When Will Taipei and Beijing Sign a Peace Agreement?

When Will Taipei and Beijing Sign a Peace Agreement?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
August 13, 2013

Summary: Taipei and Beijing are about to enter a phase in which no peace agreement equals no peaceful development. Therefore, to put it bluntly, if the DPP refuses to recognize the 1992 consensus, it will be unqualified to return to power. If it does return to power under such conditions, it will only destroy Taiwan.

Full text below:

The Second Huashan Conference indicates that the DPP has refused to accept the 1992 consensus. But some media organizations are urging the KMT and CCP to seize the initiative and sign a peace agreement between the two parties.

These are parallel developments. If the DPP wins the presidential election in 2016 and confrontation follows, that means political and economic disaster.

Take the 1992 consensus. If the DPP refuses to recognize the 1992 consensus, logically speaking it is unlikely to win in 2016. Conversely, if the DPP refuses to accept the 1992 consensus, but wins anyway, that will spell political and economic disaster for Taiwan. The Second Huashan Conference says the 1992 consensus is synonymous with opposition to Taiwan independence. Therefore the DPP can not accept the 1992 consensus. But if the DPP considers opposition to the 1992 consensus synonymous with a demand for Taiwan independence, how can Beijing possibly accept it? Therefore if the DPP wins in 2016, Taipei and Beijing could find themselves in heated controversy over whether to accept the 1992 consensus and oppose Taiwan independence. Taiwan would be destabilized, politically and economically.

Take the peace agreement. The KMT and CCP could choose to sign a peace agreement. The timing may be better when the KMT is in the opposition. If the Kuomintang is in office, before 2016 or after, a party to party, KMT to CCP peace agreement will be impossible. Any agreement would have to be a government to government. Any agreement that is not government to government, would never be signed. If however, the KMT loses in 2016, it may wish to establish a framework by which it can compete against the DPP. Any KMT to CCP peace agreement would surely be signed. But it would make the political and economic situation on Taiwan even more stable.

Imagine two moving lines crossing each other. Suppose the Democratic Progressive Party wins office but still refuses to recognize the 1992 consensus? Suppose it persists in advocating Taiwan independence? Beijing will insist that without the 1992 consensus, there can be no peaceful development. Taiwan would then descend into political and economic chaos. If the KMT loses power, it might sign a party to party peace agreement with the CCP. But this would increase the political and economic pressure on Taiwan.

The ruling DPP would be caught in a dilemma. Should it recognize the 1992 Consensus, i.e., forsake Taiwan independence, or not? The opposition Kuomintang could win support by signing a KMT to CCP peace agreement. But Taiwan would be divided. Relations between Taipei and Beijng would be upset. An unimagineable political and economic catastrophe would follow.

Therefore the KMT and CCP should not sign a party to party peace agreement. Why not? Because such a peace agreement could only be signed while the KMT is in the opposition. Whether the KMT is in the opposition is not the critical issue. The critical issue is whether the DPP is in office, but still opposes the 1992 Consensus, i.e., still advocates Taiwan independence. If the KMT signs a peace agreement, Taiwan will be plunged into political and economic chaos. The DPP will find it impossible to govern.

Before one can talk about a peace agreement, one must first understand what a peace agreement is. A peace agreement is an interim solution. It points the way to potential future reunification. It is not in itself reunification. It is political relations under circumstances in whch the two sides have yet to be reunified. It moderates the pace and limits the extent of reunification. For both Taipei and Beijing, a peace agreement is not reunification. It may even delay reunification. One might even say that if Taiwan wants to delay reunification, it must seize the initiative and sign a peace agreement beneficial to Taiwan.

Of course the 1992 consensus opposes Taiwan independence. But besides opposing Taiwan independence, it affirms the one China framework and one China, different interpretations. Taiwan independence is already impossible. Therefore when signing a peace agreement, we must be creative. We must seek to define and interpret the one China framework. We must be innovative and seek breakthroughs. This is not merely in Taiwan's interests. This is also in the interests of the common civilization shared by both sides of the Strait.

For Taiwan, an interim solution such as a peace agreement is both natural and inevitable. Taiwan must go with the flow. It must take advantage of the trend. Both the KMT and DPP should champion the 1992 consensus, the one China framework, one China, different interpretations, and the Big Roof Concept of China. Both should champion an equitable government to government peace agreement. It would stabilize political relations under circumstances in which the nation has yet to be reunified. It would enable the two sides to continue to benefit from peaceful development.

As we can all see, the problem lies with the DPP. Will the DPP refuse to recognize even the 1992 consensus? Will it oppose Taiwan independence and support one China, different interpretations? Will it refuse to sign a peace agreement? Suppose the DPP wins in 2016, but still opposes the 1992 consensus? Suppose the KMT signs a party to party peace agreement? That would surely tear Taiwan in two and lead to chaos. That would allow Beijing to take advantage of both the Blue and Green camps. That would lead to political and economic catastrophe.

