Standing on the Front Line, Responding to Public Expectations

Standing on the Front Line, Responding to Public Expectations
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 20, 2009

President Ma Ying-jeou has been in office one year. The dominant feeling during this year has been frustration with the Ma administration for failing to live up to its potential.

President Ma's performance has fallen far short of public expectations. Two very different reasons are responsible for this, and both apply. First, President Ma erred, provoking public dissatisfaction. Secondly, on other issues, President Ma did not err. Instead, public expectations were unrealistic. In other words, some problems are due to President Ma's errors. Other problems are due to unrealistic public expectations.

President Ma Ying-jeou's main goal during the remainder of his term should be to identify the gaps between his performance and public expectations, and to fill them. If President Ma has erred, he must swiftly make amends. If the public has unrealistic expectations, he must communicate with the public and convince them otherwise. The president's performance will inevitably fall short of public expectations. But the shortfalls must be kept to a minimum.

Actually, when President Ma took office a year ago, the situation was more perious than first imagined. Taipei's relations with Beijing had reached new lows. Taipei's relations with Washington had also reached new lows. Taiwan's economic dependence on mainland China had reached new highs. The mainland's influence on Taiwan's political and economic lifeblood had also reached new highs. Cross-Strait relations had come to a head, and were ready for a showdown. Chen Shui-bian and the DPP had milked the national identity issue and "ethnic" relations issue for all they were worth. The Chen corruption case had devastated the system of legal justice and social justice beyond repair. Problems plagued the nation, inside and out. Add to this a global financial tsunami that occurs only once in a century. Faced with such perilous circumstances, what kind of president did Ma Ying-jeou aspire to be? What did the public expect Ma Ying-jeou to do? This is where the gap appeared.

What kind of President did Ma Ying-jeou aspire to be? The Chen Shui-bian regime was fierce, tyrannical, and reckless. By contrast, Ma Ying-jeou was none of these things. He believed that people in political office must be upright, that integrity must be foremost. Chen Shui-bian was willing "to do whatever it takes." Ma Ying-jeou, by contrast, imposes limits upon himself. For example, Ma Ying-jeou declared that he was "retreating to the second line." The result was Liu Chao-hsuan became the most respected Premier in the past two decades. Ma never humiliated Vincent Siew the way Liu Tai-ying and Su Chi-cheng did. Ma never abused Premiers the way Chen Shui-bian did. Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian, in order to demagogue cross-Strait relations and Taipei-Washington relations, resorted to posturing and provoking external crises, to be used as political bargaining chips. Chen Shui-bian was fierce, tyrannical, and reckless to the extreme. During his "lost voyage" he ordered Air Force One flown to Libya as a gesture of protest. Ma Ying-jeou's policy was to transit on the west coast of the US, coming and going. Some suggested that he transit on the east coast, but he ignored such suggestions, saying he wanted to "keep things simple." Even Jason Hu felt Ma's style was "too bland." How does one explain Ma's style anyway?

What kind of president does the public expect Ma Ying-jeou to be? When Ma Ying-jeou said he was "retreating to the second line," the public subjected him to overwhelming criticism and ridicule. The public felt that the separation of powers between the president and the premier was something they needed to settle between themselves. But as the president, as the spiritual and political leader of the nation Ma had a responsibility to stand on the front line. Ma said "Chen Yunlin can address me as Mr. Ma," "Taiwan and mainland China are two regions," and "If re-elected I would not rule out political talks." President Ma probably felt he was merely stating some simple facts. But he really should have known his statement would provoke jibes about "Regional Administrator Ma." The public wonders how Ma can be so oblivious to the impact of his remarks. Chen Tsung-ming has refused to step down. The pre-trial investigation and the Chen corruption case have not progressed as the public hoped they would. Many people consider this President Ma's responsibility. Yet Ma's only response has been to say, "I respect the independence of the judiciary." Cross-Strait policy involves walking a tightrope. Some accuse him of "sympathizing with [Mainland] China, and selling out Taiwan." Others accuse him of promoting an "independent Taiwan and the two-states theory." As we can see, the public has sharply divergent expectations of Ma Ying-jeou.

