Mainland China's Air Defense Identification Zone: A Turning Point in Sino-Japanese Relations

Mainland China's Air Defense Identification Zone: A Turning Point in Sino-Japanese Relations
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
November 25, 2013

Summary: Superficially the Diaoyutai Islands sovereignty dispute is between China and Japan. But the United States has a return to Asia strategy. The US and Japan have carefully manipulated the situation. They have turned it into a confrontation between Mainland China and a US-Japan axis. This has forced Beijing to be especially careful in dealing with the Diaoyutai Islands issue. This is why Mainland China has remained passive  on the Diaoyutai Islands "nationalization" dispute. This is why it has sent UAVs into the airspace over the Diaoyutai Islands to test Washington's bottom line.

Full text below:

Mainland China's Ministry of Defense recently announced its Air Defense Identification Zone in the East China Sea. One aspect of the zone attracted the most attention. The Diaoyutai Island waters, which Taipei, Tokyo, and Beijing all lay claim to, is included in the identification zone. The move has elicited strong protests from Tokyo and criticism from Washington. Sino-Japanese relations have been deadlocked for some time. They are now certain to heat up once more.

Last April Tokyo Governor Shintaro Ishihara touched off a firestorm by proposing to "purchase" the Diaoyutai Islands. Sino-Japanese relations deteriorated in three stages. It went from economic warfare to political warfare to diplomatic warfare.

One. Last April a storm of controvery over the "purchase" of the islands erupted. By last September Prime Minister Noda had "nationalized" the islands. This was the economic war phase. Nationalist and anti-Japanese sentiment erupted on the Chinese mainland. Wave upon wave of boycotts of Japanese goods took place, and anti-Japanese protests erupted. Japanese companies suffered significant economic losses. The intent was to use economics to influence politics. The intent was to use Japanese companies to pressure the Japanese government, in the hopes of changing its Diaoyutai Islands "nationalization" policy.

Two. Between "nationalization" and this February, when Mainland China's radars locked on Japanese aircraft, constituted the political war stage. Mainland China's ocean surveillance vessels began regular patrols of waters surrounding the Diaoyutai Islands. Meanwhile, the East China Sea Fleet entered waters around Naguo Island and Shitan Island. The fire control radars of Mainland Chinese warships locked onto Japanese warships. Sino-Japanese tensions reached a new high. Since then relations between the two governments have been deadlocked.

Three. Between the radar lock incident and now, constitutes the diplomatic war stage. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe wants to revive the "Arc of Freedom and Prosperity" policy of the Tara Aso era. It is aggressively using financial assistance to curry favor with ASEAN countries. It is using diplomatic encirclement to "contain" Mainland China. Japan has sold 20 more coast guard cutters to the Philippines. It plans to export weapons to strengthen relations between Japan and Southeast Asian countries.

Based on past experience, we believe Mainland China suddenly announced its East China Sea air defense identification zone as a legalization measure. It wants to ensure that it is on the same legal footing as Japan in any confrontation over the islands' sovereignty.

In the Diaoyutai Islands sovereignty dispute, Beijing and Tokyo are currently on unequal footings. Japan has de facto control of the islands. It also has the advantage of having "nationalized" them. Last September, Noda announced the "nationalization" of the Diaoyutai Islands. Mainland China dispatched coast guard cutters and normalized patrols. Its goal was to break Japan's one-sided, de facto control over the Diaoyutai Islands. It entered the airspace over the Diaoyutai Islands to force Japan to admit the existence of a sovereignty dispute.

These two measures are not permanent and are quite flexible. They can be suspended unilaterally, any time. Mainland China appears to have plenty of wriggle room on the Diaoyutai Islands issue. Its motive at the moment is to resolve the dispute rather than reassert sovereignty over the Diaoyutai Islands. As long as Japan recognizes that sovereignty over the Diaoyutai Islands is in dispute and retracts its nationalization measures, the sovereignty dispute can be settled.

Unfortunately as matters stand, Japan has rejected Mainland China's proposals. The Japanese side persists in foot-dragging. Under the circumstances, Mainland China was forced to resort to legalistic means and declare an air defense identification zone. It was forced to seek an equal legal footing with Japan over the Diaoyutai Islands issue. Legalization is a sugar coating on top of the sovereignty issue. It diminishes the maneuvering room for dispute resolution. It will make the Diaoyutai Islands dispute even less soluble.

Consider the facts. We believe that Mainland China's inclusion of the Diaoyutai Islands into its East China Sea air defense identification zone is a pre-emptive maneuver. By the end of this year Washington and Tokyo intend to modify their Diaoyutai Islands guidelines. The purpose of the legal measures was military intimidation.

Superficially the Diaoyutai Islands sovereignty dispute is between China and Japan. But the United States has a return to Asia strategy. The US and Japan have carefully manipulated the situation. They have turned it into a confrontation between Mainland China and a US-Japan axis. This has forced Beijing to be especially careful in dealing with the Diaoyutai Islands issue. This is why Mainland China has remained passive  on the Diaoyutai Islands "nationalization" dispute. This is why it has sent UAVs into the airspace over the Diaoyutai Islands to test Washington's bottom line.

