One China, Different Interpretations: The Cup Theory and the Roof Theory

One China, Different Interpretations: The Cup Theory and the Roof Theory
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 4, 2010

Deng Xiaoping invoked "one country, two systems," adroitly handling the problem of Hong Kong. One might say he turned in one of the best history test papers ever. Today, Hu Jintao is invoking the 2005 Lien/Hu Summit to promote "peaceful development" in cross-Strait relations. He might be outdo even Deng Xiaoping. That's because the test questions for Taiwan are far more difficult than those for Hong Kong.
Beijing initially saw "one country, two systems" as a panacea. Good for Hong Kong, therefore good for Taiwan. But the shoe clearly does not fit. After all, the "blue sky, white sun, and red earth" of the Republic of China flag is not the Bauhinia flag of Hong Kong. The Republic of China directly elects its president. In Hong Kong even the chief executive is not directly elected. Over the past two decades, a serious stalemate has frustrated cross-Strait interaction. Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian's pro-independence moves were reasons. But Beijing has long attempted to ram "one country, two systems" and "peaceful reunification" down our throat. That is the main reason. The situation improved only when Hu Jintao put forth "peaceful development." Only then did the cross-Strait situation suddenly brighten. So-called "One Country, Two Systems" and "peaceful reunification" are goal oriented theories. On the other hand, "peaceful development" is a process oriented theory. The introduction of "peaceful development" has allowed the long stuck gears in cross-Strait relations to begin turning once again.

Beginning with the Jiang Zemin administration, Beijing gradually adopted a "status quo" theory. It now maintains that "the status quo means the status quo in Taiwan's existing regulations and documents." It argues that "Although the two sides have yet to be reunified, they are nevertheless part of one China." The arguments are evolving. The arguments for "peaceful reunification" have not vanished. But they are mentioned with much less frequency. Instead they have been replaced by Hu Jintao's "peaceful development." The concept of "peaceful development" emerged from the concept of "maintaining the status quo." We have now returned to the concept of "maintaining the status quo."

Beijing has not clarified what it means by the "status quo." But a necessary prerequisite for maintaining the status quo, is the maintenance of the Republic of China. Because the Republic of China is the status quo. No Republic of China. No status quo. Therefore the implicit premise of peaceful development is that we must maintain the status quo vis a vis both the PRC and the ROC. We must use peaceful means and ends while engaging in cross-Strait exchanges. This scenario is in fact "one China, different interpretations." It has merely remained implicit.

In the interest of brevity, let us jump from "maintaining the status quo" to "one China, different interpretations." For the Republic of China "maintaining the status quo" is impossible without "one China, different interpretations." For Beijing, "peaceful development" is impossible if it repudiates "one China, different interpretations." At this juncture, "one China, different interpretations" is a concept Taipei is striving for, and Beijing has not publicly repudiated. Without the implicit premise of "one China, different interpretations," the two sides would be missing an element essential in the framework for cross-Strait interaction.

As we see it, "One China, different interpretations" is consistent with the "cup theory" and the "roof theory." The cup theory is "one China, different interpretations." The roof theory is also "one China, different interpretations." Quoting our own editorial, "one China, different interpretations" is consistent with concept of "rational processes" and "modified goal orientation." Beijing is unwilling to explicitly recognize "one China, different interpretations." But it must not lightly repudiate it. One China, different interpretations is the concept most able to link processes with goals. Its operational costs are the smallest. Its possibility of success is the greatest.

Looking ahead, cross-Strait exchanges will require a "very long" process of competition and cooperation. In order to ensure that this "very long" process of competition and cooperation remains a "rational process," with the possibility of "modified goals," "one China, different interpretations" is the only viable strategy. One China, different interpretations is a way to eliminate differences and seek agreements. It is the chopsticks theory, i.e., the "one hand washes the other" theory. One China, different interpretations allows one to hold one's position or to advance. Holding one's position is the cup theory. Advancing is the roof theory. The two sides willingness to accept "one China, different interpretations" differs. Beijing acknowledged it only once, on the Bush/Hu Hotline. But for now and the forseeable future, the implicit understanding that will guide cross-Strait remains "one China, different interpretations." The so-called "92 Consensus," "peaceful development," or "maintaining the status quo" and "peaceful development," are all expressions of "one China, different interpretations" and "peaceful development."

Beijing is unwilling to explicitly adopt "One China, different interpretations" as official policy. But "one china, different interpretations" is already its implicit policy, one which manifests itself in practical matters. Expressions such as "maintaining the status quo," "peaceful development", "yet to be reunified, but nevertheless part of one China" can all be considered synonyms for "one China, different interpretations." The two sides have evolved from "liberate Taiwan," "counterattack the mainland," and "The Republic of China has been destroyed," to today's "win-win symbiosis." It will hardly be surprising if one day "one China, different interpretations" becomes the theme of some future summit.

