One China, Different Interpretations: A Breeding Ground for Taiwan Independence?

One China, Different Interpretations: A Breeding Ground for Taiwan Independence?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 25, 2010

Toward the end of last year the United Daily News published a series of six editorials entitled, "Thoughts on the 99th Year of the Founding of the Republic of China." They received considerable attention from people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. We do not necessarily believe the arguments presented in our editorial series are unassailable. We wrote them merely to stimulate discussion and encourage brainstorming.
Cross-Strait issues are troublesome. They provoke intense disagreement. We are gratified that many people agree with our "Six New Years Day Editorials." But we also respect those who disagree. But if our editorials have been misunderstood or misinterpreted, we would like to clarify our position, to avoid conveying any misleading impressions.

Chang Ya-chung, Hsieh Ta-ning, and Huang Kuang-kuo are three scholars. They have published an article entitled "Six Questions for the United Daily News." They maintain that the "One China, Different Interpretations" argument advanced in our Six New Years Day Editorials is equivalent to Taiwan independence, that it provides a breeding ground for Taiwan independence. This is a misunderstanding. This is also a distortion. [Translator's note: unable to ascertain the proper translation for "我們有不能已於言者"]

These three scholars have long been concerned about cross-Strait issues. They have made a number of in-depth investigations. They have offered many creative suggestions. They have inspired widespread admiration. But their recently published Six Questions touts their own theory of "One China, Same Interpretation," "One China, Three Constitutions," and "Cross-Strait Reunification," which they characterize as the "Strategic Cornerstone for Cross-Strait Peaceful Development." It refers to "One China, Different Interpretations" as illogical, infeasible, and inconsistent with the interests of the concerned parties. It even equates "One China, Different Interpretations" with hardline Taiwan independence, with creeping Taiwan independence, with a breeding ground for Taiwan independence, with shielding Taiwan independence, and with an independent Taiwan. To say that "One China, Different Interpretations" is infeasible is to express an opinion. But to suggest that "One China, Different interpretations" is the equivalent of Taiwan independence, or a breeding ground for Taiwan independence, is neither here nor there.

In fact, we see no clear-cut difference between their Six Questions and our Six Editorials. A detailed discussion will take time. But our two positions have at least two things in common.

First. Both advocate a Big Roof Theory. Our Six Editorials stress a process oriented theory for peaceful development. We hope to moderate, soften, transform, and improve upon the goal oriented theories for reunification and independence. Because we emphasize process orientation, we advocate a Chopsticks Theory involving neither reunification nor independence, and a Cup Theory which preserves the Constitution of the Republic of China and the status quo. Stressing process orientation does not mean evading the issue of goals. Therefore we also advocate a Big Roof Theory to deal with the issue of long term objectives. For example, the two sides could set up a confederation. The Six Questions seem to imply that "One China, Different Interpretations" fails to explain the meaning of "One China." But our Six Editorials make it clear that the "One China" in "One China, Different Interpretations" is a Big Roof, a Third Concept, a higher level concept. For example, setting up a confederation would involve a Third Constitution. It would be no different from their Six Questions. When it comes to "Different Interpretations," their Six Questions and our Six Editorials both champion a One China Constitution. We differ even less on this issue. Their Six Questions assert that accepting One China does not mean we must accept Beijing as the central government, and Taipei as a local government. But isn't that a kind of "Different Interpretation?" After all, their Six Questions do not accept the premise that "One China means the PRC." How different is that from our assertion that "One China" ought to refer to a Third Concept or Third Constitution? In fact, their Six Questions say that a peace agreement should be the first document to establish cross-Strait political mutual trust. That was also our proposal. So what's the difference?

Their Six Questions equates "One China, Different Interpretations" with Taiwan independence and a breeding ground for Taiwan independence. They even say it poses an embryonic threat. This distorts the facts. What champion of Taiwan independence would advocate a One China Constitution? What person attempting to establish a breeding ground for Taiwan independence would urge the two sides to return to the starting point, to Sun Yat-sen's 1911 Revolution? What person attempting to establish a breeding ground for Taiwan independence would advocate a rational process to clarify long term objectives?" The three scholars may have ambitious goals for a Greater China. But is it necessary to characterize others as having a waif mentality?

In fact, our Six Editorials proposes breaking cross-Straits relations into many parts. Their Six Questions proposes combining many parts into one. But without the parts how can one have the whole? Without the whole, how can the parts have any order? Processes and goals are mutually complementary. They need not be mutually contradictory.

