書記，乃至是習近平接班的最大威脅，薄熙來所犯下的罪行，不論在中共黨內或黨外，一直有頗為兩極的爭議。儘管他貪腐、濫權的事證明確，包括其妻谷開來的謀殺案件也已定罪，中國大陸仍有不少民眾視他為「唱紅打黑」的英雄，認為他是高層政治鬥爭的犧牲品。也因此，如何將此案藉由公開審判，消除政治上和社會上的「擁薄」勢力，是中共當局處心積慮步步為營的事。
十七個月來，薄熙來從免職、雙規、被捕、起訴到開庭審訊，全是依著中共黨中央的審慎計算慢慢推進。這是「中國特色」的司法：先確立目標框架，排除各種可能的後遺症，然後設定罪行及罪名，再進行公開審訊。包括開庭地點選在山東濟南，而不是薄熙來被控犯罪地點的大連或重慶，表面的說法是「異地受審」可確保調查的客觀中立，實際也是為了避免其人馬和徒眾的干擾，都經過仔細考量。
觀察這場為薄熙來「量身打造」的大審，中共中央進行了不少周邊部署工作，諸如：其一，習近平上台後雷厲推動「打貪」，一方面承接了薄熙來受重慶人民誇讚的「打黑」，一方面又可藉反貪之名反過來「打薄」。其二，習近平本月初下令，立案調查與薄熙來交好的前政法委周永康的斂財案，包括另一朋黨中央軍委副主席徐才厚遭「雙規」，都是清理「薄黨」的預備行動。其三，指控薄熙來收賄兩千多萬元人民幣，貪汙五百多萬公帑，其實遠低於薄家貪腐所得；其目的，是要避免薄熙來在司法上被判處死刑，但又要剝奪他在政治上東山再起的一切可能。
據稱，中共黨內有一條「入局不死」的默契，凡是擔任過政治局委員的高幹，不會被判處死刑。熟知內情人士猜測，在這樣的「默契」下，薄熙來可能被判較長的有期徒刑，最多也只是「死緩」，這是最能擺平黨內不同意見的處分。
事實上，整整一年之前，也就是去年的八月廿日，谷開來因謀殺英商海伍德被判處「死緩」。當天，谷開來當庭稱揚法庭「判決公正」，說判決體現了法院對法律、對現實、對生命的「特別尊重」；這些，都深具中國特色。讓人好奇的是，一向野心勃勃、霸氣外露的薄熙來，面對這次審訊，真的會在庭上表現出溫馴、認罪、聽命安排的姿態嗎？
這關鍵的一段，就是這場司法大戲在預先寫好的劇本中，難以保證完全照本宣科的最大懸念。正因為如此，中共否決了外界呼籲這場審訊「全程轉播」的要求，改為用「文字直播」——這也是「具有中國特色」的發明。從形勢判斷，唯一能確保薄熙來在審判中「就範」的力量，就是以其子薄瓜瓜在美繼續享有現有的安全、財富和自由，來交換他對司法的臣服。
無論如何，中共這一套寫了十幾個月的「審薄」大戲腳本，今天會不會有什麼驚奇的演出，端視薄熙來的意志和心理狀態而定。他的貪瀆濫權、踐踏體制，已經是無庸置疑；但他會不會利用自己的民粹餘威，在法庭上作最後一搏，當庭給中共當局一個難堪，仍有待觀察。
諷刺的是，一個光鮮的「打黑」英雄，最後變成了「打貪」政策的階下囚，這暴露的是中共高官權力的表裡不一。同樣諷刺的是，已成為世界工廠的中國大陸，竟要用如此曲折繁複的政治手段來布置這場司法審判，這暴露的則是中國大陸現代化的軟肋。話說回來，從台灣看薄案的審理，很多人可能會嗤之以鼻；但我們把扁家貪瀆案辦到錢也沒討回、人又趴趴走的地步，又有什麼驕傲可言？
Tuesday, August 20, 2013
Why Does the Public on Taiwan Feel So Lost?
Why Does the Public on Taiwan Feel So Lost?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
August 20, 2013
Summary: Political and social differences on Taiwan have intensified. Perhaps members of the public should begin with themselves. They should avoid negative language that provokes a negative response. They should minimize differences with their political enemies. They should restore such values as democracy, freedom, and humanity. They must attempt to transcend Blue vs. Green. They must attempt to recover, bit by bit, the middle ground. They must not permit themselves to become mire in collective cynicism and self-pity. That is a lesson the preceding wave of democratization taught us.
Full text below:
Recently UDN TV interviewed Minister of Culture Lung Ying-tai. Lung compared today's society to society a decade ago, when she was Chief of the Taipei City Bureau of Culture. She said public trust in government has nearly evaporated. She said the public on Taiwan is much less confident than it was 15 years ago.
We hardly need Lung Ying-tai to remind us. Everyone knows public trust in government has evaporated. Everyone knows we have lost faith in ourselves. These are very real and serious problems. Chart them on a graph. Over the next few years at least, the trend lines will continue to decline. Lung Ying-tai most laments the former. She laments the fact that "Officials are finding it hard to survive." But the latter is far more troubling. The public fears that no solution can be found for its long-term feeling of loss.
The self-deprecating witticism, "Officials are finding it hard to survive" is something officials have been repeating ever since democratization. The government has lost its authority. Officials have failed to keep up with the times. They have failed to change their attitude toward those they serve. Naturally they are finding it hard to win people's trust. From the peoples' perspective, democratization has made them "masters in their own home." It has made them more self-confident. It has made them less afraid to complain to officialdom. It has provided them with more opportunities to express defiance. The result however, has not been improved government efficiency. It has not been better solutions to practical problems. Such a democracy is an illusion. How can people not be disappointed. How can they not feel a sense of loss? How can they not become cynics?
Public loss of confidence in Taiwan, involves three factors. One. A loss of pride in our democracy. In 2000, ruling party change was risky business. People had high hopes for the new political order. People were proud of the fact that the ROC was the forerunner of democracy in Chinese society. Unfortunately this vision was shattered by eight years of DPP policy chaos. Chen Shui-bian family corruption was an even greater betrayal. Together, they shattered the twin myths of democratization and nativization.
Two. The economy has declined. Taiwan had an opportunity to ride the Mainland's coat tails to new economic growth and opportunity. Lee Teng-hui's "avoid haste, exercise patience" policy, and Chen Shui-bian's Closed Door Policy caused Taiwan to miss out. A second ruling party change under Ma Ying-jeou improved cross-Strait relations, but could not make up the lost economic momentum. This includes the 12 i-Taiwan Projects and the four year 500 billion public works program. These involved huge investments of funds, but failed to increase production or employment. This year, economic growth, youth unemployment, pensions, welfare, and other fundamentals, deteriorated. Neighboring countries on the other hand, continued to prosper. People were predictably frustrated.
Three. Any social consensus or sense of shared values has been lost. Under DPP rule, struggles over reunification vs. independence intensified. They became struggles between Blue and Green. Political party struggles intensified political differences within society. People on Taiwan no longer share a common language or common values. Nothing in today's society escapes the Blue vs. Green litmus test. It determines the truth or falsity of everything. This irrational Blue vs. Green conflict has expanded into every corner of society. Taiwan once had a middle ground, in academia, in civil society, and in religion. Now neutral parties remain silent in order to avoid being dragged into the conflict. Opportunists meanwhile, jump on the bandwagon and choose sides. There is no longer any middle ground. Society has lost its sense of proportion. It has lost any respect for democracy, freedom, the rule of law, professionalism, and reason it might have once had.
People on Taiwan today feel a sense of loss. They know that the ROC is sliding downhill. They know that feel-good sentiments cannot hide the truth. They see no force that will slow the ROC's descent into oblivion. Will the Ma administration suddenly wake up and get its act together? Will the next ruling party change made any difference? Will protesters once again have to take to the streets?
Wang Chien-hsuan recently thundered, "The Control Yuan may as well close up shop!" But that was irrational. High officials cannot solve our problems. But when they vent their emotions this way, they merely deepen public cynicism. Government officials must promote public confidence. The public on Taiwan has lost confidence in itself. It is waiting for the government to offer encouragment.
Political and social differences on Taiwan have intensified. One cannot expect people to believe that some high official can address this feeling of impotence. Perhaps members of the public should begin with themselves. They should avoid negative language that provokes a negative response. They should minimize differences with their political enemies. They should restore such values as democracy, freedom, and humanity. They must attempt to transcend Blue vs. Green. They must attempt to recover, bit by bit, the middle ground. They must not permit themselves to become mire in collective cynicism and self-pity. That is a lesson the preceding wave of democratization taught us.
台灣何以充斥失落感與憤世嫉俗？
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.08.20 02:14 am
文化部長龍應台接受udn tv專訪時說，比起十幾年前她出任台北市文化局長，今天社會對政府的「信任感」幾乎「蕩然無存」。她還說，十五年前後相比，今天台灣人對自己的「信心指數」也降低很多。
不用龍應台提醒，大家也知道，人民對政府「信任感」的消失，與民眾「自信心」的下降，都是極真實而嚴重的問題。如果把兩者放在時間的向度裡觀察，至少在未來幾年，我們看不到這兩條拋物線的下墜終點。更讓龍應台慨嘆的，顯然是前者，所謂的「官不聊生」；但格外值得人們關切的，其實是後者，社會憂慮台灣長期找不到出路和解方的「失落感」。
所謂「官不聊生」，是台灣民主化以來，官員一直掛在嘴邊的自嘲。政府的權威失落，而官員未隨著時勢變化而調整服務心態，當然難以得到人民的信任。然而，對民眾而言，如果民主化的結果，給了人民更多「當家做主」的自信，更多向官員嗆聲、反脣相稽的機會，結果卻無助於提升政府效能，亦無助於實際解決問題，這樣虛幻的民主，怎不令人感到失望與失落？人們又如何不憤世嫉俗？
台灣自信心的流失，或可從三方面觀察。第一，是民主驕傲的蒙塵。公元兩千年的政黨輪替雖在艱險中締造，民眾對於政治新局的開創其實仍充滿期待，同時也以台灣作為華人社會的民主先行者感到驕傲。不幸的是，這項憧憬，卻以民進黨八年的施政混亂作收，而陳水扁家族的貪瀆無行則更是對台灣社會的一記迎頭重擊，民主化和本土化神話同遭粉碎。
第二，是經濟風光的消褪。從李登輝的戒急用忍到陳水扁的鎖國政策，台灣經濟錯失了利用大陸崛起以追求壯大及脫胎換骨的契機；但二度政黨輪替後，馬英九雖改善了兩岸關係，卻在經濟面向遲遲無法找回成長的動能。包括愛台十二項建設和四年五千億擴大公共建設方案，都投入了鉅大的經費，卻看不到帶動生產和就業的附帶效益。這兩年，經濟成長、青年失業、年金及福利負擔不支等基本面表現不斷惡化；比起鄰近國家的向榮趨盛，不免讓人喪氣。
第三，是社會共識和共同價值的散失：民進黨執政期間，台灣的「統獨之爭」進一步擴大為「藍綠之鬥」，政黨的鬥爭深化為社會大眾的顏色分化，至此，台灣就完全失去了共同語言與共同價值。今天社會上發生任何事情，都要經由「藍」或「綠」的試紙檢查，來驗證它的屬性和辯正方向。經過這種非理性的藍綠運動，原來台灣還存在的「中間地帶」，包括學術界、宗教界乃至民間社團在內，清者噤聲以求身免，濁者輕易投身選邊而站。失去中間地帶的台灣，不僅失去了調和社會平衡的力量，也失去了原先對民主、自由、法治、專業、理性等價值的認知和信仰。
今天台灣人充滿失落感，一個原因是人們認知到國家正在走下坡，這是再怎麼假裝「自我感覺良好」都掩飾不了的事實；另一個更重要的原因是，人們看不出這個「台灣往下掉」的情勢，要碰到什麼樣的力量，才能把它托住。要靠馬政府突然的覺醒和振作嗎？靠下一次政黨輪替嗎？還是靠抗爭團體不斷接力在街頭衝撞？
王建?日前發飆責罵「監察院不如關掉」，其實正是這種失落心理的反射之一。問題是，高官無力解決問題，卻採取如此非理性的暴衝手法發洩，只會加深人民的憤世嫉俗。政府官員需要民眾的信任來推動國家，但台灣失落的自信心，不也在等待政府的作為來填補與提振？
老實說，當台灣政治和社會歧見深化到這種地步，人們要期待什麼高人一出手就能化解民眾的無力感，恐怕是不可能的事。民眾可以做的，或許是從自身做起，盡量避免用負面語言引發負面對應，盡量減少用政治顏色來分別敵我，盡量還原自己對民主、自由、人道等價值的原色信仰，盡可能追求超乎藍綠的客觀價值。無論如何，要一點一滴找回中間地帶，切勿再陷入集體憤世嫉俗的悲情，那是我們在前一波民主化已經切身體驗過的一課。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
August 20, 2013
Summary: Political and social differences on Taiwan have intensified. Perhaps members of the public should begin with themselves. They should avoid negative language that provokes a negative response. They should minimize differences with their political enemies. They should restore such values as democracy, freedom, and humanity. They must attempt to transcend Blue vs. Green. They must attempt to recover, bit by bit, the middle ground. They must not permit themselves to become mire in collective cynicism and self-pity. That is a lesson the preceding wave of democratization taught us.
