Saturday, June 28, 2008

With a Cold Eye: Lawmakers, Beware the People's Judgment!

With a Cold Eye: Lawmakers, Beware the People's Judgment!
United Evening News reporter Kuo-Liang-huang / Special]
June 25, 2008


Wang Chien-hsuan (right) and Shen Fu-hsiung, Nominees for President and Vice President of the Control Yuan

Ma Ying-jeou has nominated Wang Chien-hsuan President of the Control Yuan. The public is enthusiastically applauding the move. But Wang Chien-hsuan's declaration that Control Yuan nominees need not visit the Legislative Yuan to solicit their votes has angered the Legislative Yuan. Today legislators threatened to humiliate Wang Chien-hsuan by rejecting his nomination. Superficially they were confronting Wang Chien-hsuan. In reality they were confronting Ma Ying-jeou. In fact, no matter who is right, this sort of senseless confrontation has left the public thoroughly disillusioned.

The Control Yuan is a safeguard against corruption. Its purpose is to prevent graft and the abuse of power. Therefore, any debate about the nomination process should be about who is qualified for the position. The debate must not be about who must be rejected or shut out of the Control Yuan based on whether they are willing to solicit votes. If the debated degenerates into an infantile contest of wills -- if you solicit my vote I will support you, if you don't solicit my vote you will suffer the consequences -- then the public can only lower its head and sigh.

The understanding Ma Ying-jeou and Wang Chien-hsuan have is correct. Control Yuan members are nominated by the president. The legislature then exercises its right of approval. That does not not mean that nominees ought to solicit votes from legislators. Anyone who solicits votes is making an appeal based on personal relationships. If the Control Yuan kowtows to legislators, if it genuflects before them in order to be appointed, how can they possibly execute their duties in accordance with the letter of the law, by impeaching officials guilty of malfeasance?

Wang Chien-hsuan is known as "Saint Wang." He is revered by the public. If their motive is to butt heads with Ma Ying-jeou, if their motive is to declare war on Ma Ying-jeou, legislators should pick another issue. If they use Wang Chien-hsuan's refusal to solicit votes as an excuse to vent their spleen, if they attempt to turn the issue into a political football, if they turn the issue into a war between Wang Chien-hsuan and the Legislative Yuan, they may defeat Wang Chien-hsuan in the Legislative Yuan. But in terms of public image, the Legislative Yuan will only shoot itself in the foot. If they insult a former official known for his personal integrity, merely to embarrass him, the ones actually embarrassed will be themselves. They will bring shame upon the Legislative Yuan. In order to engage in political wrangling, they will sacrifice Wang Chien-hsuan.

The public has enormous respect for Wang Chien-hsuan's character. It is said that after his physical examination early this year, he made out his will. He arranged to donate all his worldy possessions to charity. He expressed gratitude for all the support his wife gave him over a lifetime. He also joked that the only thing he's not willing to donate is his wife Su Fa-chao. Today Su Fa-chao told reporters she was reluctant to see Wang undergo the nomination process for President of the Control Yuan under such circumstances. The couple's expression of feelings have touched the peoples' hearts.

Wang Chien-hsuan has confronted the Legislative Yuan in this manner. Ma Ying-jeou can not of course always approach the Legislative Yuan in a confrontational manner. As the leader of the government, Ma Ying-jeou needs to learn a little more finesse. This is something Ma Ying-jeou lacks. Otherwise, his administration will find itself hamstrung. The Legislative Yuan meanwhile must not treat everything as a bargaining chip and adopt such a haughty posture. The eyes of the public are on you as well. You too will be judged for your behavior.

冷眼集》立委們,等著民眾評分吧!
【聯合晚報╱記者黃國樑/特稿】
2008.06.25 08:18 pm

王建煊被馬英九總統提名為監察院長,社會一片叫好,但王建煊不必去立法院拜票的說法,卻惹毛了立法院,立法院如今揚言讓王建煊得票難看,明著是對抗王建煊,實則是向馬英九叫陣。其實不論誰的論點或關照正確,這種無聊的對抗,其實都已經讓民眾徹底失望。

監院的存在,是一種防腐機制,防止政府濫權、貪腐,因此,有關它的討論,如果不是鎖定在究竟誰是適任者,誰可能應該被擋下,排除在監院大門之外,而是降格到究竟要不要拜票,你拜票才看得起我,不拜票我就讓你好看,這種鬥氣又低能的把戲,民眾看了能不偃首嘆息?

王建煊與馬英九的共識其實是沒有錯的,監委由總統提名,再由國會行使同意權,並不意味被提名人應該去向立委拜票。拜票者,就是人情之請託也,監委如果曾經向立委鞠躬,為了此一「權位」競折腰,日後又如何能執春秋之筆,彈劾失職官員呢?

王建煊的聖人封號,其實已在民間建立起很高的聲望,立委如果要鬥馬英九,要向馬英九宣戰,最好拿別的題目,如果假借王建煊的不拜票說,就怒火沖天,拿著雞毛當令箭大做文章,變成王建煊與立法院的大戰,可能立法院在票數上會贏了王建煊,但在形象上,立法院不過是自取其辱。因為,將一個公認清廉的人,打了特低的低分,以為讓王建煊「難堪」,但真的難堪的是立法院,代表立法院厚顏無恥,為了政爭,居然以王建煊為祭品。

王建煊的為人,社會有很高的評價。據了解,今年初他身體檢查後,就已預立遺囑,將他身外之物都捐出去了,做好一切安排。對太太蘇法昭一輩子的扶持及支持,他感念在心,但也打趣說,他唯一捐不出去的就是蘇法昭了。對照蘇法昭今天面對媒體,仍不願看王在這種情況下出任監察院長,兩人之情,溢於言表,也讓外界不捨。

王建煊都能如此面對立院,馬英九當然不能總是與立法院形成對峙形勢,做為國政的領導中心,馬英九要有更純熟的手腕,這是馬英九要修習的學分,否則其施政將困騫顛跛,但立法院不能一副什麼都要拿籌碼來換的嘴臉,請注意,群眾的每一雙眼都在睜視著你們,你們也等著被評分。

Friday, June 27, 2008

The Government Must Beware the Impact of Fuel and Electricity Price Increases in July

The Government Must Beware the Impact of Fuel and Electricity Price Increases in July
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 27, 2008

The pain from the May 28 fuel price increase has yet to recede. But alarms from twin increases in fuel and electricity prices on July 1 are already sounding. When stagflation is rearing its ugly head, the DPP is proposing yet another agitprop "Tax Rebate Wealth Sharing" initiative. Will the Liu cabinet make a wiser decision this time? We are all waiting with bated breath.

The opposition DPP is screaming about tax rebates and wealth sharing. The ruling KMT on the other hand, is busy calculating price increases. The character of the two political parties is as different as night and day. The former thinks only of currying favor with voters, without regard for the long-term consequences. The latter thinks only of balancing the books, and seems oblivious to people's feelings. If the two parties were to complement each other's weaknesses, the DPP would act a a little more responsibily and rationally, and indulge in a little less vainglory and populism. The KMT would display a little more sensitivity, and a little less stolidity. Only then would the public on Taiwan cease being victimized by both camps.

In normal times, fuel and electricity prices would be adjusted regularly according to a reasonable formula that reflected production costs. They would of course conform to the iron laws of the marketplace. They would also allow businesses to remain in step with the global economy. But the situation facing Taiwan today can hardly be termed normal. Internally, energy and important raw material prices were artificially held down during the Chen Shui-bian era. Allowing prices to resume their market levels too rapidly would inflict too much pain on the public. Externally, the global economy is mired in stagflation. Any little misstep by the government could spell danger, with incalculable consequences.

In fact, during the last fuel price increase, We reminded the new administration that must not lose touch with public sentiment merely because it won a landslide victory in the presidential election. Unfortunately, the cabinet was firmly committed to the "immediate and full restoration of market prices." The result is its current dilemma. Market prices have not been "immediately and fully restored." The only thing immediately and fully restored has been public discontent. The rapidly eroding reputation of the cabinet is not the only cause for concern. The stock market's continued decline reflects inadequate momentum in Taiwan economy. Add public pessimism over inflation, and the atmosphere hardly conducive to government efforts to rally public morale. The twin increases in fuel and electricity prices scheduled for July 1 are bound to provoke intense public dissatisfaction. The current lull is merely the calm before the storm. It is not something for which the Liu cabinet can control. The only question is whether the Liu cabinet knows what it's in for.

An economy poised atop a slippery slope has been staggered by a one-two combination from the global energy crisis and stagflation. No government is going to find it easy to deal with such a matter. The Liu cabinet includes numerous experts in economics and finance. But that doesn't mean it's prepared for this sort of massive internal and external change. This group of administators is too elitist in its nature. Most worrisome is its lack of sensitivity to public opinion and its lack of flexibility in the face of changing conditions.

The Government must be guarded in its response to this wave of price hikes, for three reasons.

1. Consumer Prices. Changes in fuel, electricity, water, and fertilizer prices are the ones most likely to trigger price fluctuations further down the line. Once the price mechanism kicks in, it sweeps across everything in its path. The impact is irreversible. When the Ma administration took office it announced in advance its timetable for various price increases. This not only fueled expectations of price increases, it was tantamount to a self-fulfilling prophecy. Once a spark touches off a prairie fire, it will inevitably be blamed as the cause.

2. Public Psychology. After one month of wear and tear, the new administration has lost its original lustre. Most people are still willing to give it a chance. But their patience is wearing thin. This must not be ignored. May consumer prices rose 3.71 percent. Core Consumer Prices reached a new nine-year high. By contrast salaries have not increased for years. Taiwan is already mired in the swamp of stagflation. When public doubts about "Things improving immediately" increase, yet the government remains unaware of the warning signs, its reactions are much too tardy.

3. Political Promises. The biggest promise Ma Ying-jeou made to the people during the election was its promise to revive the economy. Taiwan's economy is currently in decline, with no signs of improvement in sight. The government has focused its attention entirely on price increases. This inverts priorities and leaves it open to charges of being a "Price Hike Cabinet." Besides, constantly stressing SOE revenues while neglecting the public's economic hardship, amounts to a display of callous indifference. If public indignation comes to a boil, and the government throws it another bone, that will restore neither public confidence nor consumer prices. The DPP is demanding "tax rebates and wealth sharing." This of course is transparent political opportunism on the part of sleazy politicians. But the Ma administration's efforts to balance the books for SOEs on the backs of the general public is equally foolish.

Assessing the current situation, the Ma administration must be especially leery of the impact of its July 1 fuel and electricity price increases. Its response must be measured. In particular, the economy must receive a full injection of new blood, allowing the market and public confidence to rally. It must not allow society to remain mired in the pessimistic atmosphere of stagflation.

七月油電雙漲,政府務須謹慎以對
【聯合報╱社論】
2008.06.27 03:01 am

五二八調漲油價的陣痛尚未消退,七一油電雙漲的警報又已嗚嗚大作。當停滯膨脹危機當頭,而民進黨又提出「退稅分錢」的民粹倡議抗衡,劉內閣這次是否會作出更有智慧的決策,大家正屏息以待。

在 野黨嚷著退稅分錢,執政黨卻埋頭盤算著漲價,兩個政黨性格簡直異如天壤。前者一心只想討好選民,不顧國家社會的長期後果;後者卻只顧追求行政枝節的平衡, 似乎未能回應人民的感受。兩黨若能彼此互補一下,民進黨多一點責任理性、少一點浮華民粹,國民黨多一點普羅感應、少一點學究冬烘;那樣,台灣人民才不致兩 邊受罪。

若在正常時日,油電價格根據合理公式定期反映成本,當然最符合市場經濟的穩健法則,也能讓企業經營與國際經濟節奏合拍。但台灣今 天面對的情勢,能否稱為「正常」?從內部看,能源及重要原物料價格在扁政府時代經過一番扭曲,短期內要全部漲足,民眾的痛楚將極深重;向外看,全球經濟正 陷入一波「停滯膨脹」風暴,政府決策稍一偏失,即可能將台灣推進危險地帶,後果難以逆料。

事實上,在上次調漲油價之前,我們即曾提醒新政 府不可憑恃選舉之大勝而失卻對社會現實感的掌握;可惜,當時內閣卡在「一次漲足」的思維框框中,進退失據。結果是其實並未「漲足」,民怨卻已沖天。一個月 來,讓人擔心的不只是內閣聲望的滑落,股市連續下挫反映了台灣經濟的動能不足,再加上民眾對物價飛漲所表現的悲觀,這種種氣氛,都不利於政府再採取衝擊民 生士氣的決策。亦即,七一油電雙漲注定要承受強烈的民意反感,眼前的寧靜過後,將是什麼樣的風暴襲來,恐怕不在劉內閣的掌握之中,唯不知劉內閣對此有無正 確的感應。

一個處於滑坡中的經濟,又遭逢世界性能源危機及停滯膨脹的左右夾擊,在任何政府而言,都不會是容易處理的事。劉內閣中雖然財經老將不少,卻未必有因應這種內外巨變的經驗;而這個行政團隊菁英取向太強,缺乏對民意的敏銳感應及因應變局的靈活思考,才是最令人擔憂之處。

我 們之所以呼籲政府務必謹慎因應這波漲價,主要理由有三:第一,就物價論物價,最容易引發物價連鎖波動的,莫過於油、電、水、肥等公用事業價格;其漲價機關 一旦啟動,就是橫掃百業,無法逆轉。馬政府未上任即已預告各項費率漲價時程,不僅助長預期心理,也形同以物價「推手」自居;一旦野火燎原,必定成為眾人怪 罪的「禍首」。

第二,從民眾的心理看,政府的新銳之氣經過一個月磨損,已失去原先的光華。多數人雖仍抱持著善意期待,但人們受苦的耐心禁 得起多少挫折,實不容高估。五月份消費物價上漲百分之三點七一,核心物價漲幅更創下九年新高,對比薪資多年未漲,台灣實已踩在停滯膨脹的泥沼裡。當社會上 對於「馬上就會好」的質疑聲浪越來越大,政府若還察覺不出其中警訊,未免太過遲鈍。

第三,從政治承諾和決策選擇看,選前馬英九給人民最大 的承諾,是要重振經濟。現在,台灣經濟頹勢未見起色,政府卻把全副重心放在調漲價格,不僅本末倒置,也只會招來「漲價內閣」之譏。而且,一味強調公營事業 營收,卻輕忽民生疾苦,這展示了什麼施政仁心?何況,萬一決策招致民怨沸騰,政府再另拋利多去平息眾怒,恐怕也搶救不回民心和物價。民進黨要求「退稅分 錢」固然是政治投機客的近利思維,但馬政府以全民痛苦為代價替公營事業的財務爭平衡的做法,不也愚不可及。

盱衡眼前形勢,馬政府對七一油電漲價恐怕必須格外謹慎,多所斟酌;尤其應當全力打通經濟的血脈,迅速使市況及民心振作起來,勿使社會久陷於「停滯膨脹」的悲觀氣氛之中。

Thursday, June 26, 2008

Ma Ying-jeou: Do Not Allow Talk of "Retreating to the Second Line" Bind You Hand and Feet

Ma Ying-jeou: Do Not Allow Talk of "Retreating to the Second Line" Bind You Hand and Feet
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 26, 2008

President Ma's comment that he has "retreated to the second line" has provoked considerable debate. What exactly is "retreating to the second line?" Have Ma's actions this past month been appropriate for a democratically elected president, as defined by the constitution? Put more simply, when Ma asks his financial and economic advisors "Why is the stock market falling without end?" are such expressions of concern consistent with "retreating to the second line?"

