Tsai Ing-wen's Achilles Heel

Tsai Ing-wen's Achilles Heel
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 28, 2011

Tsai Ing-wen has won the DPP presidential primary poll, and become the party's presidential candidate. She must now address the damage done to the legitimacy of the party primary by the "exclusive support" and "Tsai/Ma/Ma" controversies. She faces an even greater test. She must change her tune on cross-Strait and economic policy, and move closer to the political center.

Tsai Ing-wen has three Achilles Heels. They are: her economic policy, her cross-Strait policy, and her split personality.

Tsai Ing-wen refuses to recognize the 1992 Consensus. She questions ECFA. She opposes nuclear power generation and the construction of the Kuo Kuang Petrochemical Plant. Her opposition to "growth oriented" economic policy forces her to champion "non-growth oriented" economic policy. She proposes a slow down. She wants to de-emphasize economic growth, and emphasize environmentalism. The inevitable result of her proposal to slow economic growth, is to de-emphasize cross-Strait exchanges. In 2000, Tsai Ing-wen prevented Chen Shui-bian from recognizing the 1992 Consensus. By doing so, she painted herself into a corner. How can she extricate herself from her dilemma? How can she reconcile slowing "growth oriented" economic policies with promises of full employment and social welfare? How can she do so, while resisting the magnetic attraction of the Mainland? All this has made the public question her integrity, and wonder if she has a split personality. Tsai Ing-wen's economic policy, cross-Strait policy, and split personality, will be her Achilles Heels on the road to the presidency. Ultimately, they will be a test her character.

Tsai Ing-wen painted herself into a corner when she refused to recognize the 1992 Consensus, and "questioned ECFA." She must extricate herself from her predicament as soon as possible, before the presidential election. The public has no desire to see a suicide bomber who "refuses to recognize 1992 Consensus" elected president and butt heads with Beijing. Beijing could slow official exchanges, cut the number of Mainland tourists allowed to visit Taiwan, reduce the amount of milkfish purchased from Taiwan, and reduce the number of scheduled cross-Strait airline flights. Beijing could announce that it is "listening to what she says, and watching what she does." That would be something Taiwan could not withstand. That is why Tsai Ing-wen dared not incorporate her refusal to recognize the 1992 Consensus and her call for a public referendum on ECFA into her campaign platform. That is why she cannot make these part of her governing strategy in the event she is elected. Tsai Ing-wen must turn back now. She must not wait until she is forced to jump from a moving vehicle.

Tsai Ing-wen's hawkish cross-Strait policy has influenced her economic policies. According to her logic, economic development pressures on Taiwan make it impossible to reduce economic and trade exchanges with the Mainland. Therefore her answer is to overturn our "growth oriented" and "pursuit of economic growth only" economic policy, and develop an agriculturally oriented "local economy" in our villages and towns. In other words, we must diminish our desire for economic development, and support her hawkish cross-Strait policy. Tsai Ing-wen's opposition to nuclear power generation and the Kuo Kuang Petrochemical Plant also force her to champion an "anti-growth" policy. Her political platform has become Utopian rural economic self-sufficiency. This of course is flagrant self-deception.

Cross-Strait economic and trade exchanges cannot be blocked. Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian tried to block them for nearly two decades and failed. Besides, cross-Strait relations have already passed the point of no return. The signing of ECFA heralded a new era. Tsai Ing-wen cannot cut back on cross-Strait economic and trade relations. She can no longer question EFCA. She cannot justify her hawkish cross-Strait policy. She can no longer refuse to recognize the 1992 Consensus. All she can do is change her cross-Strait political rhetoric, and reconcile it with cross-Strait economic and trade relations.

During last April's Two Yings Debate, Tsai Ing-wen advocating overturning our "growth oriented" economic policy. She questioned our "export-oriented" economic policy. But during the last round of primary debates, she said that "for the past four centuries, Taiwan has been a trading nation." Tsai Ing-wen's presidential primary speech surely must have been written and rewritten a hundred times. How could it contain such a glaring contradiction? Just exactly what is it that Tsai Ing-wen advocates? A nation founded on trade? Or opposition to an export-oriented economy?