After Abe assumed power, Japan dispatched a special envoy to Beijing. It hoped for political dialogue to ease bilateral relations. On the other hand, Abe also increased preparedness in Diaoyutai Islands waters. He called for an aggressive defense of the Diaoyutai Islands, and a modification of the US-Japan defense guidelines. His double-dealing forced the Mainland to be more aggressive and to seize the initiative in the Diaoyutai Islands sovereignty dispute.

In short Mainland China's announcement of its East China Sea air defense identification zone was the first step in affirming its sovereignty over the Diaoyutai Islands, as well as ensuring its legalization. This will be a turning point in Sino-Japanese relations. Tokyo and Taipei have clashed over the sovereignty of the Diaoyutai Islands. Now the East China Sea has been transformed into a "Chinese lake." This will gradually lead to military clashes with Washington and Tokyo. Taipei is part of the East China Sea and Diaoyutai Islands dispute. It must of course respond as soon as possible.

中共防空識別區：中日關係的新拐點
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.11.25 04:13 am

中共國防部日前首次公布劃定東海防空識別區，其中最受關注的是，台日中三方爭議的釣魚台海域被劃入識別區範圍內。此舉，已引起日本的強烈抗議和美國的批評；僵持多時的中日緊張關係，勢必再次升溫。

自去年四月日本東京都知事石原慎太郎引發的釣魚台購島爭端以來，中日關係的惡化，可分為經濟戰、政治戰與外交戰等三個階段的演變。

首先，從去年四月購島爭議到去年九月前首相野田的「國有化」措施，屬於「經濟戰」階段；中國大陸點燃國內民族主義的反日情緒，一波波反日貨、反日商活動，讓日本企業蒙受重大的經濟損失，這是意圖「以經圍政」，希望利用日商向日本政府施壓，以期改變釣島國有化政策。

其次，是從國有化措施到今年二月中共雷達鎖定日機事件，是「政治戰」階段；中共海監船開始定期進入釣魚台海域巡視，同時東海艦隊也進入與那國島及石垣島中間水域。中共軍艦以火控雷達鎖定日本艦機，讓中日關係緊張達到最高峰，其後，兩國關係即陷入僵局。

第三，從雷達鎖定事件至今，是「外交戰」階段；首相安倍重拾麻生時期所推動的「自由與繁榮之弧」政策，積極以經濟援助的方式拉攏東協國家，利用外交包圍戰對大陸形成包圍網。其間，日本更向菲律賓出售二十艘海巡艇，意圖以武器輸出來強化日本與東南亞國家的關係。

觀察歷史的縱深，我們認為，中共這次突然發布東海防空識別區範圍，目的是想要利用「法制化」的措施，以形成與日本在釣島主權議題上對等的對抗地位。

事實上，在釣魚台主權爭議中，中日兩國一直處於不對等的關係。日本對釣島不但具有實質控制的事實，也存在國有化的法制優勢；而自從去年九月野田宣布釣島國有化後，中國大陸一方面出動海巡艦常態化巡視，目的就是要打破日本「單獨控制釣魚台」的事實；另一方面以無人機進入釣島領空，是要迫使日本承認釣魚台存在主權爭議。

然而，這兩項措施並不具有「永久性」，且因作法相當彈性，似隨時可以單方面中止；由此可見，中國大陸對釣魚台的立場似乎存在一定的迴旋空間。其目的，是要解決爭議，而不在於收回釣魚台主權。亦即，只要日本承認釣魚台主權存在爭議，並收回國有化措施，雙方的主權爭議便可順勢落幕。

問題是，情勢的發展，顯示中共的這兩項主張遲遲未被日本接受，日方只是一味「以拖待變」。在這種情況下，中共只好祭出發布防空識別區的法制化手段，以與日本在釣魚台問題上取得平起平坐的法制地位。在主權爭議包上「法制化」的糖衣後，也讓爭議解決的迴旋空間頓時壓縮，這將使日後的釣魚台爭議更加難解。

就事實的演變看，我們認為，中國大陸將釣魚台納入東海防空識別區的作為，是想要先發制人，在美日今年底針對保衛釣魚台進行調整防衛新指針前，以法制化措施達到軍事威嚇的效果。

釣魚台主權爭議表面上是中日兩國之爭，但在美國重返亞洲戰略的詮釋下，以及日本的精心操弄下，卻演變成中國大陸與美日同盟的對抗，這讓北京在處理釣魚台問題上格外小心翼翼。這也是中國大陸一直將釣島爭議被動地界定在國有化議題上，同時一再以無人機進入釣島空域來測試美國介入底線的主要原因。

安倍上台後，日本一方面向北京派遣特使，希望進行政治對話以緩和雙邊關係；在另一方面，安倍又積極強化對釣魚台海域的防備，同時又積極鼓吹以釣魚台為防衛主體，來修改美日防衛指針。這種兩面手法，讓中國大陸覺得必須要採取更大動作出擊，以掌握釣魚台主權爭議的主動權。

簡言之，中共公布東海防空識別區，是中國大陸掌握釣魚台主控權的第一步，也是其釣魚台法制化的開端，也將是中日關係的一個新拐點。過去原本的台日中釣魚台主權爭議，在東海被中國「內海化」後，將會逐漸發酵為美日中台的東海軍事爭議。身為東海周邊及釣魚台爭議當事國的台灣，對此當然必須及早因應。