As everyone knows the stock market has fallen relentlessly ever since Ma assumed office. Investor losses can only be described as appalling. "Why is the stock market falling without end? is a question everyone ought to be asking. The only person who shouldn't be asking the question, at least not in public, is President Ma. After all, he is the one should be providing us with the answers. Although Ma has been in office for a full month, he has no idea why the stock market is falling without end. Yet he persists in commenting on matters that are none of his concern, such as whether rural primary schools should be eliminated, and whether Chuang Kuo-rong should keep his teaching post. Is this really the way to "retreat to the second line?"

True, President Ma is under the spotlight and in the hotseat. The slightest misstatement or misstep will invite a barrage of "damned if you do, damned if you don't" criticisms. But like it or not, President Ma must acknowledge a harsh reality. The people may support a president who respects his constitutional mandate. After all, Ma Ying-jeou received over 7 million votes. But they will not support a president who sticks his nose into matters that are none of his business, especially when he is still clueless about affairs of state one month after assuming office.

The past eight years of DPP misrule have provided the Republic of China with a valuable object lesson in how not to govern a nation. The KMT's return to power after a second change in ruling parties is providing the nation with another kind of lesson in constitutional rule. The key question is how will President Ma and the KMT define their roles during this process. Only a few comparisons are required to show how different the current political environment is from the past past eight years. During the eight years the DPP has been in power, a president elected by a plurality has presided over a minority government. Former President Chen never gave a damn about constitutional restraints on his power. He openly demeaned the constitution openly, in public. He expanded his powers without limit. He used and abused a string of Premiers. Outside observers concluded he was attempting to create an Imperial Presidency. Even more troublesome to Chen Shui-bian and the DPP was the opposition dominated legislature. Chen Shui-bian and the DPP were never willing to compromise or engage in dialogue. Instead they incited populist mob sentiment and butted heads with the opposition. The results were predictable. Eight years in office and nothing to show in the way of accomplishments. Its sole legacy? A negative example of how not to govern a nation.

Today's political landscape is the diametric opposite of what it was over the past eight years. We now have a majority President, and a ruling party that commands a supermajority in the legislature. Such an natural advantage gives President Ma an opportunity to realize his constitutional ideals. Ma Ying-jeou naturally cares more about the constitution than Chen Shui-bian. To him the constitution specifies a dual-leadership system. Therefore he does not want to encroach upon the powers of the Premier. Hence his declaration that he was "retreating to the second line."

Even more coincidentally, after Ma stepped down from the position of party chairman after being indicted by the Special Prosecutor in the Discretionary Fund case, Ma Ying-jeou had no intention of resuming his former role as party chairman. This has led to a situation never before seen under the old KMT: the sitting President is not simultaneously the Chairman of the KMT. This arrangement could be interpreted as Ma Ying-jeou's desire to be a "President to All the People." But this has already had immediate repercussions. The first is the president can no longer use the party machinery to mediate between competing departments. The second is that the party machinery tends to become a second arena in the struggle for power. To wit, recent speculation about whether Wang Jin-pyng, Chu Li-lun, or Wu Dun-yi will be the next party chairman.

President Ma has imposed "limits on himself" regarding relations between the Presidential Office and the Executive Yuan. He has also "totally severed" relations between the Presidential Offic and the KMT. The result has been what we have seen over the past month. A cabinet consisting entirely of career civil servants and academics, confronted by a barrage of issues in the legislature, and local authorities fighting tooth and nail over resources, finds itself at a complete loss about what to do next. Conversely, the KMT legislative caucus is using the opportunity to expand its power. Ma nearly lost control over the Diaoyutai Islands ramming incident. He even hoped to personally participate in cross-strait talks. Nominees for the Examination Yuan and the Control Yuan floated rumors and made threats. The result was every time President Ma came forward, the situation descended into chaos.

If the above phenomena, become the norm, one can safely predict that under President Ma the executive branch will become weaker and weaker. The legislative branch, given President Ma's forbearance, will become more and more presumptuous. The result will the undermining of President Ma's authority and leadership, and something akin to the Democratic Progressive Party's total loss of control. If this happens, President Ma's ratings will plummet a second time. Fortunately it is only one month into his term. He still has a chance to make changes. Having controversial issues come to a head earlier rather than later is not necessarily a bad thing. What matters is how President Ma uses his presidential mandate to define his role. That role has to be more than "retreating to the second line."

中時電子報
中國時報  2008.06.26
別讓「退居第二線」之說自縛手腳
中時社論

 馬總統的「退居第二線」說,最近成了部分論者議論的話題。究竟什麼是「退居第二線」?馬總統這一個月的作為,是不是就是現行憲政體制下民選總統應有的角色?如果用更淺顯的方式追問,馬總統日前曾詢問財經首長:「股市為何會一直跌?」,這種關切是不是就叫做「退居第二線」?

 其實誰都知道,股市從「馬上」之後,就一直跌跌不休到現在,投資民眾虧損掉的資產,恐怕用慘不忍睹差堪形容,「股市為何會一直跌?」其實該是所有民眾的疑問,不該是馬總統的疑問,畢竟此刻該是他處理問題的時候,不是嗎?如果就任了一個月,對股市為何持續崩跌這般重大事務還不能清楚掌握,卻對一些根本輪不到他管的事,如鄉間小學要不要廢校,莊國榮該不該保有教職等事「說得太多」,就是所謂「退居第二線」的理想模式?

 沒有錯,此刻馬總統是一切聚光燈的焦點,他言行上任何的「過猶不及」,都會陷入父子騎驢的困境,但不論馬總統喜歡與否,他都必須承認一個現實,民眾或許支持他們的總統謹守憲政職權分際,但恐怕並不期待他們用七百多萬票選出的總統,就任一個月後還對許多政務未進入狀況,卻老愛管些其實不需要他過問的事!

 如果說民進黨過去八年的執政經驗,為台灣的憲政體制提供一種實踐模式,那麼二次政黨輪替後國民黨截至目前的執政形式,也是在實踐另一種憲政運作的模式,這中間馬總統與國民黨怎麼透過自我的實踐來詮釋其角色,顯然居關鍵位置。畢竟稍加對照,就可以發現目前的政治生態,與過去八年有多大的不同。民進黨執政八年一直無法掙脫的現實是:一位相對多數的總統,搭配著朝小野大的國會。陳前總統任內從不在意憲法對總統職權的制約,甚至經常公開輕賤這部憲法,他自己藉由「權力極大化」的操作模式,不僅損耗掉好幾位閣揆,更被外界批為是在操作「超總統制」。更麻煩的是面對在野居多數的國會,陳水扁與民進黨從不願選擇妥協對話,而是不斷藉由民粹動員擴大對抗,結果可想而知,八年的政績不僅乏善可陳,憲政運作模式更是標準的負面教材。

 如今的政治生態與過去八年完全相反,一個過半多數的總統,搭配的是執政黨席次居安全多數的國會,這種結構上的優勢,讓馬總統有更大的空間去實踐其理想中的憲政角色。馬英九當然比陳水扁更在乎這部憲法,他認知這部憲法是所謂雙首長制,所以他特別不想造成對閣揆的掣肘,所以「退居第二線」的說法就這樣出現了。

 更湊巧的是,為了首長特別費被檢察官起訴,馬英九從黨主席位置退下來之後,就無意再回鍋,這就出現了連舊國民黨都未曾見過的情況:總統不兼黨主席。儘管此一安排可以解釋成是馬英九要做「全民總統」,但若干效應已立即顯現:首先就是總統再也無法藉由政黨的平台,直接對各個部門間的競合關係介入協調;其次就是黨機器本身自主地成為權力競逐的平台,最近從王金平、朱立倫到吳敦義相繼被扯上接任黨主席的話題即是明證。

 當馬總統在府院關係上「自我設限」,又在府黨關係上「完全切割」,於是我們在過去一個月就看到了下列的畫面:一個全由技術官僚與學者為主體所組成的內閣團隊,面對國會綿密的議題攻勢,以及地方諸侯搶食資源的拉扯,表現的是完全手足無措;另一方面立院的執政黨團卻在伺機膨脹權力,不僅一度讓釣魚台島撞船事件差點無法收拾,還想上桌參與兩岸談判,對考、監兩院的提名人選更是放言威脅,結果弄到每回馬總統出面的時候,都是局面近乎陷入紛亂的時候。

 如果上述的現象,將在未來變成常態,那麼幾乎可以預期,行政部門在馬總統的自制下將越來越弱不禁風,立法部門也會在馬總統的客氣下更形囂張,最後就是馬總統的領導威信一路折損,形成不同於民進黨執政時期的另一種「治理失能」,真要演成此一狀況,馬總統的民間聲望再往下挫,也就不令人意外了。好在目前只是就職剛滿月,調整的空間還很大,相關爭議提前引爆也不是壞事,重點還是馬總統未來怎麼藉由職權實踐詮釋他的角色,至少不該只是「退居第二線」這句話吧!

Wednesday, June 25, 2008

First Rank Academics Must Be Part of the Tax Reform Commission

First Rank Academics Must Be Part of the Tax Reform Commission
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 25, 2008

The composition of the Executive Yuan Tax Reform Commission and its modus operandi will soon be announced. The China Times has published numerous editorials analyzing the importance of this committee and offering suggestions for its future direction. Unfortunately the candidate roster announced by the Executive Yuan falls far short of tax reform ideals. We hope the Executive Yuan will rethink its roster over the next few days. It must offer a presentable list of scholars. It must use discretion from very outset.

We had hoped that the Chairman of the third Tax Reform Commission would, in contrast to the first and second Tax Reform Commissions, be a respected scholar. But the Executive Yuan intends to appoint Vice Premier Paul Chiu to the position. Other candidates' names appeared in media reports. Their academic credentials fall short of expectations. Since May 20, the Ministry of Finance has been earnestly endeavoring to implement the Ma Siew administration's policy proposals. It is apparently concerned that if an academic is appointed Chairman of the Tax Reform Commission, its policy recommendations may differ significantly from the Ma Siew administration's Tax Policy White Paper. So they simply had the Vice Premier double as chairman. Not only that, , even the vice chairman will be someone who contributed to the Ma Siew administration's White Paper. The intention of this "belt and suspenders" approach is apparently to ensure the seamless integration of the commission's conclusions with the Ma Siew administration's policy proposals. Such chairman and vice chairman assignments may be painstaking, but they also limit the commission's latitude. Frankly, after such contortions, people no longer expect much of the Tax Reform Commission.

In terms of qualifications, including seniority and erudition, Chen Ting-an, Chairman of the second Tax Reform Commission is the most suitable candidate for Chairman of the Third Tax Reform Commision. If Vice Premier Chiu doubles as chairman, then Professor Chen is the best candidate for vice chairman. In terms of practical experience and tax management ideas, former Minister of Finance Lin Chuan and Hsu Chia-tung are both outstanding scholars. They are smart, farsighted, and well received by the community. Unfortunately several candidates were omitted from the list leaked by the media. These omissions strike one as the deliberate neglect of genius and the glorification of mediocrity. If the nominees for chairman and vice chairman leaked by the media are accurate, then outstanding scholars of the first rank with a wealth of experience have been deliberately excluded. Instead, the scholars involved in the development of the Ma Siew administration's three Tax Reform Commissions have been forced to play ball. In which case the outside world's perception will inevitably be negative.

Compared to the Executive Yuan Mainland Affairs Council, we see how niggardly the Ministry of Finance was in its plans for the Tax Reform Commission. President Ma knows the public on Taiwan has different views on cross-strait policy. The appointment of Taiwan Solidarity Union legislator Lai Hsing-yuan as Chairman of the Mainland Affairs Committee was an effort to seek consensus. Besides criticizing her political coloration, the outside world leveled all sorts of personal criticisms against Lai Hsing-yuan. Yet the Presidential Office and the Executive Yuan maintained a unified front. They adopted a policy of inclusiveness to create a diversified platform for cross-strait dialogue. President Ma was open in promoting cross-strait policy. Why can't the Executive Yuan and the Ministry of Finance be equally open in promoting tax reform policy? The Ma Siew administration felt no need to force the drafters of their cross-strait White Paper on the Mainland Affairs Council. So why should the Executive Yuan reject other, more suitable candidates? Why must the drafter of the Tax Policy White Paper be in charge of the Tax Reform Commission? Cross-strait policy is a sensitive issue, affecting as it does the public's feelings about unification vs. independence. Even so, the government was able to increase participation by recruiting TSU personnel. Tax policy involves cold economic analysis. It is nowhere as politically sensitive as cross-strait policy. So why the compulsion to wrap oneself in a cocoon?

We would like to remind the Ma Siew administration that under democratic pluralism, with its free flow of information, whenever one is confronted with different views on policy, it is best to incorporate them into the system. it is best to be completely open, and not attempt to manipulate the dialogue. If tax reform advocates in academia are unable to find channels to express their views, if their views are suppressed, they will use the Internet, newspapers, or blogs to disseminate their views. Therefore, even assuming the commission was intended to be a body in which "What I say, goes." the public on Taiwan cannot allow the commission to lay down the law. Attempts to neglect ability and glorify mediocrity will not create consensus. They will merely give people the mistaken impression the government wants to ram through its agenda. In which case its losses will exceed its gains.

According to media reports the composition of the commission will be determined by the Ministry of Finance. This apparently reflects Minister of Finance Lee Sush-der's notion that "The Tax Reform Commission's purpose is to realize the Ma Siew administration's policy proposals." We really have no desire to comment on the Ministry of Finance's myopia. We are however deeply concerned about the Tax Reform Commission's direction. We hope Vice Premier Chiu will rethink his position. If Professors Chen Ting-an, Lin Chuan, former Minister Shea Jia-dong and other talented individuals are excluded, then the National Security Fund will probably be forced to prop up the market the very first day the Tax Reform Commission begins operation. Only a first rank scholar can come up with first rate policy prescriptions. Absent first rank scholars, one will only end up with third rate policy prescriptions. Chairman Chiu of the Tax Reform Commission has a long and difficult journey ahead of him. Even if we have to get down on our knees and beg, the Tax Reform Commission must invite at least a few first rank scholars.

