DPP Must Stop Evading Cross-Strait Issues

DPP Must Stop Evading Cross-Strait Issues
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 14, 2011

Yesterday the DPP held its second presidential primary debate. The public is still waiting for the three candidates' cross-Strait policy platforms. Hsu Hsin-liang zeroed in at the heart of the matter: ECFA, the 1992 Consensus, and other key issues. Unfortunately Tsai Ing-wen and Su Tseng-chang continue to hem and haw. They either answered in the abstract, or they evade the question altogether. The DPP primary debate lacked focus. It merely underscored the DPP's inability to offer a practical and feasible cross-Strait policy.

Two primary debates have been held, during which Su and Tsai stopped attacking ECFA. This is an interesting development indeed. Tsai and Su even crossed swords over who deserved credit for a more liberalized cross-Strait policy. During the first political debate Tsai Ing-wen waited for the closing arguments before showing her hand. She said the DPP is more able to deal with cross-Strait issues than the KMT. She said the DPP promoted the three mini links in late 2000, soon after taking office, and promoted cross-Strait charter flights in 2003. She said the DPP lost power in 2008. Otherwise it too would have promoted direct cross-Strait flights. Su Tseng-chang was apparently unwilling to take a back seat. He chimed in during closing arguments and boasted that "The leader of the Executive Yuan at the time was none other than yours truly!"

The former Chairman of the Mainland Affairs Council during the DPP era wrote a letter to the media. He said "The DPP government was aggressive in promoting direct flights." He said promoting three links was always the DPP government's policy. The problem was Beijing. Motivated by political considerations, Beijing made sure the DPP would not benefit at the polls. That was why the three links could not be formally implemented until the elections were over.

If this is not "rewriting history," then we don't know what is. At the very least, it amounts to a 180 degree "That was then, this is now" about face. In fact, right up until the 2008 presidential election, the DPP government refused to expand cross-Strait exchanges. It lambasted the KMT for promoting a "One China Market." It warned that ""Taiwan men will be unable to find work. Taiwan women will be unable to find husbands. Taiwan children will end up as child labor in Heilongjiang." In 2009, a full year after three links were implemented, Tsai Ing-wen was till insisting that they were negatively impacting Taiwan's economy, and were the direct cause of unemployment on Taiwan. Until very recently, the DPP was still demonizing the three links as a Trojan horse, patiently waiting for an opportunity to infiltrate Taiwan. Not long ago, the three links was the DPP's ever convenient, all purpose whipping boy!

We are revisiting the past, not because we want to settle old scores with the DPP. In fact, if DPP presidential candidates are willing to be more pragmatic and rational, that is a national blessing. Good ideas and pragmatic policies are public property. If the DPP adopts the KMT's cross-Strait policy, in toto, the KMT is hardly going to sue the DPP for plagiarism or counterfeiting. As Hsu Hsin-liang said, "When cross-Strait relations remain the sole prerogative of the KMT, the DPP is going to find it hard to govern."

A pragmatic cross-Strait policy is not the exclusive franchise of any single political party. It is a universal good. But over the past decade, the DPP's cross-Strait policy has involved one about face after another. During the Chen Shui-bian era, the DPP went from a "new centrist policy," to "five noes," to calls for a "Taiwan independence referendum and the authoring of a new constitution." With its cavalier historical revisionism, it has left behind it a trail of destruction. When Su and Tsai make these changes in direction, they are hardly undergoing genuine transformation. After all, they still cannot explain their cross-Strait policy position. Such slapdash policy proposals can hardly pass muster during a presidential election and grossly underestimate the voters' common sense.

Cross-Strait relations have come a long way. The DPP must offer more than cross-Strait rhetoric. Su and Tsai must offer specific policies. In 2000 and 2008, the DPP offered empty rhetoric. It talked endlessly in circles. It labeled its empty rhetoric "effective management." In fact, it was nothing more than "hindered communication."

By contrast, over the past three years, under the Ma administration, the two sides have signed 14 agreements. These agreements encompass the three links, trade, mutual legal assistance, food safety, and cultural exchanges. One might say that the status quo is comprehensive cross-Strait exchanges. It is not that far removed from Hsu Hsin-liang's "bold opening." Does the DPP intend to maintain this status quo? Or does it intend to overturn it completely? There is no room for abstractions or for a "walk in the clouds." They must make themselves clear by speaking plainly.

At the very least the DPP must make clear whether it would continue the cross-Strait exchanges promoted during the Ma administration in the event it returns to power. The simplest approach would be to follow the recommendations of Hsu Hsin-liang. If the DPP returns to power, it must embrace all of the Ma administration's cross-Strait liberalization measures.

Last night, during the second primary debate, Hsu Hsin-liang said that both sides are dissatisfied with the 1992 Consensus, but that the 1992 Consensus remains an effective expedient. At the very least, it helps us shelve political disputes. It helps the two sides expand mutually beneficial economic and trade exchanges. The DPP may refuse to accept the 1992 Consensus. But what is its alternative? Is the DPP really prepared to bear the consequences of a setback in cross-Strait relations? The DPP must be honest and tell the voters where it stands. It must allow the voters to take the DPP's position into account when casting their ballots, It cannot attempt to squeak through without taking a stand. It cannot talk out of both sides of its mouth. It cannot deceive voters, then hope to muddle through.