Full text below:
Recently UDN TV interviewed Minister of Culture Lung Ying-tai. Lung compared today's society to society a decade ago, when she was Chief of the Taipei City Bureau of Culture. She said public trust in government has nearly evaporated. She said the public on Taiwan is much less confident than it was 15 years ago.
We hardly need Lung Ying-tai to remind us. Everyone knows public trust in government has evaporated. Everyone knows we have lost faith in ourselves. These are very real and serious problems. Chart them on a graph. Over the next few years at least, the trend lines will continue to decline. Lung Ying-tai most laments the former. She laments the fact that "Officials are finding it hard to survive." But the latter is far more troubling. The public fears that no solution can be found for its long-term feeling of loss.
The self-deprecating witticism, "Officials are finding it hard to survive" is something officials have been repeating ever since democratization. The government has lost its authority. Officials have failed to keep up with the times. They have failed to change their attitude toward those they serve. Naturally they are finding it hard to win people's trust. From the peoples' perspective, democratization has made them "masters in their own home." It has made them more self-confident. It has made them less afraid to complain to officialdom. It has provided them with more opportunities to express defiance. The result however, has not been improved government efficiency. It has not been better solutions to practical problems. Such a democracy is an illusion. How can people not be disappointed. How can they not feel a sense of loss? How can they not become cynics?
Public loss of confidence in Taiwan, involves three factors. One. A loss of pride in our democracy. In 2000, ruling party change was risky business. People had high hopes for the new political order. People were proud of the fact that the ROC was the forerunner of democracy in Chinese society. Unfortunately this vision was shattered by eight years of DPP policy chaos. Chen Shui-bian family corruption was an even greater betrayal. Together, they shattered the twin myths of democratization and nativization.
Two. The economy has declined. Taiwan had an opportunity to ride the Mainland's coat tails to new economic growth and opportunity. Lee Teng-hui's "avoid haste, exercise patience" policy, and Chen Shui-bian's Closed Door Policy caused Taiwan to miss out. A second ruling party change under Ma Ying-jeou improved cross-Strait relations, but could not make up the lost economic momentum. This includes the 12 i-Taiwan Projects and the four year 500 billion public works program. These involved huge investments of funds, but failed to increase production or employment. This year, economic growth, youth unemployment, pensions, welfare, and other fundamentals, deteriorated. Neighboring countries on the other hand, continued to prosper. People were predictably frustrated.
Three. Any social consensus or sense of shared values has been lost. Under DPP rule, struggles over reunification vs. independence intensified. They became struggles between Blue and Green. Political party struggles intensified political differences within society. People on Taiwan no longer share a common language or common values. Nothing in today's society escapes the Blue vs. Green litmus test. It determines the truth or falsity of everything. This irrational Blue vs. Green conflict has expanded into every corner of society. Taiwan once had a middle ground, in academia, in civil society, and in religion. Now neutral parties remain silent in order to avoid being dragged into the conflict. Opportunists meanwhile, jump on the bandwagon and choose sides. There is no longer any middle ground. Society has lost its sense of proportion. It has lost any respect for democracy, freedom, the rule of law, professionalism, and reason it might have once had.
People on Taiwan today feel a sense of loss. They know that the ROC is sliding downhill. They know that feel-good sentiments cannot hide the truth. They see no force that will slow the ROC's descent into oblivion. Will the Ma administration suddenly wake up and get its act together? Will the next ruling party change made any difference? Will protesters once again have to take to the streets?
Wang Chien-hsuan recently thundered, "The Control Yuan may as well close up shop!" But that was irrational. High officials cannot solve our problems. But when they vent their emotions this way, they merely deepen public cynicism. Government officials must promote public confidence. The public on Taiwan has lost confidence in itself. It is waiting for the government to offer encouragment.
Political and social differences on Taiwan have intensified. One cannot expect people to believe that some high official can address this feeling of impotence. Perhaps members of the public should begin with themselves. They should avoid negative language that provokes a negative response. They should minimize differences with their political enemies. They should restore such values as democracy, freedom, and humanity. They must attempt to transcend Blue vs. Green. They must attempt to recover, bit by bit, the middle ground. They must not permit themselves to become mire in collective cynicism and self-pity. That is a lesson the preceding wave of democratization taught us.
台灣何以充斥失落感與憤世嫉俗？
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.08.20 02:14 am
文化部長龍應台接受udn tv專訪時說，比起十幾年前她出任台北市文化局長，今天社會對政府的「信任感」幾乎「蕩然無存」。她還說，十五年前後相比，今天台灣人對自己的「信心指數」也降低很多。
不用龍應台提醒，大家也知道，人民對政府「信任感」的消失，與民眾「自信心」的下降，都是極真實而嚴重的問題。如果把兩者放在時間的向度裡觀察，至少在未來幾年，我們看不到這兩條拋物線的下墜終點。更讓龍應台慨嘆的，顯然是前者，所謂的「官不聊生」；但格外值得人們關切的，其實是後者，社會憂慮台灣長期找不到出路和解方的「失落感」。
所謂「官不聊生」，是台灣民主化以來，官員一直掛在嘴邊的自嘲。政府的權威失落，而官員未隨著時勢變化而調整服務心態，當然難以得到人民的信任。然而，對民眾而言，如果民主化的結果，給了人民更多「當家做主」的自信，更多向官員嗆聲、反脣相稽的機會，結果卻無助於提升政府效能，亦無助於實際解決問題，這樣虛幻的民主，怎不令人感到失望與失落？人們又如何不憤世嫉俗？
台灣自信心的流失，或可從三方面觀察。第一，是民主驕傲的蒙塵。公元兩千年的政黨輪替雖在艱險中締造，民眾對於政治新局的開創其實仍充滿期待，同時也以台灣作為華人社會的民主先行者感到驕傲。不幸的是，這項憧憬，卻以民進黨八年的施政混亂作收，而陳水扁家族的貪瀆無行則更是對台灣社會的一記迎頭重擊，民主化和本土化神話同遭粉碎。
第二，是經濟風光的消褪。從李登輝的戒急用忍到陳水扁的鎖國政策，台灣經濟錯失了利用大陸崛起以追求壯大及脫胎換骨的契機；但二度政黨輪替後，馬英九雖改善了兩岸關係，卻在經濟面向遲遲無法找回成長的動能。包括愛台十二項建設和四年五千億擴大公共建設方案，都投入了鉅大的經費，卻看不到帶動生產和就業的附帶效益。這兩年，經濟成長、青年失業、年金及福利負擔不支等基本面表現不斷惡化；比起鄰近國家的向榮趨盛，不免讓人喪氣。
第三，是社會共識和共同價值的散失：民進黨執政期間，台灣的「統獨之爭」進一步擴大為「藍綠之鬥」，政黨的鬥爭深化為社會大眾的顏色分化，至此，台灣就完全失去了共同語言與共同價值。今天社會上發生任何事情，都要經由「藍」或「綠」的試紙檢查，來驗證它的屬性和辯正方向。經過這種非理性的藍綠運動，原來台灣還存在的「中間地帶」，包括學術界、宗教界乃至民間社團在內，清者噤聲以求身免，濁者輕易投身選邊而站。失去中間地帶的台灣，不僅失去了調和社會平衡的力量，也失去了原先對民主、自由、法治、專業、理性等價值的認知和信仰。
今天台灣人充滿失落感，一個原因是人們認知到國家正在走下坡，這是再怎麼假裝「自我感覺良好」都掩飾不了的事實；另一個更重要的原因是，人們看不出這個「台灣往下掉」的情勢，要碰到什麼樣的力量，才能把它托住。要靠馬政府突然的覺醒和振作嗎？靠下一次政黨輪替嗎？還是靠抗爭團體不斷接力在街頭衝撞？
王建?日前發飆責罵「監察院不如關掉」，其實正是這種失落心理的反射之一。問題是，高官無力解決問題，卻採取如此非理性的暴衝手法發洩，只會加深人民的憤世嫉俗。政府官員需要民眾的信任來推動國家，但台灣失落的自信心，不也在等待政府的作為來填補與提振？
老實說，當台灣政治和社會歧見深化到這種地步，人們要期待什麼高人一出手就能化解民眾的無力感，恐怕是不可能的事。民眾可以做的，或許是從自身做起，盡量避免用負面語言引發負面對應，盡量減少用政治顏色來分別敵我，盡量還原自己對民主、自由、人道等價值的原色信仰，盡可能追求超乎藍綠的客觀價值。無論如何，要一點一滴找回中間地帶，切勿再陷入集體憤世嫉俗的悲情，那是我們在前一波民主化已經切身體驗過的一課。
Sunday, August 18, 2013
End of Jasmine Revolution, Beginning of Social Conflict
End of Jasmine Revolution, Beginning of Social Conflict
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
August 17, 2013
Summary: Some on Taiwan are comparing the White Shirt protests on Ketegelan Boulevard to Egypt's Jasmine Revolution. But the Jasmine Revolution is already ebbing. The military has ousted President Mohamed Mursi. The Jasmine Revolution has crumbled. The interim government's expulsion of Mursi supporters yesterday led to violent clashes and numerous casualties. The Jasmine Revolution left us with beautiful memories of peace. But it has now drawn to a close.
Full text below:
Some on Taiwan are comparing the White Shirt protests on Ketegelan Boulevard to Egypt's Jasmine Revolution. But the Jasmine Revolution is already ebbing. The military has ousted President Mohamed Mursi. The Jasmine Revolution has crumbled. The interim government's expulsion of Mursi supporters yesterday led to violent clashes and numerous casualties. The Jasmine Revolution left us with beautiful memories of peace. But it has now drawn to a close.
The recent wave of police evictions led to the death of hundreds. The Muslim Brotherhood has joined other groups opposed to the coup. It has launched an "Angry Friday" protest march, and will engage in more large-scale counterattacks. Muslims have also attacked and set fire to over 20 Christian churches throughout Egypt. As we can see, the crackdown is out of control. Egyptian society faces long-term confrontation and polarization. This is the most worrisome development of all.
The Jasmine Revolution overthrew the Mubarak regime. Egyptian politics then underwent two consecutive changes, both for the worse. The first was the election of President Mursi, who failed to live up to the public trust. Under his regime, Islam rapidly expanded its power. It forced through many policies that frightened secular society. Democracy regressed. The economy suffered. The second was the sudden interference of the Egyptian military in domestic affairs. It forcibly ousted Mursi. It used false pretexts to win democratic elections, undermining the legitimacy of the interim government. This is why Mursi supporters persist in their protests.
Scanning the faces of the crowd enables one to better understand Egypt's problem. The Jasmine Revolution was waged by relatively young, westernized men and women, fluent in English, accustomed to the Internet and mobile phones. Pro-Islam protesters are largely middle-aged men and women wearing traditional Muslim headwear.
This is not deliberate stereotyping. This is one country in which two different peoples coexist. Their living conditions are different. Their thoughts and concerns are also different. The Western media will undoubtedly pay much more attention to the former. The international community will undoubtedly offer it much more sympathy and support. The latter will receive much less international attention. But they vastly outnumber the former. They are Mursi's main support. Lest we forget, these two peoples are all Egyptians. They all want their nation to move forward. They all want international respect. More importantly, no matter who subjects them to repression, they all bleed the same blood.
During the Jasmine Revolution, the internal contradictions were not so obvious. People were unanimous in pointing the finger at the authoritarian Mubarak. But once the Jasmine Revolution succeeded, decades of expectations for democracy were crushed. All they received was Mursi's arbitrary rule and economic decline. The elites who instigated the Jasmine Revolution naturally concluded that Mursi hijacked their revolution. Similarly, when the military forcibly ousted Mursi, the Muslim Brotherhood felt equally indignant. As they saw it, the Egyptian military hijacked democratic elections. Overnight, two consecutive waves of unrest split Egypt along religious and class lines, leading to political enmity, bloody repression, and unending hatred.