中時電子報
中國時報  2008.06.25
務必積極廣邀一軍學者參與賦改會
中時社論

 行政院賦稅改革委員會的組成與運作,即將於近日公布。本報曾經多次以社論剖析這個委員會的重要性,並建議其未來之規畫方向。但遺憾的是,以目前行政院所公布的成員與組織來看,與稅改理想實有相當距離。我們希望行政院再做構思,也許在這幾天能做些調整,務必要擺出一列像樣的學者陣容,要慎於始。

 我們原本希望,第三次賦改會能比照第一或第二次賦改架構,由大學者出馬擔任主任委員;但是行政院目前的規畫,卻是由邱正雄副院長擔任主委,而即使是媒體報導的其他擔綱成員,論資歷與聲望也與大學者有相當距離,好生令人失望。財政部從五二○開始,就一心一意想要貫徹馬蕭政見。他們似乎擔心,由學者擔任賦改會主任委員,將來的結論也許會與馬蕭的租稅政策白皮書有差距,於是乾脆由副院長兼任主委,以便欽掌局面。不僅如此,連副主任委員,都規畫由馬蕭白皮書的撰稿者充任,幾乎是以「雙重保險」的方式,意圖掌握賦改會研究結論與馬蕭政見之銜接。這樣的主委、副主委安排儘管是煞費苦心,卻也完全侷限了賦改會的思路空間。經此折騰,坦白說民間對該會已經沒有太多期望了。

 就資望而言,二次賦改會主委陳聽安,依其輩分、學養,當然是最適合的第三次賦改會主委。即使邱副院長要自兼主委,那麼陳教授也是最佳副主委人選。就實務經驗與租稅理念而言,前財長林全與許嘉棟都是極為優秀的學者,其聰明、宏觀、視野都廣受社會肯定。但遺憾的是,目前媒體揭露的人選中,這幾位先進都被排除在委員名單外,似乎刻意要毀棄黃鐘,以便讓次佳的瓦釜將來能發震天價響的雷聲。如果媒體披露的主委、副主委等名單無誤,刻意將前列學識經驗豐富優秀的學者排除在外,反而是參與馬蕭財稅政見研擬的學者充斥在三次賦改會中,則表示該會成立伊始就自穿小鞋,那麼外界的觀感,就難免負面了。

 與行政院陸委會相比,我們就更能看出財政部規畫賦改會的小器。馬總統知道台灣民間對兩岸政策的態度有歧異,就刻意安排台聯黨的賴幸媛做陸委會主委,以「擴大民間共識基礎」。除了色彩之外,儘管外界對賴幸媛個人有種種批評,府院都能存同去異,以最大的包容去促成兩岸政策的多元對話平台。如果馬總統能夠這樣開放地思考、推動兩岸政策,為什麼行政院與財政部卻無法比照構思賦稅改革政策?如果馬蕭沒有將其兩岸白皮書的起草人強推為陸委會主委,為什麼行政院就要踢開其他更適合的人選,一定要白皮書的撰稿人去賦改會擔綱?兩岸政策涉及人民的統獨情感,處理起來雖然極為敏感,但即使如此,政府都能擴大參與,找台聯人士加入。租稅政策只是冷冰冰的經濟分析,政治敏感度遠不及兩岸,為什麼卻一定要作繭自縛呢?

 我們要提醒的是:在當前這樣一個民主多元、資訊流通的時代,面對不同的政策見解,最好的辦法就是將他們引入體制內,做全然開放的、不做操縱的討論。如果學界某些稅改主張在賦改會尋不著抒發管道,或是遭到壓抑,他們就會藉網路、報章、部落格四處發揮。因此,即使賦改會設計成一言堂,整個台灣的輿論也不可能容許賦改會自為非是。到頭來,徒然使賦改會的瓦釜意見與民間學者的黃鐘之音相牴觸,不但達不成凝聚共識的效果,反而予人政府欲強渡關山的誤解,那就很得不償失了。

 媒體報導,目前賦改會的組成應該是財政部所安排規畫,而整體而言,也似乎反映出李述德部長「賦改會是為落實馬蕭政見」的中心思想。我們對於財政部的格局視野實在不想再做評論,但是對於賦改會的未來走向,卻感到異常地憂心。希望邱副院長能夠在最後關頭再冷靜思考;像陳聽安教授、林全與許嘉棟前部長等社會菁英若都排除在外,那麼賦改會成立第一天,恐怕國安基金就得進場護盤了。無論如何,唯有一軍學者才能研議出一流的結論;排除一軍的參與就只會得出三流的結論。賦改會邱主委其實任重道遠;就算磕頭,也要把幾位一流學者請進賦改會。

Tuesday, June 24, 2008

Underestimate the Dangers of Inflation, and Pay the Price

Underestimate the Dangers of Inflation, and Pay the Price
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 24, 2008

International oil prices have skyrocketed from 100 USD a barrel at the beginning of this year to their current high of 140 USD a barrel. Although Saudi Arabia has agreed to increase production, oil prices will continue to rise. The entire world is faced with an inflationary crisis. Taiwan's Core Consumer Price Index (CPI) for May rose to its highest level in nine years. Its Consumer Confidence Index (CCI) fell to its lowest level in over seven years. Given prevailing public expectations, the Central Bank should take concrete action and demonstrate its determination to fight inflation.

Recently 30 major oil producing and consuming countries gathered in Jedda, Saudi Arabia, to discuss how to defuse the crisis in international oil prices. The largest oil-producing countries Saudi Arabia agreed to increase productivity beginning in July to 20 million barrels, from 9.7 million barrels per day. This is already the highest level of production since 1981, yet international crude oil futures prices continue to rise, with no signs of easing. Since 2000, international oil prices have increased 500 percent. Such a huge increase has led to comparable increases in fuel prices and other consumer product prices. Crop prices have increased several hundred percent. The impact on ordinary salaried workers has been horrific. The poor are having an even tougher time.

According to research from the Directorate General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics (DGBAS), the core CPI of 3. 23 percent in May established a new, nine-year high. In May the price of powdered milk, eggs and other foods increased by as much as 20%. The price impact on those who dine out has been as much as 10%. The May Consumer Confidence Index fell to a five-month low in 2007. With the new government's return to office, oil, electricity, and transportation costs have also risen. Public confidence in future prices is very low, Expectations of inflation are increasing.

When Ma took office, people genuinely expected to see better days. They did not expect international oil prices to shoot up further before the US subprime mortgage crisis took a turn for the better, the international political and economic situation became even riskier, and life became even harder. Under the impact of the US subprime mortgage crisis, global stock markets performed poorly. No one expected the once optimistic TAIEX to experience a 19 day losing streak. After the Ma administration took office, the global stock market hit bottom. People already suffering from rising prices found their funds frozen and their wallets shrunken. Many wondered whether the Ma Hsiao team had lost its magic touch. People expected the Old Hands of the Ma Hsiao team to take firm control. Increased fuel prices and electricity prices were intended to stimulate domestic demand. No one expected them to create problems, generate resentment, and trigger criticism.

In all fairness, Vice President Vincent Siew, Premier Liu Chao-hsuan, and Deputy Premier Chiu Cheng-hsiung held key positions during the Asian financial crisis 10 years ago, and have extensive practical experience dealing with financial crises. Today, 10 years later, the seriousness of the US subprime mortgage crisis has exceeded public expectations. Recently major Wall Street investment banks have been downsizing due to numerous losses. US stock markets have suffered a series of setbacks. The impact on Asian countries is gradually being felt. Most analysts never expected an Asian financial crisis, because Asian countries' economic structures are different from a decade ago. Many nations' economic and financial situation is sounder than 10 years ago, and should be able to cope.

Among the Asian countries only Vietnam is worrisome. A year ago Vietnam joined the World Trade Organization. It was the most attractive of the emerging batch of Southeast Asian tigers. Who knew one year later its status would change dramatically. Its stock market fell by 60%, real estate fell by 50 percent, and the exchange rate for their national currency is expected to depreciate by 30%. International credit rating companies blame the Vietnamese Central Bank's timid measures in response to inflation, set a poor example. In May this year, Vietnam's inflation rate touched off alarm bells. Consumer prices suddenly surged 25 percent, frightening away investors. Most analysts believe the Vietnamese Central Bank's interest rate increase was "too little, too late." This eventually resulted in runaway inflation. The main reason the Vietnamese Central Bank delayed raising interest rates was that political considerations outweighed all others. They worried that rate hikes would affect economic development. Indecisive wavering led to precisely the results they hoped against.

Vietnam's painful experience offers an object lesson for other Asian countries. If the authorities lack experience, and political considerations are foremost, a once stunning economic growth rate and investment environment will rapidly come undone. At the slightest rustling in the grass, and foreign investors who rushed to get in, will be the first to get out.

Taiwan's inflationary pressures are currently less serious than Vietnam's. Taiwan's economic structure is more mature than Vietnam's. But Vietnam's plight should not be taken lightly. Taiwan's economy relies primarily on exports. The NT dollar exchange rate increased this year by seven percent. To maintain export competitiveness, the banking sector thinks the central bank is unlikely to go all out by allowing the NT dollar exchange rate to float. Therefore raising interest rates has become a major tool to curb inflation. Over the past four years, the Central Bank has raised interest rates a total of 15 times. It has raised interest rates a total of 2.125 percent. But banks actually raised interest rates by only one percentage point. In fact, the impact was very limited.

Taiwan relies on imported gasoline. It is currently experiencing its most serious inflation in a decade. Taiwan's interest rates are low by Asian standards. If the Central Bank fails to show greater determination in its fight against inflation, if it worries about its every move, the consequences will be catastrophic.

中時電子報
中國時報  2008.06.24
低估通膨危機勢將後患無窮
中時社論

 國際油價自今年初一百美元狂飆逼近一四○美元歷史新高,儘管沙烏地阿拉伯同意增產,卻無法抑制油價繼續上漲,全球籠罩通膨危機。五月份台灣的核心物價年增率達到九年來最高,消費者信心指數跌至七年多以來新低,民間普遍存在物價上漲的預期心理下,央行確實應以實際行動展現對抗通膨的決心。

 最近卅個主要石油生產與消費國齊聚沙國的吉達,商討如何化解國際油價狂飆危機,雖然最大石油生產國沙烏地阿拉伯同意自七月起增加產能廿萬桶至每日九百七十萬桶,這已是一九八一年以來最高的產能,但國際原油期貨價格仍持續上漲,沒有舒緩的跡象。自二千年以來,國際原油價格上漲了五倍,如此巨大的增幅,已帶動其他燃油與民生物品、農作物價格高漲數倍,對於一般薪水階級衝擊非常大,窮人的日子更苦了。

 根據主計處調查,五月核心物價年增率達三.二三%,創九年新高,五月份的奶粉、雞蛋等食品價格漲幅高達二成,外食族受到的影響也高達一成。此外,五月份消費者信心指數跌到七年五個月新低,加上新政府上台後,油、電、交通等價格紛紛調漲,民眾對未來的物價信心非常低,對通膨的預期心理越來越濃厚。

 馬政府上台後,民眾殷切期盼會有好日子,未料,美國次級房貸風暴未能好轉,國際油價甚至進一步飆漲,國際政經局勢更加險峻,日子似乎變得更苦了。受到美國次級房貸風暴影響,全球股市表現均不佳,未料先前一路看好的台股連跌十九天,自馬政府上台以來的表現在全球股市敬陪末座。原本已飽受物價上漲之苦的民眾,如今資金慘遭套牢,且荷包大幅縮水,許多人不禁質疑,馬蕭團隊難道今不如昔?原本預期馬蕭團隊「老將」上場後,一切駕輕就熟,未料,從油、電公共費率的調整到擴大內需方案的推動,破綻百出,更引發外界不滿與批評聲浪。

 平心而論,從副總統蕭萬長、行政院長劉兆玄、副院長邱正雄等人在十年前的亞洲金融風暴期間均擔任要職,對於處理金融危機有豐富的實務經驗。十年後的今天,雖然美國次貸風暴的威力超乎各界預期,最近華爾街的大型投資銀行由於虧損累累,紛紛掀起裁員風,美股連連重挫,對亞洲各國的影響逐漸顯現,但一般認為亞洲還不至於發生金融危機,原因是亞洲各國的經濟結構已不同於十年前,許多國家的經濟與金融情勢均比十年前穩健,應有足夠能力因應。

 亞洲各國中唯一令人憂慮的是越南,一年前越南加入世界貿易組織,曾是東南亞最亮眼的新興小虎,不料,一年後,情勢急轉而下,股市跌了六成,房地產跌了五成,匯率預期還要貶值三成,國際信評公司歸咎於越南央行因應通膨的措施瞻前顧後,做了錯誤示範。今年五月越南的通膨亮起紅燈,消費者物價年增率突然竄升至廿五%,嚇壞了投資人,一般認為越南央行升息的動作太慢且力道太小,最後導致通膨問題一發不可收拾。進一步探究越南央行遲遲不敢升息的主因,不外乎是政治考量重於一切,擔憂升息會影響經濟發展,猶豫不決的結果適得其反。

 越南的慘痛經驗提供亞洲各國最佳的借鏡,如果執政當局缺乏經驗,一切以政治考量為依歸,原本閃亮的經濟成長與投資環境很快就會大逆轉,外資當年一窩蜂搶進,然而一有風吹草動,外資跑得也最快。

 目前台灣的通膨壓力雖然不如越南那麼嚴重,台灣的經濟結構也比越南成熟許多,但亦不能掉以輕心。台灣的經濟主要依賴出口這個單引擎,新台幣匯率今年以來升值幅度約七%,在維持出口競爭力心態下,銀行界預期央行不太可能放手讓新台幣匯率大升,因此以升息抑制通膨成為主要的工具。過去四年來,央行共升息十五次,幅度約二.一二五個百分點,但銀行利率實際拉升的幅度只有一個百分點,成效其實非常有限。

 台灣的汽油完全依賴進口,目前所面臨的通膨問題是十年來最嚴峻的情勢,加上台灣的利率在亞洲各國中是超低水準,如果央行在對抗通膨方面未能展現較大的決心,或是瞻前顧後,將引發無窮後患。

Monday, June 23, 2008

Constitutional Interpretation 644: Will There Be a "Chinese Reunification Party" on Kinmen?

Constitutional Interpretation 644: Will There Be a "Chinese Reunification Party" on Kinmen?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 23, 2008

Taiwan may soon legalize the establishment of a Communist Party or Taiwan Independence Party.

Last Friday the Council of Grand Justices issued Constitutional Interpretation 644. It ruled that provisions prohibiting civic groups from "advocating Communism or separatism" were inconsistent with the people's right to freedom of assembly, freedom of speech, and freedom of expression, as specified in the constitution, and should be considered null and void from this day forward.

In other words, future advocates of Communism or Taiwan independence, or Kinmen, Matsu, or Penghu's separatism or independence, must be permitted to form officially recognized political parties. The Ministry of the Interior may not reject their applications.

On the one hand, this is an important milestone in democracy. On the other hand, this is also a profound challenge to our system of constitutional government. For example, suppose one day the island elects a County Magistrate who belongs to a "Chinese Reunification Party " or a "Kinmen Independence Party?" That may not lead to immediate reunification or independence. But it will certainly affect Taiwan's political situation and cross-strait relations.

Communism and Taiwan independence are Taiwan's two major political problems. People may have different about Communism's theory of class struggle. But a Taiwanese Communist Party working in conjunction with the Chinese Communist Party could enjoy considerable leverage in cross-strait affairs. Conversely, because parties advocating Taiwan independence enjoy the right to freedom of association, they will inevitably have an impact upon Taiwan's political spectrum and political climate.