Secondly, Beijing is the main variable. Their Six Questions characterize our Six Editorials as wishful thinking. They may have a point. But their Six Questions also unwittingly engage in wishful thinking. Their Six Questions point out that substantive power in cross-Strait relations is asymmetrical. But their Six Questions and our Six Editorials face the same problem. Their Six Questions pose a powerful challenge to our Six Editorials. They ask why Beijing would accept "One China, Different Interpretations." Their six lengthy articles point out that Beijing's repeated rejection of "One China, Different Interpretations" amounts to opposition. But aren't they afraid that people will say the same thing about their Six Questions? Why would Beijing accept "One China, Three Constitutions?"

Beijing's opposition is not cast in stone. We do not oppose "One China, Three Constitutions." We think that "One China, Different Interpretations" and "One China, Three Constitutions" are essentially the same thing. If Beijing can accept "One China, Three Constitutions," it has no reason not to accept "One China, Different Interpretations." Since both of them advocate the Big Cup Theory and Big Roof Theory. But it makes no sense to badmouth "One China, Different Interpretations" in order to advance "One China, Three Constitutions."

In order to resolve the cross-Strait impasse, political and civic leaders on both sides have proposed innumerable policy prescriptions. All of them have encountered the same problem -- rejection by Beijing, or rejection by Taipei. This is the same problem faced by "One China, Three Constitutions" and the "One China, Different Interpretations." Nevertheless, debates rage on both sides, because what is unacceptable isn't cast in stone. Creativity requires the breaking of molds. As their Six Questions noted, the Grundlagenvertragbasic, or Basic Treaty between East and West Germany and the European Union's Helsinki Final Act were repeatedly rejected before they were finally adopted. By the same token, the two sides have moved away from the rhetoric of "Liberate Taiwan!" and "Counterattack the mainland!" They have arrived at today's theme: peaceful development. Did they not succeed in breaking through the unacceptable? We hope the two sides can accept "One China, Different Interpretations." We hope the two sides can accept "One China, Three Constitutions." We do not care whose theories become the official basis for cross-Strait negotiations. We are concerned only about adopting a rational process for the formulation of cross-Strait objectives.

Because we stress process, we do not think that our assertion that Taiwan's future should be decided by 23 million people is a deviant position. We believe the ultimate resolution of cross-Strait issues must resolve the issue of Taiwan independence. Taiwan independence can only be transformed. It cannot be eradicated. In particular, "One China, Different Interpretations," Lee Teng-hui's "Two States," and the DPP's Taiwan independence are not one and the same. Why the accusation that we are birds of a feather? Are the three scholars merely seeking targets for their arrows?

Finally, we solemnly declare that our Six New Years Day Editorials have nothing to do with the Ma administration. Nothing whatsoever. In fact, "One China, Different Interpretations" is a concept still in development. During the Lee Teng-hui era we advocated "One China, Different Interpretations." We are not worried about whether the Ma administration's "One China, Different Interpretations" differs. We merely wish to make some small effort on behalf of "One China, Different Interpretations." We welcome the creative thinking behind "One China, Three Constitutions." But we hope "One China, Different Interpretations" will not be misunderstood and misinterpreted. Soliciting a wide range of opinions cannot be a bad thing.

「一中各表」等於台獨偏安？
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.01.25 04:09 am

本報在歲末新正發表的《中華民國九十九年感思》系列社論六篇，受到兩岸有心人士的重視與討論；我們並不認為系列社論所言即是顛撲不破，而拋磚引玉、集思廣益，才是我們動念寫作的初衷。

兩岸問題是一個見仁見智的大難題。對於贊同《元旦六論》見解者，我們固然欣慰；對於不贊同者，我們也表尊重。但若有嚴重誤解或曲解，我們仍應試作說明，以免以訛傳訛。

張亞中、謝大寧、黃光國三位學者，發表《六問聯合報》，指《六論》所主張的「一中各表」，等於台獨，等於偏安；這是誤解，也是曲解，我們有不能已於言者。

三學者長期關注兩岸議題，鑽研甚深，創見亦多，令人欽敬。但此次發表《六問》，一方面標榜他門創製的「一中同表／一中三憲／兩岸統合」，喻為「兩岸和平發展的戰略基石」；另一方面，又指「一中各表」不合邏輯、不可行、不符合相關各造的利益，筆鋒一轉，甚至指「一中各表」與剛性台獨、柔性台獨、偏安台獨、偏安自保，及獨台是同一類屬的政治主張。若說「一中各表」不可行，當然可以見仁見智；但若說「一中各表」等於台獨、等於偏安，那就不知所云了。