The last time the DPP was in power, its cross-Strait policy failed to pass muster. It now has a chance to start over, Cross-Strait relations is the DPP's Achilles Heel. The DPP must not imagine it can continue to bob and weave, and by doing so, somehow muddle through.

民進黨兩岸政策 別想再用閃躲過關
2011-04-14 中國時報

民進黨昨日舉行總統初選第二次政見發表會，大家對三位參選人的兩岸政策拭目以待。可惜的是，許信良雖然直指核心，一開場就切入ＥＣＦＡ、九二共識等重大議題，蔡英文及蘇貞昌卻仍然打模糊戰，不是抽象式回答，就是迴避問題，失焦的政見發表會凸顯的是，民進黨仍無法整合提出一套務實可行的兩岸政策。

值得注意的是，兩次政見會中，蘇蔡不再攻擊ＥＣＦＡ，蔡蘇還為了誰主導兩岸開放政策，有一點小小的交鋒。在首次政見發表會中，蔡英文一直到結辯才露出底牌，她說，民進黨比國民黨更有能力處理兩岸事務，二千年執政後半年就推動小三通，二○○三年推動兩岸包機，她更強調，要不是民進黨二○○八年失去政權，也會推動兩岸直航。蘇貞昌則顯然不願屈居下風，因此也在結辯時加了一句，「當時帶著行政團隊的，正是我！」

而民進黨政府時代的陸委會前主委更是投書媒體，直指「推動直航、民進黨政府積極」，他說，三通一直是民進黨政府的政策，是北京基於政治考量，不想讓民進黨選舉加分，因此直到選舉結束，都無法正式實施。

坦白說，這若不算改寫歷史，也是某種程度的「昨非今是」。事實上，一直到二○○八年總統大選時，民進黨政府都相當排斥兩岸進一步擴大交流，痛批國民黨力推「一中市場」，會讓「查甫找沒工、查某找沒尪」；甚至在三通上路一年多，蔡英文在二○○九年仍然表示，三通影響台灣經濟，直接衝擊台灣失業。可以說，一直到不久之前，民進黨仍視三通為居心叵測的特洛伊木馬，伺機要侵蝕台灣，曾幾何時，直航竟成為民進黨大將爭功的利多政策！

重談這段往事，並不是要和民進黨算老帳，事實上，如果民進黨總統參選人更務實理性，那是國家之福。好的理念或是務實可行的政策都是公共財，如果民進黨全盤接收國民黨的兩岸政策，國民黨難道可以告民進黨抄襲、甚或仿冒？就如許信良所言，「當兩岸關係成為國民黨的專利，民進黨就很難執政了。」

務實的兩岸政策，非哪一個黨的專利，這是全民之福。只是，過去十年來，民進黨的兩岸政策，充斥太多昨是今非、昨非今是的前例。前總統陳水扁執政時代，就從新中間路線、四不一沒有、到推動公投制憲，留下一頁毀壞的轉型史；而這次的蘇蔡「轉向」，不但談不上轉型，連兩岸政策方向都說不清楚，這樣的政策品質，若想在總統大選過關，未免太看輕選民的判斷力！

兩岸關係走到這一步，民進黨不能只有兩岸論述而已，蘇蔡還必須提出對兩岸具體政策的態度。二千年及二○○八年，民進黨都只能空談論述，在無窮盡的前提要件中打轉，這些要件美其名為有效管理，其實經常是另一種形式的阻礙交流。

但是，馬政府近三年來，兩岸簽訂十四項協議，除了三通，尚有經貿協定、司法互助、食品安全及文化交流等；可以說，現狀就是兩岸全面交流，和許信良的大膽開放主張已相去不遠，民進黨執政後是要維持現狀，還是全面翻盤，他們確實沒有「抽象」或「漫步在雲端」的空間，必須說清楚、講明白。

民進黨至少要說清楚，馬政府任內推動兩岸交流，他們上台後是否維持，最簡單的作法是聽從許信良的建議，凡是馬政府任內的兩岸開放措施，民進黨上台後都「概括繼承」。

就如許信良昨晚在第二次政見發表會時所說，各方都對九二共識不滿意，但不能否認的是，九二共識是非常有效的權宜機制，至少能做到擱置政治爭議，讓兩岸能展開互利的經貿交流，民進黨若不接受九二共識，是另有對案呢？還是真要承受兩岸關係倒退的後果；民進黨應該誠實的告訴選民，讓選民做抉擇時納入考量，不能想要頭過身就過，玩兩面手法、騙選民過關。

民進黨上次執政，兩岸政策分數不及格，這次重頭再來，兩岸還是「罩門」，民進黨別想靠著閃躲就輕騎過關。