Constitutional Interpretation 644 seems progressive. In fact it lags behind current realities. Take its declaration regarding the advocacy of Taiwan independence. The DPP already has a "Taiwan Independence Party Constitution." The Taiwan Independence Party and the Taiwan Solidarity Union are also well-known Taiwan independence parties. Take its declaration regarding the advocacy of Communism. Many social movements have left-wing political colors. They also have links with mainland China. Members of the public occasionally drive sound trucks displaying PRC flags broadcasting leftist slogans. No one seems terribly concerned.

Constitutional Interpretation 644 does not establish any new civil right. It merely acknowledges the existing political reality. In fact, Taiwan's politics have already gone beyond the issue of whether one may advocate Taiwan independence or Communism. Instead the issue is how to cope with Taiwan independence and Communism, given a framework of democracy.

Regarding Taiwan independence, the amending of the "100 Criminal Laws" in 1992 already made Taiwan independence thought crimes and Taiwan independence speech crimes a thing of the past. The Taiwan Independence Alliance and other such groups are highly active. But this does not mean advocacy of Taiwan independence is about to become the Conventional Wisdom. Dealing with Taiwan independence using democratic means has allowed Taiwan independence to achieve a higher media profile, but it has actually weakened Taiwan independence in actual substance. For example, how long has it been since we have heard the call for "Taiwan independence nation-building?" The term has been replaced by such vague terms as the "Rectification of Names and Authoring of a New Constitution." or the "Normalization of the Nation." The January 2008 Legislative Elections and March Presidential Election could be considered a repudiation of Chen Shui-bian and the DPP's Taiwan independence political machinations by a majority of public at the polls. One might say that ever since the amendment of the "100 Criminal Laws," the laws no longer prohibited Taiwan independence. Instead Taiwan independence has been repudiated by the public at the ballot box. It has led the DPP stepping down. If the next round of legislative elections are conducted according to the "single constituency, two vote" system, and the presidential election is changed to an "absolute majority" system, then the fate of the Taiwan independence movement and the direction of the nation will be decided via democratic elections.

Constitutional Interpreation 644 grants Communist Parties freedom of association. It also allows the public to advocate dividing the nation. Its impact is difficult to gauge. Germany prohibits the reestablishment of the Nazi Party. The United States has not allowed the establishment of a Communist Party. All of these constitute restrictions on freedom. As noted earlier, suppose one day a "Kinmen Chinese Reunification Party" or "Kinmen Independence Party" wins the parliamentary elections and county magistrate elections? Suppose one day, given "China's rise," a "Taiwan Communist Party" appears? Suppose it makes a persuasive case for reunification with the mainland? This will be one of many unpredictable consequences of Taiwan's democracy.

Constitutional Interpretation 644 deserves to be affirmed. But it will test Taiwan's democratic system. As mentioned above, The Council of Supreme Justices has merely acknowledged existing political realities. Over the past 20 years Taiwan's democratic system has accumulated considerable experience in coping with Taiwan independence and Communism. Taiwan's political consensus is that Taiwan's future must be the joint decision of 23 million people. If that is the case, then the value of Taiwan independence and Communism will also be decided by 23 million people.

Freedom comes first. especially freedom of association. If one day a real Communist Party and a real Taiwan independence party appear on Taiwan, democracy must reign supreme. Taiwan's fortunes, for better or worse, and Taiwan's direction, must remain in the hands of 23 million people.

六四四號解釋:會否出現「金門中國統一黨」
【聯合報╱社論】
2008.06.23 03:12 am

台灣可能出現合法備案正式成立的「共產黨」或「台灣獨立運動黨」。

上周五出爐的大法官會議第六四四號解釋:人民團體法中有關「人民團體之組織與活動,不得主張共產主義,或分裂國土」之規定,不符憲法保障人民結社自由和言論自由之意旨,應自解釋公布日起失效。

換句話說,未來主張共產主義、台灣獨立,甚或主張金門、馬祖、澎湖分離獨立者,皆可組成正式政黨,內政部不得駁回其備案申請。

一方面,這是民主深化的重要里程碑;另一方面,這也是對民主憲政的更深層考驗。例如,倘若金門有一天民選產生一位「金門中國統一黨」或「金門獨立黨」黨籍的縣長,雖然未必即會「統一」或「獨立」,但必將牽動台灣政局及兩岸關係。

共產主義及台獨主張,是台灣政治中的兩大難題。共產主義的階級鬥爭論容可見仁見智,但台灣若出現一個與中共聯結的台灣共產黨,卻可能成為兩岸的槓桿;另者,如今台獨主張既有結社組黨之自由,則對台灣的政治光譜及政治板塊亦可能發生影響。

六四四號解釋看似頗為先進,其實卻亦可說是落後於社會現實的「馬後砲」。就台獨主張言,莫說民進黨迄今仍有「台獨黨綱」,「建國黨」及「台灣團結聯盟」亦是盡人皆知的「台獨黨」;就共產主義言,則許多社運團體皆有左翼色彩,間亦有與中國大陸存有相當聯結者,國人在街頭偶見插著五星旗的宣傳車呼嘯而過,亦不致驚怪。

六四四號解釋,與其說開發了新的公民權,不如說只是承認了已經存在的政治現實。其實,台灣的政治課題早已超越了「能否主張台獨」或「能否主張共產主義」的問題,而是在於:台灣如何在民主平台上處理台獨及共產主義。

就台獨論,一九九二年「刑法一百條」的修正,已使台獨的思想犯及言論犯成為歷史名詞,「台獨聯盟」之類的團體亦十分活躍;但這卻未必等同於台獨主張即能成為主流民意,只是改以「民主」的方式來處理台獨議題。自從以民主平台來處理台獨議題後,台獨運動雖在形勢上升高,卻在實質上亦有倒退,例如久已不聞「台獨建國」,而改稱「正名制憲」或「國家正常化」等較隱晦的名詞;至二○○八年一月立法委員選舉及三月總統大選,則可謂是多數國人在投票箱前否定了陳水扁及民進黨的台獨操作。可以這麼說,自「刑法一百條」修正以來,法律即未禁止台獨主張;台獨主張最後是在民主平台上及投票箱前受到了民意節制,而導致民進黨下台。未來倘若仍維持立委選舉的「單一選區兩票制」,並進一步將總統選舉定為「絕對多數制」;則台獨運動或其任何關於國家定位主張之何去何從,應皆可由民主平台來決定。

六四四號解釋准許共產黨結社,再加以容許公開主張分裂國土,則較難估計其效應。其實,德國不容納粹黨再生,及美國亦曾不准共產黨設立,皆是在自由及限制之間的斟酌。前文論及,如果有一天金門出現「金門中國統一黨」或「金門獨立黨」,並贏得縣長及縣議會選舉;或如果有一天,在「中國崛起」的背景中,台灣出現了一個有品質的以階級論述及中國聯結為訴求的「台灣共產黨」,那都將為台灣的民主憲政添增許多變數。

六四四號解釋值得肯定,但對台灣的民主平台亦將是一考驗。如前所述,大法官只是承認了已經存在的政治現實,且二十年來台灣民主平台對台獨及共產主義已經累積了相當程度的處理經驗。台灣今日最大的政治共識是:台灣前途由二千三百萬人共同決定;既是如此,對台獨及共產主義的評價,自然亦應由二千三百萬人決定。

自由第一,結社自由,有一天真正的共產黨及台獨黨可能會在台灣出現;民主至上,但台灣的吉凶禍福、台灣的方向,仍是掌握在二千三百萬人手中。

Friday, June 20, 2008

One Month Ago the KMT Stepped Up and the DPP Stepped Down

One Month Ago the KMT Stepped Up and the DPP Stepped Down
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 20, 2008


Inauguration Day May 22, 2008

As of today, the Ma administration has been in office exactly one month. By the same token, the DPP has been in the opposition for one month.

For the Ma administration, there was no honeymoon period. Soon after it took office, six-hour long lines formed at gas stations. The repercussions from the Diaoyutai ramming incident are still being felt. One month has whizzed by, with hardly a day of peace. Yin Chi-ming's oil price hikes, Chen Chao-min's remarks on the 319 Shooting Incident of 2004, Francisco Ou's green card controversy, and Chen Wu-hsiung's fertilizer hoarding issue have all provoked demands for their resignations.

The Liu cabinet has been in office less than a month. Yet there have been calls for four cabinet members to step down. What exactly is the problem? Must the Liu cabinet learn the hard way, by means of "shock treatments?"

Since the Ma administration took office, the political landscape has changed. The public need no longer listen to endless static about "love of Taiwan vs. a lack of love for Taiwan," hate speech about "Taiwanese vs. Chinese pigs," "elimination of Chiang influences and de-Sinicization," and "rectification of names and the authoring of a new constitution." Political differences may not have gone away, but at least they are not longer drawing blood. The greatest consolation the second change in ruling parties has granted the people is liberation from never ending Blue vs. Green confrontation. The focus of public debate has shifted from "Taiwan independence" and "Taiwanese, not Chinese" identity politics to public policy issues. No longer is the government using controversies to divide the community. Instead, the community is setting the agenda. The public no longer has the uneasy feeling that its leaders are manipulating them. Instead the public is setting the agenda, and politicians are following their lead. Examples include oil prices, cross-strait issues, and the stimulation of domestic demand.

The Ma administration took office one month ago. Since then, one crisis after another has exploded in rapid succession, in unprecedented fashion. Major earthquakes are often accompanied by powerful aftershocks. If these crises are not handled properly, they can seriously damage the Ma administration's image. But if they are handled well, or considered handled well in retrospect, the Ma administration's stock may rise. The Ma administration took advantage of the Boao Forum to play the Vincent Siew card. It ordered the ROC Coast Guard to escort a private fishing vessel, the Quanjiafu, allowing it to circumnavigate Diaoyutai island. These are miraculous achievements. On the other hand, annoucing a gasoline prince increase at 5:45pm and failing to preempt the hoarding of fertilizers amount to shooting itself in the foot. Furthermore, the green card controversy was from beginning to end, a crisis of the Ma administration's own making. Ma administration crisis management turned out to be crises managing the Ma administration. More than one political appointee put his foot in his mouth, including Premier Liu Chao-hsuan, who said that that "giving up one's green card constituted a personal sacrifice." Obviously somebody forgot to tighten the screws.

Let's review the crises which have exploded since the DPP stepped down last month. The DPP has seized the initiative and has been setting the agenda. But it has failed to deal with the issues in sufficient depth. It has generated plenty of thunder, but little rain. Take cross-strait issues. Taiwan's opening to the mainland is a fait accompli. But the DPP has no idea how to deal with this macro trend. All it knows how to do is to deny the existence of the 1992 Consensus. It is unable to explain how it reached its conclusion. Take the Diaoyutai ramming incident. All it can do is accuse the Ma administration of being wishy-washy, of being suddenly soft then suddenly hard. It is unable to deny that the ROC Coast Guard circumnavigated the island, shattering a three decade old psychological barrier. Take the green card issue. It was later discovered that at least 22 DPP political appointees had dual citizenship, and that three "ambassadors" have green cards, including Representative to Japan Koh Se-kai, who has a "Sakura Card." The DPP has nothing of substance to offer on cross-strait and Diaoyutai issues. On the green card and other issues, the only dirt it has been able to dig up blew up in its own face. If the Ma administration ever learns how not to trip over its own tongue, the DPP may run out of issues to demagogue.

A month long ordeal, consisting of one crisis after another, all part of a larger struggle between the newly empowered KMT and the newly disempowered DPP. Major storms generate large waves. How will they impact the KMT and DPP's profit and loss columns? We will learn the answer only after the storm is over and the dust has settled. For example, the final verdict on cross-straits relations will depend upon the aftermath of the various summit meetings. The final verdict on the Diaoyutai ramming incident will depend on its impact on the national psyche. The final verdict on the government's policy of stimulating domestic demand will depend on its domestic political and economic consequences. In other words, on which party has dealt with these matters in greater depth. Whose impact will be greater, and who will emerge the victor, will be subject to the test of time.

The KMT government's greatest achievements one month into its term are: 1. A clearer sense of national identity, diminished frictions between community groups, and increased political stability. Amidst the hubbub, a quieter, more peaceful society has emerged. 2. Direct cross-strait transportation links and the confrontation over Diaoyutai have forced Taipei, Washington, Tokyo and Bejing to display greater flexibility, in theory as well as in practice. Important changes have already taken place. Taiwan will become more visible, and its status less rigidly defined. It need no longer be defined as a pawn in a "cross strait" or "Taipei, Washington, Tokyo" strategic struggle. It can now be considered a player in a "Taipei, Washington, Tokyo, Beijing" strategic scenario. Meanwhile, the KMT government faces major challenges. How will it achieve economic growth and social justice in the face of inflation and rising oil prices? How will it achieve its goal of an Asian Pacific economic and political platform?

The DPP may find it difficult to define this month's crises as grist for its mill or as its opportunity for a comeback. Once the KMT's fever has broken, the shock effect of these events and issues may help it find its way, eliminate blind spots and avoid dead ends. The Ma administration has been in office for only one month. Yet the DPP has been demanding that it step down. Such unreasonable demands, once discredited, will become less and less convincing over time. Therefore, the DPP had better redouble its efforts to find a new strategic objective. Guerrilla warfare and harrassment tactics may not be sustainable in the long-term.

For the past month the air has been thick with smoke. Some people consider it appalling that the new administration has descended into such chaos in only one month. Others see things differently. Others consider it fortunate that the Ma administration has been able to confront so many critical issues during its first month in office. Some are concerned about chaos. Others are wallowing in undisguised Schadenfreude. The DPP is probably rubbing its hands with anticipation at the prospect of a political atmosphere choked with impenetrable smoke. The KMT is probably working hard to ensure that the dust settles.

Over the past month, the air has been filled with smoke. The KMT government has repeatedly enacted the Chinese parable about the "Father and Son Riding the Mule to Market." No matter who rides or doesn't ride the mule, someone has condemned it. Will the KMT eventually find its way? Over the past month, the dust has gradually settled. The DPP however has seized on every opportunity to demand someone's resignation. Is this how it intends to fufill its role as an "opposition party with experience in governance?"

今天滿月:國民黨執政及民進黨下野
【聯合報╱社論】
2008.06.20 03:23 am

今天是馬政府就職滿月,也是民進黨再度成為反對黨滿月。

對於馬政府來說,根本沒有「蜜月」。上任不久加油站就出現六個小時的車龍,一直到今日仍餘波盪漾的則是釣魚台撞船事件,一個月匆匆過去,幾無寧日;其間從尹啟銘的油品漲價、陳肇敏的三一九談話、歐鴻鍊的綠卡風波,及陳武雄的肥料囤積等,都被人高喊下台!

上台未滿月就下台聲四起的劉內閣,究竟是出了根本的問題,或只是「震撼教育」而已?