Egypt's Jasmine Revolution was universally lauded as a movement of public awakening, as a refreshing example of peaceful, rational, and successful protest. Who knew that two short years later, the situation would lead into nationwide unrest, public suffering, and social enmity, to the point where people have thrown up their hands in disgust. To overthrow a tyrant or two is not difficult. The true challenge is to create a long-lasting democracy that protects all its citizens. As the example of Mursi shows, it is easy for those who have tasted power to be carried away. It is easy for them to ignore the religious beliefs and values of those who differ. The military failed to give Mursi a chance to do better before it forced his ouster. It vigorously suppressed the Muslim Brotherhood. This too guaranteed that the country would descend into chaos. The masses on both sides blindly clashed, without regard for right and wrong, increasing antagonism and hatred.
Egypt's interim government has declared a one-month state of emergency. It has effectively returned to Mubarak era military rule. Such changes make those who cheered the Jasmine Revolution want to hide their faces. This paradoxes and institutional complexities of democracy demand closer examination. Mass movements can tear down powerful regimes. But they can also disrupt social order. Democratic elections can reflect public opinion. But they can also elect anti-democratic strongmen. A military coup can control abuse of power by a president. But it can also irreparably divide a society. Military repression can clear the streets of mobs. But it can also drive people to engage in street battles and resort to terrorist activities.
Without self-restraint, humility, and patience, one cannot establish a truly democratic society. This is what we have learned from Egypt's Jasmine Revolution.
茉莉花革命凋零且質變為社會衝突
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.08.17 02:47 am
正當台灣有人把凱道「白衫軍」和埃及的「茉莉花革命」相提並論，茉莉花革命其實已經凋萎了。在軍方罷黜穆希總統時，茉莉花即已告摧折；而日昨臨時政府下令驅逐擁穆希的群眾引發激烈死傷衝突，茉莉花革命留下的和平與美好記憶，至此盡付東流。
這波軍警驅離行動造成數百人的死亡後，「穆斯林兄弟會」已聯合各個「反政變」團體，發起「憤怒星期五」的大遊行，將進行更大規模的反擊。與此同時，埃及各地發生了穆斯林攻擊廿多座基督教堂並縱火的事件。由此看來，鎮壓行動失控，將使埃及社會陷入長期分裂與兩極對峙，這才是最值得擔憂的事。
在茉莉花革命推翻穆巴拉克政權後，埃及政治發生了兩次「劣化的質變」。第一次，是民選的穆希總統未能珍惜人民的託付，他在政府中大肆擴張穆斯林勢力，強行推動讓國內世俗派心寒和恐慌的政策，導致民主倒退、經濟走樣；第二次，是埃及軍方驟然干政，強行罷黜穆希，假民意之名奪取民主選舉的果實，使得臨時政府的正當性備受挑戰。這正是「擁穆希」群眾不斷抗爭的理由。
以群眾的臉孔作為對照，大家也許更容易理解埃及今天的問題。我們在茉莉花革命中看到的，是一批相對年輕、西化、熱情、英語流利、使用網路和手機的男女；我們在「擁穆」示威中看到的，則是更多中年以上、傳統、憤怒、戴著回帽或頭巾的群眾。
這並非要故意將群眾分類或刻板印象化，但是，這就是同一個國家裡並存的兩種不同人民，他們的生活處境不同，他們的思維和關注也大不相同。在西方媒體鏡頭前，前者無疑享有更多國際社會的注目、同情與支持；後者的國際曝光度比較小，但他們在人數上卻占有絕對優勢，也是支持穆希的主力。但別忘了，這兩類人都是埃及人民，他們都渴望國家進步，渴望自己受到尊重；更重要的是，他們不論受到誰的鎮壓，流出的血都是一樣鮮紅。
在茉莉花革命期間，這樣的內部矛盾其實並不明顯，人民的箭頭都一致指向專制的穆巴拉克。但在茉莉花革命後，當數十年的民主期待，卻只換來穆希的專橫統治及經濟萎縮，掀起茉莉花革命的菁英民眾自然認為穆希豪奪了他們的革命果實。同樣的，當軍方密謀強行罷黜穆希後，穆斯林的兄弟姐妺們當然也義憤難填，認為軍方強姦了埃及的民主選舉。經過這兩次的動盪，埃及社會的宗教和階級差異一夕裂為斷層，演成政治的敵我對陣；再加上鎮壓的血腥仇恨，就更沒完沒了。
埃及的茉莉花革命，原是舉世稱揚的一場人民自覺運動，創造了清新、和平、理性抗爭而獲得勝利的先例；誰知，不過短短兩年，情勢卻演變成今天舉國動盪、人民煎熬、社會仇殺的地步，委實讓人唏噓。由此可見，要推翻一個或兩個暴君並不困難，真正艱難的是，要如何建立一套可長可久的民主制度，讓所有的國民都能受到它的保障。從穆希的例子看，大權在握的人很容易得意忘形，忘了要尊重那些宗教信仰及價值觀和自己不同的人；對軍方而言，未給穆希改善的機會即將他罷黜，並大肆打壓穆兄會，也注定國家要陷入混亂和失序狀態；對雙方群眾而言，一味爭論已經沒有黑白可言的是非，也只會增加對立和仇恨的情緒。
目前的埃及，在臨時政府宣布進入一個月的「緊急狀態」後，等於已回到一個如同穆巴拉克時代的軍事統治。對所有曾為茉莉花革命而歡呼過的人而言，面對這樣的變化，除了掩面而嘆，恐怕也必須對民主的吊詭、複雜與制度性之必要多作思考。群眾運動能推倒強權，也能破壞社會秩序；民主選舉能反映民意，也能選出反民主的強人；軍事政變能節制濫權總統，卻也能把社會帶向無法挽回的撕裂；軍事鎮壓可以驅走街頭群眾，卻可能把民眾推入巷戰衝突及恐怖活動。
沒有自我節制，沒有謙卑忍讓，不可能產生真正的民主社會。這是我們看埃及茉莉花革命的枯萎應該學到的一課。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
August 17, 2013
Summary: Some on Taiwan are comparing the White Shirt protests on Ketegelan Boulevard to Egypt's Jasmine Revolution. But the Jasmine Revolution is already ebbing. The military has ousted President Mohamed Mursi. The Jasmine Revolution has crumbled. The interim government's expulsion of Mursi supporters yesterday led to violent clashes and numerous casualties. The Jasmine Revolution left us with beautiful memories of peace. But it has now drawn to a close.
Full text below:
Some on Taiwan are comparing the White Shirt protests on Ketegelan Boulevard to Egypt's Jasmine Revolution. But the Jasmine Revolution is already ebbing. The military has ousted President Mohamed Mursi. The Jasmine Revolution has crumbled. The interim government's expulsion of Mursi supporters yesterday led to violent clashes and numerous casualties. The Jasmine Revolution left us with beautiful memories of peace. But it has now drawn to a close.
The recent wave of police evictions led to the death of hundreds. The Muslim Brotherhood has joined other groups opposed to the coup. It has launched an "Angry Friday" protest march, and will engage in more large-scale counterattacks. Muslims have also attacked and set fire to over 20 Christian churches throughout Egypt. As we can see, the crackdown is out of control. Egyptian society faces long-term confrontation and polarization. This is the most worrisome development of all.
The Jasmine Revolution overthrew the Mubarak regime. Egyptian politics then underwent two consecutive changes, both for the worse. The first was the election of President Mursi, who failed to live up to the public trust. Under his regime, Islam rapidly expanded its power. It forced through many policies that frightened secular society. Democracy regressed. The economy suffered. The second was the sudden interference of the Egyptian military in domestic affairs. It forcibly ousted Mursi. It used false pretexts to win democratic elections, undermining the legitimacy of the interim government. This is why Mursi supporters persist in their protests.
Scanning the faces of the crowd enables one to better understand Egypt's problem. The Jasmine Revolution was waged by relatively young, westernized men and women, fluent in English, accustomed to the Internet and mobile phones. Pro-Islam protesters are largely middle-aged men and women wearing traditional Muslim headwear.
This is not deliberate stereotyping. This is one country in which two different peoples coexist. Their living conditions are different. Their thoughts and concerns are also different. The Western media will undoubtedly pay much more attention to the former. The international community will undoubtedly offer it much more sympathy and support. The latter will receive much less international attention. But they vastly outnumber the former. They are Mursi's main support. Lest we forget, these two peoples are all Egyptians. They all want their nation to move forward. They all want international respect. More importantly, no matter who subjects them to repression, they all bleed the same blood.
During the Jasmine Revolution, the internal contradictions were not so obvious. People were unanimous in pointing the finger at the authoritarian Mubarak. But once the Jasmine Revolution succeeded, decades of expectations for democracy were crushed. All they received was Mursi's arbitrary rule and economic decline. The elites who instigated the Jasmine Revolution naturally concluded that Mursi hijacked their revolution. Similarly, when the military forcibly ousted Mursi, the Muslim Brotherhood felt equally indignant. As they saw it, the Egyptian military hijacked democratic elections. Overnight, two consecutive waves of unrest split Egypt along religious and class lines, leading to political enmity, bloody repression, and unending hatred.
Egypt's Jasmine Revolution was universally lauded as a movement of public awakening, as a refreshing example of peaceful, rational, and successful protest. Who knew that two short years later, the situation would lead into nationwide unrest, public suffering, and social enmity, to the point where people have thrown up their hands in disgust. To overthrow a tyrant or two is not difficult. The true challenge is to create a long-lasting democracy that protects all its citizens. As the example of Mursi shows, it is easy for those who have tasted power to be carried away. It is easy for them to ignore the religious beliefs and values of those who differ. The military failed to give Mursi a chance to do better before it forced his ouster. It vigorously suppressed the Muslim Brotherhood. This too guaranteed that the country would descend into chaos. The masses on both sides blindly clashed, without regard for right and wrong, increasing antagonism and hatred.
Egypt's interim government has declared a one-month state of emergency. It has effectively returned to Mubarak era military rule. Such changes make those who cheered the Jasmine Revolution want to hide their faces. This paradoxes and institutional complexities of democracy demand closer examination. Mass movements can tear down powerful regimes. But they can also disrupt social order. Democratic elections can reflect public opinion. But they can also elect anti-democratic strongmen. A military coup can control abuse of power by a president. But it can also irreparably divide a society. Military repression can clear the streets of mobs. But it can also drive people to engage in street battles and resort to terrorist activities.
Without self-restraint, humility, and patience, one cannot establish a truly democratic society. This is what we have learned from Egypt's Jasmine Revolution.
