Civil Service Evaluation System Reform: Jihad or Terrorism?

Civil Service Evaluation System Reform: Jihad or Terrorism?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 23, 2010

Reform of the civil service evaluation system will necessarily provoke intense conflict. This is hardly surprising. What is surprising is how government heads have taken the lead in badmouthing such reforms.

Two issues are involved in the dispute over civil service evaluation system reform. One concerns principles. The other concerns technical obstacles. Each has provoked both positive and negative reactions. During debates, Wu Den-yih, Li Yong-ping, and other government heads left the public with the impression they were sacrificing their principles merely because they had encountered some technical obstacles. What these government heads should have done, was to approach technical obstacles from the perspective of principle, and aspired to create a system the public could respect.

First, we should make clear just how much slack the new system has. Kuan Chung said "If one gets a C rating this year, no problem. Just work hard and get an A next year." This remark exposed the new system as a "toothless tiger." Under new regulations, 3% of all personnel will be given a C rating. Anyone who receives three consecutive C ratings will be forced to retire or laid off. But nobody is likely to receive three consecutive Cs under the existing system, unless there is absolutely no alternative. What Kuan Chung said in effect was, "So what if one gets two consecutive Cs? Just get a B next year!" In other words, in actual practice, the new system's mechanism for "punishing poor performance and eliminating poor performers" is virtually non-existent. The mandatory C ratings for 3% of all personnel will have nothing more than a warning effect, or "catfish effect."

The "catfish effect" is what happens when a catfish is introduced into a tank full of sardines. The catfish alarms the sardines, forcing them to remain active. The catfish does not actually eat the sardines. If such a softball evaluation system were implemented in Singapore or South Korea, the number of C ratings handed out would be set at 10% or more. In fact, even 10% is too lenient. This is why the public thinks the new system is weak. From a management perspective, we agree. If government heads fail to point civil servants in the right direction, if they fail to acknowledge the legitimacy of civil service reform, but instead speak of "technical obstacles" or even demonize reform efforts and encourage civil servants to take to the streets, we consider it incomprehensible.

Wu Den-yih, Li Yong-ping, and others have raised concerns about the new system. Their concerns are not unreasonable. For example, if every agency, good or bad, big or small, is forced to give 3% of its personnel C ratings, that may be unfair. But if one compares public schools against other public schools, and private schools against other private schools, then one public school must be in last place. One cannot refuse to rate other public schools merely because one does not wish to give a particular public school a C rating. Giving 3% of all agencies, good or bad, big or small, C ratings may involve technical obstacles. But government heads have heavy responsibilities. They cannot refuse to see the forest for the trees.

Even stranger reasons have been trotted out. Some have actually said that "a government head handing out ratings is like someone wielding a knife. Good people get cut, bad people purge their opponents." But this is a problem every office in the world must cope with. Even without C ratings for 3% of all employees, concerns over who gets an A and who gets a B remain, even under our current system. Government heads have heavy responsibilities. Is it not shocking that they would invoke the standards of the "man in the street" when evaluating civil service reform?

Reform is like war. Those who direct the war, must define the war. The Examination Yuan has referred to reform as a "jihad." It has apparently become what Wu Den-yih and Li Yong-ping have described as "terrorist activities." Government reform efforts have been incorrectly spun as a civil war between civil servants. A government ought to act in unison. This war has been misnamed, making it difficult to prosecute. It has become a case of "I do not know what I'm fighting for, and I do not know whom I'm fighting for."

How an issue is perceived, depends upon how it is defined. Reform of the civil service evaluation system can improve civil servants' self-esteem and sense of honor. It can also incite discontent within the ranks of the civil service. Wu Den-yih and other government heads are not being unreasonable when they cite "technical obstacles." But if inflammatory speech succeeds in demonizing such a moderate, even slack new system in the minds of civil servants, then thes government heads have acted irresponsibly, and their political response must be considered a debacle.

This debate over civil service evaluation reform has mired the Ma administration in "civil strife," in a "damned if you do, and damned if you don't" dilemma. The government has defined its reform efforts as a "jihad." Some may oppose a jihad, but at least those who support it will give it their seal of approval. But if even some in the government consider the government's reform efforts "terrorist activities," those who oppose it will continue to oppose it. And even those who support it will be disillusioned by the government's "civil strife." Voter support will evaporate as a consequence of one such fiasco after another.

