The 51% Rule: Why the Blue Camp Refuses to Vote

The 51% Rule: Why the Blue Camp Refuses to Vote
United Daily News editorial
A Translation
January 12, 2010

During last month's three in one local elections, and the three county legislator by-elections held last weekend, the most noteworthy political phenomenon was the low Blue Camp voter turnout. The Blue Camp vote count in the three in one local elections, was one million votes fewer than the Blue Camp vote count during Ma Ying-jeou's presidential election. The vote count for Anita Chan Lai-ling in the Taoyuan County Legislative Yuan by-election was about 37,000 votes. It was almost 40,000 less than Liu Cheng-ching's vote count in the previous election. In other words, it was merely half.

A string of elections held since the second change in ruling parties show that President Ma Ying-jeou has not won over any voters in the Green Camp. Instead he has suffered a serious loss of enthusiasm and support within the Blue Camp. The Green Camp is a monolith. Ma Ying-jeou cannot broaden his support by pandering to the Green Camp. He can only alienate his Blue Camp supporters by making them feel betrayed and abandoned. For Ma Ying-jeou, this amounts to a fatal erosion of his political base. Moreover, the less he is able to rally support within the Blue Camp, the more maneuveuring room he offers the Green Camp. Ma Ying-jeou's leadership position is increasingly tenuous. The Blue Camp is frustrated with the Ma administration's failure to fulfill its potential. Its sense of alienation and loss is more and more serious. This has led to a vicious cycle and generated divisions.

During the 2008 presidential election Ma Ying-jeou's campaign headquarters had a "51% rule." This was its election strategy. The so-called 51% rule meant that Ma Ying-jeou must be transformed into a political figure whom a majority of the public would award a score of 51% or more. In other words, their goal was to avoid transforming Ma Ying-jeou into a political figure whom a minority of the public would award a score of 90%, but whom others would award a score of only 5%. Their thinking was that as long as a majority of the public awarded Ma Ying-jeou a score of 51%, he would not become someone whose image was too sharply drawn, hence invite powerful reactions, either pro or con. This would allow him to break out of the Blue vs. Green dichotomy. This would allow him on the one hand to win Pale Green centrist votes, and on the other hand pave the way for social reconciliation after assuming office. The 51% rule was not entirely an electoral strategy. It probably reflected Ma Ying-jeou's moderate beliefs and introverted personality.

The Ma Ying-jeou administration apparently continued to use the 51% rule after it assumed office. It continued to walk on eggshells, eager to please all of the people all of the time. But as we can all see, it merely created a Green Camp monolith, and alienated his Blue Camp core support. As one can imagine, most Blue Camp supporters initially awarded Ma Ying-jeou a score well above 51%. But the reality now is that many Blue Camp supporters are awarding him a score lower than 51%. They refuse even to vote. Many more Blue Camp voters, regardless of whether they vote, feel alienated and adrift.

This is the Ma administration's plight. Green Camp momentum is strong. Blue Camp members' enthusiasm, sense of identification, sense of pride, sense of participation, sense of accomplishment, and degree of support have gone from bad to worse, and can go no lower. This is a deadlock. This is a crisis.

Compare this with the KMT. The absolute number of votes for the DPP may not have increased, but its supporters' enthusiasm and sense of identification with the party is high, well over 51%. From this we can see that the question is not whether the KMT can inspire the Green Camp and break down barriers between the Blue realm and the Green realm. The question is whether it can re-ignite the enthusiasm of its Blue Camp supporters. The question is how can it enable them to feel a sense of identification, a sense of pride, a sense of accomplishment, and a degree of support. Ma Ying-jeou cannot base his rule on such an alienated, even contemptuous political foundation. Blue Camp voters are not about to seek refuge in the DPP. But if they are so disillusioned they no longer expect anything from the Ma administration, is that not a frightening prospect?

What are the factors that led to our current situation? We have repeatedly tried to explain. The main reason is that the Republic of China is a nation divided by deep differences over national identity, communal group membership, cross-Strait policy, and social justice. This situation is not one that a "civil servant" such as the president can wave away with a magic wand. It requires a "national leader" to turn the tide. Alas, ever since President Ma took office, he has "retreated to the second line of defense," he has "refused party chairman status," he has "refused to issue emergency orders." His behavior has been that of an administator rather than a national leader. Ma Ying-jeou considers his behavior law-abiding and measured. But his supporters see it as cowardly and incompetent, as shirking responsibility. Ma Ying-jeou may consider his behavior consistent with his 51% rule. But the 51% rule is precisely what landed him in his current predicament.

Here we wish to avoid a possible misunderstanding. We are not saying that Ma Ying-jeou should cozy up to "Deep Blue" voters. We merely think that Ma Ying-jeou must respond to mainstream Blue Camp expectations. He must help his supporters recover their cohesiveness and pride. If he persists in abiding by his 51% rule, if he persists in binding himself hand and foot, if he persists in his efforts to be all things to all people, then most of his supporters will give him a score below 51%.