茉莉花革命凋零且質變為社會衝突
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.08.17 02:47 am
正當台灣有人把凱道「白衫軍」和埃及的「茉莉花革命」相提並論，茉莉花革命其實已經凋萎了。在軍方罷黜穆希總統時，茉莉花即已告摧折；而日昨臨時政府下令驅逐擁穆希的群眾引發激烈死傷衝突，茉莉花革命留下的和平與美好記憶，至此盡付東流。
這波軍警驅離行動造成數百人的死亡後，「穆斯林兄弟會」已聯合各個「反政變」團體，發起「憤怒星期五」的大遊行，將進行更大規模的反擊。與此同時，埃及各地發生了穆斯林攻擊廿多座基督教堂並縱火的事件。由此看來，鎮壓行動失控，將使埃及社會陷入長期分裂與兩極對峙，這才是最值得擔憂的事。
在茉莉花革命推翻穆巴拉克政權後，埃及政治發生了兩次「劣化的質變」。第一次，是民選的穆希總統未能珍惜人民的託付，他在政府中大肆擴張穆斯林勢力，強行推動讓國內世俗派心寒和恐慌的政策，導致民主倒退、經濟走樣；第二次，是埃及軍方驟然干政，強行罷黜穆希，假民意之名奪取民主選舉的果實，使得臨時政府的正當性備受挑戰。這正是「擁穆希」群眾不斷抗爭的理由。
以群眾的臉孔作為對照，大家也許更容易理解埃及今天的問題。我們在茉莉花革命中看到的，是一批相對年輕、西化、熱情、英語流利、使用網路和手機的男女；我們在「擁穆」示威中看到的，則是更多中年以上、傳統、憤怒、戴著回帽或頭巾的群眾。
這並非要故意將群眾分類或刻板印象化，但是，這就是同一個國家裡並存的兩種不同人民，他們的生活處境不同，他們的思維和關注也大不相同。在西方媒體鏡頭前，前者無疑享有更多國際社會的注目、同情與支持；後者的國際曝光度比較小，但他們在人數上卻占有絕對優勢，也是支持穆希的主力。但別忘了，這兩類人都是埃及人民，他們都渴望國家進步，渴望自己受到尊重；更重要的是，他們不論受到誰的鎮壓，流出的血都是一樣鮮紅。
在茉莉花革命期間，這樣的內部矛盾其實並不明顯，人民的箭頭都一致指向專制的穆巴拉克。但在茉莉花革命後，當數十年的民主期待，卻只換來穆希的專橫統治及經濟萎縮，掀起茉莉花革命的菁英民眾自然認為穆希豪奪了他們的革命果實。同樣的，當軍方密謀強行罷黜穆希後，穆斯林的兄弟姐妺們當然也義憤難填，認為軍方強姦了埃及的民主選舉。經過這兩次的動盪，埃及社會的宗教和階級差異一夕裂為斷層，演成政治的敵我對陣；再加上鎮壓的血腥仇恨，就更沒完沒了。
埃及的茉莉花革命，原是舉世稱揚的一場人民自覺運動，創造了清新、和平、理性抗爭而獲得勝利的先例；誰知，不過短短兩年，情勢卻演變成今天舉國動盪、人民煎熬、社會仇殺的地步，委實讓人唏噓。由此可見，要推翻一個或兩個暴君並不困難，真正艱難的是，要如何建立一套可長可久的民主制度，讓所有的國民都能受到它的保障。從穆希的例子看，大權在握的人很容易得意忘形，忘了要尊重那些宗教信仰及價值觀和自己不同的人；對軍方而言，未給穆希改善的機會即將他罷黜，並大肆打壓穆兄會，也注定國家要陷入混亂和失序狀態；對雙方群眾而言，一味爭論已經沒有黑白可言的是非，也只會增加對立和仇恨的情緒。
目前的埃及，在臨時政府宣布進入一個月的「緊急狀態」後，等於已回到一個如同穆巴拉克時代的軍事統治。對所有曾為茉莉花革命而歡呼過的人而言，面對這樣的變化，除了掩面而嘆，恐怕也必須對民主的吊詭、複雜與制度性之必要多作思考。群眾運動能推倒強權，也能破壞社會秩序；民主選舉能反映民意，也能選出反民主的強人；軍事政變能節制濫權總統，卻也能把社會帶向無法挽回的撕裂；軍事鎮壓可以驅走街頭群眾，卻可能把民眾推入巷戰衝突及恐怖活動。
沒有自我節制，沒有謙卑忍讓，不可能產生真正的民主社會。這是我們看埃及茉莉花革命的枯萎應該學到的一課。
Thursday, August 15, 2013
Three Suns: The DPP's Twisted Triangle
Three Suns: The DPP's Twisted Triangle
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
August 16, 2013
Summary: Chen Shui-bian has rejoined the DPP. Together with Su Tseng-chang and Tsai Ing-wen, the three have created a "three suns" configuration. Three suns, all scrambling to fulfill their destinies. All competing to eclipse the other two. This wonder of political astronomy play itself out, right up to 2016 and beyond.
Full text below:
Chen Shui-bian has rejoined the DPP. Together with Su Tseng-chang and Tsai Ing-wen, the three have created a "three suns" configuration.
On May 28, this newspaper published an editorial entitled "Twisted Triangle: Chen Shui-bian, Su Tseng-chang, and Tsai Ing-wen." We wrote, "After the current All Peoples Conference, the path to power within the DPP will largely depend on triangular relationship between Chen Shui-bian, Su Tseng-chang and Tsai Ing-wen. . Developments indicate that this is a changeable scalene triangle. It might be termed a twisted triangle." Today, that twisted triangle has become a reality.
This "three suns" or "twisted triangle" works like the twin tracks of a railroad track. One track represents an ongoing struggle between the Taiwan independence, one nation on each side faction and the reform faction. The other track represents the ongoing struggle between Su Tseng-chang and Tsai Ing-wen fighting over the 2016 presidential election. Su is clearly more Taiwan independence oriented. Tsai is more reform oriented. Therefore the two parallel tracks may well cross and lead to a collision.
First take the ongoing struggle between the Taiwan independence, one nation on each side faction and the reform faction. Chen Shui-bian will most assuredly spin his return to the party as "vindication," as proof that he was "a victim of political and judicial persecution." Therefore Chen Shui-bian's readmission to the DPP cannot be interpreted as "medical parole." His ultimate goal is to redefine his place in history. As Annette Lu noted, Ah-Bian is not seeking "better treatment as a criminal." He is seeking to rebuild his political power base.
Chen's approach is to trade his personal support for Taiwan independence for Taiwan independence support for his greed and corruption. If Chen Shui-bian fails to support Taiwan independence, political support for his greed and corruption will vanish. Chen's greed and corruption is more than a moral or PR matter for the DPP. His greed and corruption means life or death for the DPP. Chen has returned to the party. He will now be the DPP's "Taiwan independence sun." The stars in the DPP constellation are subject to the effects of gravity. The Taiwan independence tail wags the DPP dog. Now that Chen Shui-bian has returned to the party, that is even more assured.
When the DPP party membership review team procrastinated, Chen Shui-bian sent a message to Su Tseng-chang, If the review team's answer was no, Chen would withdraw his supporters from the DPP and form a rival political party. It would become a "party outside the party." Now that Chen Shui-bian has returned to the DPP, he has essentially formed a "party inside the party." If he had formed a "party outside the party," the DPP might have been able to reform itself. But now that Chen has formed a "party inside the party," reform is essentially hopeless, and the party's chances for survival are slim.
Chen Shui-bian has rejoined the DPP, The probability that the DPP will reform itself has plummeted. If Chen's return leads to a schism within the party, the DPP will find it difficult to regain public trust. This will reduce the likelihood of the DPP winning the 2016 general election. Let us take a step back. Suppose the DPP wins the 2016 general election. The president will be the DPP candidate, either Su Tseng-chang or Tsai Ing-wen. The conclusion will be that the party has been vindicated. The pressure to pardon an "innocent" Chen Shui-bian will be even greater. But if the ruling DPP pardons an unrepentant, greedy, corrupt, obdurately pro-Taiwan independence Chen Shui-bian, the nation will know no peace. It will plunge into turmoil, politically and economically. Conversely, if a DPP president fails to pardon Chen Shui-bian, who will be able to prevent Chen Shui-bian from making a comeback? Perhaps this is what observers are referring to as "long term pain."
Now take the ongoing struggle between Su Tseng-chang and Tsai Ing-wen over the 2016 general election. Chen Shui-bian has rejoined to the party. Su Tseng-chang supported him. Tsai Ing-wen harbored reservations. From the beginning, Su Tseng-chang spun the Chen corruption case as "political persecution." He advocated an All Peoples Conference "referendum." He wanted the party to welcome Chen back into the party with open arms. During the application process he insisted that "Everything will be by the book." He called for "a little more humanity, and a little less calculation." This shows that Su was an enabler in this case, perhaps even the instigator. Su Tseng-chang is the DPP party chairman. Is he thinking of 2016? Is he afraid of offending Taiwan independence elements? If so, he has only one choice -- welcome Ah-Bian back into the party. But Su Tseng-chang's move has sharpened the battle lines between himself and Tsai Ing-wen in 2016.
Tsai Ing-wen has reservations about Chen Shui-bian returning to the party. She said, "I hope he (Chen) makes more of an effort, so that the public will accept him and sympathize with him." Her implication? Most of the public has not accepted Chen Shui-bian, and not sympathized with Chen Shui-bian. She even said, "The DPP's basic values of clean government and concern for right and wrong must not be muddied." She clearly wanted Chen supporters within the party to leave well enough alone. But events have gone against her. Chen is now back in the party, and is trumpeting his lifelong devotion to the party.
The DPP is advancing towards 2016. The Taiwan independence, one nation on each side faction is engaged in an ongoing struggle with the reform faction. Su and Tsai are engaged in an ongoing struggle over the 2016 general election. Two parallel tracks may well cross and lead to a collision. It all depends on changes in the "three suns" configuration. Chen's sun is the smallest. But its gravitational field remains strong. Its field is also the most destructive. Su's sun is not attempting to outshine Tsai's sun. It is merely attempting to eclipse Tsai's sun. It may play the role of spoiler. If Tsai's sun wants to shine, it must free itself from the gravitational field of Chen's sun and Su's sun. If Chen's sun and Su's sun eclipse Tsai's sun, if the DPP becomes a political prisoner to Taiwan independence forces, the party's future will be dim. Therefore the DPP party chairmanship election in May of next year may well change the "three suns configuration."
Three suns, all scrambling to fulfill their destinies. All competing to eclipse the other two. This wonder of political astronomy play itself out, right up to 2016 and beyond.
三個太陽：民進黨歪三角正式啟動
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.08.16 02:58 am
陳水扁重回民進黨，與蘇貞昌、蔡英文形成了「三個太陽」的態勢。
五月二十八日，本報社論〈歪三角：陳水扁、蘇貞昌、蔡英文〉指出：「經此次全代會，民進黨內部的權力與路線鬥爭，相當大部分將取決於陳水扁、蘇貞昌與蔡英文的三角關係。事態顯示，這是一個變動不居的不等邊三角形，可稱歪三角。」如今，這個歪三角正式啟動了。
這「三個太陽」或「歪三角」，將在猶如火車的雙軌上運動：一側軌道是台獨一邊一國派與轉型派的角力，另一側軌道則是蘇貞昌與蔡英文為二○一六年大選的角力。由於蘇顯然較傾獨派，而蔡則可能較主轉型；因此，兩軌並行，卻又相互尬車，行車之安全堪虞。
先說獨派一邊一國與轉型派的角力。陳水扁將返黨定位為「對於政治及司法迫害的實質平反」；因此，不能將陳水扁的胃口看成只想要「保外就醫」，他的最終目標是重建其歷史定位。呂秀蓮即指出：扁要的不只是「受刑人處遇的問題」，而在「重建政治勢力」。
陳水扁的手法是：「我挺獨」，來換取「獨挺貪」。因為，陳水扁若不「挺獨」，「挺貪」的政治動能即失依托。其實，「挺貪」尚只是民進黨的道德風評問題而已，「挺獨」則是民進黨一決生死的路線之爭。如今，陳水扁返黨，將成民進黨內的「台獨太陽」，民進黨天空裡的星宿星辰皆將受其引力之影響。獨派在黨內尾巴搖狗的地位，在陳水扁返黨後將更形確立。
當民進黨「入黨複審小組」拖延進度時，陳水扁傳話給蘇貞昌，謂若無善了，將拉隊出走，另組新黨，是為「黨外之黨」；如今陳水扁回黨，卻不啻形成了「黨中之黨」。但若是「黨外之黨」，民進黨尚有轉型的生路；如今卻面對「黨中之黨」，若是轉型無望，恐就生機渺茫了。
陳水扁回黨，將使民進黨轉型的可能性劇降；倘因此而造成民進黨內部撕裂、社會信任難以重建，則將使民進黨二○一六年勝選的機率降低。退一步說，假設民進黨贏了二○一六大選，屆時民進黨籍的總統（蘇貞昌或蔡英文）更無理由不對「在黨內已經平反」的清白黨員陳水扁特赦。但若竟然特赦了既貪又獨、始終不認錯道歉的陳水扁，其政經治理恐就再無寧日了；但反過來說，若屆時仍不特赦陳水扁，誰又能擋得住陳水扁的反撲？這也許就是輿論所說的「長痛」。
再談蘇貞昌與蔡英文二○一六大選的角力。在陳水扁回黨一事上，蘇貞昌是支持派，蔡英文的態度則較有保留。蘇貞昌一開始即將扁案定位為「政治迫害」，並贊成在全代會「公決」此案，等於是要舉黨歡迎陳水扁回黨；又在「申請案」進行中表示，「一切按程序規定處理」，再稱「多一點人性，少一點算計」。凡此，在在顯示，蘇是此案的護航者，甚至是主導者。其實，蘇貞昌站在黨主席的立場，若心繫二○一六，又不想亦不敢開罪獨派，他也只有迎扁回黨的唯一選擇。然而，蘇貞昌的這個動作，使他與蔡英文在二○一六的角力形成更明銳的區隔。
蔡英文對陳水扁返黨較有保留。她說：「希望他（陳水扁）要多作努力，讓社會接受他、同情他。」此話可能是指，社會多數尚未接受陳水扁，也不同情陳水扁。她更說：「民進黨清廉的基本價值及是非判斷不要被模糊掉。」此話更儼然是要黨內的挺扁操作適可而止。然而，事與蔡英文之願違，陳水扁如今回黨了，並宣稱將永遠做黨的義工。
於是，民進黨通向二○一六的軌道，即是「台獨一邊一國派及轉型派的角力」，與「蘇蔡二○一六年大選的角力」，兩軌並行，卻又相互尬車的態勢，一切將取決於「三個太陽」的變動關係。其中，陳太陽的體積較小，但引力最強，亦最具負作用與破壞力；蘇太陽的第一目標已非超越蔡太陽，而只在欲圖遮蔽蔡太陽，因而可能淪為「成事不足，敗事有餘」的角色；蔡太陽若想出頭天，則必須掙脫陳太陽及蘇太陽的引力，倘若最後仍被扁蘇兩顆太陽遮成蔡日蝕，或淪為獨派的政治俘虜，那也就難有前景可期了。於是，明年五月的黨主席選舉，遂成可能改變「三個太陽架構」的時點。
三個太陽，爭逐天命，競相製造相互的日蝕；這個政治天文奇觀，將一直演到二○一六年及以後。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
August 16, 2013
Summary: Chen Shui-bian has rejoined the DPP. Together with Su Tseng-chang and Tsai Ing-wen, the three have created a "three suns" configuration. Three suns, all scrambling to fulfill their destinies. All competing to eclipse the other two. This wonder of political astronomy play itself out, right up to 2016 and beyond.