Taipei and Beijing are about to enter a phase in which no peace agreement equals no peaceful development. Therefore, to put it bluntly, if the DPP refuses to recognize the 1992 consensus, it will be unqualified to return to power. If it does return to power under such conditions, it will only destroy Taiwan.

兩岸何時簽訂和平協議
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.08.13 03:00 am

一方面，第二次華山會議顯示，民進黨似乎不可能接受「九二共識」；另一方面，有媒體主張，可由國共兩黨先行簽訂《和平協議》。

這兩條發展動線，若是在二○一六年民進黨贏得總統大選後出現剪刀交叉，那將是台灣的政經大災難。

先談「九二共識」。民進黨若不接受「九二共識」，照理說，即不易在二○一六勝選；但反過來說，民進黨若不接受「九二共識」卻仍能在二○一六勝選，即是台灣政經災難的預告。民進黨二次華山會議的說法是：因為「九二共識」就是「反對台獨」的同義語，所以民進黨不可能接受「九二共識」；但相對而言，若民進黨將「反對九二共識」與「堅持台獨」視為同義語，北京又怎能接受？因而，民進黨若在二○一六勝選，兩岸可能仍將陷於「是否接受九二共識」（是否反對台獨）的激烈爭議之中，台灣的政經治理必失穩定。

再談和平協議。國共若要簽和平協議，較有可能的時機當於國民黨在野之際。因為，國民黨若是執政黨，不論在二○一六之前，或二○一六以後，皆無可能以「黨對黨」簽訂國共和平協議；若要簽，必然要爭取「政府對政府」，若非「政府對政府」，必簽不成。但是，倘若國民黨在二○一六年敗選而失去政權，則為了建立與民進黨相互抗衡的架構，國共兩黨議簽和平協議即可能成為必然的結果；如此，又將使台灣的政經情勢更難穩定。

不妨想像這兩條動線交叉的景象：一方面，民進黨若執政而仍不接受「九二共識」（主張台獨），北京必然以「無九二共識即無和平發展」為操作主軸，台灣政經情勢必立即陷於混亂；另一方面，失去政權的國民黨為與民進黨抗衡，即可能與北京簽定黨對黨的《和平協議》，這又必然為台灣的政經情勢添加壓力。

屆時，主政的民進黨陷於「是否接受九二共識（是否放棄台獨）」的進退失據之勢，在野的國民黨則以《國共和平協議》爭取話語權，台灣撕裂、兩岸失衡，勢將引爆不堪設想的政經浩劫。

因此，最好不要出現國共兩黨簽訂和平協議的場景，因為那可能就是國民黨在野之時。但國民黨下野並非關鍵，問題在於民進黨若主政卻仍反對九二共識（主張台獨），則國共若簽和平協議，台灣的政經大局即必陷撕裂及敗亂，民進黨亦絕無平順主政的可能。

談和平協議，應先理解和平協議的性質。和平協議是一種「中程方案」；它指向未來可能統一，但其本身卻不是「統一」，而是在規劃兩岸「尚未統一」的「政治關係」，所以亦有節制統一之時程及內涵的效能。因而，對兩岸而言，和平協議不但不是「統一」，且可能是「統一」的緩衝器與節制器。甚至可說，台灣若要對統一作出緩衝與節制，即應當主動爭取簽訂對台灣有利的和平協議。

至於九二共識，自然是「反對台獨」。但在「反對台獨」以外，尚有「一中框架」及「一中各表」等義。其實，對台灣而言，「台獨」至今已絕無可能；因此，台灣應當爭取在和平協議的議簽過程中，對「一中架構」的定義權及對「一中各表」的運作權，尋求創新及突破。這不僅是為台灣的利益所必爭，也是為了兩岸共同的文明成就所必爭。

對台灣而言，類如《和平協議》這樣的「中程方案」，已是理所當趨，亦是勢所必至；因此，台灣非但應順勢而為，更應因勢利導。因而，不論是國民黨或民進黨執政，均應努力爭取在「九二共識」、「一中框架／各自表述」下，以「大屋頂中國」的思維，在「政府對政府」的對等地位下，簽定《和平協議》，來穩定「尚未統一的政治關係」，以持續並延伸兩岸的「和平發展」。

然而，有目共睹，問題主要在民進黨。民進黨如果連「九二共識」（反對台獨／一中各表）都不接受，遑言議簽《和平協議》。如前所述，倘若民進黨在二○一六勝選，卻仍「反對九二共識」，而國共則簽定了《和平協議》；那必將釀成台灣撕裂敗亂，而北京藍綠通吃的政經浩劫。

兩岸即將進入「無和平協議，即無和平發展」的階段。因此，直白而言，民進黨若不接受「九二共識」，即無重返執政的資格，除非想要葬送台灣。