Is "Sympathizing with China" synonymous with "Selling Out Taiwan?"

Is "Sympathizing with China" synonymous with "Selling Out Taiwan?"
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 19, 2009

The theme of the May 17 protest march was "Oppose Sympathizing with China, Defend Taiwan." Its four demands were "Defend Taiwan. Ensure Sovereignty. Help the Unemployed. Protect the Disadvantaged." Unfortunately the marchers were unaware of the internal contradictions in their own demands.

Their fundamental reasoning is that "Sympathizing with [Mainland] China" means one is incapable of "Defending Taiwan." Supposedly this has two harmful effects. First, sovereignty will be lost. Second, financial hardship will follow.

Why do we say the marchers' demands contain inherent contradictions? First of all, "Sympathizing with China" is not necessarily antithetical to "Defending Taiwan. Protecting Taiwan." If "Sympathizing with China" means establishing a policy of "Cross-Strait Goodwill," of creating a mutually-beneficial, win-win scenario, then "Sympathizing with [Mainland] China" is hardly going to bring disaster down upon Taiwan, and may well bring benefits. Equating "Sympathizing with China" with "selling out Taiwan" is a logical non sequiteur. Opinion polls show that although a majority of respondents believe the Ma administration's cross-Strait policy is indeed "Sympathizing with China," it also feels that such a policy benefits Taiwan. As we can see, "Sympathizing with China" is not necessarily "Selling out Taiwan." In fact, a policy of "Sympathizing with China" can also be rooted in a desire to "Defend Taiwan. Protect Taiwan." It can also be motivated by the real world advantages of "Defending Taiwan. Protecting Taiwan."

Will "Sympathizing with China" lead to a loss in sovereignty? To answer this question, we must first understand the Republic of China's current status regarding its sovereignty. The sovereignty of the Republic of China has been been dealt a series of traumatic blows. For example, it cannot join the United Nations. It must use the name "Chinese Taipei" when participating in certain international events. These are painful to our citizens. The Ma administration's cross-Strait policy cannot fully express our sovereignty. But at least we can use the name "Chinese Taipei" while participating in WHA activities. At least no more nations have broken off diplomatic relations with us. At least we are establishing a framework for cross-Strait exchanges based on the premise of "1992 Consensus. One China, Different Interpretations," in which we refrain from repudiating each others‘ status. These subtle but significant achievements were hard won. But they have unquestionably enhanced our sovereignty. Nor has the Ma administration's cross-Strait policy undermined our sovereignty on Taiwan. The Republic of China flag continues to flutter above the Presidential Palace. Republic of China elections continue to be held, just as they always have been. The Republic of China Legislature continues to be plagued by opposition DPP antics such as locking the doors to the Legislature in protest. Tens of thousands of Mainland tourists come and go beneath the Republic of China flag every day. One could argue that the Republic of China's sovereignty has been significantly improved during this period.

Has "Sympathizing with China" led to economic difficulties? In fact, most people affirm the Ma administration's cross-Strait policy precisely because it contributes to Taiwan's economic development. The deepening of cross-Strait economic exchanges is bound to impact some sectors or businesses. We must respond appropriately. But the overall situation has unquestionably been beneficial to Taiwan. Besides, cross-Strait exchanges are an economic path we cannot refuse to take. On the one hand, the DPP complains of economic hardship. On the other hand, it contradicts itself by blasting any policy it accuses of "Sympathizing with China." Cross-Strait exchanges are essential to Taiwan's economy. On this we have a broad social consensus. This is why most people do not equate "Sympathizing with China" with "Selling out Taiwan." From an economic perspective, "Sympathizing with China" may even be motivated by a desire to "Defend Taiwan."

During the May 17 protest march, Yeh Chin-chuan led a delegation to the WHA. His trip touched on the matter of sovereignty. At the Cross-Strait Forum in Xiamen Wang Yi announced Beijing's "Eight Benefits for Taiwan" program. This, and the "Western Straits Economic Zone" were both the result of "economic exchanges." The Democratic Progressive Party says it champions our sovereignty. How then can it object to participation in the WHA? The DPP says it hopes to revive the economy. How then can it oppose Beijing's "Eight Benefits for Taiwan?"

The Democratic Progressive Party's vigilance regarding the risks of cross-Strait exchanges deserves affirmation. Yet its May 17 protest march was all about Taiwan independence. This is hardly the answer to the Republic of China's sovereignty and economic problems. The DPP sees the May 17 protest march as a case of successful political mobilization. But the protest march merely mired the DPP ever more deeply in Taiwan independence thinking. This poses a hidden danger for the DPP. The Ma administration proposes an amicable Mainland policy that "Sympathizes with China." If it can continue showing that dignity and sovereignty correlate positively with economic development, then the Democratic Progressive Party's strategy of equating "Sympathizing with China" with "Selling out Taiwan" will no longer be viable. How else can one explain Chen Chu's trip to the Mainland?