Furthermore, the local economy, the cross-Strait economy, and the global economy are not mutually exclusive. They fit within each other. The global economy contains the cross-Strait economy, which in turn contains the local economy. The local economy is contained within the cross-Strait economy, which in turn is contained within the global economy. Each includes the other. As long as one starts from Taiwan, one will end up on Taiwan. How can one distinguish between "moving toward [Mainland] China by way of the world," and "moving toward the world by way of [Mainland] China?" Look at the swarms of Mainland tourists at the night market in Kaohsiung. How can one distinguish between the "local economy" and the "cross-Strait economy?" Look at the Flora Expo. How can one distinguish between the "global economy," the "cross-Strait economy," and the "local economy?" If Taiwan adopts Tsai Ing-wen's "local economy," it will be unable to afford increased welfare spending. It will be even less able to resist the siren call of the Mainland.

The presidential race has begun. Such cross-Strait and economic issues should be thoroughly debated. For Tsai Ing-wen, this presents a serious problem. This requires a public assessment of Tsai Ing-wen's integrity. Consider her environmental policy. When Tsai Ing-wen was Vice Premier, she lobbied on behalf of the Kuo Kuang Petrochemical Plant project. Now, with the wave of a magic wand, she has transformed herself into an environmentalist standard bearer, standing up against the Kuo Kuang Petrochemical Plant. With another wave of a magic wand, she has transformed herself from the Vice Premier who urged the swift completion of the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant, into the opponent of of commercial operations for the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant, and the champion of a nuclear-free homeland by 2025. Was her about face really the result of earnest soul-searching? Or merely the behavior of an opportunistic turncoat? Consider her cross-Strait policy. Tsai Ing-wen helped concoct the "two states theory." In 1999 the theory landed Lee Teng-hui in diplomatic hot water, without and within. Does Tsai Ing-wen really intend to repudiate the 1992 Consensus, and One China, Different Interpretations? Does she really intend to return the nation to the internal social divisions and external diplomatic crises of the Lee/Chen era? Tsai Ing-wen prevented Chen Shui-bian from recognizing the 1992 Consensus in 2000. She made it impossible for Chen Shui-bian to proceed down his "new centrist path." Does she truly intend to "refuse to recognize the 1992 Consensus?" Tsai Ing-wen talks of "strengthening democracy through rationality" Does she truly intend to make people wonder "What in the world is she is talking about?"

Tsai Ing-wen dismisses the 1992 Consensus as an "historical framework." But it was Tsai Ing-wen who imposed this "Tsai Ing-wen framework" on herself, in 1999 and 2004. Tsai Ing-wen refuses to divest herself of this framework. She wants the public to consider her framework a collective framework. She would have Beijing believe that this Tsai Ing-wen framework has public endorsement and support. Is Tsai Ing-wen merely ambitious? Or is she a raving lunatic?

All these questions reflect poorly on Tsai Ing-wen's character and integrity. She was a beneficiary of the 18% preferential interest rate for civil service employees. But now she denounces it. She lobbied on behalf of the Kuo Kuang Petrochemical Plant. But now she denounces it. She expedited construction on the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant. But now she denounces it. She boasted that "Taiwan was founded on trade." But now she opposes export-oriented economic policy. Her own family's cemetery is costly and extravangant. Yet she demonized Ma Ying-jeou's late father merely over the inscription on his funerary urn. She championed clean primary elections. Yet she exploited "exclusive support" and "Tsai/Ma/Ma" tactics. Her two states theory harmed Lee Teng-hui. Yet she remains obdurately opposed to "One China, Different Interpretations." Her opposition to the 1992 Consensus harmed Chen Shui-bian. Yet she refuses to divest herself of her "Tsai Ing-wen framework."

Tsai is capricious and self-contradictory. Tsai Ing-wen's character must be able to withstand public scrutiny. Tsai Ing-wen's advantage is her clean image. But a clean image is not the same as character and integrity. As the public begins to scrutinize Tsai Ing-wen's character, doubts will arise about her integrity. The election may change from one based on electioneering skill, to one based on fundamental principles. Tsai Ing-wen has won the party primary. She must now address her policy contradictions and her split personality.

