Monday, March 1, 2010

Four Consecutive Blue Camp Defeats: Why Public Sentiment Shifted So Quickly

Four Consecutive Blue Camp Defeats:
Why Public Sentiment Shifted So Quickly
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 1, 2010

During the 2/27 legislative by-election, Democratic Progressive Party candidates took three more seats. Since September, the KMT has lost four seats in a row. Over the past two years, the Ma administration has lost five seats in a row. Apart from the legislative by-election for Taipei's Da-an District, the KMT has failed to win a single election. This includes the Yunlin County legislative by-elections and the three in one primary elections. The KMT has not won a single election beginning with the three legislative by-elections beginning with the Chinese New Year and ending with the four legislative by-elections seats following the Chinese New Year. It made no difference whether the party chairman was Ma or Wu; whether the party secretary-general was Wu, Tsan, or Ching; and whether the premier was Liu or Wu.
Especially following last year's three in one elections, the public has had less and less patience with the Ma administration. If the public mood does not change, the five year end municipal elections could become a harbinger of the 2012 presidential election. Such a change is difficult to imagine. Think back to the ruling party change in 2000. The Chen regime went from its zenith to its nadir. The change began during the third year of his first term. Chen family corruption, including the corporate bribery scandals, had long ago come to light. From the very first day of Chen's second term, corruption scandals followed him around like shadows and rapidly snowballed. According to prosecutors the sums involved range from several billions to tens of billions of NT dollars. The ruling party changed in 2008. The person responsible for overthrowing the Chen regime was not Ma Ying-jeou, but Chen himself. Nevertheless, before the Chen regime's fall, it lingered eight long years. The actual amounts it embezzled are still unknown.

Just what happened to the Ma administration? Why did it lose public support so quickly? Did the problem lie with President Ma Ying-jeou? Or did it lie with the KMT? Whether the problem lies with Ma or with the KMT, neither is new to the political scene. Both Ma and the KMT are well known to the public. Ma Ying-jeou is known for his integrity and kindness. This has allowed him to rise rapidly amidst public anger with the Chen regime. Unfortunately the KMT has failed to adapt to the new political environment since losing power eight years ago. Ma Ying-jeou has failed to realize he needed to offer greater leadership. Only better leadership can undo the collapse of ethics and professionalism precipitated by eight years of Chen regime misrule. Ma Ying-jeou failed to change. Society, meanwhile, did. The public has clearly lost faith in the Ma administration.

When the media criticizes KMT factionalism, it is easy to forget that Democratic Progressive Party political struggles are also plagued by factional strife. Take Chiayi County. Chen Ming-wen won the legislative by-election. Chen hails from a typical Lee Teng-hui era KMT faction. During the Chen era he cozied up to the DPP. He was thereby "rehabilitated." After serving as county executive for eight years, he passed the baton to Chan Hua-kuan, then ran for the national legislature. Such is factional succession. Similar incidents have taken place in Yunlin County with the Chang Jung-we clan. The Chang clan was unable to count on rehabiliation by the Blue Camp. Even less could it ensure political succession by supporting Blue Camp factions or clans. Take Hsinchu County. Cheng Yung-chin served as County Executive for eight years. But he still wanted to pick his successor. When the Kuomintang ruled that this was unacceptable, Cheng quit the party and ran as an independent. First he violated party discipline, then he endorsed his own brother. Given such antics, the Kuomintang defeat during the legislative by-election was entirely predictable.

Why are Blue Camp factions so incorrigible? Why are they able to force the KMT to compromise? Why not hand power over to others? Why do Green Camp factions yield to the DPP? Why is the DPP able to remain resolute?

Even more ironic is how the Chen regime was able to coopt local factions, by resorting to both threats and inducements. The issuance of judical threats were coupled with offers of political pork. By contrast, the KMT is unable to offer its factions either rewards or punishments. It must allow its factions to do what they wish. The sad fact is that the factions are the winners, and the party is the loser.

The Ma administration's ratings have fallen. From the first day he took office, he began appointing professionals to his cabinet. But he allowed the old Kuomintang to maintain its hold on power. The KMT ignored the government's orders, making it impossible for the professionals in his cabinet to operate. Typhoon Morakot was merely the straw that broke the Liu cabinet's back. The Wu cabinet meanwhile, made too many sacrifices in professionalism for the sake of electoral considerations. The Wu cabinet could think only about reducing the impact of its policies on the election resuts. It successfully amended the Local Government Act in the Legislative Yuan. This slightly boosted morale within the KMT. But KMT and local faction insiders who ridiculed the KMT or President Ma far outnumbered those attempting to unite the presidential office, the executive branch, and the party. As a result, recruiting cabinet officials has been difficult. Even recruiting candidates for the five municipal elections has been difficult. Candidates fall over each other seeking the nomination for KMT owned electoral districts. But no one is willing to don armor for non KMT owned electoral districts. Even during the eight years the KMT was in the opposition. dedicated party members were willing to make sacrifices. But two short years after being in power, even this remnant of fighting spirit has evaporated.

