Su Tseng-chang's Two Cities Strategy: Reasonable? Justified?

Su Tseng-chang's Two Cities Strategy: Reasonable? Justified?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 2, 2010

The evening the ballots were counted for the four county legislative by-elections, the Su Tseng-chang camp let it be known that Su intended to run for mayor of Taipei. When asked about the matter the following day, Tsai Ing-wen dismissed it as "mere rumor." She said she learned about it only after reading the newspaper, and hoped everyone would give Su more time to think about it. Su Tseng-chang would neither confirm nor deny the rumor. He said he would report to Chairman Tsai before commenting. Those in the know believe the two have yet to reach a consensus.

Su Tseng-chang announced his intention to run in advance. He hoped to force Tsai Ing-wen to accept a fait accompli. But clearly Tsai has reservations. Su Tseng-chang's "Two Cities Strategy" has numerous defects. The most egregious of which is that Su Tseng-chang is treating the five cities elections as a Machievellian political tool, when his real goal is to run for president in 2012.

The Su camp says that the number of seats the DPP wins in the five cities election is secondary. The Su camp says its primary concern is how many ballots the DPP receives. Only this will help the DPP return to power. In other words, Su Tseng-chang is "shorting New Taipei, and transiting Taipei City." His purpose is not to win a mayoral seat for the DPP. His purpose is to establish a coat tails effect, to create momentum, paving the way for a presidential run in 2012.

Before his strategy can be considered reasonable and justified, Su must answer two questions. One. Must Su Tseng-chang be the DPP's presidential candidate? Two. Su Tseng-chang is using the five cities election as a stepping stone in his presidential campaign. But suppose he resigns his position as mayor, only to lose his bid for the presidency? Can the Democratic Progressive Party really afford to pay such a heavy price?

Tsai Ing-wen hopes to take three cities out of five. Her goal is to win New Taipei. Su Tseng-chang would draw out Chu Li-lun. In terms of political responsibility, Su cannot refuse, since he is the one candidate most able to take on Chu Li-lun. If Su chooses not to run, the DPP would essentially be surrending Taipei City. Su may be trying to force Tsai Ing-wen to go up against Chu Li-lun. But if Tsai Ing-wen loses, the cost could be even greater than if Su Tseng-chang loses. In which case, how can Su justify exploiting Tsai Ing-wen?

Su may be able to emerge victorious over Chu Li-lun. But Su is unwilling to be drafted, and is refusing to do battle. Actually, if Su were to prevail over Chu Li-lun in New Taipei, he would still have two alternatives. One. He could announce that he is making a bid for the presidency, and hope the public approves. Two, He could announce his intention to quietly serve out his term as New Taipei mayor, and endorse others, such as Tsai Ing-wen, as the Democratic Progressive Party's presidential candidate. That however, is not Su Tseng-chang's calculus. Although Su has declared that the goal is to "take four out of five," he has adopted a strategy of "shorting New Taipei, and transiting Taipei City." He is unconcerned whether the DPP wins or loses. He is concerned only about his own bid for the presidency. Su Tseng-chang must explain why he wants to run for president, and why the DPP must go along with his strategy of "shorting New Taipei, and transiting Taipei City." Is it reasonable? Is it justified?

Su Tseng-chang's Two Cities Strategy may have won over some Green Camp supporters. But it is far too risky. It could be a lose/lose proposition. The benefits are difficult to assess. Who knows whether Su can get elected president in 2012? Should the DPP assume such a risk for the Su alone? Should it force the entire DPP to bear the risk for such an opportunistic move? Given the DPP's larger concerns, it may be unwise, and should be given careful consideration. Otherwise Su's Two Cities Strategy could leave the DPP in the lurch, both in New Taipei and in the Presidential Palace.

In terms of rational decision-making, if the DPP hopes to return to power, its best strategy is to take one step at a time. It needs to treat any victories in Taipei City and New Taipei as victories in their own right. Su Tseng-chang wants to run for president. If the DPP adopts a strategy of "shorting New Taipei, and transiting Taipei City" for his sake, wouldn't it be counterproductive? Wouldn't it amount to "licking blood from the blade of the knife?"

Su Tseng-chang's extremely tricky Two Cities Strategy is both opportunistic and risky. It may not withstand close scrutiny. Never mind DPP leaders such as Tsai Ing-wen, who may not agree with Su Tseng-chang's opportunistic attempt to treat the party as his own political instrument. Su's Two Cities Strategy has yet to meet with the approval of the entire nation. Will the general public countenance Su Tseng-chang manipulating the five cities elections so cavalierly, treating democracy as a game?

Su Tseng-chang may not wish to be locked in by the five cities elections. If so, he can choose not to run at all. He can choose not to run in New Taipei. He can choose not to run in Taipei City. But if he chooses to run, he can hardly announce beforehand that his real goal is to run for president. He cannot treat the five cities elections as a Machiavellian political tool. The Democratic Progressive Party has no reason to "short New Taipei, and transit Taipei City" for Su's sake. Nor can the general public allow Su to play them for fools. Su Tseng-chang's strategy is much too ego-centric. It exaggerates his own importance. It indulges in wishful thinking. Once reality rears its ugly head, his strategy could backfire. He could find himself denounced as an opportunistic politician, manipulating democratic elections for his selfish purposes.