The two sides have experienced 60 years of divided rule. History has confirmed that narrow ideology tends to become broader, and shallow thinking tends to become deeper. Ideology has changed. Thinking has changed. Peaceful development has jumpstarted communications. Hopefully the "1992 consensus" and "one China, different interpretations" will create a win-win situation.

一中各表‧杯子理論‧屋頂理論
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.01.04 04:12 am

鄧小平以「一國兩制」流利地處理了香港問題，這應是歷史上答得最好的政治考卷之一。如今，胡錦濤藉二○○五年「連胡會」，對兩岸關係提出的「和平發展」，或許有可能超越鄧小平。因為，台灣的考題比香港難得太多。

原本，北京認為「一國兩制」是一帖萬靈丹。香港好用，也想用在台灣，但顯然藥不對症。畢竟，中華民國的青天白日滿地紅國旗與香港的紫荊花旗不同；中華民國直選總統，香港連特首亦非直選。過去二十年，兩岸互動陷入嚴重僵局，固然是李登輝與陳水扁的台獨操作所致，但北京方面一向欲以「一國兩制／和平統一」橫柴入灶，亦是主因。一直到了胡錦濤提出「和平發展」，事態始有轉機，兩岸情勢亦告豁然開朗。若以本系列的用語來說，「一國兩制／和平統一」是「目的論」，而「和平發展」是「過程論」。由於「和平發展」出檯，使得齒輪卡死已久的兩岸關係恢復運轉。

自江澤民以來，北京逐漸形成「維持現狀」的論述，包括「現狀就是見之於台灣現行規定及文件的現狀」、「雖然尚未統一／仍是一個中國」等，在論述演變的過程中，「和平統一」的說法雖未完全消失，但已大幅降低出現頻率，取而代之者就是胡錦濤的「和平發展」。「和平發展」這個概念是出自「維持現狀」，現在又回過頭來成為「維持現狀」的主要支撐。

北京未曾將「現狀」說清楚。但維持現狀的必然前提，即是維持中華民國；因為，中華民國即是「現狀」，無中華民國即無「現狀」。所以，所謂「和平發展」，必然引申出來的潛台詞就是：在中華人民共和國和中華民國的現狀下，以和平的手段及目的，進行兩岸互動發展。此一景觀，其實就是「一中各表」，雖然心照不宣。

為了節省篇幅，我們要從「維持現狀」跳躍到「一中各表」。對中華民國而言，若非「一中各表」，即不可能「維持現狀」；對北京而言，若否定「一中各表」，即不可能「和平發展」。在現階段，「一中各表」是台灣力爭而北京未公開否認的概念；假設沒有這個若隱若顯的「一中各表」，兩岸現在運作的互動架構即失依托。

從本系列社論的觀點來看，「一中各表」是可以貫通「杯子理論」與「屋頂理論」的概念。因為，杯子理論是一中各表，屋頂理論也是一中各表。再以社論語言來說，一中各表也是可以貫通「合理的過程論」至「改良之目的論」的概念。北京即使暫時不願在口頭上承認「一中各表」，但千萬不可輕易否定；因為「一中各表」是想像中最能貫通「過程」與「目的」的概念，且運作起來代價最小，而成就的可能性卻最大。

往前面看，兩岸關係需要一個「很長」的競合過程，「很長」這個「引號」，是強調其時間一定很長，且必須很長。為了確保在這個「很長」的競合演化中，能有「合理的過程」，並能創造「改良之目的」，「一中各表」應是唯一的可行策略。「一中各表」，是化異求同；同與異的交替，就是筷子理論。一中各表，亦可守可進；守是杯子理論，進則是屋頂理論。雖然兩岸承認「一中各表」的程度不同（北京僅在布胡熱線承認一次）；但在目前及可見之未來，主導兩岸互動的主要默契就是「一中各表」。所謂「九二共識／和平發展」，或「維持現狀／和平發展」，就是「一中各表／和平發展」。

雖然，一中各表暫時不易成為北京的公開政策；卻已存在於默契及局部的實際體現中。所謂「維持現狀」、「和平發展」、「雖然尚未統一／仍是一個中國」，其實皆可視為「一中各表」的引申語或替代詞。兩岸之間，曾從「解放台灣」、「反攻大陸」、「中華民國已經滅亡」等相互詛咒，演化至今日的「雙贏共生」；那麼，另日「一中各表」若從潛台詞變成定場詩，亦不令人意外。

畢竟，兩岸分裂分治六十年來的歷史演化在在證實：思想會從狹窄變到寬闊，意境會從淺陋變到高遠。思想變了，意境也變。一句「和平發展」啟動了交流齒輪，亦寄望一句「九二共識／一中各表」共創雙贏。