To make a percentage-based analogy, a person in office cannot expect 100% of the public to give him a score of 51% or more. Instead, he should enable 60% of the public to give him a score of 60% or more. This should be his goal. If he can get 60% of the public to give him a score of 60% or more, what reason is there to assume the nation's morale cannot be revitalized and restored?

If Ma Ying-jeou is unable to inspire enthusiasm and a sense of pride within the Blue Camp, he shouldn't even think of attempting to inspire enthusiasm in the Green Camp.

51％法則：藍營為何不投票？
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.01.12 03:25 am

在上個月的三合一地方選舉，與上周末的三縣立委補選中，最顯著的政治現象，就是藍營選民的投票率極低。藍軍在三合一選舉的得票數，較馬英九在總統大選的得票，少了一百餘萬票；此次立委補選，以桃園縣為例，陳麗玲的得票（約三萬七千票），竟較前次廖正井少了近四萬票，只剩對半。

二次政黨輪替以來的歷次選舉顯示：馬英九總統並未在綠營爭取到新的認同者與支持者，反而卻是藍營支持者的熱情與認同已見嚴重耗損流失。綠營如鐵板一塊，這只是顯示馬英九難有拓展的空間；但藍營支持者的疏離與背棄，對馬英九而言，卻是統治基礎的致命性鬆動。何況，愈是帶不起藍營的熱情，就使綠營愈有操作的空間；而馬英九的領導地位因而愈告吃緊，藍營恨鐵不成鋼的疏離感與失落感也愈形嚴重。惡性循環，遂告產生。

在二 ○○八總統大選期間，馬英九競選總部曾有一種「51％法則」，據為輔選主軸。所謂51％法則，就是要將馬英九塑造成大多數人對他存有51％認同的政治人物。換句話說，就是不要將馬塑造成一部分人極認同（比如說90％），但另一部分人極不認同（比如說5％）的明銳典型。在當時，此一構想或許是：只要大多數人認同馬英九51％，不使他成為形象太明銳而招致強烈愛憎的人物；即可打破藍綠界線，一方面爭取中間偏綠的選票，另一方面亦為當選執政後整合社會預做鋪墊。這個51％法則，也許並不純然是選舉策略，而也如實地反映了馬英九中庸內斂的信仰與人格。

這個51％法則，在馬英九當選總統執政後，似乎仍然沿用，於是一味謹小慎微，想要討好所有的人；然而，如所共見，卻造成了如今綠營鐵板一塊、藍營疏離背棄的局面。想像中，多數藍營的支持者，原本對馬英九認同與支持的「平均值」，應當是超逾 51％的；但現今的事實卻顯示，有些藍營選民的支持度已低於51％（不投票了），更多的藍營選民則不論投不投票，亦已陷於高度的疏離與失落之中。

這或許正是馬政府如今政治處境的寫照：綠營反對者的氣勢旺盛，藍營支持者的熱情、認同感、光榮感、參與感、成就感，及支持度皆每下愈況，趨低不起。這是僵局，也是危機。

若與國民黨對照，民進黨選票的絕對數雖未見增加，但其支持者的熱情與認同感卻十分熾烈（遠逾51％）；由此可知，國民黨現在的問題已然不在能否感化綠營、打開藍綠界際，而是在如何將幾乎已告熄滅的藍營支持者的熱情重新點燃，如何使他們產生足夠的認同感、光榮感、成就感及支持度。馬英九若將其國家治理，置於如此疏離、甚至對他帶有輕蔑嘲諷的社會支持之上，這些藍軍或許不會去投靠民進黨，卻亦對馬政府不抱期待，這是何其恐怖可怕的場景？

至於為何形成如今這個局面的原因，我們曾多次試作解析。主要的原因是：中華民國是一個在國家認同、族群關係、兩岸政策及社會正義上皆是遍體鱗傷的國家；這個局面絕對不是一個只以「高級公務員」自許的總統所能化解，而需要一個以「國家領袖」自命的總統來扭轉乾坤。但是，馬總統上任後，「退居第二線」、「不兼黨主席」、「不發布緊急命令」等作為，皆是一個「行政角色」的格局，而不是一個「國家領袖」的境界。馬英九自認是守法守分，中規中矩，但在支持者眼中卻是懦弱無能，自縛手腳。這種風格在馬英九的想像中也許符合51％法則，卻落至今日親痛仇快的下場。

討論至此，可能會產生一個誤解。本文並不認為馬英九應當向所謂的「深藍」靠攏，而只是認為馬英九必須努力回應藍營中的主流期待；使其支持者回復向心力與光榮感。倘若仍然維持51％法則，綁手綁腳，想要討好所有的人，多數支持者的熱情必將在51％以下低迴。

若仍以百分比作一概略的抽象比喻：主政者不可能教百分之百的國人對他皆有51％的認同；但應將能使60％左右的國人對他持有60％以上的認同，做為自我努力的目標。倘能獲得60％左右國人60％以上的認同，國家豈有不振興光大的道理？

馬英九若帶動不起藍營的熱情與光榮感，就更別談想要感化及帶動綠營了。