馬政府上任,國人感受到的最鮮明的政治景觀就是:不再動輒聽到「愛台灣/不愛台灣」、「中華民國/台灣國」、「台灣人/中國豬」、「去蔣/去中」、「正名制憲」等纏繞耳際的噪音;這些政治歧見或許仍然潛存於社會之中,但已無血肉撕裂的感覺。政黨二度輪替帶給民眾最大的慰藉,就是從藍綠撕裂的窒悶中脫困。社會議論的焦點,由統獨、族群,轉變成公共議題;且不再是由主政者利用議題來操弄社會,反而是由社會主導了議題設定。亦即,國人如今已經感覺不到主政者用統獨或族群的議題來玩弄民眾,反而見到社會輿論將主政者導向公共議題,如油價、兩岸議題、擴大內需方案等的議論之中。

馬政府就任一個月的另一鮮明景觀是「大議題/大事件」盡出,一個月裡出現這麼多「大議題/大事件」,堪謂空前。大事件自然會掀起大風波,大風波處理不好,必會嚴重折損馬政府形象;但若當時處理得好,或事後被認為處理得好,亦可能提升馬政府的社會評價。準此以論,馬政府掌握博鰲論壇的機會打出蕭萬長這張牌,及掌握「全家福號」海釣船出海,演出海巡艦繞釣魚台一周,皆可視為神來之筆的佳作;但如油品漲價選在下午五時四十五分宣布,及對防止囤積肥料失去機先等,卻可謂竟在不應翻車的路上翻了車。再者,綠卡事件則可謂自始至終皆是馬政府自己製造及養大的危機;處理危機,卻反而「被危機處理」。至於不少政務官常因失言或口誤掀起風波,包括劉兆玄的「棄綠卡犧牲說」,皆是螺絲沒有鎖緊的徵候。

回頭看民進黨下野一個月,層出迭現的大事件、大題材,使民進黨立即搶占了輿論的焦點;然而,民進黨的戰略縱深顯然不夠,熱鬧有餘但火候欠佳。例如:面對兩岸議題,民進黨對開放的大趨勢已完全失去反對的空間,只強調不承認「九二共識」,卻說不出個所以然;在釣魚台撞船事件,只說馬政府忽軟忽硬,卻不能否定海巡艦終於繞島一周突破了三十年的心理障礙;至於綠卡事件,後來發現民進黨不但至少有二十二名政務官帶著雙重國籍上任,且有三名「大使」始終持有外國綠卡,包括駐日代表許世楷的「櫻花卡」。倘若民進黨在如兩岸及釣魚台的大議題上沒有縱深可言;在綠卡等事件上,又出現反挫自己的後座力;再加上馬政府若未來失言口誤亦漸漸減少,則民進黨恐怕要擔心未來可能找不到可以發揮的話題了。

一個月來此起彼落的大議題、大事件,可謂對上台的國民黨及下野的民進黨都是一場大操兵。大事件自然有大風波,這些大風波對國民黨及民進黨的最後得失,恐怕要看風波停息、塵埃落定之後的效應,而不能只看風波正起之時的利鈍;例如,兩岸要看直航的後續效應,釣魚台要看在國民心理上留下何種印象,擴大內需則要看帶動的地方政經效應;亦即,要看兩黨誰的縱深夠,誰的後效大,誰能禁得起時間的考驗,始能決定誰是最後的贏家。

概括而言,一個月來國民黨政府的較大成就是:一、國家認同比較清朗、族群鬥爭降溫、憲政體制較趨平穩;在喧鬧的表象中,出現了比較寧靜平和的社會基礎。二、由於兩岸直航及釣魚台角力,使得「台/美/日/中」四邊關係的想像空間及實際情境,皆已經出現或可能出現不同於往昔的重要變化;今後,台灣的主體地位若能漸形凸顯且靈活,即不必將「兩岸」及「台/美/日」下成兩盤棋,而可望將「台/美/日/中」下成一盤棋。另者,國民黨政府面臨的主要挑戰,則仍是在油價上漲、通貨膨脹的壓力下,如何實現一個經濟成長、分配公平的社會;並在此一基礎上,向「亞太平台」的政經角色前進。

至於民進黨,似乎不宜將這一個月的「大議題/大事件」視為其東山再起、捲土重來的本錢;因為,這些大事件及大議題所造成的「震撼教育」,反而可能協助國民黨打通了經脈、消滅了盲點與死角,出完了疹子;則民進黨在馬政府上台的第一個月就大喊下台,恐怕這種勢頭一旦再而衰、三而竭,未來難以為繼。因此,民進黨仍應以擴展戰略的縱深為主要的努力目標,游擊戰及騷擾戰恐難圖長久。

這一個月,掀起漫天煙塵。有人認為,才一個月就亂成這個樣子,怎麼得了;但也有人認為,第一個月就能把所有的大議題翻攪一遍,未嘗不是好事。有人憂慮煙塵漫天的亂象,也有人樂見提前出現塵埃落定的效應;煙塵漫天可能是民進黨期待的景象,塵埃落定則是國民黨努力的目標。

一個月來,煙塵漫天,屢屢演出父子騎驢的國民黨政府,會不會漸漸找到執政的正確手感?相對而言,一個月來,也逐漸塵埃落定,動不動就喊「下台」的民進黨,將如何真正實現其「有執政經驗的反對黨」的角色?

Thursday, June 19, 2008

Joint Resignations Will Help the Ruling and Opposition Parties Define Themselves

Joint Resignations Will Help the Ruling and Opposition Parties Define Themselves
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 19, 2008

Representative to Japan Koh Se-kai's "Death before Dishonor" political gesture is pressuring Chen regime political appointees, foreign ministry officials, and executives of state-owned enterprises to submit a joint resignation. If this happens and the government conducts a thorough house-cleaning, then we really must give the DPP a giant thumbs up. If one is going to be an opposition party, this is the way to be an opposition party.

Doing so would at least solve an awkward dilemma that has prevailed ever since the change in ruling parties. On the one hand, the KMT would like to make major personnel changes as soon as possible. On the other hand, it is concerned it will be accused of carrying on a political purge. The result has been haphazard personnel assignments or rumors of personnel assignments that lead nowhere. The DPP meanwhile, constantly suspects the KMT of forming some sort of "Task Force for the Destruction of the DPP," of plotting to purge DPP appointees still in office. Now that the DPP is in the opposition, it must often witness its own members being humiliated by Pan Blue legislators. One month after the change in ruling parties, the ruling and opposition parties may have staked out their positions on the ideological spectrum, but neither side has been able to make any bold moves. Neither side is at ease. Wouldn't a joint resignation be an tremendous relief for both the Blue and Green Camps?

The ruling party could then act like a ruling party, and the opposition party could act like an opposition party. The sheep would have been separated from the goats. Pan Blue legislators would no longer be tempted to single out "Residual Greens" to cross-examine. Pan Green legislators would no longer worry about inadvertently burning one of their own. Nor would they have to endure the Blue Camp placing the blame on "officials from the previous administration." As DPP legislator Ker Chien-ming sees it, the DPP can't tolerate the KMT "using Green Camp political appointees as scapegoats to shift attention away from KMT incompetence."

Since the KMT has reclaimed the right to rule, and even promised "total governance, total responsibility," it should appoint its "Best and Brightest." But ever since the Green Camp accused Ma of conducting a political purge, he has been walking on egg shells. Many officials who should have been replaced have been kept on. By the same token, many officials appointed by the former administration find themselves caught in a dilemma. They don't know whether to stay or to go. At any moment they know they could be replaced. How many of them are going to have the presence of mind to implement new policy?

Reports of an alleged "Task Force for the Destruction of the DPP" are really rather absurd. If the DPP is so feeble it can be destroyed by some Blue Camp "Task Force," then the game is already over. The DPP might as well pack it in. Eight years ago, when the Democratic Progressive Party came to power for the first time, how did it treat Blue Camp officials who remained in office? Today the Blue Camp is merely treating them the same way. If you can't stand the heat, get out of the kitchen. Why not use the opportunity to establish a tradition of joint resignations based on whoever is the ruling party? Paranoid speculation about some "Task Force for the Destruction of the DPP" is unlikely to increase Blue Camp political momentum. But it could seriously diminish the DPP's stature.

Ironically, Representative to Japan Koh Se-kai's "Death before Dishonor" political gesture provides a way out of this predicament. If the Green Camp wishes to assign political responsibility for the Diaoyutai ramming incident, it can hardly blast the Ministry of Foreign Affairs while heaping praise on Koh Se-kai. The Green Camp can't wait to humiliate Pan Blue officials, but is unwilling to allow Koh Se-kai to appear in the Legislative Yuan, to be "humiliated" by Blue Camp legislators. To avoid the charge of double standards, the Green Camp's only choice is a joint resignation.

The solution is actually quite simple. The Blue Camp needs to assume total political responsibility. The Green Camp needs to provide comprehensive checks and balances. If five or six hundred officials in the Ma administration still have their hearts in the Green Camp, isn't something seriously wrong with the arrangement? The Green Camp was in the political opposition for a long time. The first time it took office it lacked the necessary talent, and was forced to recruit Blue Camp officials. This was entirely understandable. Since the Blue Camp insists it is "ready to go," it should have no problem filling hundreds of vacancies. If the KMT is not concerned about charges that it is conducting a "political purge," it should assign its own people to these positions and not look back.

Every time a U.S. presidential election results in a change in the ruling party, large numbers of former officials pack their bags and move their families home, to be replaced by new officials. Sometimes every four years. Sometimes every eight years. This is all perfectly normal. Nobody considers it the least bit strange. Nobody hints darkly of political purges of former officials. Nobody turns joint resignations into Greek tragedies. Nobody alleges the existence of a "Task Force for the Destruction of Such and Such Party." After all, this is nothing more than a routine change of ruling parties.

As for these five or six hundred officials, allegedly the DPP's Best and Brightest, will they all resign simultanously on orders from the DPP? We'll have to wait and see. After all, each of these officials has a different story. Some were promoted with great difficulty. Some really hustled to get themselves promoted. Some were hurriedly installed just before the change in ruling parties. Some have no intention of clinging to their rice bowls. Some are well qualified for their jobs. If the DPP issues an order demanding a joint resignation, how many of them will fall in line? We will know in just a few days.

中時電子報
中國時報  2008.06.19
藉著總辭讓朝野各自就定位
中時社論

 講實在話,如果不是因為駐日代表許世楷的「不堪其辱」事件,讓民進黨有意要讓所有曾經任命的政務官、外交官及國營事業負責人通通「集體請辭」,來一次徹底的人事大清倉,這一切如果後來都能成為事實,我們在這倒還真要向民進黨豎起大拇指:要做在野黨,就該這麼幹!

 選擇這麼做,至少解決了政黨輪替後一直都挺彆扭的困局:一方面國民黨早早就想大幅調整人事,但又怕被綠營扣上「清算政治」的帽子,結果接掌政權後的人事布局,不是零零星星,就是多半有風聲卻沒動靜。民進黨呢,老是懷疑國民黨內真有個什麼「毀民進黨小組」,會對那些還留在位子上的官員下手,特別是都已經在野了,還要經常目睹自己人在那被藍營立委羞辱,結果政黨輪替都一個月了,縱然朝野政黨早就各自就定位,但就是沒法大開大闔,雙方都不舒坦。若能來一次「集體請辭」,不藍綠陣營都獲得了解脫?

 畢竟如此一來,朝是朝,野是野,不必再老是你泥中有我,我泥中有你,弄得藍營立委質詢時專挑「綠營遺老」的麻煩,綠營立委質詢要不就是得小心別燒到昔日的自家人,要不就是得忍受藍營把問題全都推給「舊官僚」,正如同立委柯建銘所謂:絕不要再當國民黨轉移治國無方的「墊腳石」與「替死鬼」。

 嘗試想想:國民黨既然拿回了執政權,又標榜「完全執政、完全負責」,當然就該部署好完整的執政團隊,但被綠營一個「清算」帽子這麼一扣,反而處處瞻前顧後,許多該調整的人事就這麼被擱置了下來。同樣的,那些還在任上的前朝官員,不少人也陷入進退失據的困境,不知是該走還是該留,時時刻刻又有可能會被撤換的心理預期,試問誰還有什麼心情去推動政務?

 這兩天傳出的「毀民進黨小組」的說法,其實真的也很扯,民進黨若是衰弱到能被藍營搞個什麼「小組」就毀掉了,那還玩什麼?八年前民進黨初次執政的時候,對那些還留在任上的藍營官員,何曾客氣過?如今藍營不過是同樣的手法再玩一遍而已,若是不想受這個氣,藉此建立隨政黨輪替集體去留的慣例,也未嘗不可不是嗎?為一個「毀民進黨小組」的說法弄到那般杯弓蛇影,既長不了藍營多少氣勢,反倒滅了自己不少威風!

 駐日代表許世楷這一回合的「辭職政治學」風波,其實正是這種困局的最佳寫照。綠營要追究執政當局在釣魚台撞船事件的政治責任,總不能只轟外交部,卻又力捧許世楷吧?綠營競相羞辱藍營的官員,又不願讓許世楷去立院接受藍營立委的「羞辱」,要避免被外界指為雙重標準,集體請辭恐怕是唯一的選擇了。

 所以,問題其實很單純,藍營需要完整的責任政治,綠營期盼能操作完整的制衡政治,如果還有那麼五、六百名官員「人在曹營心在漢」,怎麼說都不對勁吧?以前綠營因為是長期在野,初掌執政權時行政人才不足,迫不得已向藍營借將,這在彼時完全可以理解。如今藍營既然說他們都準備好了,立即補實幾百名缺額應該不是問題,不是嗎?國民黨如果已經沒有「清算」的顧慮,就放手布局人事吧!

 美國大選只要每逢政黨輪替,華府都會出現大量卸任官員拖運行李舉家搬出,同時又有成群新任官員遷入的畫面,有時四年一次,有時八年一次,大家都見怪不怪,從沒鬧過什麼清算前朝官員,集體請辭戲碼,或是「毀XX黨小組」的風波,畢竟這就是在政黨輪替嘛!

 至於這批號稱優秀的五、六百名官員,會不會在民進黨一聲令下就全部請辭呢?大家一塊等著看吧!畢竟這中間每位官員的故事都不一樣,有不少的人是好不容易才升上去的,有的是費好大勁經營才爭取到的,有的還是趕在政黨輪替前趕忙才安排的,有的則早就無心戀棧,有的也確實是適才適所的優秀人才,如果民進黨一聲集體請辭令下,他們都會立即行動一致嗎?再沒幾天就揭曉了。

Wednesday, June 18, 2008

Koh Se-kai's Desertion Under Fire

Koh Se-kai's Desertion Under Fire
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 18, 2008

After days of protests and denials, the Japanese government has finally expressed a willingness to pay compensation and to apologize for ramming and sinking an ROC fishing boat. ROC legislators have canceled their reconnaissance mission to Diaoyutai. The storm has temporarily died down. The most regrettable aspect of this major diplomatic incident, is continued partisan infighting on Taiwan, and the inability of the opposing parties to unite to defend the ROC's national interests.

Representative to Japan Koh Se-kai refused to report to the Legislative Yuan. Instead, along with another legislator, he held a press conference, condemning the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and demanding that it immediately approve his resignation. Koh Se-kai's gesture not only violated the civil service code of ethics, it was a serious dereliction of a diplomatic envoy's sworn duty. The two nations are mired in a controversy. When the Ministry of Foreign Affairs recalled ROC Representative to Japan Koh Se-kai, it was one way for the ROC to bargain with Japan. Yet Koh chose this moment to loudly announce his resignation. He not only deserted his post in the heat of battle, he publicly embarrassed his own government. No competent diplomat would ever betray his own country in such an underhanded manner.

