Good Cross-Strait Economic Relations Equals Good Cross-Strait Political Relations

Good Cross-Strait Economic Relations Equals Good Cross-Strait Political Relations
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 12, 2009

ECFA is not on the agenda of the fourth round of talks later this year, leading to all sorts of speculation and debate. Some people think it has merely been postponed, not ruled out. Some people think Beijing has no intention of going along with it, and that ECFA is probably done for.

Over the past year, the two sides have made unprecedented progress in cross-Strait relations. But the rapid development of cross-Strait relations means economics must be brought in synch with politics. Some people think the Ma administration's concept of "first economics, then politics" is "only economics, no politics." They think the Ma administration is too pro-Beijing. They fear that if Taiwan's economy is integrated with the Mainland's, Taiwan's poltical system will be as well. Others think that the Ma administration's concept of "first economics, then politics" is perceived by Beijing as a variation of the two-states theory. They think cross-Strait mutual trust is on the brink of disintegration, and that is why the mainland has little interest in ECFA.

These two viewpoints differ sharply. But they are a matter of opinion. One side thinks Ma Ying-jeou is pro-Beijing, and therefore Taiwan will be swallowed up by the mainland. The other side thinks Ma Ying-jeou is pro-independence, and Beijing has targeted him for punishment.

Actually, the Ma administration is not the only one to endorse the concept of "first economics, then politics." The Beijing authorities also hold this view. Their intention is to ease the pressure on both sides, to create more breathing room, to separate economics from politics, and to give economics priority over politics. But what isn't political between the two sides? How can the institutionalization of cross-Strait economic interaction not have political repercussions? Are the three links purely economic? Aren't they political? Are financial agreement purely economic? Aren't they political?

The rapid institutionalization of cross-Strait economic and trade exchanges over the past year was a highly political decision. The two sides knew what the political impact would be. The political impact may make Taiwan independence even less possible. But Beijing also knows it must forsake military force as a means of achieving reunification. Cross-Strait relations are currently in a state of "neither reunification, nor independence, both reunification, and independence." It is in an upward spriral, contained within a framework of peaceful development.

Such a strategy ensures that Taiwan is unable to declare independence, and that Beijing is unable to compel reunification. Beijing hopes that Taiwan independence sentiment on Taiwan will fade. The Ma administration hopes to turn cross-Strait hostility into a win-win scenario of peaceful coexistence. Beijing hopes of course to move toward reunification. It knows it must first convince the public on Taiwan. It must pass the test of democracy. The Ma administration does not advocate Taiwan independence. But "no independence" plus "no reunification" involves a delicate balance. Under the circumstances, Beijing knows that no government on Taiwan that advocates reunification can survive. The Ma administration also knows the "two states theory" cannot resolve the cross-Strait impasse.

In this delicate balance, what Taipei wants is for Beijing to realize that Taipei is not hostile toward it. What Beijing wants is for the public on Taiwan to understand that improved cross-Strait relations will enhance Taipei's dignity and interests. After all, the Taiwan region has a vibrant system of government. The majority of the public wants to maintain the status quo. Therefore the authorities in Taipei dare not engage in Taiwan independence. Nor can the authorities in Beijing demote the authorities in Taipei to the status of Beijing's "caretaker government." Beijing is unlikely to harbor such illusions. Therefore Beijing is unlikely to resort to violence to achieve reunification. It cannot turn Taipei into its charity case via procurement policies. That is not what the public on Taiwan wants from cross-Strait relations. Nor can it make the public on Taiwan feel good about cross-Strait relations by such means. Most importantly, it is not conducive to Taipei's survival and development. If the ROC finds it difficult to survive and develop because Beijing undermines cross-Strait relations, Beijing will also feel the pressure.

Therefore, we believe ECFA has merely been postponed, not necessarily ruled out. If our speculation is incorrect, we hope the situation can be turned around. After all, ECFA or CECA was Hu Jintao's idea, as formulated in his Six Points. High ranking officials in Beijing have repeatedly declared that "the name is not important." The authorities on both sides claim that ECFA is "economic in nature." But as we said earlier, it is essentially a political decision, and will have profound a political impact. Because of ECFA, the two sides will have a better framework for win/win, mutually beneficial peaceful development.

It is unnecessary to put bilateral opportunities and thinking over the past year into a stereotypical "reunification vs. independence" framework. As long as the two sides maintain good economic relations, there will be good political relations. The political impact will be positive. The result will be better than independence, and also better than reunification.

