No Backtracking on the Road to Revolution
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 3, 2010

The KMT has suffered yet another legislative by-election defeat. KMT Secretary-General King Pu-tsung told this paper that the party's hard-line stance would not change. It would selectively "reform whatever local factions needed to be reformed." Many local political bosses have arrived at a watershed in their relationship with the KMT. This is true whether King Pu-tsung's hardline reforms represent the will of party chairman Ma Ying-jeou or not. For the KMT, such reforms are ten years overdue. They are something the KMT must do. The KMT's rot began with its roots. Because it is the ruling power, not a day goes by in which it is not hobbled or even threatened by local factional leaders.

Local factions are deeply rooted. They existed during the Two Chiangs Era. Back then local factions, both "black" and "gold" participated in politics only at the local level, no higher than the Provincial Assembly. It was impossible for them to gain entry to the central government. Local factional bosses were unable to gain entry to the legislature, never mind become political appointees. During the Lee Teng-hui era however, the political environment changed. Political participation was liberalized. Local political factions could no longer be artificially prevented from participating in central government elections. Lee Teng-hui rallied local factions against old school Kuomintang factions. This is how black gold factions were able to gain entry to the legislature. The Taiwan Provincial Government was "frozen/eliminated." The Taiwan Provincial Assembly was terminated. Locally elected representatives inundated the legislature. Professionalism at the central government level was seriously degraded. All the political tricks familiar to local factions, from political patronage to vote-buying became problems KMT party leaders had to confront and even accomodate.

The public welcomed the Republic of China's first Taiwanese president. Lee Teng-hui successfully integrated local factions within the party. Unfortunately he stopped at nothing in the process. As a result Lee Teng-hui's democratization was tainted by black gold politics. Eventually the KMT paid the price. It found itself in the political wilderness for eight years. Not a day passed without talk of reform. Not a day passed without talk of opposition to corruption and black gold. The KMT suffered for eight years. It regained political power on the basis of Ma Ying-jeou's reformist image. But less than two years later, all its bad habits have returned.

Local party bosses in charge of local party affairs prior to the KMT's loss of power, now open ask aspiring candidates questions such as, "How deep are your pockets? How much money can you lay on the line?" This money is needed for campaign publicity, and to provide political patronage for the candidates. It is even needed for party affairs. The KMT has regained political power. As its secretary general, King Pu-tsung must coordinate local party affairs. He never imagined coming face to face with candidates demanding to know who will reimburse them the 15 million NTD they already spent. These candidates show no embarrassment. They do not blush. They do not stammer. They ask "How can we fight a war on an empty stomach?"

King Pu-tsung has been KMT Secretary-General only briefly. The cause of his astonishment is the root of the Kuomintang's most terrifying problem. It is difficult to eradicate. It makes people wonder. What was the Kuomintang doing while in the opposition for eight years? Are its reforms for real or not? The KMT has been back in power two years. But what has it done? Is it having trouble overcoming political inertia? Did it fail to cultivate new talent? Will these matters be dealt with repeatedly with the most expedient and cavalier methods? Will the KMT cave in by accepting nomination standards demanded by local party factions? No matter what the answer, there is only one conclusion. It is also the reason King Pu-tsung has experienced two consecutive defeats. The KMT's long-standing problems have reached the stage where they must be resolved, or else.

The KMT's long-term problem is how to strengthen a party in which party loyalty is not that strong. King Pu-tsung has little to do with the party's outdated practices. To demand that he assume responsiblilty for them may strike outsiders as unfair. But this can't be helped. History has left King Pu-tsung with this cross to bear. He must assume responsibility for the success or failure of the party's reforms. He believes reform is essential. He has vowed not to compromise. He will have to pay the price.

Political reforms for any political party that aspires to govern long term, must enable it to succeed, and not to fail. Whether one is looking at the short-term political impact, or the long-term historical legacy, the inescapable reality is that "history is written by the victors." The KMT's victory or defeat is not the public's concern. The question that concerns the public is whether KMT reforms will be beneficial or harmful to the long-term development of the nation. The KMT must ask itself why its reforms have led to failure rather than success. This is an issue the Democratic Progressive Party must deal with as well. Has Taiwan's political culture deteriorated to the point of hopelessness? Bluntly speaking, no politician or political professional should compromise with a decadent political culture. Because today's compromises may be bitter fruit they must swallow tomorrow.

The KMT is no longer an authoritarian political party. It regards itself as a democratic political party dedicated to winning elections. As it transforms itself, the KMT must retain its innocence and maintain its discipline. If King Pu-tsung is serious, then we support the KMT's unyeilding commitment to reform. We hope the KMT will remember its fighting spirit during its eight years in the opposition. We hope it will reaffirm its belief that reform is the basis of success, and that success is the result of reform.

