Beijing: An Invitation to a Funeral, or an Invitation to a Dance?

Beijing: An Invitation to a Funeral, or an Invitation to a Dance?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 4, 2009

Controversy over ECFA (formerly known as CECA) rages on. Yet Beijing has barely touched upon the subject. It is virtually silent. But it takes two to tango. What are the prospects for ECFA? Taipei must not engage in wishful thinking. The success of ECFA depends also on Beijing's attitude.

Beijing's attitude may well be the key to ECFA's success. If Beijing wants to take advantage of ECFA, if it is offering Taipei an "Invitation to a Funeral," then getting ECFA signed will be impossible. Even if it is signed, it might undermine cross-Strait relations. On the other hand, if Beijing is offering Taipei an "Invitation to A Dance," then ECFA, by doing the Tango with Taipei may improve once-troubled cross-Strait relations. It may help set up a long term framework for "peaceful development." The future hangs in the balance.

Beijing cannot help entertaining the notion of an "Invitation to a Funeral." Taipei cannot help having concerns about accepting an "Invitation to a Funeral." Short-sighted individuals in Beijing may think they can use ECFA to entrap Taipei. They may think that with ECFA they will hold the power of life and death over Taipei. If that is the case, the public on Taiwan can hardly agree to it. If the public on Taiwan feels that after signing it has been tricked into accepting an "Invitation to a Funeral," the situation will deteriorate. How will they view the Beijing authorities' treachery? How will we maintain sound cross-Strait relations?

If ECFA is signed, cross-Strait relations will most assuredly become closer. But a closer relationship must not make Taipei's political institutions and economic development increasingly subject to Beijing's control. A closer relationship must help Taipei preserve its political mechanisms and economic vitality. As long as ECFA can provide the public on Taiwan with such assurances, the public on Taiwan will support it, and ECFA will enhance cross-strait relations. Such an ECFA will benefit Taipei, benefit cross-Strait relations, and benefit Beijing.

Signing ECFA must not involve the endorsement of any technical or formal "One China" [under Beijing] political premise. The signing of ECFA will have undeniable political repercussions. The Beijing authorities must not make political hay out of such repercussions. ECFA must be interpreted correctly. On the one hand, ECFA will make de jure Taiwan independence even more difficult. On the other hand, ECFA will also make de jure reunification less urgent and less necessary. Therefore, the role of ECFA is not to "promote reunification." It is to help the public on Taiwan better understand cross-Strait relations. ECFA will establish a "no reunification, no independence, reunified, not reunified" framework for "peaceful development."

Therefore Beijing must not see ECFA as a short-term "Invitation to a Funeral," but rather as a long-term, win-win "Invitation to a Dance" that promotes mutual prosperity. If Beijing hopes to use ECFA to entrap Taipei, it will not improve cross-Strait relations. Beijing cannot use the Hong Kong or Tibet model to resolve the Taiwan question. If Taipei is able to find new opportunities for economic survival as a result of ECFA, the impact on cross-Strait relations will be positive. Therefore, we have two suggestions for Beijing.

First, the Comprehensive Economic Eooperation Agreement (CECA) has been revised at Taipei's request. It is now called the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA). The framework for the ECFA is like a clothesline. Clothes that have been washed are hung on the clothesline first. Clothes that have not been washed are not. Therefore there is no need for a "package deal." Instead one can enjoy an "early harvest." Beijing has agreed to this framework, and is not demanding a "package deal." It is responding to our priorities by making decisions that fulfill the practical requirements of both sides and the expectations of the public.

Second, most importantly, before and after the two sides sign ECFA, Beijing should announce that it favors simultaneously concluding, in step with Taipei, an FTA or other economic cooperation agreement with ASEAN and other countries. The signing of ECFA is not about entrapping Taipei, but about strengthening cross-Strait relations, by increasing Taiwan's economic vitality. The public on Taiwan knows that stable cross-Strait relations will promote Taiwan's economic development and increase its economic vitality. This will make the public more willing to support such cross-Strait relations. This is a virtuous circle. It allows Beijing to "pin its hopes on Taiwan compatriots." On the other hand, if Beijing sees ECFA as an "Invitation to a Funeral," as an opportunity to seal Taipei up in a funerary urn, it will be acting contrary to reason, contrary to humanity, contrary to public opinion, and cross-Strait relations will be led astray.

Hu Jintao's "Hu Six Points" calls for "the exploration of workable mechanisms for cross-Strait economic development and Asia-Pacific regional economic cooperation." This means cross-Strait economic and trade integration with ASEAN. As we can see Hu is not a short-sighted individual who sees ECFA as an "Invitation to a Funeral." Surely he is a visionary who has offered Taipei an "Invitation to the Dance."