Several Blue Camp legislators denounced Koh Se-kai as a "traitor to Taiwan." Their charges were inappropriate. But as the ROC's diplomatic envoy to Japan, Koh Se-kai is duty-bound to report to the legislature as a whole, not just a few impolite Blue Camp legislators. Yet he used this as an excuse to refuse to report to the Legislative Yuan. This was not merely an act of contempt for the legislature, it was also a dereliction of his solemn duties as a public servant. Therefore no matter how well Koh Se-kai might have performed during his term of office, at the crucial moment he let his country down. He came up short. He neglected his duties. He failed to speak on behalf of his country.

Koh Se-kai's dereliction of duty was rooted not merely in his possession of a "Sakura Card," i.e., Permanent Resident status in Japan, but in his Taiwan independence and Japanophilic orientation. Blue vs. Green animosity, aggravated by the recent change in ruling parties, with encouragement from Green Camp legislators, motivated Koh Se-kai's rash behavior. From Koh Se-kai's "sounding of retreat" we can see that diplomatic envoys are not the only ones afflicted with cognitive disorders. Partisan politics on Taiwan is rife with such befuddlement. Otherwise
how could the ruling and opposition parties indulge in partisan bickering when the nation is confronted by an external threat?

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs' recall of Koh Se-kai during the confrontation is a commonplace means of diplomatic protest. It was directed at Japan. Who knew Koh Se-kai would conclude it was directed at him? Who knew he would interpret it as an expression of new administration dissatisfaction with his performance, and as an attempt to humiliate him? Given his failure to distinguish between public and private issues, it is little wonder he failed to understand his solemn duty. As his country's Representative to Japan, Koh Se-kai should have been loyal to his nation and his government. Instead he was loyal only to the DPP. He defied the new administration's directives. Some people said his most significant achievement while in office was to successfully cast Ma Ying-jeou as an "anti-Japanese element." With diplomats such as this stationed in foreign countries, how can we possibly uphold our nation's larger interests?

The Chen Shui-bian regime has ripped apart society with eight years of Blue vs. Green demagoguery. What's worse, it has led the nation on a Quixotic political quest, for an unattainable goal. For eight years the DPP has been shouting "We love Taiwan." In fact, their shrill declarations of love for Taiwan have merely enabled them to question the loyalty of anyone "not one of us." They trumpeted their "bull in a china shop" diplomacy and their "scorched earth" diplomacy, but turned a blind eye and a deaf ear to challenges to ROC sovereignty, fishing rights and human rights. Koh Se-kai's desertion under fire is hardly an isolated case. It represents the DPP's befuddlement regarding national identity. They dare not proclaim sovereignty over Diaoyutai. They dare not argue on behalf of Taiwanese fishermen when their rights and interests are violated. When diplomats stationed in foreign countries are recalled to testify before the legislature, they play the partisan card. So the question is: How exactly does the DPP love Taiwan?

The Diaoyutai incident has triggered an island wide political storm. It has highlighted the island's identity crisis. If the nation is unable to unite in the face of threats to its sovereignty, how will it cope when confronted by more severe tests? The opposition party is hardly the sole culprit. Ruling party legislators have also stirred up trouble, clamoring for war and demanding the dispatch of troops. They have increased the executive branch's already heavy burden. This is hardly the way a ruling party should behave.

The current storm had a favorable outcome, primarily because incontrovertible evidence showed that a Japanese warship rammed and sank an ROC fishing boat. The new administration was therefore able to use public anger to demand justice. The rights and interests of the fishing boat owner will probably be protected, but the underlying problem remains unsolved. It is said that diplomacy is an extension of domestic politics. The soft power wielded by our civil society and our economic system can help increase the ROC's inadequate diplomatic breathing space. But irrational partisan bickering could become a burden for foreign policy. The Koh Se-kai incident has added a new wrinkle to the Diaoyutai incident, and is something the ruling and opposition parties must consider as part of the larger picture.

許世楷臨陣棄守:談大使的操持與風骨
【聯合報╱社論】
2008.06.18 03:08 am

經過連日抗議折衝,日本政府就撞沉我海釣船事件表示賠償及致歉之意,我立委亦相應取消乘艦巡弋釣魚台之行,此一風波應可暫告平息。但令人遺憾的是,在這樣重大的外交事件中,台灣內部依舊沉酣於黨派之鬥,不能一致捍衛國家權益。

駐日代表許世楷拒絕列席立院報告,卻在綠營立委陪同下另舉行記者會,以幾近嗆聲的方式要求外交部准他辭職。許世楷此舉,不僅違背了行政倫理,更嚴重喪失了一個駐外使節的本分。試想,兩國正處於爭議狀態,許世楷被外交部「召回」即是我國對日交涉的手段之一;他竟然在此際高喊辭職,不僅形同陣前棄守,也等於公然給自己的政府難堪。任何稱職的外交官,都不該做出這種有辱自己國家的事。

若干藍軍立委罵許世楷為「台奸」,當然是自失格調的批評。但作為駐日使節,許世楷在體制上要面對的是整體國會,而非少數失禮的藍軍立委;他以此為由拒赴立院,不僅藐視了國會,也輕忽了己身公職所承擔的嚴肅義務。從這點看,不管許世楷在駐日任內的表現如何,但他在最關鍵的時刻棄守,實已功虧一簣,有虧他對外「代表國家」的使節職守。

許世楷失格失態的表現,除緣於他仍持有日本「櫻花卡」備遭批評外,主要是他的獨派色彩和親日背景,再加上政黨輪替帶來的「藍綠政治」情結作祟,遂使他在綠營立委慫恿下作出突兀的舉措。事實上,從許世楷的「陣前喊退」,我們看到的不僅是一位駐外使節的認知錯亂,我們更看到台灣政黨政治的畸形對立;否則,在國家面對外在危機時,朝野怎麼還有閒情酣於內鬥,互扯後腿?

外交部在折衝過程將許世楷「召回」,這原是外交上常見的抗議手段,是針對日本而發;孰料,許世楷卻將此舉視為針對他而來,認為新政府不滿意他的表現,故意藉機羞辱他。如此公私夾纏,一個使節的角色認知如何可能準確?更核心的問題是,許世楷作為駐日代表,應該效忠國家和政府;但他卻似乎選擇只效忠民進黨,抗拒新政府的指令。甚至有人說他駐日期間最大的績效之一,就是把馬英九塑造成「反日分子」。這樣的駐外使節,對於國家整體利益要如何維持?

追根究柢,扁政府過去八年的藍綠政治,不僅把社會帶向撕裂,更把國家推向茫然的追求。民進黨八年高喊的「愛台灣」,其實只是方便自己質疑異己人士的忠貞;它大肆鼓吹「衝撞外交」、「烽火外交」,對關涉台灣主權、漁權乃至人權的問題卻裝聾作啞。許世楷的臨陣脫逃,豈止是他個人角色的迷失,也是民進黨的國家認同迷航。試想,若連釣魚台的主權都不敢宣示,若連漁民權益受損都無法據理力爭,若連駐外使節返國報告都要論政黨顏色,民進黨愛的是什麼樣的台灣?

從釣魚台的涉外事件,竟引發島內的政治風波,也凸顯了台灣深沉的整合危機:如果面對國家主權問題,內部都不能齊一腳步;未來若遭遇更嚴峻的考驗時,台灣能集中力量應付嗎?別說是在野黨的杯葛,且看執政黨立委這次的表現,其間任意起鬨瞎鬧者有之,信口開河叫囂出兵一戰者有之,讓行政部門窮於應付,哪裡看得出一個執政黨國會黨團應有的表現?

說實在,這次風波能有今天的交涉成果,主要是我漁船釣客對日艦的蠻橫衝撞充分蒐證,新政府才能藉助民氣,據理折衝。聯合號的權益雖然可望獲得維護,但這片惡水上的問題依然懸而未決。過去我們常說,外交是「內政的延續」,透過民間或經濟的軟實力,政府可有效延伸台灣不足的外交空間;但在非理性的惡鬥下,內政恐怕將成為「外交的包袱」。許世楷事件成為釣魚台風波的併發症,值得朝野兩黨從大局再深思。

Tuesday, June 17, 2008

Republic of China Vessels Circumnavigate Diaoytai for the First Time in 30 Years

Republic of China Vessels Circumnavigate Diaoytai for the First Time in 30 Years
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 17, 2008

Is Diaoyutai Republic of China territory or not? If it isn't, then all we can do is bite our lips and stare at our feet. If it is, then Japanese warships may not intrude into our sovereign territory and kill our people.

The Diaoyutai incident is currently occupying center stage. Not only is it a test of the ruling KMT government, it is also a test of the opposition Democratic Progressive Party.

Yesterday's ramming incident has led to two major developments. 1. On the part of the government: Defend Diaoyutai protestors boarded a boat named the "Quanjiafu" and entered Diaoytai Island waters. Over 20 Japanese ships attempted to block them. Republic of China Coast Guard ships positioned themselves between the Japanese ships and the protestors' boat, preventing the wake from capsizing the smaller boat. They positioned themselves to both the port and starboard sides of the Quanjiafu, helping it circumnavigate Diaoyutai Island. They even engaged in a water cannon duel with the Japanese ships. 1. On the part of the DPP: Representative to Japan Koh Se-kai, an advocate of Taiwan independence, offered his resignation. He attempted to force the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to "immediately approve his resignation." Former legislator Tsai Chi-fang returned to the Legislative Yuan and said: "Only Kinmen and Matsu are Republic of China territory. Taiwan, Penghu and Diaoyutai are not."

When the ramming incident first occurred, DPP legislators screamed for blood. They declared they didn't rule out a shooting war. They declared their willingness to sacrifice their lives for their country. But as soon as the government adopted a harder line, and recalled Koh Se-kai, its Representative to Japan, DPP Chairman Tsai Ing-wen abruptly changed her tune and said the government's response was "excessive."

Koh Se-kai's reaction was even more interesting. Japan expressed "regret" over the incident, but refused to apologize. ROC Minister of Foreign Affairs Francisco Ou said that Japan's response "fell short of expectations." Koh Se-kai however said "An expression of regret is an apology" and that the matter should "be considered concluded." How can one carry on diplomacy when an ambassador has the temerity to openly thumb his nose at the Minister of Foreign Affairs?

Before Taiwan independence advocate Koh Se-kai became a public official, he maintained that Diaoyutai is Japanese territory. Chen Shui-bian appointed him Republic of China Representative to Japan. The result was what we have today, suffering on the part of our own compatriots, and rejoicing on the part of our enemy. Koh Se-kai's resignation at this sensitive moment Is tantamount to deliberately kicking his own government when it is down. It is tantamount to deliberately humiliating the Republic of China. The ramming incident allows us to discern the vast difference between the Taiwan independence movement's concept of sovereignty and foreign policy, and the Republic of China's concept of sovereignty and foreign policy. Advocates of Taiwan independence such as Lee Teng-hui and Tsai Chi-fang go so far as to assert that Diaoyutai is Japanese territory. Other advocates of Taiwan independence dare not make such open declarations. But they are reluctant to challenge Japan's claims. That is why Tsai Ing-wen opposes recalling Koh Se-kai. That is why Koh Se-kai would like to consider the matter closed. That is why Tsai Chi-fang alleges that "Taiwan, Penghu and Diaoyutai are not Republic of China territory." Their reactions provide insights into the psychological workings of these individuals.

The DPP's response to the ramming incident is distinguished by two major characteristics: 1. The speakers are determined to insult their own government and avoid condemning Japan. When the government maintains a soft line, they adopt a hard line and blast the government. When the government adopts a harder line, they abruptly reverse themselves and blast the government for "excesses." 2. The DPP uses the media to humiliate the government, but categorically refuses to participate in or support public protests against Japanese aggression. When a fishing boat was turned over to Lee Ching-hua, the DPP took to the streets, demanding that it be turned over to political protest groups. Put simply, the DPP is using the Defend Diaoyutai movement as a pretext to engage in partisan warfare against the ruling KMT. It has never viewed the Defend Diaoyutai movement as a movement to defend the nation's territory against foreign aggression.

The ramming incident has once again exposed the DPP's hypocrisy and befuddlement. Open conflict has erupted with a foreign nation. How is one to resist foreign aggression, defend national sovereignty, and maintain national dignity with such a disloyal political opposition?

The Quanjiafu convoy represents the first time in 30 years that Republic of China naval vessels have circumnavigated Diaoyutai Island. The closest they came to the island was 0.4 nautical miles. This was the first time Republic of China warships openly confronted Japanese warships and declared that "Diaoyutai is Republic of China territory." Given such developments the ruling and opposition parties must reach a new consensus regarding Diaoyutai. As noted at the beginning of this article: Since Diaoyutai is Republic of China territory. Japanese ships have no right to intrude and ram our vessels. This is the only possible conclusion the public on Taiwan can reach. There is no alternative.

This Is a dispute over territory. This is a dispute over sovereignty. If the DPP considers a Japanese ship violating ROC territorial waters and ramming and sinking an ROC fishing vessel not "excessive," then our ships escorting an ROC vessel through ROC territorial waters can hardly be considered "excessive." Still less can recalling our Representative to Japan be considered "excessive." The situation being what it is, we hope the DPP will consider the big picture. We also hope the ruling KMT will respond properly. Yesterday's decision by the Coast Guard to navigate Diaoyutai waters, was authorized by our national security system. This is the right approach. By contrast, we take exception to members of the legislature hijacking the Defense Minister and forcing him to conduct an "inspection" of Diaoyutai. In June 2005, Legislative Yuan Speaker Wang Jin-pyng and Defense Minister Li Jye boarded an ROC ship and came within 38 miles of Diaoyutai. The Quanjiafu's private sector political gesture yesterday, along with the Coast Guard's numerous gestures are sufficient. Tomorrow's Lafayette frigate voyage is superfluous.

The Diaoyutai issue is the result of 30 years of weakness on the part of Taiwan. As a new beginning, the Coast Guard may wish to circumnavigate the island once a week. However everyone must have a well thought out plan. We must not be slapdash. We must not treat the waters around Diaoyutai as a stage for political posturing.