Full text below:
Chen Shui-bian has rejoined the DPP. Together with Su Tseng-chang and Tsai Ing-wen, the three have created a "three suns" configuration.
On May 28, this newspaper published an editorial entitled "Twisted Triangle: Chen Shui-bian, Su Tseng-chang, and Tsai Ing-wen." We wrote, "After the current All Peoples Conference, the path to power within the DPP will largely depend on triangular relationship between Chen Shui-bian, Su Tseng-chang and Tsai Ing-wen. . Developments indicate that this is a changeable scalene triangle. It might be termed a twisted triangle." Today, that twisted triangle has become a reality.
This "three suns" or "twisted triangle" works like the twin tracks of a railroad track. One track represents an ongoing struggle between the Taiwan independence, one nation on each side faction and the reform faction. The other track represents the ongoing struggle between Su Tseng-chang and Tsai Ing-wen fighting over the 2016 presidential election. Su is clearly more Taiwan independence oriented. Tsai is more reform oriented. Therefore the two parallel tracks may well cross and lead to a collision.
First take the ongoing struggle between the Taiwan independence, one nation on each side faction and the reform faction. Chen Shui-bian will most assuredly spin his return to the party as "vindication," as proof that he was "a victim of political and judicial persecution." Therefore Chen Shui-bian's readmission to the DPP cannot be interpreted as "medical parole." His ultimate goal is to redefine his place in history. As Annette Lu noted, Ah-Bian is not seeking "better treatment as a criminal." He is seeking to rebuild his political power base.
Chen's approach is to trade his personal support for Taiwan independence for Taiwan independence support for his greed and corruption. If Chen Shui-bian fails to support Taiwan independence, political support for his greed and corruption will vanish. Chen's greed and corruption is more than a moral or PR matter for the DPP. His greed and corruption means life or death for the DPP. Chen has returned to the party. He will now be the DPP's "Taiwan independence sun." The stars in the DPP constellation are subject to the effects of gravity. The Taiwan independence tail wags the DPP dog. Now that Chen Shui-bian has returned to the party, that is even more assured.
When the DPP party membership review team procrastinated, Chen Shui-bian sent a message to Su Tseng-chang, If the review team's answer was no, Chen would withdraw his supporters from the DPP and form a rival political party. It would become a "party outside the party." Now that Chen Shui-bian has returned to the DPP, he has essentially formed a "party inside the party." If he had formed a "party outside the party," the DPP might have been able to reform itself. But now that Chen has formed a "party inside the party," reform is essentially hopeless, and the party's chances for survival are slim.
Chen Shui-bian has rejoined the DPP, The probability that the DPP will reform itself has plummeted. If Chen's return leads to a schism within the party, the DPP will find it difficult to regain public trust. This will reduce the likelihood of the DPP winning the 2016 general election. Let us take a step back. Suppose the DPP wins the 2016 general election. The president will be the DPP candidate, either Su Tseng-chang or Tsai Ing-wen. The conclusion will be that the party has been vindicated. The pressure to pardon an "innocent" Chen Shui-bian will be even greater. But if the ruling DPP pardons an unrepentant, greedy, corrupt, obdurately pro-Taiwan independence Chen Shui-bian, the nation will know no peace. It will plunge into turmoil, politically and economically. Conversely, if a DPP president fails to pardon Chen Shui-bian, who will be able to prevent Chen Shui-bian from making a comeback? Perhaps this is what observers are referring to as "long term pain."
Now take the ongoing struggle between Su Tseng-chang and Tsai Ing-wen over the 2016 general election. Chen Shui-bian has rejoined to the party. Su Tseng-chang supported him. Tsai Ing-wen harbored reservations. From the beginning, Su Tseng-chang spun the Chen corruption case as "political persecution." He advocated an All Peoples Conference "referendum." He wanted the party to welcome Chen back into the party with open arms. During the application process he insisted that "Everything will be by the book." He called for "a little more humanity, and a little less calculation." This shows that Su was an enabler in this case, perhaps even the instigator. Su Tseng-chang is the DPP party chairman. Is he thinking of 2016? Is he afraid of offending Taiwan independence elements? If so, he has only one choice -- welcome Ah-Bian back into the party. But Su Tseng-chang's move has sharpened the battle lines between himself and Tsai Ing-wen in 2016.
Tsai Ing-wen has reservations about Chen Shui-bian returning to the party. She said, "I hope he (Chen) makes more of an effort, so that the public will accept him and sympathize with him." Her implication? Most of the public has not accepted Chen Shui-bian, and not sympathized with Chen Shui-bian. She even said, "The DPP's basic values of clean government and concern for right and wrong must not be muddied." She clearly wanted Chen supporters within the party to leave well enough alone. But events have gone against her. Chen is now back in the party, and is trumpeting his lifelong devotion to the party.
The DPP is advancing towards 2016. The Taiwan independence, one nation on each side faction is engaged in an ongoing struggle with the reform faction. Su and Tsai are engaged in an ongoing struggle over the 2016 general election. Two parallel tracks may well cross and lead to a collision. It all depends on changes in the "three suns" configuration. Chen's sun is the smallest. But its gravitational field remains strong. Its field is also the most destructive. Su's sun is not attempting to outshine Tsai's sun. It is merely attempting to eclipse Tsai's sun. It may play the role of spoiler. If Tsai's sun wants to shine, it must free itself from the gravitational field of Chen's sun and Su's sun. If Chen's sun and Su's sun eclipse Tsai's sun, if the DPP becomes a political prisoner to Taiwan independence forces, the party's future will be dim. Therefore the DPP party chairmanship election in May of next year may well change the "three suns configuration."
Three suns, all scrambling to fulfill their destinies. All competing to eclipse the other two. This wonder of political astronomy play itself out, right up to 2016 and beyond.
三個太陽：民進黨歪三角正式啟動
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.08.16 02:58 am
陳水扁重回民進黨，與蘇貞昌、蔡英文形成了「三個太陽」的態勢。
五月二十八日，本報社論〈歪三角：陳水扁、蘇貞昌、蔡英文〉指出：「經此次全代會，民進黨內部的權力與路線鬥爭，相當大部分將取決於陳水扁、蘇貞昌與蔡英文的三角關係。事態顯示，這是一個變動不居的不等邊三角形，可稱歪三角。」如今，這個歪三角正式啟動了。
這「三個太陽」或「歪三角」，將在猶如火車的雙軌上運動：一側軌道是台獨一邊一國派與轉型派的角力，另一側軌道則是蘇貞昌與蔡英文為二○一六年大選的角力。由於蘇顯然較傾獨派，而蔡則可能較主轉型；因此，兩軌並行，卻又相互尬車，行車之安全堪虞。
先說獨派一邊一國與轉型派的角力。陳水扁將返黨定位為「對於政治及司法迫害的實質平反」；因此，不能將陳水扁的胃口看成只想要「保外就醫」，他的最終目標是重建其歷史定位。呂秀蓮即指出：扁要的不只是「受刑人處遇的問題」，而在「重建政治勢力」。
陳水扁的手法是：「我挺獨」，來換取「獨挺貪」。因為，陳水扁若不「挺獨」，「挺貪」的政治動能即失依托。其實，「挺貪」尚只是民進黨的道德風評問題而已，「挺獨」則是民進黨一決生死的路線之爭。如今，陳水扁返黨，將成民進黨內的「台獨太陽」，民進黨天空裡的星宿星辰皆將受其引力之影響。獨派在黨內尾巴搖狗的地位，在陳水扁返黨後將更形確立。
當民進黨「入黨複審小組」拖延進度時，陳水扁傳話給蘇貞昌，謂若無善了，將拉隊出走，另組新黨，是為「黨外之黨」；如今陳水扁回黨，卻不啻形成了「黨中之黨」。但若是「黨外之黨」，民進黨尚有轉型的生路；如今卻面對「黨中之黨」，若是轉型無望，恐就生機渺茫了。
陳水扁回黨，將使民進黨轉型的可能性劇降；倘因此而造成民進黨內部撕裂、社會信任難以重建，則將使民進黨二○一六年勝選的機率降低。退一步說，假設民進黨贏了二○一六大選，屆時民進黨籍的總統（蘇貞昌或蔡英文）更無理由不對「在黨內已經平反」的清白黨員陳水扁特赦。但若竟然特赦了既貪又獨、始終不認錯道歉的陳水扁，其政經治理恐就再無寧日了；但反過來說，若屆時仍不特赦陳水扁，誰又能擋得住陳水扁的反撲？這也許就是輿論所說的「長痛」。
再談蘇貞昌與蔡英文二○一六大選的角力。在陳水扁回黨一事上，蘇貞昌是支持派，蔡英文的態度則較有保留。蘇貞昌一開始即將扁案定位為「政治迫害」，並贊成在全代會「公決」此案，等於是要舉黨歡迎陳水扁回黨；又在「申請案」進行中表示，「一切按程序規定處理」，再稱「多一點人性，少一點算計」。凡此，在在顯示，蘇是此案的護航者，甚至是主導者。其實，蘇貞昌站在黨主席的立場，若心繫二○一六，又不想亦不敢開罪獨派，他也只有迎扁回黨的唯一選擇。然而，蘇貞昌的這個動作，使他與蔡英文在二○一六的角力形成更明銳的區隔。
蔡英文對陳水扁返黨較有保留。她說：「希望他（陳水扁）要多作努力，讓社會接受他、同情他。」此話可能是指，社會多數尚未接受陳水扁，也不同情陳水扁。她更說：「民進黨清廉的基本價值及是非判斷不要被模糊掉。」此話更儼然是要黨內的挺扁操作適可而止。然而，事與蔡英文之願違，陳水扁如今回黨了，並宣稱將永遠做黨的義工。
於是，民進黨通向二○一六的軌道，即是「台獨一邊一國派及轉型派的角力」，與「蘇蔡二○一六年大選的角力」，兩軌並行，卻又相互尬車的態勢，一切將取決於「三個太陽」的變動關係。其中，陳太陽的體積較小，但引力最強，亦最具負作用與破壞力；蘇太陽的第一目標已非超越蔡太陽，而只在欲圖遮蔽蔡太陽，因而可能淪為「成事不足，敗事有餘」的角色；蔡太陽若想出頭天，則必須掙脫陳太陽及蘇太陽的引力，倘若最後仍被扁蘇兩顆太陽遮成蔡日蝕，或淪為獨派的政治俘虜，那也就難有前景可期了。於是，明年五月的黨主席選舉，遂成可能改變「三個太陽架構」的時點。
三個太陽，爭逐天命，競相製造相互的日蝕；這個政治天文奇觀，將一直演到二○一六年及以後。
Wednesday, August 14, 2013
DPP and Ah-Bian: Lie Down with Dogs, Get Up with Fleas
DPP and Ah-Bian: Lie Down with Dogs, Get Up with Fleas
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
August 15, 2013
Summary: Yesterday the DPP approved Chen Shui-bian's application to rejoin the party. This shows that the DPP has never given the Chen family's corruption a second thought. Even worse, it now intends to invite this embezzler back into its house. The DPP is essentially telling the world it is in cahoots with Ah-Bian. The last vestige of hope that voters might have held out for the DPP is now gone.
Full text below:
Yesterday the DPP approved Chen Shui-bian's application to rejoin the party. This shows that the DPP has never given the Chen family's corruption a second thought. Even worse, it now intends to invite this embezzler back into its house. The DPP is essentially telling the world it is in cahoots with Ah-Bian. The last vestige of hope that voters might have held out for the DPP is now gone.
Ah-Bian is rejoining the party. The DPP finds itself in a bind. It is clearly guilty of gross hypocrisy. First of all, this is not rehabilitation. Chen Shui-bian was found guilty on mutiple counts of corruption. Most people do not consider Ah-Bian a "victim." More importantly, Ah-Bian has never confessed his crimes or apologized for his misdeeds. Yet the DPP has given him a free pass. The Ah-Bian corruption scandal will only bring down the DPP.