Ma Ying-jeou got elected on the basis of his "Better Immediately!" campaign slogan. The subsequent gap between public expectations was of course, huge. Also, many factors, such as the rise and fall of cross-Strait relations were not under his control. The financial tsunami made matters worse. The Chen corruption case dragged on, making many people impatient. Faced with criticism from within and without, many members of the public almost hoped that Ma Ying-jeou would display a few "fierce, tyrannical, and reckless" traits. Instead, Ma Ying-jeou's forebearance was interpreted as weakness and incompetence. In fact Ma Ying-jeou could easily say the words or make the gestures needed to win over populist sentiment. So how did he get to be labeled as "weak and incompetent?" Is this the result of a gap in public expectations? Or is Ma Ying-jeou a person who simply will not live up to his potential?

What does Ma Ying-jeou expect of himself as a president? What does the public on Taiwan expect of him as a president? For the answers to these two questions, and to bridge the gap between public expectations and Ma's performance, we need to answer an even more fundamental question: Given the Republic of China's internal and external circumstances, what kind of leader does it need?

President Ma must stand on the front line. No matter what the separation of powers between the President and Premier might be, no matter how the party and government might interface, President Ma has symbolic and political responsibility to stand on the front line. He must stand on the front line. But Taiwan cannot endure another populist president who lives by demagoguery. Externally, he must persuade Beijing to maintain a win-win relationship. Internally, he must persuade Taiwan independence elements to see the error of their ways, and heal society's wounds. The president has taken a position on the front lines. He must be patient on the international front and forgiving on the domestic front. The president is standing on the front line, taking the point. It would be an easy matter for him to make a show of being a powerful leader, fierce, tyrannical, and reckless. But standing on the front line, taking the point, he must bite his tongue, he must make concessions. he must avoid doing the things he shouldn't do. That may well be beyond the abilities of ordinary mortals. To what extent must he remain silent? To what extent must he make concessions? How can he do what must be done, and refuse to do what must not be done? How can he avoid accusations that he has not lived up to his potential.

The public is frustrated with the Ma administration for not living up to its potential. The potential the public expects it to live up to may not be all that great. Ma Ying-jeou's own expectations may be simple and transparent. The problem is understanding our situation inside and out. What kind of potential should national leaders fulfill? Only after we have answered this question, can we fill the gap between public expectations and the president's performance.

站上第一線 回應恨鐵不成鋼的期待
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.05.20 05:46 am

馬英九總統就職一周年。這一年來令人感受最強烈的社會氛圍，或許就是恨鐵不成鋼。

馬總統的表現與社會期待出現巨大落差，其實有兩種迥然不同但同時並存的原因：一、馬總統的表現出錯，使社會失望；二、社會的期待可能有所偏誤，而馬總統的表現未必是錯。也就是說，有些問題出在馬總統的錯誤，有些問題出在社會的期待未必正確。

找出總統表現與社會期待的落差，並盡力修補其間的落差，應是馬英九未來任期的主要努力目標。如果是馬總統自己的錯誤，亟應改正；如果是社會期待的偏差，則須溝通及說服。總統表現與社會期待必定會有落差，但應使其間落差收縮至最小的程度。

一年前馬總統就任時的情勢，其實比想像中更要險峻。對外而言，台灣與中國大陸的關係惡化到谷底，與美國的關係亦空前惡劣；但相對地，台灣對大陸的經濟依賴度卻攀上前所未有的高點，大陸對台灣政經命脈的影響支配力則升至前所未有的高點。對內而言，則兩岸競合關係的爭議已至攤牌階段，陳水扁及民進黨對國家認同及族群關係的操作已在剃刀邊緣，而扁案對司法正義及社會公道的摧殘亦已到了無以復加的地步。內憂外患，遂使整個台灣陷於進退維谷的態勢；不僅如此，後來又加上一場百年罕見的全球金融海嘯。面對如此險峻的時勢，馬英九自己想要做一個怎樣的總統？國人又期待馬英九做一個怎樣的總統？前文所說的落差，遂告出現。