我國艦隻三十年來 首次繞行釣魚台一周
【聯合報╱社論】
2008.06.17 03:11 am

釣魚台是不是中華民國領土?如果不是,大家摸摸鼻子;如果是,不容日本軍艦侵入殺人。

此次釣魚台事件似正方興未艾,不但考驗國民黨政府,且也考驗著反對黨民進黨。

撞船事件昨日有兩大發展。一、政府方面的作為:保釣人士搭小船「全家褔號」進入釣魚台海域,二十餘艘日本艦艇全面阻擋,我海巡署艦隻駛入日艦與抗議船「全家福號」之間,防止「湧浪」掀翻小船,並護衛在「全家福號」左右兩側,協助其繞行釣島一周,甚至與日艦互噴水柱。二、民進黨方面的作為:有台獨背景的駐日代表許世楷遞出辭呈,逼外交部「立即准辭」;前立法委員蔡啟芳回到立法院說:只有金門、馬祖是中華民國的領土,台灣、澎湖及釣魚台都不是。

撞船事件發生之初,民進黨立委不斷燒火,一下子問是否不惜一戰,一下子說要不要為國捐軀;但是,等到政府升高姿態,「召回」駐日代表許世楷,黨主席蔡英文卻又說「有點過火」。

許世楷的反應更令人玩味。日方對事件表示「遺憾」,卻未道歉,我外交部長歐鴻鍊認為「與預期有落差」;但許世楷卻說,「遺憾就是道歉」,且認為此事應「告一段落」。「大使」公開反對部長的主張,這教對外交涉如何進行得下去?

台獨運動者許世楷在出任公職前曾主張釣魚台是日本領土,陳水扁命他擔任中華民國的駐日代表,終於落到今日這種親痛仇快的結局。許世楷在這個對外交涉的關鍵時刻辭職,不啻就是故意要對自己的政府落井下石,就是故意要給中華民國好看。從撞船事件可以看出,「台獨」與「中華民國」的主權觀念及外交策略迥然不同。就獨派觀點言,李登輝、蔡啟芳甚至認為釣魚台根本是日本的領土,其他獨派雖不敢公開作此表示,卻亦不願挑戰日本的主張。於是,蔡英文反對「召回」,許世楷主張「告一段落」,蔡啟芳說「台灣、澎湖及釣魚台都不是中華民國的領土」,皆是此類心理背景的反應。

民進黨對這次撞船事件的回應,有兩大特徵:一、一切發言,以羞辱政府為主調,但未譴責日本。在政府態度保留時,燒火挑激政府;在政府升高手段時,又奚落政府「過火」。二、民進黨只是藉媒體放話羞辱政府,但完全未參與支持民間的抗日行動;海釣船交給了李慶華,上街抗議則交給了社運團體。說穿了,民進黨只是將此次保釣事件作為朝野鬥爭的題材,而從未將此視為保領土、禦外侮的運動。

此次撞船事件,再度暴露了民進黨政治操作的偽詐及意識形態的錯亂;在對外衝突爆發之際,有這樣的反對黨,如何抵禦外侮,又如何維持國家主權尊嚴?

由於為「全家福號」護航,形同中華民國艦艇亦實現了三十年來首次繞行釣魚台一周,最接近該島處僅零點四浬左右,且亦是中華民國艦艇首次對日艦用「大聲公」宣示「釣魚台是中華民國領土」。事態發展至今日地步,全國朝野應對釣魚台問題,建立起新的認知與共識。正如文首所說:如大家認為釣魚台是中華民國的領土,就不能容日艦侵入撞船;這是台灣上下唯一的認知與共識,別無選擇。

既是領土之爭,既是主權之爭;日艦侵入撞船若非「過火」,則我艦護航亦不能謂「過火」,何況是召回駐日代表?然而,值此事態已有激化跡象之時,我們除了希望民進黨應顧全大局,亦希望國民黨執政團隊要妥善因應。昨日海巡署進入釣魚台海域的動作,當然是在事前獲得國安體系授權,這是正確的做法;相對而言,我們對於明天打算挾持國防部長前往釣魚台「視察」的立法委員卻不以為然。其實,在二○○五年六月,就曾上演過一次立法院長王金平、國防部長李傑搭艦前往距釣魚台三十八浬處「視察」的前例;如今既有昨日「全家福號」的民間行動在先,海巡署亦已作足姿態,明天的拉法葉艦之行其實是能免則免。

釣魚台問題因台灣三十年的軟弱而惡化至此,不妨即以此次海巡署艦隻繞島一周作為一個新的開始;但各方卻亦仍應有節有度,不宜過於操切,更不可把釣魚台海域當作民粹政治的舞台!

Monday, June 16, 2008

Stability for the Wealthy: Responding to the Global Economic Tidal Wave

Stability for the Wealthy: Responding to the Global Economic Tidal Wave
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 16, 2008

Global inflation continues to arrive, wave upon wave, increasing uncertainty about the propects for continued economic growth, and leading to recent shocks in international financial markets. The US, mainland China, and Hong Kong market indices have fallen to new lows over the past year. A 25-day losing streak in Vietnam's Ho Chi Minh Stock Index triggered renewed concerns about a repeat of the Asian financial crisis. Even though warming cross-strait relations are providing some support, Taiwan has not been spared. The TAIEX has fallen over 10% since the new administration took office less than a month ago This betrays investor uncertainty. This year, beginning with the U.S. subprime mortgage crisis, the world economy has endured swiftly increasing oil prices and steadily increasing grain prices. Under their combined impact, the economic challenges are formidable, and the watchword in political policy is "stability."

The current wave of economic changes and market corrections can be traced back to early summer last year. Until last April the world's major economies were still intoxicated by the longest and strongest economic expansion in post-war history. The large scale crisis in the housing industry led to bankruptcies in the financial industry. The first shot fired, the subprime mortgage crisis, failed to alert the market. Only the Bear Stearns hedge fund collapse in July touched off a chain reaction. The market has experienced an across the board liquidity crunch. Central banks in Europe and America have joined hands in an attempt to save the market by means of capital injections. Only now has the market become aware of the seriousness of the problem, and made a series of corrections in asset valuations, policy, and regulatory structures. At the same time, high oil prices and high grain prices, long a hidden concern behind the economic boom, have reared their ugly heads. But the sense of crisis remains less intense than during the previous financial storm. Therefore it is not receiving the attention it deserves.

Problems have remained unsolved, and myopic policies have fueled inflation. For example, in order to solve the liquidity crisis European and American central banks have injected massive funds into the market. This may temporarily quench the market's thirst, but it will also delay the healing process. It will aggravate inflation. In order to forstall a recession, the U.S. Federal Reserve Board has repeatedly lowered interest rates. This may slow the slide into recession, but at the cost of higher inflation. It delays the response to changes in asset prices. In Asia, Japan was on track to raise interest rates. But now business loan considerations have put this on hold. The economy has not improved, but inflation has already increased. Among the emerging economies, mainland China's overall prospects remain the same, but already seems more tentative. Crude oil prices are controlled. Grain prices are subject to short term speculation. Unrelieved increases can easily cause significant distress. Others countries such as India, Vietnam, and Indonesia, adopted similar policies. But were forced to cancel them due to increasingly negative results.

The attention of financial market investors has turned from when the United States' subprime mortgage crisis will end, to whether global inflation is worsening and how the major economies are responding. Emerging economies in Asia kept their distance from the subprime mortgage crisis. Can they withstand this acid test, and survive catastrophic inflation? Developed countries experiencing across the board slow downs are paying particular attention. Emerging countries in Asia have been the most powerful driving force in global economic growth in recent years. Their forward momentum directly affects the performance of the global economy, especially because they are export-oriented economies. Asian countries today face difficult economic policy choices. When they began economic development they were heavy on growth and light on inflation. Now however, the bill has come due.

Theoretically speaking, the standard method for controlling inflation is raising interest rates. Countries dependent upon energy imports may even require currency supports. But no matter whether they raise or lower interest rates, they may increase their industrial overhead. This may affect their export competitiveness, reduce their corporate profits, and undermine their economic growth. Countries that suffered through the Asian financial crisis understand the importance of foreign exchange reserves. They have aggressively accumulated foreign exchange reserves and have actively encouraged domestic investment. As a result, the effectiveness of efforts to control inflation have been seriously diminished by more fundamental policy countermeasures. But if one allows inflation to worsen, not only will it impact current economic performance, it is likely to change a short-term correction into a long-term recession. It is likely to increase political risk, causing social unrest, leading to unpredictable consequences. Therefore the market is watching discreetly from the sidelines. Stocks in Asia have fallen even more than in Europe and America, reflecting investor concern.

Under such circumstances, many nations are changing their economic policies. The most important task now is controlling inflation. The US has ceased lowering interest rates. European central banks have indicated that they will hike rates. Asian central banks have also substantially increased their prime rates in order to stabilize their economies. The US has successively cut interest rates. Taiwan, by contrast, has slightly raised interest rates, demonstrating a steady hand. Judging by this, Central Bank CEO Peng Huai-nan has lived up to his reputation as a first class chief executive. One hopes he will maintain a steady course, and do what must be done.

富貴穩中求:因應全球經濟巨浪之道
【聯合報╱社論】
2008.06.16 02:52 am

全球通貨膨脹來勢洶洶,加深了經濟成長前景的不確定性,導致近期國際金融市場巨幅震盪,美國、中國大陸、香港等指標股市都跌到一年來相對低點,連跌廿五天的越南股市更引發亞洲金融危機重演的疑慮;即使是有兩岸關係升溫加持的台北股市亦未能倖免,新政府上任未滿月竟已跌逾一成,在在說明了投資人的高度不安全感。今年世界經濟以美國次級房貸風暴的善後起始,遇上國際高油價、高糧價效應發酵,相斥的情勢對衝之下,經濟挑戰益形艱巨,「穩定」已是政策組合的重中之重。

這一波的經濟轉折與調整點,要往前追溯到去年的初夏。去年四月,當時全球各大經濟體依舊沉醉在二次世界大戰後最長、最強的經濟擴張氛圍裡;即使美國大型住宅金融業者新世紀聲請破產,擊發了次貸風暴的第一槍,也沒能喚起市場的警覺。直到七月貝爾斯登跟著摔倒,掀起企業連環爆,市場流動性全面緊縮,歐美中央銀行聯手注資救市,市場才意識到問題的嚴重性,展開了一連串的調整,包括資產價值、政策、監管體制等。於此同時,一直隱身於經濟榮景之後的高油價、高糧價通膨效應也冒出了頭,但仍因危急性比不上次貸風暴,未獲得應有的關注與重視。

這樣的輕忽,不只失去了解決問題的先機,更因政策過於短視而為通膨火上加油。例如歐美央行為化解流動性枯竭危機,大舉為市場挹注資金,雖暫解市場之渴,但也拉長了療傷期,並為通膨助拳;又如美國聯邦準備理事會(Fed)為防美國經濟衰退而連續大幅降息,或止住景氣滑速,卻是以升高通膨為代價,並干預了資產價格調整的速度;在亞洲,原擬步上升息軌道的日本,亦因次貸及景氣考量而停步,經濟未見好轉,通膨卻已升壓。至於新興經濟體,中國大陸的宏觀調控依舊,但已顯遲疑,而以管制售價因應原油、糧食走揚的短期性作法,隨著漲勢不墜而益顯窘迫;其他如印度、越南、印尼等,都採行了類似的政策,但也因負面效應日增,終致被迫取消。

因此,現在金融市場投資人關注的焦點,已從美國的次貸風暴何時結束,轉向全球的通膨情勢是否惡化,以及各大經濟體的對應之道;其中,一直自詡與次貸風暴保持距離的亞洲新興經濟體,能否通過考驗、安度這次通膨的劫難,在已開發國家經濟全面放緩之際,尤其受到矚目。這不只是因為,亞洲新興國家是推升近年全球經濟成長的最大動力,其續航力直接關乎世界景氣的表現;更是因為其出口導向的經濟特色,令亞洲經濟國家的政策抉擇變得困難,這也是他們一開始即重成長、輕通膨的主因,但如今已到了圖窮匕現的時刻。

在學理上,控制通膨的典型作法是升息,進口能源依賴型國家甚至還需輔以本國貨幣升值的對策,但無論是升息還是升值,都可能增加企業資金成本、影響其出口競爭力,進而降低企業獲利、干擾經濟成長;再拉長時間來看,經歷過亞洲金融風暴的國家都領會了外匯儲備的重要性,積極累積的外匯儲備及鼓勵投資的內需政策,讓控制通膨的努力更遭遇了來自政策面根深柢固的抵制,效果自是大減。可是,若任令通膨情勢惡化,不只衝擊當期經濟表現,更可能使短期修正轉為長期衰退,進而升高政治風險,造成社會動盪,後果難料。也因此,市場都在冷眼旁觀,近期亞股跌勢更甚於歐美,實在反映這樣的深層憂慮。

在此情勢下,近來各國經濟政策已開始轉向,抗通膨成了第一要務,美國停止降息、歐洲預示升息,亞洲央行更是紛紛大幅上調基準利率,力求穩定經濟現勢;相對而言,在美國連番降息之際仍力行微幅升息政策的台灣,展現了穩健的作風,於今觀之,央行總裁彭淮南不負其A級總裁之名,並期待其堅持下去,為所當為。

Friday, June 13, 2008

Tsai Ing-wen Rejects the 1992 Consensus

Tsai Ing-wen Rejects the 1992 Consensus
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 13, 2008

Tsai Ing-wen said that when the ruling Democratic Progressive Party regains power, it may reject the 1992 Consensus.

If the Democratic Progressive Party regains power, it will not be before 2012. By then, on the basis of the 1992 Consensus, the two sides will have established direct flights across the Taiwan Strait, mainland tourism to Taiwan, and even Taiwan's entry into the WHO. By then, what exactly will the DPP be rejecting? The 1992 Consensus, or direct flights across the Taiwan Strait, mainland tourism to Taiwan, and Taiwan's entry into the WHO?

If the DPP hopes to offer a convincing cross-strait policy platform, it needs to get the jump on the KMT and not allow itself to be left behind. Tsai Ing-wen says that when the Democratic Progressive Party regains power (no earlier than four years from now) it may reject the 1992 Consensus. But four years from now, an extensive superstructure erected on the foundation of the 1992 Consensus will be a fait accompli. Does the DPP really have any alternative but to accept the 1992 Consensus?

A Chinese aphorism says that "when you point at the moon, you concentrate on the moon and forget about your finger." The 1992 Consensus is merely the finger. Direct flights and other cross-strait policies are the moon. The DPP must offer its own rationale for direct flights and other cross-straits policies. Rejecting the 1992 Consensus is no longer an option. Can declaring that four or eight years from now it will reject the 1992 Consensus unscramble the omlet?

In the past, The DPP proposed "doing away with the 10,000 Year Legislature" and "lifting martial law." It ran ahead of the KMT, it welcomed the future. If today it uses "Rejecting the 1992 Consensus when it regains power" as a rallying cry, then it is falling behind the KMT, and attempting to turn back the clock.

The DPP is still piecing together a new cross-strait policy platform. So far its main themes are: 1. Reject the 1992 Consensus. 2. Reject the term "Chinese Taipei." In fact, during the Chen Shui-bian era, it never openly opposed the 1992 Consensus. It merely alleged that "There wasn't any 1992 Consensus." Today, now that there is a 1992 Consensus, the DPP has no choice but to up the ante, and demand "One China, Different Interpretations." But since Hu Jintao already spoke the words "One China, Different Interpretations" during Bush and Hu's Hotline conversation, the 1992 Consensus is merely an abbreviation for "One China, Different Interpretations." Besides, "One China, Different Interpretations" has room for growth. During the Wu Hu Meeting the two political parties recognized each other as ruling parties. Therefore the 1992 Consensus, or One China, Different Interpretations, hold out the promise of pragmatic and positive developments. This is not something the DPP can control. The DPP is in danger of becoming marginalized, even of becoming an outsider. Besides, If the DPP believes the 1992 Consensus has some other meaning other than "One China, Different Interpretations," what would it be? If the DPP rejects participation in the WHO in the name of "Chinese Taipei," does it want to wage yet another divisive campaign to "Join the UN in the Name of Taiwan?"

