A United States No Longer Certain and In Search of a Pretext

A United States No Longer Certain and In Search of a Pretext
by Chang Ya-chung
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 2, 2010

Foreign Affairs Quarterly enjoys an outstanding reputation among experts in international relations. The current January/February issue includes an article entitled, "Not So Dire Straits," by American scholar Bruce Gilley, which reveals how some members of the US intelligentsia see Washington's role in cross-Strait relations.
After World War II, Finland was extremely cautious about how it dealt with the Soviet Union. Based on geo-political and economic realities, the Finnish government, with the full support of its citizens, took measures to avoid foreign conflict in order to ensure the survival and prosperity of the Finnish nation. Finland's cautious foreign policy should have received affirmation and praise. Instead, during the Cold War, Western scholars and politicians coined the term "Finlandization" to ridicule smaller nations who succumbed to the Soviet Union and who were unwilling to become followers of the United States. Naturally the United States did not use the term "Finlandization" to describe the nations who succumbed to them.

The Term "Finlandization" Reveals US Egocentrism

The article "Not So Dire Straits" uses the derogatory term "Finlandization" to describe Taipei's policy of reconciliation with Beijing. Some scholars in the US are apparently unaware that historically, constitutionally, culturally, and ethnically, cross-Strait relations are completely different from the relationship between the Soviet Union and Finland. The two sides share close economic and social relationships the Soviet Union and Finland never did. The author's use of the term "Finlandization" to describe Taipei's actions is neither here nor there, and brims over with US egocentrism.

The article concluded that since 1949 the United States has played an important role In stabilizing the cross-Strait situation, but that today this historic task has come to an end. The United States should make strategic and diplomatic changes in response to Taipei's "Finlandization." For example, the United States must henceforth consult Beijing before expanding official contacts with Taipei. It must re-formulate its military alliances, to the exclusion of Taipei. On the diplomatic front, it will publicly support cross-Strait peaceful development. But it will reduce the transfer of sensitive technology to prevent leakage from Taiwan to the mainland.

Most importantly, it will belatedly begin honoring the commitment it made to Beijing in 1982 to significantly reduce arms sales to Taipei. The author concludes by giving a positive spin on his "abandon Taipei, cozy up to Beijing," or "shrug off Taipei, lean towards Beijing" policy recommendation. He characterizes the United States' hands-off position on Taiwan Strait affairs as respect for China's territorial integrity. He says it will help ease Sino-US relations, and slow down China's military expansion, thereby increasing the likelilhood of Mainland China's "peaceful rise." The article concludes, "Now is the time for Washington to make an historic shift."

This article sees U.S. interests as the sole consideration for U.S. policy in East Asia. It underscores the sense of powerlessness the US feels as it loses the ability to influence cross-Strait relations. It also reminds one of the "hands-off policy" the US adopted towards the Republic of China in 1949.

Do as the United States Says, or Fend for Yourself

More importantly, it reveals the United States' concern only for its self interest. Like its "China Policy White Paper" of 1949, it passes all the blame for the United States' policy of "unburdening itself of Taipiei" or "abandoning Taipei" onto the KMT government. It spins its irresponsible policy as "inevitable."

This article reveals how some American scholars and politicians are attempting to compare Taipei's efforts to promote cross-Strait reconciliation, with Finland's refusal to side with the West during the Cold War. It attempts to turn Taipei's efforts to pursue cross-Strait into a pretext for the United States to cease playing a stabilizing role in the cross-Strait scenario.

The article avoids making clear that in the future, Taipei must take responsibility for its own security. The United States is no longer concerned. Taipei no longer has a role in the United State's future security arrangments for East Asia, because it has already been "Finlandized." It is no longer "our man." From the article, we see how once again the U.S. appears to be "respecting Taiwan's choice," but is merely revealing its true face, its "Do as I say, or fend for yourself" posture.

Understanding Washington's Policy toward Taipei

Cross-Strait peaceful development is not to the strategic advantage of any given world power. But it is to the advantage of mankind as a whole. It is a moral choice that people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait have a right to make. The United States should help and encourage Taipei in its cross-Strait interactions. It should help Taipei make use of its advantages. It should help both sides move towards peace. It should help the Mainland become more open, more free, and better governed.

We are saddened seeing a Taiwan policy no longer rooted in idealism. We regret seeing an uncertain Taiwan policy in search of a rationale. We must understand the nature of US policy toward Taiwan over the past 60 years. What justification did the United States have in 1949 for its White Paper on China? What justification did the United States have in 1971 for not supporting the Republic of China in the United Nations? What justification did the United States have in 1979 for breaking off diplomatic relations with Taipei? What justification did the United States have in 1982 for its August 17 bulletin? We are now hearing about "Taiwan's Finlandization" in mainstream academic journals, about Washington's readiness to "abandon Taipei and cozy up to Beijing," about about "unburdening ourselves of Taipei and leaning toward Beijing." Under the circumstances, should we continue viewing "cozying up to the US" as our number one priority? Should we continue to appease the US? Or should we give serious consideration to a different direction?

