The Legislative Yuan Cross-Strait Committee's Difficult Birth

The Legislative Yuan Cross-Strait Committee's Difficult Birth
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 30, 2009

The KMT and the DPP always sing a different tune depending upon whether they are in or out of power. Over the past nine years, the Republic of China has had two different ruling parties. The thinking and rhetoric of the two major political parties has always varied depending on whether they were in or out of power. A typical example is their support or opposition to a Legislative Yuan committee on cross-Strait affairs.

Broad segments of society have long hoped to participate in formulating cross-Strait policy. During the Lee Teng-hui administration the National Unification Council invited Kang Ning-hsiang and others to participate. These invitations triggered conflicts within the Democratic Progressive Party. In 2000, the ROC underwent ruling party change. Chen Shui-bian immediately set up a "Bipartisan Cross-Strait Group," with Lee Yuan-tse as convener. The purpose of the group was to replace the now hollowed out National Unification Council. Lee Yuan-tse had his own ideas about cross-Strait exchanges. Chen Shui-bian was also aggressive about cross-Strait policy. His bipartisan group went so far as to arrive at three understandings and four recommendations that clashed with the beliefs of Democratic Progressive Party fundamentalists. Among the most important recommendation was that the "One China" issue ought to be dealt with by referring to the ROC Constitution.

But the Kuomintang, which had just lost power, refused to take part in the non-partisan group. It felt the party with a ruling majority in the Legislative Yuan had the right to direct cross-Strait affairs. Legislative Yuan Speaker Wang Jin-pyng, the highest ranking member of the KMT at the time, first proposed this idea. By the end of June 2000 the "Legislative Yuan Mainland Policy and Cross-Strait Affairs committee" had prepared a draft law. Half a month later the Legislative Yuan issued a version approved by both parties. By the end of the year they were even holding meetings on Three Mini-Links. Not only did Democratic Progressive Party members not reject the bill, their representatives put their signatures to it. But shortly thereafter Chen Shui-bian dropped his "One Country on Each Side" bombshell, immediately putting a damper on cross-Strait exchanges. The cross-Straits committee, whose composition corresponded to that of the Legislative Yuan, found itself promptly mired in a Blue vs. Green partisan dispute. Democratic Progressive Party members boycotted the committee, and even accused it of infringing upon the constitutional authority of the Legislative Yuan's Domestic Policy Committee and the constitutional authority of the President. A bipartisan committee that had alread met with the approval of the Office of the President and the Legislative Yuan was now shut down.

The KMT may have lost the initiative in cross-Strait decision-making, but not the desire to participate. In this context, a KMT/CCP forum was established. Pan Blue leaders visited the Mainland one after another, competing for the right to formulate cross-Strait policy. National Assembly Speaker Wang Jin-pyng was never able to visit the Mainland in his official capacity as Legislative Yuan Speaker. But he never abandoned the idea of strengthening the influence of the Legislative Yuan. From 2000 onwards, he periodically called upon the Legislative Yuan to set up a cross-Strait committee, especially before and after the Legislative Yuan Election.

Wang's hope never became a reality. One reason was that the KMT/CCP forum ignored Chen Shui-bian's "active management," i.e., obstructionism, and bypassed the Legislative Yuan.

Cross-Strait exchanges are of the utmost importance to the Republic of China. During the Chen administration the DPP refused to allow the Legislative Yuan to set up a cross-Strait committee. They were worried about the Pan Blue Camp's greater numbers. They were worried they couldn't control the Chen administration's austerity policy. Unfortunately, after nine years, the KMT, which has regained control of the government, and which enjoys a supermajority in the Legislative Yuan, has completely forgotten how forcefully it argued on behalf of a cross-Strait Legislative Yuan committee, and how it demanded that the government's cross-Strait policy be subject to Legislative Yuan oversight and checks and balances. Wang Jing-pyng once urged the Legislative Yuan to set up a cross-Strait committee. But now the situation is reversed. The Democratic Progressive Party is now calling for the establishment of such a committee. The KMT is now refusing, citing the same reasons as the DPP.

The Ma administration took office on May 20 last year. It has been forced to cope with the global economic crisis. Cross-Strait affairs has become its highest priority. Its responsibilities are varied and heavy. It has also had little time to implement them -- less than a year. Far less time than Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian had -- 20 years. The Ma administration, particularly the President, must incorporate the views of the Legislature into its policymaking process. This includes major and minor cross-Strait policies, including those of life and death importance, providing they don't affect ROC national sovereignty. The right to administer cross-Strait policy does not mean the right to act arbitrarily and unilaterally. These affairs affect everyone. For example, Premier Liu opposes a referendum on a cross-Strait economic cooperation. But besides the Legislative Yuan, what mechanisms do we have to ensure that the policies have been subjected to public debate? Demands that the Legislative Yuan participate in the decision-making process are an integral part of our constitutional system. Besides, the KMT commands a supermajority. What does it have to fear?

