Taiwan is Taiwan, Finland is Finland

Taiwan is Taiwan, Finland is Finland
The Apple Daily (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
Chao Chun-shan, Committee Member, National Policy Research Foundation
A Translation
January 02, 2010

In the latest issue of "Foreign Affairs," American scholar Bruce Gilley wrote that since the Ma administration came to power, its policy of reconciliation with the mainland has led the Republic of China in Taipei down the road toward "Finlandization." Gilley concludes that the United States must make some strategic and diplomatic changes. Before it expands official contacts with Taipei, it should consult with Beijing. Along with its allies, it must establish a new strategic plan. It must exclude Taipei, and make a thorough review of its policy of U.S. arms sales to Taipei.
The term "Finlandization" has its roots in the relationship between the Soviet Union and Finland. In 1948, the two sides established a special relationship with a "Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance." The agreement stipulated that if Germany and its allies attacked the Soviet Union or transited through Finland in order to attack the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union and Finland were obligated to assist each other. When faced with the threat of armed attack, the Soviet Union had the right to request military consultations with Finland. Finland could not organize or participate in any military alliance against the Soviet Union. Finland's actions had to be based on bilateral economic cooperation and a spirit of friendship with the Soviet Union. When the agreement was reached, then President of Finland Juho Kusti Paasikivi knew the Soviet Union might attempt to control Finland, but felt such an agreement was worth a try.

Without a doubt the Soviet Union acquired huge military and economic interests by signing the agreement. When Western scholars use the use "Finlandization," they mean that although a nation has complete sovereignty, its foreign policy-making powers have been severely curtailed. Another scholar characterized "Finlandization" as a "transitional stage between Western democracy and communism."

Hoping for Non-Confrontational Methods

Gilley claims that the Republic of China is similar to Finland during the late 1940s. For example, the area of the Republlc of China's active jurisdiction may be small, but it nevertheless posseses sovereignty. The Republic of China government in Taipei is geographically close to a major power. It shares common cultural and historical ties with its powerful neighbor. It has a strong "sense of independence," but is pragmatically required to accomodate the vital interests of a major power. More importantly, Republic of China political leaders and citizens currently seek security through integration rather than conflict.

The Republic of China's situation, as Gilley notes, bears some similarities with that of Finland. But cross-Strait relations are far more complex than relations between Finland and the Soviet Union. Taipei's current policy toward the Mainland is also significantly different from Finland's policy toward the Soviet Union. For starters, Finland shared a 1269 kilometer border with the Soviet Union. Finland faced a direct threat from the Soviet Union. It lacked strategic depth. It had little room to maintain its own security. The two sides of the Taiwan Strait are separated by water. The Taiwan Strait acts a barrier. It offers defensive capabilities. Secondly, Finland was part of a different regional power structure than the Republic of China. When Finland turned to the Soviet Union the United States and its NATO allies voiced no objections. Beginning with the Cold War, the United States considered security in the Taiwan Strait an important part of its Asia-Pacific interests. The US-Japan security system even considered security in the Taiwan Strait as matters along its perimeter.

Thirdly, the Finnish general election 50 years later strengthened relations with the Soviet Union. It cemented a national consensus. Republic of China citizens have a strong desire to defend themselves. The defense of the Republic of China is the greatest common denominator. Republic of China citizens all hope to emerge into the sunlight of the international stage, and have no desire to impose limits on themselves. Fourth, Beijing's policy toward Taipei's strategic goal is "one country, two systems" and "peaceful reunification." Its handling of the "Taiwan issue" is very different from the Soviet Union's policy objectives for Finland. Finally, the Ma administration's "diplomatic truce" or "pragmatic diplomacy" does not mean giving up the pursuit of an independent foreign policy. We advocate reconciliation with the Mainland. At the same time we also hope to strengthen our relationship with the Washington, Tokyo, and others. The two are complementary, not mutually exclusive. That is why the government is concerned that the controversy over US beef imports will affect Taipei/Washington relations.

In 1995, the Taiwan Strait crisis erupted. Later the Chen administration adopted a "two part battle plan" for Mainland and foreign policy. The United States, to avoid entanglement, issued Taipei a warning. It demanded that the DPP government accept full responsibility for its aggressive policy. That is why Gilley's claims are no surprise. They reflect the rapid adjustments Washington has had to make in the face of rising Mainland power. They also reflect the hope that Taipei will play the role of catalyst in the democratization of the Chinese mainland. It hopes that it will continue to participate in Washington's strategy of engagement with Beijing.