馬英九自己想做一個怎樣的總統？若與陳水扁之標榜「悍性／霸性／賭性」相較，馬英九似乎三者俱缺，他主張「政者正也」、「誠信第一」。陳水扁可謂「無所不用其極」，馬英九則是「有所不為」。例如，馬英九宣示「退居第二線」，使劉兆玄成為近二十年來最受總統尊重的行政院長；他未曾如蕭萬長被劉泰英、蘇志誠羞辱，也未曾如所有的行政院長皆被陳水扁糟蹋。再如，李扁皆以操作兩岸關係及台美關係為能事，裝腔作勢，藉挑激外部危機來做為自己的政治籌碼；陳水扁甚至將其「悍性／霸性／賭性」發揮到了極致，在「謎航之旅」把總統專機開到了利比亞，以示抗爭；但馬英九的政策卻是「美西去／美西回」，有人建議過境美國東岸，他卻連提都不提，謂為「單純化」。這樣的風格連胡志強都說「太平淡」，如何解釋這樣的風格？

相對而言，國人又期待馬英九做一個怎樣的總統？一句「退居第二線」，使馬英九面對排山倒海的抨擊與譏嘲。民間認為，總統與閣揆的權責分際是你們二人間事，但身為總統，在精神象徵及治國責任上皆必然要站在「第一線」。再如，主動表示「陳雲林可以稱我馬先生」、「台灣與中國大陸是兩個地區」、「若連任不排除觸及協商政治的議題」等等；馬總統可能覺得只是一根腸子通到底的事實陳述，但豈不知必然招致「馬區長」的譏嘲，而其實更多國人亦覺得總統發言豈能如此「白目」至作繭自縛的地步？又如，陳聰明不下台，扁案偵審的進度不符社會期待；許多國人認為責任在馬總統，他則始終以一句「尊重司法獨立」回應。再如，兩岸政策走鋼絲，有人指他「傾中賣台」，有人則指他是「獨台／兩國論」，可見社會對馬英九的期待分歧嚴重已至何等地步？

馬英九在「馬上好」的競選口號中當選，後來出現的社會期望落差自是非常之大。何況，兩岸形勢消長，諸多因素已非操之在我；復以金融海嘯狂襲，更是雪上加霜；而扁案遲久未決，亦引發部分國人極大的不耐。在如此內外交煎的情勢中，許多國人或許寄望馬英九能表現出一定程度的悍性、霸性及賭性，而馬英九的隱忍內斂則被解讀為懦弱無能。其實，以馬英九的條件，他或許僅憑說幾句話或作幾個姿態就能輕易為自己贏得民粹人氣，但何以如今「懦弱無能」居然成了他的政治標籤？這是社會期待的偏差？還是馬英九確實是一塊不可能錘鍊成精鋼的生鐵？

馬英九自期為怎樣的總統？台灣主流社會又期待他成為怎樣的總統？欲解答這兩個問題，並修補其間落差，其實應先回答另一個更高階的問題：台灣內外情勢走到今日地步，需要怎樣的國家領導人？

馬總統必須站上第一線。無論府閣分際如何，無論黨政介面如何；馬總統在精神象徵及治國責任上皆必須站上第一線。但站上第一線，台灣卻不可再出現一個以民粹操作為能事的總統。對外，要說服北京維持兩岸雙贏共生；對內，要感召台獨進行修正並撫平族群創傷。總統雖然站上第一線，但對外要忍，對內要讓；總統站在第一線的巔峰，極易表現其悍性、霸性與賭性的「能力」；但站在第一線的巔峰，要咬牙忍，願咬牙讓，能咬牙「有所不為」，那或許才是另一種非同一般的過人之能。但是，要忍到什麼地步，讓到什麼地步，要如何在「有所不為」中展現「大有為」，才不會滋生「恨鐵不成鋼」的抨擊與譏諷？

恨鐵不成鋼。社會期待的「鋼」或許是不拘一格的繞指鋼，馬英九自期的「鋼」卻可能是寧拙勿巧而幾乎可以透視的水晶鋼。問題是：先須確定台灣內外情勢走到今日，國家領導人應當是怎樣的「鋼」？解答了這個問題，才能修補其間的落差。

但無論如何，馬總統必須回應恨鐵不成鋼的社會期待。