Cross-Strait issues are the most controversial of all. The Legislature should be involved. Legislative participation will blunt objections from both the ruling and opposition parties. Providing of course that they reach agreements on key issues such as whether to first sign or first review cross-Strait agreements. The Legislature should take part in the process. Legislative participation will provide a buffer for cross-Strait negotiations. Legislative participation will prevent policy disputes from getting out of control and spilling onto the streets. The Legislative Yuan cross-Strait committee should set up the necessary mechanisms. It must not spin its wheels debating whether they are possible.

What Chen Shui-bian refused to do, Ma Ying-jeou must do. The Legislature must participate in the formulation of cross-Strait policy. A cross-Strait committee set up by the Legislative Yuan is a sensible move.

立法院兩岸小組因何難產
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.03.30 03:49 am


「換了位子就換了腦袋」，這句話在國、民兩黨身上，隨時隨地都適用；九年來，台灣歷經兩次政黨輪替，朝野兩大政黨從思維到語言，始終擺脫不掉這九字真言的魔咒。立法院應否設置兩岸事務對策小組，就是典型的例子

兩岸事務希能廣納參與，非始於今日，早在李登輝執政時代，國統會即延請康寧祥等，甚至引發民進黨內訌。二○○○年政黨輪替，陳水扁隨即成立「跨黨派兩岸小組」，由李遠哲出任召集人，取代虛而未廢的國統會。當時的李遠哲對兩岸交流很有想法，陳水扁同樣非常積極，跨黨派小組甚至做出不符合民進黨基本教義派的三點認知、四項建議，其中，最重要的建議就是：依據憲法處理一中爭議。

不過，甫失政權的國民黨卻拒絕參與跨黨派小組，並認為兩岸事務的主導權應回歸由多數黨掌控的立法院，當時國民黨所餘唯一最高權力人物的立法院長王金平就率先提出此一主張。二○○○年六月底「立法院大陸政策暨兩岸事務因應對策小組」設置要點草案旋即提出，半個月後朝野協商版本出爐，同年底甚至還為了兩岸小三通召開過會議。民進黨人本來不排斥，甚至協商代表都簽了字，但沒多久因陳水扁拋出「一邊一國論」，兩岸交流善意瞬間凍凝，這個依照國會政黨席次比例組成的兩岸小組，從此陷入藍綠口水爭議；民進黨人翻臉拒絕參與，甚至批評這個小組有摧毀立法院內政委員會與違憲侵犯總統職權之虞。結果，總統府與立法院兩個原本可以容納朝野共商兩岸政策的小組全部停擺。

當時國民黨在兩岸事務決策體系失去了角色，卻沒失去熱烈投入兩岸事務的企圖心，國共論壇遂在這個背景下順理成章地成立；藍營領袖先後登陸，爭搶兩岸發言權。王金平欲以國會議長身分訪問大陸的夢想落空，但他希望強化立法院政策影響力的想法並未放棄，從二○○○年開始，幾乎每隔一段時間，特別是在立法院換屆選舉前後，他總會一再呼籲，立法院「應該」成立兩岸事務小組。王金平的期盼迄未實現，原因之一是國共論壇無視扁政府的積極管理，間接取代了立法院的角色。

兩岸交流是影響台灣最重要的政策，扁時代民進黨排斥立法院成立兩岸小組，擔心的是人頭數不過藍營，難以主控扁政府緊縮的政策路線。遺憾的是，經過九年，國民黨重新掌握政權，又在立法院擁有絕對多數席次，卻完全忘記當年如何力主應在立法院成立兩岸小組，以及如何要求政府的兩岸政策應該受到國會合理監督制衡的那段往事。如今，倡議立法院成立兩岸小組的仍是王金平，這一回卻形勢逆轉，變成民進黨致函王金平要求成立，反對的倒是國民黨，但理由竟與當年的民進黨如出一轍。

馬政府自去年五二○就任以來，除了因應全球經濟危機，兩岸事務已經成為最高優先順位的政策主軸，不但是質量俱重，幅度與速度亦在一年不到的時間中，遠遠超越包括李登輝與陳水扁時代加總的二十年。但兩岸政策不論大小，若非涉及主權，即是攸關人民生活的實際利益，馬政府、特別是馬總統必須思考如何將代表最高民意的國會，納進決策程序之中；畢竟兩岸事務並非行政權可獨斷獨行，而是全民的事務，例如劉內閣反對兩岸經濟合作架構協議舉行公投，但除了立法院外還有什麼機制能確保此一協議能經過民意的激盪錘煉？立法院參與也許增加了決策過程的雜音，卻是憲政體制不可或缺的一環；何況，國民黨掌控絕對多數，又何懼之有？

兩岸政策是最具爭議的議題，國會參與非僅是應有之義，且足為朝野內外之緩衝。只要在重大關鍵上有所規範，如兩岸協議之先簽後審，即應使國會發生功能，一可作兩岸交涉之緩衝，再可免政策爭執失控於街頭。立院兩岸小組應朝如何設置來討論，而不宜阻滯在可否設置。

陳水扁拒絕的事，正是馬英九應該慎重思考的事。應當讓國會在兩岸事務中扮演應有的角色，而設置立院兩岸小組是合理的思考。