Therefore declaimers that the two sides are "only talking about economics and not politics" are untrue.

好的兩岸經濟關係，就是好的政治關係
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.05.13 04:38 am

ＥＣＦＡ未列入兩岸下半年第四次談判的議程，引發種種揣測及議論。有人認為只是推遲，而非破局；有人則認為北京方面已無意於此，ＥＣＦＡ恐怕沒戲唱了。

一年來，兩岸關係進展快速，確實展現出空前歷史機遇的氣勢。然而，伴隨著兩岸關係快速發展，卻也立即出現了經濟與政治如何協調整合的問題。有人認為，馬政府「先經濟／後政治」的主張，「只談經濟／不談政治」，將使馬政府太過傾中，而恐有「經濟被（大陸）內化／政治被消化」的疑慮。另有一類看法則認為，馬政府「先經濟／後政治」的態度，已被北京視為另類兩國論，兩岸互信瀕於解體，因而大陸方面已對ＥＣＦＡ的議題興趣缺缺。

這兩類議論皆甚尖銳深刻，卻見仁見智至南轅北轍的地步。一方認為馬英九傾中，將被大陸「消化」；另一方則認為馬英九傾獨，將受北京懲罰。

其實，「先經濟／後政治」不僅是馬政府的主張；中共領導人亦一向持此觀點。此類主張，用意是在緩解雙方壓力，創造空間；所以將「經濟」與「政治」作二分法，並作出「先／後」的區隔。然而，兩岸之間何事不含政治，何事不是政治？兩岸經濟互動的法制化，又何一不是政治所決定，更何一不會產生政治效應？三通只是經濟嗎？難道不是政治？金融協議又只是經濟嗎？難道不具政治效應？

一年來，兩岸經貿法制化的快速發展，原即是雙方高度政治性的決定，而其必然衍生的政治效應亦當在雙方的估算之中。此種政治效應，或許使得台獨變成更不可能，卻亦顯示北京已知必須駛離武力統一的軌轍；兩岸關係於「不統／不獨／亦統／亦獨」之間，在「和平發展框架」上呈螺旋上升狀態演進。

這樣的策略，應當是在「台灣不能台獨／北京不能武力統一」的包夾中形成的思考。北京方面希望台獨意識能夠在台灣淡化，而馬政府方面則希望化兩岸敵對為雙贏共存。北京當然希望朝統一方向發展，卻知首應說服台灣的民意，亦即通過台灣民主機制的檢驗；馬政府則不主張台獨，但「不獨」亦「不統」。這是一個「包夾中的平衡」。在現狀下，北京不會傻到認為一個主張「統一」的台灣政府能夠維持得下去；馬政府也不會愚至認為主張「兩國論」是解決兩岸僵局的處方。

在這個「包夾中的平衡」中，台灣要做到的是，使北京認為台灣對中國不是一個敵對的存在；北京要做到的則是，使台灣人民相信改善兩岸關係有助於提升台灣的尊嚴與利益。台灣畢竟是一極有活力的民主體制，多數民意主張維持現狀，台灣的主政者因此不可能冒進搞台獨，而北京亦不可能令台灣政府淪為北京的「看守政府」而妄想其尚能維持。所以，北京不至於用粗暴的手段求統一，也不可能使台灣淪為在北京施捨性「採購」政策下的餵養物。因為，那不是台灣人民要的兩岸關係，也不是能使台灣人民產生好感的兩岸關係。最重要的，那不是台灣能夠生存發展之道；台灣若因北京所扭曲的兩岸關係而難以生存發展，北京感受的壓力亦將相對升高。

因而，我們相信，ＥＣＦＡ只是推遲，而未必是破局；倘若我們的推測有誤，也希望情勢能夠迴轉。畢竟，ＥＣＦＡ或ＣＥＣＡ，是胡六點的主張；且北京高層還屢屢聲明「名稱不重要」。兩岸當局雖皆聲稱ＥＣＦＡ是「經濟性」的，但正如前文所言，在本質上卻是一個政治性的決定，且亦將產生深刻的政治效應。那個效應是：兩岸將因ＥＣＦＡ而有一個更能互利雙贏的和平發展框架。

不必再將一年以來的兩岸新機遇及新思維套進陳腐的「統／獨」公式中。只要兩岸能維持一個好的經濟互動關係，那就絕對也就是一個好的政治關係，亦必會發生好的政治效應。比獨好，也比統好！

所以，「只談經濟／不談政治」的說法，是說不通的。