The DPP has allowed Ah-Bian to rejoin the party. But the DPP leadership was clearly ashamed. It was at a loss to defend its actions. This was clear from the two rationalizations offered by DPP Central Party Review Panel Convener Kuan Bi-ling. Rationalization One. Chen Shui-bian is sick. He is a victim of severe depression. By magnanmously allowing him to rejoin the party, the DPP is deferring to both human rights concerns and tp medical necessity. Rationalization Two. Former President Chen's application to rejoin the party was approved by the Central Standing Committee. Chief Convener Ker Chen-ming presented the application to former President Chen to fill out. Therefore the party cannot permit any internal inconsistencies.
Such sophistry can hardly rationalize the party's actions, which are utterly incomprehensible. Political parties are not hospitals. Ah-Bian may well be suffering from severe depression. But what does that have to do with rejoining the DPP? Now consider the second justification. The Central Standing Committee has resolved that Ah-Bian may rejoin the party. Therefore, as the logic goes, the Review Panel must not oppose this resolution. This sounds like plain and simple evasion of responsibility. It is true that the DPP Central Standing Committee and Central Evaluation Committee ought to have the final say regarding Ah-Bian's application to rejoin the party. The DPP Central Standing Committee deliberately passed the buck to the Review Panel. Put bluntly, DPP Party Chairman Su Tseng-chang evaded responsibility. But this is a sin of historic proportions that could very well sink the DPP. Can Su really dodge such a bullet?
In late 2006, Wu Shu-cheng was being prosecuted for corruption in the State Affairs Fund case. Chen Shui-bian was still president. Yet the DPP convened an emergency session of the DPP Central Executive Committee. DPP leaders engaged in heated debate. The party still included dissenting voices outspoken enough to acknowledge the First Family's wrongdoing. They demanded that the party distinguish between right and wrong. Now however, the DPP's word is final. Chief Convener Ker Chien-ming conveys the party leadership's ruling to the party faithful. Who dares to utter a word of dissent?
Ironically Su Tseng-chang contradicted himself. In 2008 Tsai Ing-wen took over as DPP Party Chairman. Confronted with the Chen corruption case, she was helpless to respond. WikiLeaks revealed that Su Tseng-chang repeatedly criticized Tsai Ing-wen during a meeting with the AIT. He said that under Tsai Ing-wen's leadership, the DPP lacked courage and determination. He said it failed to unequivocally and promptly disown Ah-Bian. It failed to distance itself from him. This he said, was a colossal blunder.
Today, looking back at Chairman Su's magniloquence, one cannot help being overwhelmed by emotion. Tsai Ing-wen's bottom line was Chen Shui-bian's right to medical treatment. She was unable to block the Taiwan independence fundamentalists. She was unable to prevent the Chen faction from extending its reach into the DPP. But contrast, Su Tseng-chang has allowed the Chen faction to march right in. Su's conduct is not even in the same ballpark as "courage." Su totally ignored right and wrong. The public finds one question most baffling of all. Why, it asks, was it necessary to allow Ah-Bian to rejoin the party? Yesterday during the Review Panel meeting, some said the DPP should simply bite the bullet and get it over with. Refusing to allow Ah-Bian to rejoin the party might lead to short-term pain, i.e., attacks from party insiders. But the DPP would continue to uphold Chen Shui-bian's right to health care. By contrast, allowing Ah-Bian to rejoin the party would surely lead to long-term pain. The DPP would continue taking heat for the Chen corruption case. It would lose its firewall.
Long term pain vs. short term pain. Which is worse? Anyone with a modicum of common sense knows the answer to that. No wonder DPP elder Lin Cho-shui blasted Chen Shui-bian's reentry into the party. For a political party with a mission, this is shameful. Meanwhile, realpolitik has motivated the DPP to hurriedly readmit Ah-Bian. It is almost as if the DPP is rushing to the aid of President Ma Ying-jeou, who has been dogged by low approval numbers. It is almost as if the DPP is filling the role of relief pitcher.
Lin Cho-shui said that if Chen Shui-bian insists on rejoining the party, he will become a nightmare for the DPP's 2016 presidential candidate. Anyone with a modicum of political knowledge understands this. In other words, allowing Ah-Bian to rejoin the party now is both morally and practically ill-advised .
It is destructive. It lacks any redeeming virtue. So why is the party leadership doing it? The answer may have to do with next year's party chairmanship election. Perhaps they are fighting each other for the Taiwan independence fundamentalist vote. But that is akin to drinking poison to quench one's thirst. Readmiting Ah-Bian means accepting what he has done. Leaders of a political party so deficient in vision may win their party's leadership. But such a party will never be able to win the presidency. Their individual struggles will be for naught. Most regrettable of all, the DPP will eventually be dragged down as well.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2013.08.15
社論－同流合汙 民進黨終於被看「扁」
本報訊
民進黨昨日通過陳水扁「再入黨申請案」，就一個從未嚴肅反省扁家貪腐弊案的政黨而言，現在又不明不白的將貪汙犯迎進門，此舉無異昭告天下，民進黨終於與扁同流合汙；而選民對民進黨的最後一絲期待，也終將就此破滅。
扁再入黨，讓民進黨陷於名不正言不順的困境。首先，這不是平反，陳水扁不但多案定讞，多數民意也不認為判決冤枉了扁；更重要的是，扁從未為過去的作為認錯致歉，隨隨便便就接納他，只會讓扁案重擔拖垮民進黨。
這一次民進黨同意讓扁重新入黨，顯然連民進黨中央都於心有愧，他們理不直氣不壯到什麼程度，單單從民進黨中央入黨複審小組召集人管碧玲的說法，就可以看出來，管碧玲提出同意扁入黨的兩個理由，第一、陳水扁為重度憂鬱之病人，其再入黨之情感，民進黨應給予人權暨醫療需求之必要考量。第二、陳前總統申請再入黨案，係經中常會決議，由柯建銘總召攜帶申請書，提送陳前總統填寫，黨不宜有前後不一的矛盾。
坦白說，這樣的說詞不但無法自圓其說，簡直是不知所云。試問，政黨又不是開醫院，扁有重度憂鬱症，與加入民進黨何干，至於第二點理由指稱，中常會既已決議扁入黨，複審小組不宜反對，聽起來簡直就是在迴避責任；確實，本該由民進黨中常會、中評會作最終決議的扁入黨案，黨中央卻刻意推給審查小組，說穿了，就是民進黨黨主席蘇貞昌逃避責任，只是，讓民進黨沉淪這樣一個歷史性的罪過，蘇貞昌真的逃得了嗎？
說來諷刺，民國95年底、扁嫂吳淑珍因國務機要費貪汙案遭起訴，當時陳水扁貴為總統，但民進黨仍召開臨時擴大中執會，讓民進黨菁英激辯，那時該黨還有少數諤諤之士，直言扁及第一家庭之過，要求黨中央不可無是非；相反的，現在的民進黨則是黨意先行，貴為總召的柯建銘負責送件，黨內還能有什麼異聲！
更諷刺的，還是蘇貞昌的前後不一；蔡英文於97年接任民進黨黨主席，面對扁案左支右絀，維基解密透露，蘇貞昌當時接受美國在台協會訪問時多次批評，蔡英文主持下的民進黨缺乏膽識及決斷力，未能及早和扁畫清界線，未能和扁清楚切割，這是一大錯誤。
現在回過頭來看蘇主席當初這番豪語，令人感慨萬千！蔡英文至少堅持守住保衛陳水扁醫療人權這條底線，但還是能夠力擋基本教義派，不讓扁及扁系伸手進入民進黨；相反的，蘇貞昌則是讓扁系長驅直入。這樣的作為，不但與他說的膽識相差不可以道里計，其實已經是毫無是非可言。民意最不解的是，為何非要同意扁入黨不可？昨日複審小組會議中，就有長痛、短痛之說，短痛指的是不讓扁再入黨，可能短時間內會被攻擊，但民進黨仍可持續關心陳水扁的司法和醫療人權；相對的，所謂的長痛，當然是指民進黨與扁案包袱將長相左右，痛失防火牆。
坦白說，長痛、短痛孰者為重，只要有一點常識者都很清楚，難怪民進黨大老林濁水接受訪問時痛陳，陳水扁再入黨一案，對一個理想性使命政黨而言，這是非常羞恥的紀錄。同時，就政治現實面而言，民進黨現在趕著讓扁入黨，形同是幫民調低迷的馬英九總統解圍、扮演救援投手的角色。
林濁水還說，如果陳水扁堅持入黨，對民進黨內要參選2016總統大選的人而言都是一個噩夢，這也是任何有一點政治常識者，都可以了解的道理；換句話說，民進黨中央此時安排扁重新入黨，不但正當性有問題，同時也是不智之舉。
百害而無一利，黨中央為何孤注一擲，也許只能從明年的黨主席選舉、爭奪基本教義派選票可以解釋；只是，這是飲鴆止渴，因為，既接納扁，也就是同時接納他的所作所為，一個如此沒有長遠目光的政黨領導者，即使爭得黨權，將來也不可能奪取大位，個人白忙一場無所謂，最令人遺憾的是，民進黨也終將被拖累。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
August 15, 2013
Summary: Yesterday the DPP approved Chen Shui-bian's application to rejoin the party. This shows that the DPP has never given the Chen family's corruption a second thought. Even worse, it now intends to invite this embezzler back into its house. The DPP is essentially telling the world it is in cahoots with Ah-Bian. The last vestige of hope that voters might have held out for the DPP is now gone.
Full text below:
Yesterday the DPP approved Chen Shui-bian's application to rejoin the party. This shows that the DPP has never given the Chen family's corruption a second thought. Even worse, it now intends to invite this embezzler back into its house. The DPP is essentially telling the world it is in cahoots with Ah-Bian. The last vestige of hope that voters might have held out for the DPP is now gone.
Ah-Bian is rejoining the party. The DPP finds itself in a bind. It is clearly guilty of gross hypocrisy. First of all, this is not rehabilitation. Chen Shui-bian was found guilty on mutiple counts of corruption. Most people do not consider Ah-Bian a "victim." More importantly, Ah-Bian has never confessed his crimes or apologized for his misdeeds. Yet the DPP has given him a free pass. The Ah-Bian corruption scandal will only bring down the DPP.
The DPP has allowed Ah-Bian to rejoin the party. But the DPP leadership was clearly ashamed. It was at a loss to defend its actions. This was clear from the two rationalizations offered by DPP Central Party Review Panel Convener Kuan Bi-ling. Rationalization One. Chen Shui-bian is sick. He is a victim of severe depression. By magnanmously allowing him to rejoin the party, the DPP is deferring to both human rights concerns and tp medical necessity. Rationalization Two. Former President Chen's application to rejoin the party was approved by the Central Standing Committee. Chief Convener Ker Chen-ming presented the application to former President Chen to fill out. Therefore the party cannot permit any internal inconsistencies.
Such sophistry can hardly rationalize the party's actions, which are utterly incomprehensible. Political parties are not hospitals. Ah-Bian may well be suffering from severe depression. But what does that have to do with rejoining the DPP? Now consider the second justification. The Central Standing Committee has resolved that Ah-Bian may rejoin the party. Therefore, as the logic goes, the Review Panel must not oppose this resolution. This sounds like plain and simple evasion of responsibility. It is true that the DPP Central Standing Committee and Central Evaluation Committee ought to have the final say regarding Ah-Bian's application to rejoin the party. The DPP Central Standing Committee deliberately passed the buck to the Review Panel. Put bluntly, DPP Party Chairman Su Tseng-chang evaded responsibility. But this is a sin of historic proportions that could very well sink the DPP. Can Su really dodge such a bullet?
In late 2006, Wu Shu-cheng was being prosecuted for corruption in the State Affairs Fund case. Chen Shui-bian was still president. Yet the DPP convened an emergency session of the DPP Central Executive Committee. DPP leaders engaged in heated debate. The party still included dissenting voices outspoken enough to acknowledge the First Family's wrongdoing. They demanded that the party distinguish between right and wrong. Now however, the DPP's word is final. Chief Convener Ker Chien-ming conveys the party leadership's ruling to the party faithful. Who dares to utter a word of dissent?
Ironically Su Tseng-chang contradicted himself. In 2008 Tsai Ing-wen took over as DPP Party Chairman. Confronted with the Chen corruption case, she was helpless to respond. WikiLeaks revealed that Su Tseng-chang repeatedly criticized Tsai Ing-wen during a meeting with the AIT. He said that under Tsai Ing-wen's leadership, the DPP lacked courage and determination. He said it failed to unequivocally and promptly disown Ah-Bian. It failed to distance itself from him. This he said, was a colossal blunder.