中時電子報 新聞
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中國時報 　2010.03.03
社論－既已走上改革 就不能再回頭

本報訊

立委補選再失利，國民黨祕書長金溥聰接受本報專訪時，不改強硬姿態表明，他是有選擇性地，「值得整合的地方派系才整合。」對許多地方實力型人物而言，無論金溥聰的強勢整軍，是否代表黨主席馬英九意志的貫徹，他們與國民黨的關係，勢必已經走到抉擇的分水嶺；對國民黨而言，這卻是遲到十數年的「改革」，非做不可，否則，一個從根爛起的國民黨，即使掌握執政權，還是無一日不受派系文化的牽制，甚至要脅。

地方派系根深柢固，兩蔣時代早有之，兩蔣時代對地方派系不論是黑是金，唯一的準則是參政只限於地方，最多上達省議會，絕無可能進入中央，既無緣進入國會，遑論政務官；李登輝時代，政治環境丕變，民主政治既已全開放，就不可能人為限制地方派系直取中央的參政權，李登輝更援引地方派系牽制老國民黨的流派鬥爭，所謂黑金就堂而皇之進入國會殿堂；凍廢省之後，省議會終結，地方民代大舉進軍國會，中央問政素質嚴重衰弱不說，所有地方派系熟悉且慣用的政治伎倆，從搓圓仔湯到買票賄選，都成為黨中央不得不面對，甚至不得不適應的選舉文化。

當年，身為眾望所歸的第一位台灣人總統，李登輝成功地結合地方派系，遺憾的是，因為無所不用其極地結合地方勢力，讓李登輝的民主之功，無可避免地沾染黑金爭議，最終也讓國民黨付出失去政權的代價。令人錯愕的是，在野八年的國民黨，無一日不談改革，無一日不談反腐反黑金，臥薪嘗膽八年，國民黨靠著清廉改革形象的馬英九，以望風披靡之勢，爭回政權，兩年不到，過去執政惡習竟全部回籠！

失去政權前的國民黨，主持地方黨務者，可以大剌剌地跟有意參選者直問：口袋有多深？能拿多少錢？這些錢，既要應付文宣需求，還要應付其他參選者搓圓仔湯之用，甚至不乏應付黨務需索者；讓金溥聰想像不到的是，爭回政權的國民黨，身為祕書長的他，協調地方時，竟要面對參選者臉不紅氣不喘地直問，已經花掉的一千五百萬該向誰拿？還要面對地方黨務負責人，毫不害羞的問：糧草沒下如何打仗？

金溥聰接任國民黨祕書長時間有限，他的錯愕，正是國民黨恐怖的、除之難去的病根。讓人懷疑的是，那國民黨在野八年做了些什麼？到底是真改革還是假改革？國民黨重新執政兩年，又做了什麼？是政治惰性難改？還是國民黨忘記培養人才，這件事只能一而再、再而三，企圖用方便且隨便的方式，屈附於地方派系做為黨內提名的標準？但不論答案是什麼，結論只有一個，也是金溥聰輔選兩敗的心得：國民黨長期以來的問題，已經到了不能不解決的時候了。

國民黨長期的問題，要讓一個黨性其實並不那麼堅強，與黨務系統淵源或關係其實不那麼深厚的金溥聰擔負責任，外人看可能未盡公平；但是，沒有辦法，歷史機運如此，金溥聰此刻既擔此大任，就得負起成敗的責任，他認為非改不可、絕不妥協，就得付出必要的代價。

但是，對於志在永續執政的政黨而言，任何改革設定的目標都應該是成功，而非失敗。不論從短期的政治效果或長期的歷史評價，「以成敗論英雄」都是無法逃避的現實。國民黨勝選或敗選，並非社會大眾需要關切的問題，社會大眾關切的是改革於國家長遠發展到底是利是弊？但是，國民黨必須思考：為什麼改革帶來的竟是失敗、而非成功？這個問題連民進黨都必須嚴肅面對，難道台灣政治文化已經惡劣到如此不可救藥的地步嗎？更直接的講，每一個以政治為志業或職業的政治人物，都不能對政治愈趨惡劣的文化妥協，因為，今日妥協所產生的苦果，明日可能就是自己必須吞下的。

國民黨已不再是以黨領政的威權政黨，而是自許為選舉機器的民主政黨，在這個體質轉換的過程中，清白與紀律都是國民黨必須堅持的。如果金溥聰的改革理念是真的，我們支持國民黨咬牙踏上不可逆轉的改革之路，而且，期待國民黨重新回味在野八年的戰鬥意志，堅定信念：改革就是成功的基礎，成功將是改革的果實！