北京的思考：請君入甕或與卿共舞？
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.03.04 04:35 am

ＥＣＦＡ（原稱ＣＥＣＡ）在台灣已經吵得如火如荼，但海峽對岸卻只是輕描淡寫，幾乎不動聲色。然而，要兩個人才能跳探戈，ＥＣＦＡ的前景如何，不能只看台北一廂情願，也要看北京作何思考。

其實，北京的意念，也許才是ＥＣＦＡ成敗的關鍵。倘若北京是想藉此「請君入甕」，ＥＣＦＡ就不可能簽得成，即使簽成了也可能反使兩岸關係更形扭曲，更加惡化；相對而言，北京倘若有「與卿共舞」的想法，兩岸通過ＥＣＦＡ這一場行雲流水的探戈，非但可能將雙邊盤根錯節的關係理順，也應能藉此建立可大可久的「和平發展」框架。一念之差，判若天壤。

北京不免會有「請君入甕」的想法，而台灣則一定會有「不可入甕」的顧慮。北京的短視者或許會想，藉由ＥＣＦＡ將台灣「套」住，即可恣意生殺予奪。但是，倘係如此，台灣的民意如何能答應簽字？而簽成以後台灣人民若覺得「入甕」，處境惡化，將對北京當局的邪念惡意如何看待？又如何維繫一個平衡穩定的兩岸關係？

ＥＣＦＡ若簽成，必定會使兩岸關係更趨緊密。但此種緊密關係，切不可使台灣在民主機制及經濟發展上感到更受制於北京；而應使此種關係，有助於台灣更能維持其內發性的民主機制與經濟活力。只要ＥＣＦＡ能使台灣人民感知並證實此點，台灣人民就會支持ＥＣＦＡ，也就會因ＥＣＦＡ而支持此種建設性的兩岸關係。這樣的ＥＣＦＡ，對台灣有利，也對兩岸關係有利，所以對北京也有利。

簽訂ＥＣＦＡ，在技術及形式上可以做到不涉「一個中國」等政治規範；但ＥＣＦＡ的簽訂，亦當然有其不可諱言的政治效應，因此北京當局千萬不可對此種政治效應作出錯誤的解讀。正確的解讀是：ＥＣＦＡ一方面雖然將使「法理台獨」變成更不可能，但ＥＣＦＡ也同時已使「法理統一」急遽降低了急迫性與必要性。所以，ＥＣＦＡ的作用非在「促統」，而是要使台灣民意對兩岸關係因ＥＣＦＡ而產生正面的解讀，以建立一個「不統／不獨／亦統／亦獨」的「和平發展架構」。

因此，北京看ＥＣＦＡ，不可將之視作「請君入甕」的短線操作，而應看成雙贏共榮的「與卿共舞」，追求的是可大可久。換句話說，北京若想用ＥＣＦＡ「套死」台灣，兩岸關係必將仍然無解，因為北京不可能用香港化或西藏化來解決台灣問題；反之，倘若台灣能因ＥＣＦＡ而獲得新的生機與活力，則這種效應必然將是兩岸關係的重大正數。因此，我們對北京當局有二點基本建議：

一、台灣方面從「綜合性經濟合作協議」（ＣＥＣＡ），調整為「經濟合作架構協議」（ＥＣＦＡ），其中所謂「架構」（Framework），猶如拉起一條「晒衣繩」，先洗好的衣服就先晒上去，尚未洗好的就不晒；如此，即不必「包裹解決」，而可有「早期收穫」。北京方面宜贊同「架構」方案，而不採「包裹」方式，可就輕重緩急作出回應雙邊現實需求及民意期待的決策。

二、最重要的是，在簽訂兩岸ＥＣＦＡ前後，北京允宜同步宣示樂見台灣與東協及其他國家締結ＦＴＡ或他類經濟合作協定。因為，兩岸簽ＥＣＦＡ，不在「套死」台灣，而是透過加強兩岸關係使台灣有更大的生機與活力；再因台灣民意感知兩岸關係有助其對外發展的生機活力，而回過頭來更願支持及鞏固此種兩岸關係。如此一來，即成良性循環，即可「寄希望於台灣同胞」。反之，北京若將ＥＣＦＡ視為「甕」，欲封死台灣在「甕」外的世界，則屬逆天理，悖人道，反民意，兩岸關係亦將走上歧途絕路。

「胡六點」有言：「探討兩岸經濟共同發展與亞太區域經濟合作機制相銜接的可行途徑。」這即是指兩岸經貿與東協接軌的問題，或許可見，胡錦濤不是將ＥＣＦＡ視為「請君入甕」的短視者，他應當懷有「與卿共舞」、「與君共濟」的高瞻遠矚！