The most important characteristic of a leader is a undying loyalty. As Ma Ying-jeou sits in the Presidential Palace, has he asked himself why his best fighters have vanished? If the Democratic Progressive Party gains three more seats, it will merely hold 33 seats in the Legislative Yuan. This will not change the balance of power in the legislature. But it will clearly reveal that the ruling party's political strength has taken another hit. Controversy has already erupted within the Blue Camp over the cabinet reshuffle. The media has repeately offered similar suggestions. If such suggestions fall on deaf ears, if the same old faces remain in the cabinet, the situation will continue to deteriorate. The Ma administration must appreciate the significance of the new political climate. A single word, "corruption," toppled the Chen regime. Let us hope that in 2012, a single word, "obtuse," does not topple the Ma administration.

中時電子報 新聞
中國時報  2010.03.01
社論-藍連四敗 民心為何潰散這麼快
本報訊

二二七立委補選,民進黨再下三城,這已經是去年九月以來,國民黨的「連四敗」,也是馬政權兩年不到的「第五敗」!除了台北市大安區立委補選之外,從雲林立委補選、三合一基層選舉、農曆年前三席立委補選到農曆年後的四席立委補選,不論黨主席是吳是馬,黨秘書長是吳、是詹還是金,閣揆是劉或是吳,國民黨都找不到勝選基礎和理由。

特別在去年底三合一選舉之後,整體社會氣氛對馬政府的治理失能愈來愈不耐煩。可以想見,這個氣氛不變,年底五都選舉有可能提前吹響二○一二政權再更迭的號角。這是讓人難以想像的變化,回想二千年政黨輪替,扁政權從高點到低點,第一任的第三年開始,扁家弊案諸如企業行賄早已初露端倪,第二任從扁就任的第一天起,弊案如影隨形,愈滾愈大,從坊間傳聞檢調偵辦,涉入金額從十數億到數十億到上百億;二○○八政黨再輪替,推倒扁政權的不是馬英九,而是陳水扁自己;即使如此,扁政權的淪落,還是足足走了八年,涉及貪汙的實際金額到現在都還結清不了。

馬政權到底發生了什麼事?會讓民心潰散得這麼快?到底是馬英九總統的問題?還是國民黨的問題?但不論馬英九或國民黨,都不是政壇新人或新角色,相反的,不論馬個人或黨,都是台灣民眾熟悉的,馬英九為人熟悉的清廉厚道的特質,讓他在全民惡扁氛圍下快速竄起;然而,國民黨失去政權八年中,並未相應新的政治環境,調整體質,馬英九也未體會到他必須更強勢的領導,才能加速重建扁政府八年崩壞的政治道德和治理專業。馬英九沒有改變,但社會氣氛變了,而民眾對政府的期望顯然失落了。

當輿論批評國民黨的派系文化時,很容易就疏忽了,其實民進黨爭奪政權,也無法迴避派系牽制。以嘉義縣為例,立委補選勝出的陳明文,是李登輝時代典型的國民黨派系,扁政權時靠攏民進黨,竟就此漂白,縣長八年之後交棒給張花冠,自己再接續選立委,這叫派系接棒。類似案例,曾經發生在雲林縣的張榮味家族,但是張家既不能靠挺藍漂白,更無法靠挺藍搞派系或家族交棒。以新竹縣為例,鄭永金縣長八年還要欽點接班人,結果不為國民黨接受,竟拱出脫黨參選縣長者,違紀在前,竟還能再拱自己的親兄弟,代表國民黨角逐立委補選,敗選早可預期。

值得思考的是:為什麼身在藍營的地方派系就能死性不改,吃定國民黨必須對派系妥協讓步?否則江山寧可拱手讓人?為什麼身處綠營的派系對民進黨的向心力會一夕轉變成為黨性堅強?更諷刺的是,當年扁政權收編地方派系的手法可是威脅利誘、軟硬兼施,司法壓力伴隨行政資源。相比之下,無賞無懲的國民黨就只能讓派系予取予求,難堪的是,得者派系而失者政黨。

馬政府聲望下跌,從他就任第一天就已開始,他任用了專業內閣,卻讓老國民黨壓陣,不聽府院號令的國民黨,讓專業內閣寸步難行。莫拉克風災只是壓垮劉內閣的最後一根稻草;吳內閣上路後,卻又犧牲太多專業,政治與接續而來幾乎沒停過的大小選舉考量,讓吳內閣只能思考如何降低政策對選票的衝擊,儘管立法院上會期打一架通過地制法修正案,讓國民黨內小有團結士氣,但無可諱言,不論是中央黨團或地方派系,袖手看國民黨或馬總統笑話的人,遠多過團結一心拉抬府院黨聲勢的人。於是乎,入閣任官者難覓,競逐五都者難求;國民黨易選區眾人搶破頭,國民黨艱困區,無戰將肯披戰袍;在野八年,黨內還有為黨奉獻拚搏的悲壯士氣,執政短短兩年,這一丁點戰鬥意志都消弭於無形。

但凡領導者,最重要的特質就是要有死士願鼎力效忠,馬英九枯坐總統府,不能不深思何以賢士戰將俱遠矣?民進黨再下三城,於立法院不過取得卅三席,於國會議事容或無涉,但就大局卻顯見執政黨聲勢再挫。藍營內已有內閣改組之議,類似建議輿論一而再、再而三提出,若非建議如泥牛入海,無聲無息,就是內閣老人舊面孔搬風,愈搬愈糟,馬政權必須徹底警覺,新人新政新氣象的意義。一個「貪」字推倒扁政權,希望兩年後的二○一二年,不會出現一個「笨」字推倒馬政權的危機發生。

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