Today, looking back at Chairman Su's magniloquence, one cannot help being overwhelmed by emotion. Tsai Ing-wen's bottom line was Chen Shui-bian's right to medical treatment. She was unable to block the Taiwan independence fundamentalists. She was unable to prevent the Chen faction from extending its reach into the DPP. But contrast, Su Tseng-chang has allowed the Chen faction to march right in. Su's conduct is not even in the same ballpark as "courage." Su totally ignored right and wrong. The public finds one question most baffling of all. Why, it asks, was it necessary to allow Ah-Bian to rejoin the party? Yesterday during the Review Panel meeting, some said the DPP should simply bite the bullet and get it over with. Refusing to allow Ah-Bian to rejoin the party might lead to short-term pain, i.e., attacks from party insiders. But the DPP would continue to uphold Chen Shui-bian's right to health care. By contrast, allowing Ah-Bian to rejoin the party would surely lead to long-term pain. The DPP would continue taking heat for the Chen corruption case. It would lose its firewall.
Long term pain vs. short term pain. Which is worse? Anyone with a modicum of common sense knows the answer to that. No wonder DPP elder Lin Cho-shui blasted Chen Shui-bian's reentry into the party. For a political party with a mission, this is shameful. Meanwhile, realpolitik has motivated the DPP to hurriedly readmit Ah-Bian. It is almost as if the DPP is rushing to the aid of President Ma Ying-jeou, who has been dogged by low approval numbers. It is almost as if the DPP is filling the role of relief pitcher.
Lin Cho-shui said that if Chen Shui-bian insists on rejoining the party, he will become a nightmare for the DPP's 2016 presidential candidate. Anyone with a modicum of political knowledge understands this. In other words, allowing Ah-Bian to rejoin the party now is both morally and practically ill-advised .
It is destructive. It lacks any redeeming virtue. So why is the party leadership doing it? The answer may have to do with next year's party chairmanship election. Perhaps they are fighting each other for the Taiwan independence fundamentalist vote. But that is akin to drinking poison to quench one's thirst. Readmiting Ah-Bian means accepting what he has done. Leaders of a political party so deficient in vision may win their party's leadership. But such a party will never be able to win the presidency. Their individual struggles will be for naught. Most regrettable of all, the DPP will eventually be dragged down as well.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2013.08.15
社論－同流合汙 民進黨終於被看「扁」
本報訊
民進黨昨日通過陳水扁「再入黨申請案」，就一個從未嚴肅反省扁家貪腐弊案的政黨而言，現在又不明不白的將貪汙犯迎進門，此舉無異昭告天下，民進黨終於與扁同流合汙；而選民對民進黨的最後一絲期待，也終將就此破滅。
扁再入黨，讓民進黨陷於名不正言不順的困境。首先，這不是平反，陳水扁不但多案定讞，多數民意也不認為判決冤枉了扁；更重要的是，扁從未為過去的作為認錯致歉，隨隨便便就接納他，只會讓扁案重擔拖垮民進黨。
這一次民進黨同意讓扁重新入黨，顯然連民進黨中央都於心有愧，他們理不直氣不壯到什麼程度，單單從民進黨中央入黨複審小組召集人管碧玲的說法，就可以看出來，管碧玲提出同意扁入黨的兩個理由，第一、陳水扁為重度憂鬱之病人，其再入黨之情感，民進黨應給予人權暨醫療需求之必要考量。第二、陳前總統申請再入黨案，係經中常會決議，由柯建銘總召攜帶申請書，提送陳前總統填寫，黨不宜有前後不一的矛盾。
坦白說，這樣的說詞不但無法自圓其說，簡直是不知所云。試問，政黨又不是開醫院，扁有重度憂鬱症，與加入民進黨何干，至於第二點理由指稱，中常會既已決議扁入黨，複審小組不宜反對，聽起來簡直就是在迴避責任；確實，本該由民進黨中常會、中評會作最終決議的扁入黨案，黨中央卻刻意推給審查小組，說穿了，就是民進黨黨主席蘇貞昌逃避責任，只是，讓民進黨沉淪這樣一個歷史性的罪過，蘇貞昌真的逃得了嗎？
說來諷刺，民國95年底、扁嫂吳淑珍因國務機要費貪汙案遭起訴，當時陳水扁貴為總統，但民進黨仍召開臨時擴大中執會，讓民進黨菁英激辯，那時該黨還有少數諤諤之士，直言扁及第一家庭之過，要求黨中央不可無是非；相反的，現在的民進黨則是黨意先行，貴為總召的柯建銘負責送件，黨內還能有什麼異聲！
更諷刺的，還是蘇貞昌的前後不一；蔡英文於97年接任民進黨黨主席，面對扁案左支右絀，維基解密透露，蘇貞昌當時接受美國在台協會訪問時多次批評，蔡英文主持下的民進黨缺乏膽識及決斷力，未能及早和扁畫清界線，未能和扁清楚切割，這是一大錯誤。
現在回過頭來看蘇主席當初這番豪語，令人感慨萬千！蔡英文至少堅持守住保衛陳水扁醫療人權這條底線，但還是能夠力擋基本教義派，不讓扁及扁系伸手進入民進黨；相反的，蘇貞昌則是讓扁系長驅直入。這樣的作為，不但與他說的膽識相差不可以道里計，其實已經是毫無是非可言。民意最不解的是，為何非要同意扁入黨不可？昨日複審小組會議中，就有長痛、短痛之說，短痛指的是不讓扁再入黨，可能短時間內會被攻擊，但民進黨仍可持續關心陳水扁的司法和醫療人權；相對的，所謂的長痛，當然是指民進黨與扁案包袱將長相左右，痛失防火牆。
坦白說，長痛、短痛孰者為重，只要有一點常識者都很清楚，難怪民進黨大老林濁水接受訪問時痛陳，陳水扁再入黨一案，對一個理想性使命政黨而言，這是非常羞恥的紀錄。同時，就政治現實面而言，民進黨現在趕著讓扁入黨，形同是幫民調低迷的馬英九總統解圍、扮演救援投手的角色。
林濁水還說，如果陳水扁堅持入黨，對民進黨內要參選2016總統大選的人而言都是一個噩夢，這也是任何有一點政治常識者，都可以了解的道理；換句話說，民進黨中央此時安排扁重新入黨，不但正當性有問題，同時也是不智之舉。
百害而無一利，黨中央為何孤注一擲，也許只能從明年的黨主席選舉、爭奪基本教義派選票可以解釋；只是，這是飲鴆止渴，因為，既接納扁，也就是同時接納他的所作所為，一個如此沒有長遠目光的政黨領導者，即使爭得黨權，將來也不可能奪取大位，個人白忙一場無所謂，最令人遺憾的是，民進黨也終將被拖累。
KMT-CCP Peace Agreement Presents Limitless Possibilities
KMT-CCP Peace Agreement Presents Limitless Possibilities
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
August 14, 2013
Summary: On the 8th of this month, Want Want China Times Media Group Chairman and founder Tsai Eng-meng made a proposal during the "Cross-Strait Peace Wealth Creation Forum." Tsai proposed that the KMT and CCP sign a peace agreement. His proposal is consistent with scholarly research. Peace is a process that proceeds from small to large, from easy to difficult, from near to far. Everyone ought to give this fact serious consideration.
Full text below:
On the 8th of this month, Want Want China Times Media Group Chairman and founder Tsai Eng-meng made a proposal during the "Cross-Strait Peace Wealth Creation Forum." He urged Taipei and Beijing to sign a peace agreement. But realizing differences of opinion persisted on Taiwan, he urged the Kuomintang and the Communist Party to take the initiative of signing a peace agreement first. Only peace can build trust and create wealth. Opposition parties on Taiwan can catch up later. If such constructive and creative ideas can be implemented, the possibilities for cross-Strait relations are limitless.
Tsai made his proposal because he believes peace is an overarching value. A peace agreement would mean that the Chinese Civil War has officially ended. ARATS Vice Chairman Zheng Lizhong, who was present, considered it an excellent suggestion. MAC Vice Chairman Chang Hsien-yao also agreed with Tsai's proposal. The KMT said it would be happy to see the parties discuss cross-strait peace. Great achievements must begin with humility. A journey of a thousand miles begins with a single step. Achieving anything requires a process. As long as the parties are willing to listen, nothing ought to be ruled out.
As early as April 2005, during the first Lian Hu meeting, the KMT and CCP expressed the desire to sign a peace agreement. The KMT returned to power in 2008. Mainland President Hu Jintao seized the opportunity to improve bilateral relations. On December 31, he announced his six point policy for Taiwan. Once again, Beijing raised the issue of a cross-strait peace agreement. The Mainland demonstrated considerable goodwill and a willingness to cooperate.
In May 2008, President Ma Ying-jeou took office. Based on the 1992 consensus, he proposed a cross-strait provisional framework. He called for no [immediate] reunification, no independence, and no use of force. He unilaterally adopted a series of measures to improve relations with the Mainland. In January 2012, the Taiwan Region of the Republic of China held a presidential election. President Ma Ying-jeou was re-elected. During the election campaign, President Ma reiterated his vision for a "golden decade." In it he proposed the conditional deliberation and negoatiation of a cross-strait peace agreement. His proposal attracted considerable attention.
Consider a peace agreement between the two sides, such as Tsai's proposed agreement between the the KMT and CCP. Skeptics may say that the KMT and CCP can laugh away their past difference like brothers. Relations between the two may be harmonious. Cross-strait relations may not be what they once were. But the KMT and the CCP do not have the final say. One ought not create a tangled web and make things more complicated than they need to be. Consider the matter in a more positive light. This could be a gradual solution to the problem, a way to realize peace. How can anyone object?
Scholars researching the matter say a peace agreement requires complex advance negotiations. It requires preliminary and interim agreements. It requires broad agreement over the framework. It requires attention to implementation. The peace agreement would be subdivided into structure and content. The protocol would be subdivided into procedure, substance, and structure. A peace agreement should also address past grieveances, provide security guarantees, promote reconciliation, establish trust, and normalize relations. Each process is complex. Obviously the peace agreement must include different phases and different content. It is an ongoing process. Put simply, peace cannot be achieved overnight.
The results of research show the following. One. There can be no peace without compromise. Two. Peace must be a consensus reached by a majority. They must see it as just. Three. Peace must bring benefits. Four. The benefits of peace must be socially acceptable. Five. A society must be determined to achieve peace. Six. Peace today is no guarantee of peace tomorrow. But benign interaction can help protect a fragile peace. Seven. Peace often requires third party support. This support is often merely a formality. Eight. The longer the ceasefire, the more difficult it is to persuade the disputants to enter the peace process. The temporary state has become a fact of life. Nine. The more people involved in the peace process, the more robust the peace. Ten. The more communication and cooperation between different social strata, the more enduring the peace.
This does not mean that meeting all the conditions will guarantee peace. Nor does it mean that one or two missing conditions make peace impossible. Both sides may seek peace. They may not rule out a peace agreement. But they may lack mutual trust. They may be too self-centered. They may assume they are on the right side of history. They may consider only their own case. Self-restraint may be perceived as weakness. Self-protection may be perceived as provocation. The other side's words and deeds may make a just peace impossible. One side may refuse to make concesssions to deny the other side the satisfaction of winning. One sie may demand concessions but refuse to reciprocate. Any hope for peace may be lost in the process.
