Tuesday, January 26, 2010

Force Manufacturers to Relocate rather than Sign ECFA?

Force Manufacturers to Relocate rather than Sign ECFA?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 26, 2010

The first round of negotiations over ECFA begin in Beijing today.
Three main reasons have been cited for opposing ECFA. Reason 1. ECFA is not merely an economic issue. It is also a political issue. Signing ECFA means that the two sides of the Taiwan Strait will be more closely bound together. Reason 2. Beijing should publicly agree to Taipei signing FTAs with other countries. Otherwise, Taipei should refuse to sign an ECFA with Beijing. Reason 3. We have alternatives to signing ECFA. For example, we need only build factories in any one of the ASEAN plus One or ASEAN plus Three nations. Once we do so, we automatically gain access to them all.

Let's begin with Reason 1. Signing ECFA will give us a 5-10 percent Mainland tariff reduction. But this applies only pertains to exports. Even more important is total exemption from tariffs. That would allow manufacturers to keep their factories on Taiwan, increasing employment opportunities on Taiwan. If we do not sign ECFA, the manufacturers may be forced to move their plants to Southeast Asia or Mainland China. If that happens, the unemployment problem on Taiwan will surely deteriorate. Therefore, one of the reasons for signing ECFA is to encourage manufacturers to keep their roots on Taiwan. Those who oppose signing ECFA may ask "What's wrong with relocating?" This may solve the manufacturers' problems, but exports will become less competitive. Worse, it will exacerbate unemployment on Taiwan. If manufacturers are able to set up factories on Taiwan, why should they be forced to move to Southeast Asia?

When it comes to signing FTAs with other countries, there appears to be no difference between the pros and the cons. But even if we can't sign FTAs with other countries at the moment, we must sign an ECFA with Mainland China. Globalization and regional economic organizations are a macro level trend. Taipei must seek the same tariff treatment as other countries on Mainland China. It must provide incentives for companies to build plants on Taiwan. Therefore it must sign ECFA. Taiwan's exports constitute 70% of its GDP. Taiwan's exports to Mainland China constitute 40% of its total exports. We now face ASEAN plus One (Mainland China), ASEAN plus Three (Mainland China, Japan, and South Korea), ASEAN plus Six (add India, New Zealand, and Australia), and ASEAN plus Seven (Russia). Do people really want manufacturers on Taiwan to relocate, rather than sign ECFA? Those who oppose ECFA do not object to products from Taiwan being sold on the Mainland. Do they object to products from Taiwan being tariff-free? Do they object to manufacturers on Taiwan remaining on Taiwan? Of course it would be best if Taipei could also sign FTAs with other countries. But for the time being it can't. Therefore it must sign an ECFA with Beijing.

If Taipei can some day become part of "ASEAN plus Four," it might be able to use its membership to protect its political interests. But the threat to the livelihood of lower level agricultural and industrial workers is more serious than any threat posed by ECFA. It is precisely because cross-Strait politics is such an important factor, that ECFA will reduce the negative effects on agriculture and industry. Taipei must stand tall. It must face the test of globalization. ECFA is a globalization issue. But it has been deliberately spin-doctored and turned into an issue of cross-Strait politics. It has become a blind spot in the dispute over ECFA. In order to meet the challenges of globalization and regional economic organizations, we must sign ECFA. We must factor in any political risk. As long as the Republic of China, from the president down to neighborhood chiefs, maintains its system of democratic elections, it will have all the support it needs. It will be able to maintain political security in the form of the "status quo and peaceful development"

The most fundamental concern is that after signing ECFA, Taipei must not be subject to Beijing's control. ECFA is of course not limited to only economic matters. It also has political implications. Therefore the choice to sign or not sign ECFA, is actually a choice between two political strategies. Naturally advocates Taiwan independence oppose ECFA. But if the proposal advocates "neither reunification nor independence," they should agree to sign ECFA.

If we wish to usher in globalization, we have no reason to oppose ECFA. ECFA will solve cross-strait economic and trade problems. But more importantly, ECFA will solve "ASEAN plus X" regional economic problems. We must be able to survive in a globalized world. Only then can we find solutions to our political problems. If our economy cannot survive, how can we find solutions to our political problems? One might say that signing ECFA will bind Taipei. But it would be more accurate to say that not signing ECFA will bind Taipei to the wrong political strategy.

Taipei's economic path has been affected by its political situation. Conversely, Taipei's political path has been affected by its economic situation. The advent of globalization and regional economic organizations are Taipei's greatest economic challenges, and also its greatest political threat. In cross-Strait relations, the challenges of bilateral economic and trade relations have already exceeded those of direct political or military threats. The controversy over ECFA boils down to a simple reality. Taipei must adopt certain political and economic strategies for its survival. But Taipei cannot ignore globalization and regionalization, and the "ASEAN plus X" tidal wave. It cannot ignore the urgency and necessity of signing ECFA. That is, unless we really want manufacturers to relocate.