Tsai Ing-wen said: "If the DPP regains power it will reject 1992 Consensus." This is predicated on the assumption it will regain power. Actually, the DPP's rejection of the 1992 Consensus and the term "Chinese Taipei" may be a choice thrust upon it by its status as an opposition party. For the DPP to adopt such a stance is actually helpful to the ruling Kuomintang. Because the KMT can use DPP opposition as a reason to improve cross-strait relations. Furthermore, this is probably not the path by which the DPP will return to power. Anyone with any political sense will find it hard to imagine that four or eight years from now, the DPP will emerge victorious on the basis of the campaign slogan: Down with the 1992 Consensus!

Tsai Ing-wen said: Taiwan's sovereignty is non-negotiable. But Tsai Ing-wen has not clarified her bottom line. Is it the "Resolution on Taiwan's Future?" If so, why does the DPP oppose changing the name of the postal service back to the "Republic of China Post?" Is it the "Taiwan independence Party Constitution" and the "Resolution for a Normal Nation?" Tsai Ing-wen has not clarified what is negotiable and non-negotiable. She has merely rejected "Chinese Taipei." But how many times has the DPP used the term "Chinese Taipei" during its eight years in office? At least once every time an international baseball game was held.

If the DPP hopes to regain power, it cannot simply "reject the 1992 Consensus." It must confront the new cross-strait scenario erected on the foundation of the 1992 Consensus. It must find a way for Taiwan to seek solutions and avoid problems, to achieve a win/win cross-strait scenario. It should stop trying to push aside the finger pointing at the moon. It should confront the moon already high in the sky!

蔡英文不接受九二共識?
【聯合報╱社論】
2008.06.13 03:03 am

蔡英文說:民進黨再執政時,可以不接受「九二共識」。

民進黨若再執政,那至少是四年後二○一二年的事。屆時,兩岸在「九二共識的基礎上」,早已實現了直航、陸客來台,也可能已實現了台灣加入WHO等;到了那個時候,民進黨究竟只是「不接受」九二共識,抑或也「不接受」直航、陸客來台及台灣加入WHO?

民進黨正在重建其兩岸論述。最重要的是:整個論述必須趕在國民黨的前頭,而不能被國民黨甩在後頭。蔡英文說,民進黨再執政(至少四年後)可以「不接受」九二共識;但是,四年後「在九二共識的基礎上」搭建的一切架構均已形成,難道還有「接不接受」九二共識的問題?

以指指月,得月忘指。九二共識只是手指,直航等等才是月亮。民進黨必須在直航等新形勢中建立其兩岸論述,已經沒有「接不接受」九二共識的餘地。若宣示將在四年後或八年後「不接受九二共識」,難道能將熟飯還原成生米?

過去,民進黨主張「打倒萬年國會」、「解除戒嚴」,這是站在國民黨的前面,也引領了「未來」;但是,如今倘以「再執政後不接受九二共識」為號召,這卻是落在國民黨的後頭,也是開歷史倒車。

民進黨的兩岸新論述仍在拼湊之中。如今所見,其主軸似在:一、不接受「九二共識」;二、不接受「中華台北」。其實,在陳水扁時代,從未正面反對「九二共識」,只說「沒有九二共識」;如今,「九二共識」已經有了,民進黨只好加碼,要求「一中各表」。然而,自胡錦濤在「布胡熱線」中說出了「一中各表」,如今「九二共識」其實已是「一中各表」的「小名」或「別名」;何況,未來「一中各表」的空間亦有擴大的可能,吳胡會相互承認為執政黨即是;因而,無論「九二共識」或「一中各表」,隨時都有出現更務實的正面發展的可能性,皆非民進黨可以操之在我,極易被邊緣化,甚至淪為局外人。何況,如果民進黨以為「九二共識」對台灣而言不是「一中各表」,難道民進黨還有其他解讀?至於民進黨若不接受以「中華台北」參加WHO,難道還要再來一次「以台灣名義加入聯合國」的內外大戰?

蔡英文說「再執政後可以不接受九二共識」,似乎是從「再執政」的假設,來思考民進黨的兩岸論述。其實,民進黨不接受「九二共識」,不接受「中華台北」,可能是身為「反對黨」不得不然的選擇;民進黨採此立場,對執政的國民黨卻頗有利,因為可以藉民進黨的反對作為改善兩岸關係的槓桿。然而,這恐怕並非民進黨通向「再執政」的道路,任何有政治常識者皆難想像,在四年後或八年後,民進黨賴以勝選而能再執政的競選口號將是:反對九二共識。

蔡英文說:台灣的主權,不能退讓。但蔡英文迄未說明其底線何在,倘若《台灣前途決議文》是她所說的底線,則為何民進黨反對改回「中華民國郵政」?又為何不廢除《台獨黨綱》及《正常國家決議文》?且蔡英文亦未說明其彈性何在,只說反對「中華台北」,但曾否計算過民進黨在八年執政期間使用「中華台北」的次數?至少每一場國際棒球賽均是。

民進黨若想「再執政」,不能只是「不接受九二共識」;而是必須面對「在九二共識的基礎上」所形成的兩岸新形勢,為台灣找到趨吉避凶、兩岸雙贏的道路。不必仍想撥開指月的手指,而要面對已經高掛天際的月亮!

Thursday, June 12, 2008

No Matter How Rushed, The Law is the Law

No Matter How Rushed, The Law is the Law
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 12, 2008

The new government has been in office less than a week. Yet it is already asking for a supplementary budget in order to increase domestic demand and construct public infrastructure. Logically speaking local governments ought to welcome such a budget. To everyone's surprise the Legislative Yuan Budgetary Research Center announced it considers such subsidies illegal. Although Blue and Green camp legislators see matters differently, their conclusions are identical. Both have sharply denounced this 100 billion NT budget package. Both Blue and Green camp local government leaders are equally dissatisfied. The new cabinet has just come to power. Yet its first act has come to such an ignominious end. This ought to be considered a warning sign.

Why has a cabinet made up of veteran financial and economics experts fumbled so badly? Because it is congenitally defective. How? Over the past eight years people have endured too much pain. This inspired the Ma team to wage an election campaign proclaiming "We're ready!" and "Everything will be better, as soon as Ma takes over!" The result was Ma Ying-jeou received over 7 million votes, 2 million more than his opponent. Once the KMT returned to power, public expectations that "Everything will be better, as soon as Ma takes over!" became a cross the new administration had to bear.

In response to such expectations, the KMT think tank held intensive meetings just before the new administration assumed office on May 20. It explored ways to ensure that everything would actually get better when Ma took over. This is how the short-term contingency budget came into being. The intentions were good. The economic prospects were too depressing. Expanding domestic demand can revitalize economic growth, therefore it is a feasible approach. Over the past eight years the DPP government has also used supplementary budgets to underwrite additional construction or increase public employment, in order to revive the economy,.

But the supplementary budgets or special budgets proposed by the DPP government over the past eight years encountered the same problems as the new cabinet. Therefore the Legislative Yuan Budgetary Research Center will issue a report pointing out, with few exceptions, violations of the Budget Law. What's embarrassing is that for the past eight years the Legislative Yuan Budgetary Research Center has been a weapon of the KMT. But because the supplementary budget involved local government interests, KMT legislators merely went through the motions. They didn't block extravagant expenditures. They allowed the legal dispute over the supplementary budget and the special budget to remain unresolved, for eight years. Now that the KMT has returned to power, the issue is blowing up in its own face.

According to the Budget Law, supplementary budgets and special budgets are subject to preconditions. Supplementary budgets are responses to expanded authority, expanded operations, or major accidents. Shortfalls in revenue or major accidents will be brought to the President's attention by the Executive Yuan committee. Surely the recent change in ruling party cannot be considered a "major accident?" The DPP government submitted similar budgets to the Legislative Yuan in the past. These budgets were investigated by the Control Yuan. One year they discovered a 7.4 billion shortfall in revenue. The Executive Yuan failed to make up the shortfall in accordance with the law by using the previous year's surplus. The Control Yuan was forced to "correct" the Ministry of Finance's oversights. The special budget, meanwhile, being more akin to a transitional budget, must meet requirements for transitional budgets.

From this perspective, the Executive Yuan's decision to invoke the short-term emergency supplementary budget and special budget amendment is questionable. For example, the Executive Yuan originally assumed that weekend cross-strait charter flights and the arrival of mainland tourists in July would be an obvious and effective short term panacea providing a boost to the economy. That is why the Bureau of Environmental Protection proposed a 38,500,000 NT "environmental upgrade in response to mainland passengers arrival on Taiwan" supplementary budget. The amount may have been small, but the Legislative Yuan Budgetary Research Center nevertheless cited it as a Budget Law violation. The Bureau of Environmental Protection's needs were met. But they were promptly deleted from the supplementary budget and instead incorporated into regular budget expenditures.

This is the easy part. Many local governments' budget items have encountered similar problems. They have been rejected by the Executive Yuan and the relevant ministries. They have been asked to reconsider their requests. County and municipal governments first submitted their requests in late April, after the KMT think tank announced its proposal and local party heads had engaged in a preliminary exchange of views. They submitted a second request after the new cabinet took office on May 20. They submitted a third request after a controversy erupted in the Legislative Yuan. All told, county and muncipal leaders submitted three or four versions. After they submitted their budgets, they dared not assume that they would be approved. As a result, both budgets have been submitted to the Legislative Yuan for consideration or for first instance review. Yet the details were finalized only on June 20. What is this besides a joke at the Legislative Yuan's expense?

The new administration has taken office. Its earnest attempt to ensure that "Everything will get better as soon as Ma takes over" deserves affirmation. But some things simply cannot be rushed. The government's two major concerns, the annual budget and pending legislation are just such things. The new cabinet is not fully in place. The incoming administration does not fully understand how the outgoing administration's budget has been allocated. It does not understand local government needs. Nor does the new cabinet have time to get caught up on such matters. It must hurry up and propose supplementary budget cuts and special budget amendments. These are examples of haste making waste.

The new cabinet may be in a big hurry. The Legislative Yuan Budgetary Research Center has cited a number of legal violations. But no matter how unhappy the Legislative Yuan may be with the Executive Yuan's budget, the people are suffering. As long as the budget is not outrageous, it should be passed. Most importantly, the 2009 central government budget is about to come out. No matter how difficult it may be, the new cabinet must find time to work closely with the various ministries, legislators, and even local governments. It cannot make such decisions on its own, behind closed doors.

中時電子報
中國時報  2008.06.12
再急也得依法定程序行事
中時社論

 新政府就任不到一周,推出擴大內需與公共建設相關的追加減預算案,照說這個以補助地方為主的預算,應該受到地方政府的歡迎,沒想到經立法院預算中心評估認為有違法之虞;藍綠立委見解雖不一,炮口卻完全一致,打得這筆千億預算滿頭包,而地方政府首長不分藍綠也都不滿意,新閣上台第一件「政事」就落得如此下場,確實是個警訊。

 一個基本上以老手組成財經金隊伍的內閣,何以會如此陣腳大亂?這裡頭當然有先天不足的因素,什麼是先天不足?因為過去八年,慘澹太久,馬團隊以「準備好了」成功營造「馬上就好」的想像,讓馬英九拿下七百多萬選票,以二百多萬的票差當選總統,國民黨重新贏回政權,「馬上就好」既是民意的期待,更是新政府的壓力。

 為了回應這股期待,新政府在五二○就職前,就透過國民黨智庫系統密集開會,研究「馬上就好」的各種可能方案,推出短期應急預算構想就這麼成型。持平來看,構想起心動念是良善的,因為市景太低迷,用擴大內需的方式振興經濟成長,確實是個方法;就像過去八年,民進黨政府同樣用追加減預算辦理擴大公共建設或就業服務等等,用意就是在振興景氣。

 但是,過去八年民進黨政府提出追加減預算案或是特別預算案,和這一回新內閣碰到的問題都是一樣的,因此幾無例外,立法院預算中心都會來上一本報告:有違反預算法之虞。尷尬的是,過去八年立法院預算中心的報告是國民黨的武器,但涉及地方建設利益,國民黨立委虛晃一招,也沒真擋下任何天大的預算,只是讓追加減預算案與特別預算案的法理爭議,持續八年未決,直到國民黨重新執政,倒打了自己一耙。

 根據預算法,要辦理追加減和特別預算,都是有清楚的條件需求,追加預算得依法律增加機關、業務或發生重大事故;追減預算得發生歲收短收或發生重大事故經行政院會提請總統以令裁減之。怎麼說,政黨輪替都不該是「重大事故」吧!民進黨政府過去提報類似預算案,曾被立法院函送監察院調查,有一年真的發生歲收短缺七十四億,行政院未依法辦理追減預算而挪用前年歲計賸餘彌補,當時的財政部還被監察院「糾正」了一番。至於特別預算,那更得是「跨年度預算」才符合編列要旨。

 從這個角度看,行政院要短期應急的追加減預算和特別預算修正案都有相當大的討論空間。隨便舉例,在行政院初始想法中,七月開放兩岸周末包機與陸客觀光,是最明顯有效提振經濟的短效良方,因此,環保署就提列「因應陸客來台提升環境生活」追加預算三千八百五十萬,數額不多,但就被立法院預算中心直指為涉嫌違反預算法的項目之一,環保署的需求還是要做,但是立刻從追加減預算中剔除,改納入環保署的例行預算支出。

 這還是相對簡單的,許多地方政府提報的預算項目,都碰到類似問題,而遭到行政院相關部會打回票,要求地方政府重議。從四月底國民黨智庫提出構想,和黨籍地方首長初步交換意見,縣市政府提列過一次,五二○新閣到位正式再報一次,立法院開審引發爭議,再改提報一次,來來回回,縣市首長就提報了三、四次版本,而且提報後還不敢確知會不會過關。結果,兩項預算案都已提送立法院審議,甚至完成初審,然而,細目卻得等到六月廿日才會拍板定案,這不是開立法院的玩笑嗎?

 新政府上台,卯足全力希望「馬上就好」,這股認真值得肯定,但是,很多事急不得也不能急。展現政府政策的兩大主軸:預算與法案,都是急不得的大事。新閣未到位,前政府的預算執行狀況如何,新人未盡了解,遑論地方需求,新閣也來不及先期了解。急乎乎地推出追加減預算案與特別預算修正案,就是愈急愈搞不定的例子。

 情勢既已如此,新內閣再急也急不來,儘管立法院預算中心臚列數項有違法之虞,換言之,立法院再不滿意行政院這次預算編列,基於疾民所疾、苦民所苦,只要不是太過離譜,應該會放行通過。重要的是,接續下來的九十八年度中央政府總預算的概算編列在即,新內閣再辛苦都得挪出時間,和各部會、立委、乃至地方政府密切溝通,不能再關在辦公室裡做決策了。