Tsai has proposed that the KMT and CCP sign a peace agreement. His proposal is consistent with scholarly research. Peace is a process that proceeds from small to large, from easy to difficult, from near to far. Everyone ought to give this fact serious consideration.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2013.08.14
社論－國共和平協議 讓兩岸有無限可能
本報訊
本月8日，旺旺中時媒体集團董事長、旺報創辦人蔡衍明於「兩岸和平創富論壇」呼籲，兩岸簽署和平協議，但是由於台灣內部意見分歧，所以他率先主張，由國民黨與共產黨先行簽署，因為只有和平才能建立互信、創造財富，而將來台灣其他的在野黨也可跟進。我們認為，這種建設性的思維和創造性的構想如果能夠付諸實施，未來的兩岸關係將有更大的空間和無限的可能。
蔡創辦人之所以出此倡議，是因為篤信和平才是最高的價值，協議的簽署將象徵國共內戰的正式結束。對此，與會的大陸海協會常務副會長鄭立中表示建議很好，而陸委會副主委張顯耀也說非常認同此議，給予尊重，國民黨方面則說樂見各方討論有關兩岸和平的相關建言。當然登高自卑、行遠由邇，凡事都要有一個發展、醞釀的過程，只要相關各方願意傾聽，不排除嘗試都是好事。
其實，早在2005年4月，國共雙方就曾於第一次的連胡會中，正式表達了關於兩岸研議、簽署和平協議的願景；2008年國民黨重掌政權之後，為了把握改善雙方關係的契機，當時的大陸國家主席胡錦濤也於當年12月31日發表對台政策的六點最新主張，北京再次提到兩岸和平協議的問題，中國大陸也展現相當程度的誠意與配合。
2008年5月，在馬英九總統主政之下，台北在九二共識的基礎上，主張兩岸不統、不獨、不武，提出兩岸暫行架構的概念，主動採取一系列政策，進一步改善和中國大陸之間的關係。2012年1月，中華民國台灣地區進行總統大選，馬英九總統獲選連任。選前，馬總統曾在黃金十年願景中再次提到，在滿足某些特定條件情況下，研議未來推動洽簽兩岸和平協議一事，引發各界關注。
不過，此時大家談的還是兩岸之間的和平協議，如今蔡創辦人所主張的則是國共之間的和平協議；持懷疑態度的人或謂，國共兩黨今天已經兄弟一笑泯恩仇，彼此關係已水乳交融，而且兩岸關係也今非昔比，並非國共兩黨能夠說了就算，實無必要再治絲益棼，把事情搞得更為複雜。但若從正面的角度來看，這確實不失為一個逐步解決問題的辦法，落實和平、簽署協議總不會有人反對吧？
其實，根據相關學者的專業研究，簽署和平協議所涉事端相當複雜，其中有談判前的協議，中程或初期的協議、廣泛或架構性的協議，以及如何執行協議等等。另外，若就和平協議的本身來說，又可細分為協議的結構與內容、協議的組成，其中包括程序性、實質性和結構性部分。至於建構和平協議的步驟則還應包括對過去的不公不義的糾正、安全保證、互惠和解、互信建立及關係正常化等等，每一個過程都相當的複雜。顯然，和平協議不但有不同的階段和組成內容，而且還會是一個發展的過程，簡單的說，和平不可能一蹴而成。
研究結果還顯示出，第一，沒有和平是不經妥協的；第二，和平必須是社會大多數成員的共識，被社會各界視為公正的；第三，和平必須能夠帶來好處；第四，和平所帶來的利益必須能夠讓社會接受；第五，要達成和平必須要有決心和意願；第六，和平雖然不保證未來的互動，但良性的互動有助於維護脆弱的和平；第七，和平通常必須受到第三者所支持，即使這種支持有時只是形式上的；第八，停火期間越長，爭議雙方越難進入和平協議，因為這種暫時的狀態已經成為一種穩定的生活方式；第九，越多人參與的和平過程，這種和平越為堅固；第十，社會上不同階層越多的溝通與合作，將使得和平越為穩固。
當然，在實務上這既不意味滿足上述所有條件就能維持和平，也不表示缺乏其中的一或二項就無法實現和平。反過來看，我們也發現，過去有太多的例子證明，雖然鬥爭雙方都表示有意追求和平，不排斥和平協議，但由於缺乏互信，彼此都出於本位思考，認為自己站在歷史正確的一方，只看到有利於己的一面；而自我克制又可能被對方視為軟弱，加強自衛的結果又被對方視為挑釁，由於對方的所做所為，所以不能給對方公正的和平，為了不能讓對方有獲勝的感覺，所以堅不讓步，只要求對方讓步，而沒有適當的回饋等等，終於導致和平無望。
如今，蔡衍明創辦人正式提出國共簽署和平協議的主張，與學術研究的結果相當吻合，這正是一個由小而大、由易而難、從近到遠的漸進發展過程，值得各界進一步嚴肅加以思考。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
August 14, 2013
Summary: On the 8th of this month, Want Want China Times Media Group Chairman and founder Tsai Eng-meng made a proposal during the "Cross-Strait Peace Wealth Creation Forum." Tsai proposed that the KMT and CCP sign a peace agreement. His proposal is consistent with scholarly research. Peace is a process that proceeds from small to large, from easy to difficult, from near to far. Everyone ought to give this fact serious consideration.
Full text below:
On the 8th of this month, Want Want China Times Media Group Chairman and founder Tsai Eng-meng made a proposal during the "Cross-Strait Peace Wealth Creation Forum." He urged Taipei and Beijing to sign a peace agreement. But realizing differences of opinion persisted on Taiwan, he urged the Kuomintang and the Communist Party to take the initiative of signing a peace agreement first. Only peace can build trust and create wealth. Opposition parties on Taiwan can catch up later. If such constructive and creative ideas can be implemented, the possibilities for cross-Strait relations are limitless.
Tsai made his proposal because he believes peace is an overarching value. A peace agreement would mean that the Chinese Civil War has officially ended. ARATS Vice Chairman Zheng Lizhong, who was present, considered it an excellent suggestion. MAC Vice Chairman Chang Hsien-yao also agreed with Tsai's proposal. The KMT said it would be happy to see the parties discuss cross-strait peace. Great achievements must begin with humility. A journey of a thousand miles begins with a single step. Achieving anything requires a process. As long as the parties are willing to listen, nothing ought to be ruled out.
As early as April 2005, during the first Lian Hu meeting, the KMT and CCP expressed the desire to sign a peace agreement. The KMT returned to power in 2008. Mainland President Hu Jintao seized the opportunity to improve bilateral relations. On December 31, he announced his six point policy for Taiwan. Once again, Beijing raised the issue of a cross-strait peace agreement. The Mainland demonstrated considerable goodwill and a willingness to cooperate.
In May 2008, President Ma Ying-jeou took office. Based on the 1992 consensus, he proposed a cross-strait provisional framework. He called for no [immediate] reunification, no independence, and no use of force. He unilaterally adopted a series of measures to improve relations with the Mainland. In January 2012, the Taiwan Region of the Republic of China held a presidential election. President Ma Ying-jeou was re-elected. During the election campaign, President Ma reiterated his vision for a "golden decade." In it he proposed the conditional deliberation and negoatiation of a cross-strait peace agreement. His proposal attracted considerable attention.
Consider a peace agreement between the two sides, such as Tsai's proposed agreement between the the KMT and CCP. Skeptics may say that the KMT and CCP can laugh away their past difference like brothers. Relations between the two may be harmonious. Cross-strait relations may not be what they once were. But the KMT and the CCP do not have the final say. One ought not create a tangled web and make things more complicated than they need to be. Consider the matter in a more positive light. This could be a gradual solution to the problem, a way to realize peace. How can anyone object?
Scholars researching the matter say a peace agreement requires complex advance negotiations. It requires preliminary and interim agreements. It requires broad agreement over the framework. It requires attention to implementation. The peace agreement would be subdivided into structure and content. The protocol would be subdivided into procedure, substance, and structure. A peace agreement should also address past grieveances, provide security guarantees, promote reconciliation, establish trust, and normalize relations. Each process is complex. Obviously the peace agreement must include different phases and different content. It is an ongoing process. Put simply, peace cannot be achieved overnight.
The results of research show the following. One. There can be no peace without compromise. Two. Peace must be a consensus reached by a majority. They must see it as just. Three. Peace must bring benefits. Four. The benefits of peace must be socially acceptable. Five. A society must be determined to achieve peace. Six. Peace today is no guarantee of peace tomorrow. But benign interaction can help protect a fragile peace. Seven. Peace often requires third party support. This support is often merely a formality. Eight. The longer the ceasefire, the more difficult it is to persuade the disputants to enter the peace process. The temporary state has become a fact of life. Nine. The more people involved in the peace process, the more robust the peace. Ten. The more communication and cooperation between different social strata, the more enduring the peace.
This does not mean that meeting all the conditions will guarantee peace. Nor does it mean that one or two missing conditions make peace impossible. Both sides may seek peace. They may not rule out a peace agreement. But they may lack mutual trust. They may be too self-centered. They may assume they are on the right side of history. They may consider only their own case. Self-restraint may be perceived as weakness. Self-protection may be perceived as provocation. The other side's words and deeds may make a just peace impossible. One side may refuse to make concesssions to deny the other side the satisfaction of winning. One sie may demand concessions but refuse to reciprocate. Any hope for peace may be lost in the process.
Tsai has proposed that the KMT and CCP sign a peace agreement. His proposal is consistent with scholarly research. Peace is a process that proceeds from small to large, from easy to difficult, from near to far. Everyone ought to give this fact serious consideration.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2013.08.14
社論－國共和平協議 讓兩岸有無限可能
本報訊
本月8日，旺旺中時媒体集團董事長、旺報創辦人蔡衍明於「兩岸和平創富論壇」呼籲，兩岸簽署和平協議，但是由於台灣內部意見分歧，所以他率先主張，由國民黨與共產黨先行簽署，因為只有和平才能建立互信、創造財富，而將來台灣其他的在野黨也可跟進。我們認為，這種建設性的思維和創造性的構想如果能夠付諸實施，未來的兩岸關係將有更大的空間和無限的可能。
蔡創辦人之所以出此倡議，是因為篤信和平才是最高的價值，協議的簽署將象徵國共內戰的正式結束。對此，與會的大陸海協會常務副會長鄭立中表示建議很好，而陸委會副主委張顯耀也說非常認同此議，給予尊重，國民黨方面則說樂見各方討論有關兩岸和平的相關建言。當然登高自卑、行遠由邇，凡事都要有一個發展、醞釀的過程，只要相關各方願意傾聽，不排除嘗試都是好事。
其實，早在2005年4月，國共雙方就曾於第一次的連胡會中，正式表達了關於兩岸研議、簽署和平協議的願景；2008年國民黨重掌政權之後，為了把握改善雙方關係的契機，當時的大陸國家主席胡錦濤也於當年12月31日發表對台政策的六點最新主張，北京再次提到兩岸和平協議的問題，中國大陸也展現相當程度的誠意與配合。
2008年5月，在馬英九總統主政之下，台北在九二共識的基礎上，主張兩岸不統、不獨、不武，提出兩岸暫行架構的概念，主動採取一系列政策，進一步改善和中國大陸之間的關係。2012年1月，中華民國台灣地區進行總統大選，馬英九總統獲選連任。選前，馬總統曾在黃金十年願景中再次提到，在滿足某些特定條件情況下，研議未來推動洽簽兩岸和平協議一事，引發各界關注。
不過，此時大家談的還是兩岸之間的和平協議，如今蔡創辦人所主張的則是國共之間的和平協議；持懷疑態度的人或謂，國共兩黨今天已經兄弟一笑泯恩仇，彼此關係已水乳交融，而且兩岸關係也今非昔比，並非國共兩黨能夠說了就算，實無必要再治絲益棼，把事情搞得更為複雜。但若從正面的角度來看，這確實不失為一個逐步解決問題的辦法，落實和平、簽署協議總不會有人反對吧？
其實，根據相關學者的專業研究，簽署和平協議所涉事端相當複雜，其中有談判前的協議，中程或初期的協議、廣泛或架構性的協議，以及如何執行協議等等。另外，若就和平協議的本身來說，又可細分為協議的結構與內容、協議的組成，其中包括程序性、實質性和結構性部分。至於建構和平協議的步驟則還應包括對過去的不公不義的糾正、安全保證、互惠和解、互信建立及關係正常化等等，每一個過程都相當的複雜。顯然，和平協議不但有不同的階段和組成內容，而且還會是一個發展的過程，簡單的說，和平不可能一蹴而成。
研究結果還顯示出，第一，沒有和平是不經妥協的；第二，和平必須是社會大多數成員的共識，被社會各界視為公正的；第三，和平必須能夠帶來好處；第四，和平所帶來的利益必須能夠讓社會接受；第五，要達成和平必須要有決心和意願；第六，和平雖然不保證未來的互動，但良性的互動有助於維護脆弱的和平；第七，和平通常必須受到第三者所支持，即使這種支持有時只是形式上的；第八，停火期間越長，爭議雙方越難進入和平協議，因為這種暫時的狀態已經成為一種穩定的生活方式；第九，越多人參與的和平過程，這種和平越為堅固；第十，社會上不同階層越多的溝通與合作，將使得和平越為穩固。
當然，在實務上這既不意味滿足上述所有條件就能維持和平，也不表示缺乏其中的一或二項就無法實現和平。反過來看，我們也發現，過去有太多的例子證明，雖然鬥爭雙方都表示有意追求和平，不排斥和平協議，但由於缺乏互信，彼此都出於本位思考，認為自己站在歷史正確的一方，只看到有利於己的一面；而自我克制又可能被對方視為軟弱，加強自衛的結果又被對方視為挑釁，由於對方的所做所為，所以不能給對方公正的和平，為了不能讓對方有獲勝的感覺，所以堅不讓步，只要求對方讓步，而沒有適當的回饋等等，終於導致和平無望。
如今，蔡衍明創辦人正式提出國共簽署和平協議的主張，與學術研究的結果相當吻合，這正是一個由小而大、由易而難、從近到遠的漸進發展過程，值得各界進一步嚴肅加以思考。
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