Taipei is hardly the only one to adopt a conciliatory policy towards Beijing. Washington and Washington's other allies, including Tokyo and Seoul, are all committed to improving relations with Beijing. Therefore, we believe that Gilley's argument that the Republic of China is moving toward "Finlandization," is merely one man's opinion. Whether it accords with mainstream views in the United States remains to be seen. Until then, the Republic of China government in Taipei has no need to make any rash remarks or haphazard analogies.

台灣是台灣 芬蘭是芬蘭
(Commentary)
Source: The Apple Daily
國家政策研究基金會政策委員 趙春山
January 02, 2010

美國學者季禮（Bruce Gilley）在最近一期的《外交事務》期刊撰文指出，馬政府上台後對大陸採取的和解政策，已使台灣一步步走向「芬蘭化」的道路。因此季禮認為，美國必須進行戰略和外交調整，包括在與台灣擴大官方接觸前，應與北京進行磋商，在與盟邦重建一個新的作戰計劃時，把台灣排除在外，及徹底檢討美國的對台軍售政策等。

「芬蘭化」一詞源自於1948年蘇聯與芬蘭締結《友好合作與互助條約》時，雙方所建構的一個特殊關係。該約規定當德國及其盟友攻擊芬蘭或假道芬蘭攻擊蘇聯時，蘇芬有相互援助的義務；當面對武力攻擊威脅時，蘇聯有權要求芬蘭進行軍事磋商；芬蘭不得組織或參加任何對付蘇聯的軍事同盟，芬蘭的行動必須以發展雙方經濟與合作的友好精神為依據。該約締結時，芬蘭總統帕西基維意識到蘇聯可能藉此控制芬蘭，但認為締約之舉值得一試。

毫無疑問，蘇聯已因蘇芬條約的簽定而獲取鉅大軍事與經濟利益，而西方學界在使用「芬蘭化」一詞時，代表的是：一個國家對內雖具完全權威，但對外決策權力卻相當有限。另有學者將「芬蘭化」視為：「從西方民主制度到共產主義制度之間的一個過渡階段。」

盼整合非衝突手段

季禮認為，台灣和1940年代末期的芬蘭，有許多類似的特點：例如，台灣幅員雖小但對內享有主權；同時，台灣在地理上接近一個強權，並和這個強鄰分享共同的文化和歷史聯繫；除此之外，台灣強力的「獨立感」，也被一種需要與強權重大利益配合的「務實感」所抵銷；更重要的是，台灣的政治領袖和人民，目前都希望透過整合，而非衝突的手段來尋求安全。

台灣和芬蘭的處境如季禮所言，或有若干相似之處；但兩岸關係的複雜性，絕對超過當時的蘇芬關係。台灣目前採取的大陸政策，也和芬蘭當時的對蘇政策有明顯的不同。首先蘇芬邊界長達1269公里，芬蘭面對蘇聯的直接威脅，缺乏戰略縱深，在維護自身的安全方面，沒有多大的選擇空間；兩岸則隔台海遙遙相望，台灣有海峽作為屏障，有防守的能力；其次，芬蘭當時與台灣面臨的地區權力結構不同，芬蘭倒向蘇聯時，美國與北約盟國不表異議；而從冷戰時代開始，美國即把台海安全視為其亞太利益的重要部分，美日安保體制甚至把台海安全視為「周邊有事」的範圍。

第三，芬蘭50年代舉行大選後，強化與蘇聯關係幾乎成為一項全民共識；台灣有自我防衛的強烈意志，維護中華民國是全民最大公約數，在發展對外關係上，大家都希望「走出去」，不會自我設限；第四，中共對台政策的戰略目標是「一國兩制、和平統一」，其處理「台灣問題」的手法和蘇聯當時對芬蘭的政策目標大為不同；最後，馬政府的外交休兵或活路外交概念，並不表示放棄外交上追求獨立自主的立場。我們主張與大陸和解，同時也希望強化與美日等國的實質關係。兩者相輔相成，不是相互排斥。這就是政府為何擔心美牛事件會影響台美關係的主因。

在1995年台海危機爆發，尤其是扁政府採取「兩面作戰」的大陸與外交政策後，美國為了避免捲入麻煩，曾對台提出警告，要求民進黨政府應對其急進政策的代價「概括承受」。因此季禮的說法並不意外，它一方面反映出美國面對一個崛起的中國，必須盡速調整它的中國政策；另方面也希望台灣能扮演催化中國大陸民主化的角色，進一步參與美國對中共的接觸戰略。

在亞洲地區，並非只有台灣採取對大陸的和解政策，美國的其他盟國，包括日本和韓國在內，都致力改善與中國的關係。因此，我們相信季禮有關台灣走向「芬蘭化」的說法只是一家之言，是否成為美國的主流意見有待觀察。在此之前，台灣內部實在無須妄加論斷，隨意比附。

（本文刊載於99.01.02，蘋果日報，本文代表作者個人意見）