寧可廠商外移也不簽ECFA?
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.01.26 02:59 am

ECFA首場協商今日在北京登場。

反對簽ECFA的主要理由,可以歸納為三點:一、ECFA不只是經濟事務,也是政治事務;簽了ECFA,兩岸關係就不易解套。二、北京應公開同意台灣與其他國家簽FTA,否則台灣即不應與北京簽ECFA。三、不簽ECFA,仍有其他解決之道;例如,面對東協加一或東協加三,只要能進入其中任何一國設廠投資,即可「打遍全部」。

先從最後一點談起。簽訂ECFA,可在中國減免五%至十%的關稅,這只是從出口貿易的利益來看;但更重要的則是,由於可以免除關稅,即可維持廠商在台投資設廠的利基,以增加台灣的就業機會。倘若不簽ECFA,相關廠商必須外移至東南亞或中國,可能即是唯一選擇;但如此一來,台灣的失業問題亦必趨嚴重。因此,主張簽訂ECFA的理由之一,正是要留住廠商,有「根留台灣」的作用;反對簽約者建議「何不外移」,也許可解決廠商的問題,卻必會使台灣的就業問題更形惡化,而不僅是外銷產品失去競爭力而已。但若能在台灣設廠,何必移往東南亞?

關於與其他國家簽FTA,正反雙方似無歧見。但即使暫不能與其他國家簽FTA,也必須與中國簽ECFA。因為,全球化及區域經濟組織的運作已是大勢所趨,如前所述,台灣為能與其他國家取得在中國免關稅的平等立足點,及為求維持吸引廠商在台投資設廠的誘因,皆不能不簽ECFA;台灣出口貿易可占GDP總值的七成,而台灣將對中國的出口又占總出口總值的四成,面對東協加一(加中國)、東協加三(加中、日、韓)、東協加六(再加印、紐、澳),及東協加七(再加俄羅斯)這個迎面而來的情勢,台灣難道真的寧可廠商外移,也不簽ECFA?反對簽ECFA者,並不反對台灣產品銷往中國市場;難道卻反對在中國免關稅,及反對廠商留在台灣?台灣當然最好也能與其他國家簽FTA;但即使暫時不能,也必須與中國簽ECFA。

其實,倘若台灣有朝一日能成為「東協加四」,雖可能取得政治平衡的利益,但對台灣農業及基層勞工的生計威脅,必較ECFA更嚴重。(正因兩岸的政治因素,使ECFA有可能在農業等方面減少衝擊)。然而,即使如此,台灣也必須挺起胸膛、面對全球化的考驗;如今將ECFA這個因應全球化的經貿議題扭曲成只是兩岸的政治議題,可謂正是ECFA爭議中的主要盲點。為了迎對全球化及區域經濟組織的挑戰,所以必須簽訂ECFA;至於其中必須考量的政治風險,只要中華民國維持自總統至里長的民主直選制度,就有充分的支撐,能夠維持「維持現狀/和平發展」的政治安全。

最根本的顧慮是在,簽訂ECFA後台灣會不會被北京套住。ECFA當然不只是經濟事務,也有其政治意涵;因而,簽不簽ECFA,其實是兩種政治戰略的選擇。若主張台獨,自然反對簽ECFA;但若主張「不統/不獨」,即會傾向贊成簽ECFA。

關鍵在於:若要迎對全球化,即無理由反對ECFA。與其說ECFA是在解決兩岸經貿問題,不如說是台灣須藉ECFA以處理與「東協加N」的區域經濟難題。台灣必須先有在全球化中求生的能力,始有可能在政治上找到出路;否則,經濟上若無生路,在政治上亦不可能有出路。若謂簽ECFA會套住台灣;不如說,若不簽ECFA,反而會使台灣被錯誤的政治戰略套住。

台灣的經濟路線受到政治情勢的影響;同樣的,台灣的政治路線也受制約於經濟情勢。全球化及區域經濟組織是對台灣最大的經濟挑戰,也是最大的政治威脅;甚至就兩岸關係言,雙方經貿關係的挑戰,也已超越了政治或軍事的直接威脅。關於ECFA的種種爭議,歸結而言,其實只是對於台灣應當採取何種「政經戰略」以維生存發展持不同看法。但除非台灣能否定全球化及區域化的發展,及改變「東協加N」的大勢,即不能不考慮簽訂ECFA的急迫性與必要性。否則,難道真的要主張廠商統統外移?

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