其實，我們完全看不出《六問》與《六論》有甚麼斬釘截鐵的歧異。暫難細論，僅舉二者的最大共同點有二：

一、都是「泛屋頂理論」。《六論》的主軸，是強調和平發展的「過程論」，而欲以緩化、軟化、轉化，來改善統獨的「目的論」。因為強調「過程論」，所以主張「筷子理論」（不統／不獨），與「杯子理論」（維持「中華民國一中憲法」的「現狀」）；但強調「過程論」，亦並未迴避「目的論」，因此也主張可考慮以「屋頂理論」來處理「目的議題」，例如兩岸成立「邦聯」。《六問》似乎指稱：「一中各表」對「一中」的意涵交代不清，但《六論》卻說得很清楚：「一中各表」所說的「一中」，說的是「屋頂」，是「第三概念」、「上位概念」；比如，若成立「邦聯」就會出現「第三憲」，與《六問》無異；至於「各表」，《六問》與《六論》皆主張「一中憲法」，更無差別；《六問》又稱，「接受一中，不表示我們必然接受大陸為中央，台灣為地方」，這豈非也是一種「各表」？《六問》畢竟並不贊成「一個中國就是中華人民共和國」，而認為「一個中國」應是「第三概念」（第三憲），這又與《六論》有何不同？甚至，《六問》主張，可經「和平協議」做為建立兩岸政治互信的「第一份文件」，這也是本報早有的提議，差別何在？

至於《六問》將「一中各表」說成與台獨與偏安無異，甚至說成皆是「螟蛉子之焦慮」，更不啻已是指鹿為馬。台獨會主張「一中憲法」嗎？偏安者會主張「兩岸共同回歸辛亥革命及孫中山的起點」嗎？會主張由「合理的過程」達到「改善之目的」嗎？三學者大可自詡有「經略大中華」的雄心壯志，但何必將他人說成「孤兒心態」？

其實，《六論》主張兩岸關係應「化整為零」，《六問》則是主張應當「化零為整」。然而，無零豈有整，無整則零亦亂；「過程」與「目的」應是首尾呼應、相輔相成，沒有非要相互對立的道理。

二、北京是主要的變數。《六問》稱，《六論》的觀點有一點一廂情願，我們承認；但《六問》的問題，則是在不知自己也有一點一廂情願。《六問》指出，「兩岸的物質權力處於不對稱狀態」，這也是《六問》與《六論》必須面對的相同處境。《六問》對《六論》的質疑，最具說服力者，應是「北京『憑甚麼』接受一中各表」這類的口吻，六篇長文不斷抬出「北京不答應」，據此反對一中各表；難道不怕有人也會用同一語氣請教《六問》，北京又「憑甚麼」接受「一中三憲」？

然而，北京不接受，未必是絕對不可變的事情。必須聲明，我們不反對「一中三憲」，且認為「一中各表」與「一中三憲」只是名異實同；而北京若能接受「一中三憲」，就沒有道理不接受「一中各表」，因為兩者皆是「泛杯子理論」與「泛屋頂理論」。令人遺憾的是，若為了主張「一中三憲」，卻要以北京「憑甚麼接受」來否定「一中各表」，那就是莫名所以了。

其實，為了解決兩岸僵局，在兩岸主政者與社會菁英間，出計獻策者不可勝數；其中有一共同困境，即皆須面對「北京不答應」或「台灣不接受」的難題，這也是「一中三憲」與「一中各表」的共同處境。雖然如此，兩岸卻仍然是議論滔滔，正是因為「不接受／不答應」未必是鐵板一塊。所有的「理念的創製」，皆須首先打破「墨守成規」的侷限。正如《六問》所說，東西德的《基礎條約》，與歐盟的《赫爾辛基最終議定書》，皆是穿透了許多「不答應／不接受」才破繭而出；同樣的，兩岸自「解放台灣」「反攻大陸」，能走到今日以「和平發展」為主軸基調，又何嘗不是穿透了許多「不答應／不接受」而形成？我們希望兩岸皆能接受「一中各表」，同時也歡迎兩岸能接受「一中三憲」；我們不在意誰的理論學說能成為兩岸的正式論述或旗幟，我們只關切如何經由「合理的過程」以實現兩岸「改善之目的」。

由於我們更強調過程論，所以不認為「台灣前途應由兩千三百萬人決定」是甚麼離經叛道的論述；我們也認為兩岸問題的終極解決，必須同時化解確實存在的台獨因素，所以只能轉化台獨，而不可想像把台獨一筆勾銷；尤其，「一中各表」與李登輝的「兩國論」，及民進黨的台獨，根本不是一回事，何能將之指為一丘之貉？三學者難道不是在「為箭畫靶」？

最後，我們要鄭重聲明，《元旦六論》與馬政府完全無關，連一點點關聯都沒有。其實，「一中各表」是一個仍在發展中的概念，我們在李登輝時代即主張「一中各表」，也不在意與馬政府「一中各表」的思考有何出入。我們的用心，只在嘗試為「一中各表」思考體系的建構略盡棉薄而已。我們歡迎「一中三憲」的創見，但也希望我們對「一中各表」的思考，勿被誤解及曲解。集思廣益，豈不甚好？