Is the Two Cities Strategy reasonable and justified? One. Why has Su Tseng-chang's candidacy become a given, no longer subject to question? Two. Why must the five cities elections be treated as Su Tseng-chang's political too, paving the way for his presidental campaign? Three. Does Su really intend to adopt the strategy of "shorting New Taipei, and transiting Taipei City?" Four. Should the sanctity of democratic elections be debased in such a manner? If so, how do Su Tseng-chang and the DPP intend to answer to the public?

The DPP has long achieved victories by means of opportunism and trickery. But isn't the Two Cities Strategy just a little too opportunistic and a little too tricky?

中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 　2010.03.01
社論－藍連四敗 民心為何潰散這麼快
本報訊

二二七立委補選，民進黨再下三城，這已經是去年九月以來，國民黨的「連四敗」，也是馬政權兩年不到的「第五敗」！除了台北市大安區立委補選之外，從雲林立委補選、三合一基層選舉、農曆年前三席立委補選到農曆年後的四席立委補選，不論黨主席是吳是馬，黨秘書長是吳、是詹還是金，閣揆是劉或是吳，國民黨都找不到勝選基礎和理由。

特別在去年底三合一選舉之後，整體社會氣氛對馬政府的治理失能愈來愈不耐煩。可以想見，這個氣氛不變，年底五都選舉有可能提前吹響二○一二政權再更迭的號角。這是讓人難以想像的變化，回想二千年政黨輪替，扁政權從高點到低點，第一任的第三年開始，扁家弊案諸如企業行賄早已初露端倪，第二任從扁就任的第一天起，弊案如影隨形，愈滾愈大，從坊間傳聞檢調偵辦，涉入金額從十數億到數十億到上百億；二○○八政黨再輪替，推倒扁政權的不是馬英九，而是陳水扁自己；即使如此，扁政權的淪落，還是足足走了八年，涉及貪汙的實際金額到現在都還結清不了。

馬政權到底發生了什麼事？會讓民心潰散得這麼快？到底是馬英九總統的問題？還是國民黨的問題？但不論馬英九或國民黨，都不是政壇新人或新角色，相反的，不論馬個人或黨，都是台灣民眾熟悉的，馬英九為人熟悉的清廉厚道的特質，讓他在全民惡扁氛圍下快速竄起；然而，國民黨失去政權八年中，並未相應新的政治環境，調整體質，馬英九也未體會到他必須更強勢的領導，才能加速重建扁政府八年崩壞的政治道德和治理專業。馬英九沒有改變，但社會氣氛變了，而民眾對政府的期望顯然失落了。

當輿論批評國民黨的派系文化時，很容易就疏忽了，其實民進黨爭奪政權，也無法迴避派系牽制。以嘉義縣為例，立委補選勝出的陳明文，是李登輝時代典型的國民黨派系，扁政權時靠攏民進黨，竟就此漂白，縣長八年之後交棒給張花冠，自己再接續選立委，這叫派系接棒。類似案例，曾經發生在雲林縣的張榮味家族，但是張家既不能靠挺藍漂白，更無法靠挺藍搞派系或家族交棒。以新竹縣為例，鄭永金縣長八年還要欽點接班人，結果不為國民黨接受，竟拱出脫黨參選縣長者，違紀在前，竟還能再拱自己的親兄弟，代表國民黨角逐立委補選，敗選早可預期。

值得思考的是：為什麼身在藍營的地方派系就能死性不改，吃定國民黨必須對派系妥協讓步？否則江山寧可拱手讓人？為什麼身處綠營的派系對民進黨的向心力會一夕轉變成為黨性堅強？更諷刺的是，當年扁政權收編地方派系的手法可是威脅利誘、軟硬兼施，司法壓力伴隨行政資源。相比之下，無賞無懲的國民黨就只能讓派系予取予求，難堪的是，得者派系而失者政黨。

馬政府聲望下跌，從他就任第一天就已開始，他任用了專業內閣，卻讓老國民黨壓陣，不聽府院號令的國民黨，讓專業內閣寸步難行。莫拉克風災只是壓垮劉內閣的最後一根稻草；吳內閣上路後，卻又犧牲太多專業，政治與接續而來幾乎沒停過的大小選舉考量，讓吳內閣只能思考如何降低政策對選票的衝擊，儘管立法院上會期打一架通過地制法修正案，讓國民黨內小有團結士氣，但無可諱言，不論是中央黨團或地方派系，袖手看國民黨或馬總統笑話的人，遠多過團結一心拉抬府院黨聲勢的人。於是乎，入閣任官者難覓，競逐五都者難求；國民黨易選區眾人搶破頭，國民黨艱困區，無戰將肯披戰袍；在野八年，黨內還有為黨奉獻拚搏的悲壯士氣，執政短短兩年，這一丁點戰鬥意志都消弭於無形。

但凡領導者，最重要的特質就是要有死士願鼎力效忠，馬英九枯坐總統府，不能不深思何以賢士戰將俱遠矣？民進黨再下三城，於立法院不過取得卅三席，於國會議事容或無涉，但就大局卻顯見執政黨聲勢再挫。藍營內已有內閣改組之議，類似建議輿論一而再、再而三提出，若非建議如泥牛入海，無聲無息，就是內閣老人舊面孔搬風，愈搬愈糟，馬政權必須徹底警覺，新人新政新氣象的意義。一個「貪」字推倒扁政權，希望兩年後的二○一二年，不會出現一個「笨」字推倒馬政權的危機發生。