The author is a Professor at the National Taiwan University Department of Political Science, and a Chairman of the Society for Cross-Strait Unification.

中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 　2010.01.11
面對尋找託辭而不再確定的美國
張亞中

在國際關係學界享有極高聲譽的《外交事務》季刊，這一期（2010年1、2月）刊登了美國學者季禮（Bruce Gilley）所撰寫的《不太危急的海峽》（Not So Dire Straits），傳達出美國知識界一些人如何看待未來美國在兩岸關係中的角色與作為。

二次大戰結束後，基於地緣政治經濟的現實，芬蘭為了自己的利益，在全民支持下，謹小慎微地處理與蘇聯的關係，從而避免衝突並確保芬蘭的生存與發展。芬蘭這種謹慎的外交政策本應受到肯定與讚揚，但是在冷戰期間，西方學者與政界，卻用「芬蘭化」一詞來嘲諷那些屈服於蘇聯、不願意追隨美國的小國。至於屈服與追隨美國的國家，美國是不會用「芬蘭化」來形容它們的。

芬蘭化一詞 顯示自我中心

在《不太危急的海峽》中，看似對台灣推動兩岸和解的理解，但是用「芬蘭化」一詞來為台北的和解政策做註腳，卻有相當的貶意。這些美國學者完全沒認知到，在歷史、憲政、文化與血緣紐帶上，兩岸關係完全不同於外國間的蘇芬關係；兩岸之間現有的經濟、社會的互動與緊密，更非當時的蘇芬所能比擬。作者用「芬蘭化」來形容台北作為，根本是不倫不類，充滿著美國自我中心的想像。

文章最後提到：1949年以來，在穩定兩岸局勢方面，美國扮演過重要角色，如今這個歷史任務差不多走到盡頭，美國應該在戰略和外交上作出調整，以配合台灣走向「芬蘭化」。例如：美國今後在擴大對台官方接觸前，須先諮詢北京；要重新制訂與盟國間的軍事計畫，剔除台灣的參與；在外交上公開支持兩岸和平發展；減少轉移敏感技術以免台灣洩漏給大陸。

最重要的是，重拾1982年對北京作出的承諾，大幅減少對台軍售。作者最後再美化其「棄台親中說」或「脫台傾中說」，表示美國撒手台海事務，是對中國領土完整的尊重，有助和緩中美關係，並可減緩大陸的軍事發展，從而增加中國「和平」崛起的機會。文章結語並呼籲「現在正是華府作出歷史性轉向的時機」。

這篇文章完全站在美國利益為出發點來思考美國的東亞政策。我們從中看到美國對兩岸關係發展已經失去影響力的無力感，也看到1949年美國對中華民國「袖手不管政策」（hands-off policy）的可能翻版。

不扈從美國 就請自生自滅

更重要的，看到了美國為了自己利益，像1949年發表《對華政策白皮書》一樣，不惜把美國「脫台」或「棄台」政策的一切責任推給國民黨政府，從而把自己偽裝成「不得不」改變政策的不負責任者。

這篇文章反應出一些美國學者與政客，企圖將台灣推動兩岸和解的行為比擬為當時芬蘭不願意追尋西方的背棄行為，把台北追求兩岸和平的努力扭曲成美國不再能扮演穩定兩岸局勢的說詞。

文章沒有明白寫出的是：台灣必須為自己未來的安全自我負責，美國已經不想再過問，台灣未來在美國的東亞安全架構中也不應該有地位與角色，因為台灣已經「芬蘭化」了，不再是「自己人」了。從文章中，我們看到美國再一次露出那看似「尊重台灣選擇」，本質卻是「不做扈從就請自生自滅」的真面目。

認清美國對台政策本質

兩岸和平發展不是有利於哪個強權的戰略選擇，而是人類，特別是兩岸人民應有也必須有的道德選擇。美國應該協助與鼓勵台灣在兩岸互動中，發揮台灣的優勢，促使兩岸走向更和平，大陸走向開放、自由與善治。

我們很遺憾看到一個不再有理想的對台政策正在醞釀，更遺憾地看到一個不確定的對台政策正在找尋立論基礎。我們應認清60年來美國對台政策的本質，1949 年美國以何種理由發表對華白皮書？1971年以什麼理由在聯合國不再支持台灣？1979年以什麼說辭與台北斷交？為何1982年會出現八一七公報？如今「台灣芬蘭化」的言論已經在主流學術期刊出現，華府可能準備「棄台親中」、「脫台傾中」，我們是要繼續將「親美視為對外關係的第一優先？繼續討好？還是應該認真思考一下真正的大方向？

（作者為台灣大學政治學系教授、兩岸統合學會理事長）