Reform is like war. Those who direct the war, must first define the war.

考績改革究竟是聖戰或恐怖活動
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.03.23 02:19 am

考績制度改革必是利害衝突劇烈，本不足怪；奇怪的是行政首長帶頭以負面評價來唱衰考績改革。

此次《考績法》改制的爭議，可分作兩類。一類是對「原則問題」的爭議，一類是對「技術問題」的爭議；而每一類問題又可引出正面及負面兩種評價。吳敦義及李永萍等行政首長在辯論新制時給人留下的印象是：因技術問題而否定了原則，致對整個改革新制給予負面評價。然而，面對此次爭議，較符行政首長角色的立場或許應當是：強調原則正當而修正技術問題，將新制改革導向正面印象的社會視聽。

首先必須弄清楚，新制的鬆緊程度究竟如何。關中說：「今年打丙，明年努力拿甲就好了嘛！」一句話，已經道盡新制其實是「無牙老虎」。新制規定，三％打丙；且三年連續打丙者，始得令其退休或資遣。在當前這種行政文化中，除非已是無可如何，「三年連續打丙」的情況其實極不易發生；關中的話屆時就變成：「兩年打丙，第三年打乙就好了嘛！」也就是說，實際運作起來，新制的「懲劣／汰劣」的「退場機制」幾乎並不存在；其實只是「鯰魚效應」，寄望三％打丙能發生一些「警惕／激勵」的作用而已。

所謂「鯰魚效應」，就是在沙丁魚的池裡放一條鯰魚，目的在刺激沙丁魚活動起來，而不在吃掉沙丁魚。如此「溫和」的考績制度，若與星韓等國最低階考績規定十％相較，其實已是寬縱得多。正因如此，民間甚至認為，新制的力道太弱；站在人事管理的觀點，我們亦持此見。在此種情勢下，身為行政首長，若非僅未能引導公務員以正面態度認知改革的正當性，反而強調諸種「技術障礙」，甚至將改革妖魔化，挑激公務員的抗議情緒，這就令人不解了。

吳敦義與李永萍等對新制提出的有些質疑，或許不無道理。例如各機關不論大小良莠均三 ％打丙，有失公平。但建國中學的成績與建中比，私立補校與私立補校比；不能說建中就不可有最後一名。更何況，尤其不能因建中不「打丙」，就讓全國的中學也打不成。機關不論大小良莠皆三％打丙，容或真有技術障礙，但站在行政首長的高度，卻不可見樹不見林。

更奇異的理由是，有人居然說：「打考績的首長就像擁有一把刀，良善的人披荊斬棘，惡質的人誅除異己。」其實，這是舉世辦公室皆可能存在的問題，即使沒有三％打丙，現今考績制度誰打甲誰打乙，難道就無此種顧慮。站在行政首長的高度，竟以此種「庶人之見」來評論考績改革，豈不是駭人聽聞。

改革很像是一場戰爭。主導戰爭者，首應掌握戰爭的「定義權」。然而，如今考試院口中的這場「聖戰」，似乎變成了吳敦義與李永萍等人口中的「恐怖活動」。這場國家體制的改革，也被扭曲成了公務員之間的「內戰」。以「政府一體」的觀點來看，這場戰爭已是「名不正／言不順」，更已是「不知為何而戰／不知為誰而戰」。

橫看成嶺側成峰。考績改革可以朝提升公務員自尊心、榮譽感的方向疏導，也可朝挑激公務員不滿情緒的方向操作。吳敦義等行政首長提出的「技術障礙」並非全無道理，但若因為此類言論，使得如此溫和、甚至仍嫌流於寬縱的新制，在公務員間留下妖魔化的形象；我們認為，這樣的行政首長有失立場，這樣的政治對應亦屬敗筆。

這場考績論戰，使馬政府陷入「內亂」，且已又落入父子騎驢的境地。如果「政府一體」將此改革定義為「聖戰」，則反對者固然反對，至少或許尚能贏得贊成者的聲援；然而，倘若連政府內部都有人將之視為「恐怖活動」，則反對者固然反對，連贊成者也會對政府的「內亂」感到失望。所謂「選票跑光光」，也許就是一次又一次複製此類情事而形成的。

改革有如戰爭。主導戰爭者，首應掌握「定義權」。