The May 17 protest march was a major revelation to both Beijing and Taipei. It implied that although the public opposes "Selling out Taiwan," it does not oppose "Sympathizing with China." What constitutes "Sympathizing with China?" What constitutes "Selling out Taiwan?" The Ma administration knows. So does Beijing. So does the public on Taiwan. That is why we advocate "inviting the other side to a dance," but do not advocate "inviting the other side to its own funeral."

「傾中」等於「賣台」？
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.05.19 05:55 am

「反傾中／護台灣」、「保台灣／顧主權／救失業／護弱勢」。這是五一七遊行的主題與四大訴求，卻可能有不自覺的內在矛盾。

這套論述的基本邏輯是：「傾中」就不能「保台」，其禍害有二：一、主權流失，二、造成經濟困境。

為何說這套論述有內在矛盾？首先，「傾中」未必與「保台／護台」是對立的概念。「傾中」倘若是指營造「兩岸親善」的政策思維，主張互惠雙贏；則「傾中」就未必會給台灣帶來災禍，反而可能帶來利益。因此，將「傾中」與「賣台」畫上等號，可能是一種錯誤的邏輯跳躍。民意調查顯示，多數受訪者雖認為馬政府的兩岸政策「傾中」，但多數受訪者亦表支持並認為對台灣有利。可見，「傾中」不必然就是「賣台」；其實，「傾中」政策，也可以建立在「保台／護台」的思維上，亦可追求「保台／護台」的實際效益。

「傾中」是否即會造成「主權」喪失？這先要認清中華民國的「主權」現狀。中華民國的主權現今已然處於受傷狀態，例如不能參加聯合國，或須以「中華台北」的名義參與特定國際活動，這些皆是國人心中之痛。然而，馬政府如今的兩岸政策，雖不能使主權的對外表現得到全面伸展，但至少亦初步獲得以「中華台北」名義參與ＷＨＡ的突破，且迄未進一步損傷建交國的數字，並嘗試以「九二共識／一中各表」或「互不否認」為兩岸交往的框架；這些細微但重大的成就皆得來不易，不能謂不是在「主權」方面的進展。另一方面，馬政府的兩岸政策，在主權的對內表現上更無任何損傷，總統府上的國旗依然招展，選舉照樣舉行，國會仍然出現在野黨鎖門抗爭的場景，何況每日數萬大陸觀光客在青天白日的國旗下來來往往……。或許可以這麼說，這段期間台灣的主權內外表現，反而已有約略進展。

再說，「傾中」是否造成經濟困境？其實，馬政府的兩岸政策受到多數人肯定的主要原因，正是認為有助於台灣的經濟發展。兩岸經濟交流深化，勢必對某些領域或行業產生衝擊，必須有所因應；但就大局而言則必對台灣有利，且兩岸交流亦是別無選擇的經濟出路。故而，民進黨一方面訴諸經濟困境，另一方面抨擊「傾中」政策，其中自生矛盾。因為，兩岸交流是台灣經濟不可或缺的要素，已是社會的常識與共識；這也正是民間認為「傾中」未必是「賣台」的主因。就經濟面看，「傾中」也許正因為要「保台」。

正當五一七遊行登場之際，葉金川率團參加ＷＨＡ，這是涉及「主權得失」的事件；而廈門海峽論壇，王毅又宣布「惠台八點」，再加上「海西經濟區」端上檯面，這則是「經濟交流」的事件。民進黨主張伸張主權，恐怕不能反對參與ＷＨＡ；主張振興經濟，則亦不可能一一批駁抵拒「惠台八點」。

民進黨對兩岸交流深化的風險意識是必須肯定的。然而，五一七遊行仍以台獨為主調，這對台灣的主權與經濟問題皆不是正確的解答；五一七遊行被民進黨解讀為成功的政治動員，但這場遊行使台獨論述繼續沉澱內化，卻是民進黨的隱憂；因為，馬政府主張兩岸友善的「傾中」政策，若能繼續被證實在主權尊嚴及經濟發展上皆是正數，民進黨將「傾中」與「賣台」畫上等號的論述戰略，即可能無以為繼。否則，如何解釋陳菊登陸？

當然，五一七遊行對兩岸當局亦皆有重大啟示。台灣人民或許不反對「傾中」，但必定反對「賣台」。至於，怎樣是「傾中」？怎樣是「賣台」？馬政府清楚，北京也清楚，台灣人民更是點滴在心頭一清二楚。這就是何以我們主張：要「與卿共舞」，不要「請君入甕」！