蔡英文的三個罩門
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.04.28

蔡英文在民進黨總統初選民調獲勝出線。接下來，她須在黨內修補「唯一支持」及「蔡馬馬」造成的初選正當性破口；更大的考驗是，她須在兩岸政策及經濟政策上改變口吻，朝中間移動。

綜合而言，經濟政策、兩岸政策及人格整合是蔡英文的三大罩門，而三者又交互影響。

蔡英文「不承認九二共識」、「質疑ＥＣＦＡ」的兩岸政策，及非核、反國光石化的環保政策，造成了她必須反對「成長掛帥」，並主張「不以經濟成長率為主」的經濟政策；反過來說，她主張放緩、放低的經濟路線，及抬升的環保姿態，則是支撐其放緩、放低其兩岸交流的必然結論。而蔡英文將如何從在二○○○年阻擋陳水扁承認九二共識的窘境中脫困，又如何能以放緩「成長掛帥」的經濟政策去實現其就業與社福承諾及抗拒中國大陸的磁吸作用，皆將引發國人對其人格之平衡及整合的質疑。因而，經濟政策、兩岸政策與人格整合，將是蔡英文總統大選之路上的三大罩門，並歸結到對其人格品質的考驗。

蔡英文必須在總統大選前及早設法從「不承認九二共識」、「質疑ＥＣＦＡ」的困局中解套。一者因國人恐不願見蔡英文若當選總統後捆著「不承認九二共識」的人肉炸彈，去與北京攤牌；再者，屆時北京只要「放緩兩會交流」或「降低陸客來台人數、減購虱目魚及直航減班」，即可對「蔡總統」發出「聽其言，觀其行」的訊息，這絕對是台灣承受不起的。所以蔡英文不宜以「不承認九二共識」、「ＥＣＦＡ公投也是一個選項」為競選政見，更不可能以此作為若當選總統後的治國戰略。蔡英文宜早些轉彎，勿待被迫下車。

蔡英文的鷹派兩岸政策，強烈地影響了她的經濟政策。在她的邏輯中，台灣因經濟發展的壓力而無法降低與大陸的經貿交流；因而，她提供的答案是，應翻轉「成長掛帥」及「只追求經濟成長率」的經濟路線，向農業、鄉鎮去發展「在地經濟」。也就是要以降低經濟發展的欲求，去支撐其鷹派兩岸路線。此外，蔡英文非核及反石化的立場，也使她必須以「反成長」為訴求主調，鄉鎮自給自足的「桃花源經濟」成了她的品牌政見。這些，當然是自欺欺人。

兩岸的經貿交流絕無可擋，即使經李扁二屆政府近二十年來的切割也切不斷，何況兩岸如今已進入無可折返的「後ＥＣＦＡ」時代。因而，蔡英文不可能再以降低兩岸經貿關係（質疑ＥＣＦＡ），來支撐其鷹派的兩岸政策（不承認九二共識）；而只有調整其兩岸政治論述，以與兩岸經貿關係合轍。

在去年四月雙英辯論中，蔡英文主張翻轉「成長掛帥」，質疑「出口導向」；但在最後一場初選政見會中，她又說台灣四百年來皆以「貿易立國」。蔡英文豈可在千錘百鍊的總統初選演說稿中，出現如此水火不容的自相矛盾：究竟妳是主張貿易立國？還是反對出口導向？

何況，在同心圓的概念中，在地經濟、兩岸經濟及全球化經濟，其實是「全球→兩岸→在地」，及「在地→兩岸→全球」往復循環的體系，你泥中有我，我泥中有你；只要從台灣出發又回到台灣，誰能分出「由世界走向中國」或「由中國走向世界」？只要看一看高雄六合夜市的陸客盛況，誰能將「在地經濟」與「兩岸經濟」切割？也只要看一看花博，誰又能將「全球／兩岸／在地」切割？台灣若回到蔡英文的「在地經濟」，將更無力量支付社福支出，尤更無力量抵拒中國大陸的磁吸作用。

進入總統大選後，這類兩岸議題及經濟議題應當獲得徹底通透的辯論，這是蔡英文必須嚴肅面對的問題，因為這將涉及對蔡英文人格整合的評價。就環保政策言，蔡英文自關說國光石化環評的行政院副院長，搖身一變為反國光石化的旗手；又從督促核四趕工的行政院副院長，搖身一變開出了核四不商轉及二○二五非核家園的政治支票。這究竟是真實「反省」，還是投機「變臉」？就兩岸政策言，蔡英文參與製作的「兩國論」，已在一九九九年使李登輝陷於內外交迫；難道現在蔡英文還要再一次以否認「九二共識／一中各表」，讓國人回到內部痛苦撕裂、外交烽煙四起的李扁時代？再者，蔡英文已在二○○○年因阻擋陳水扁承認九二共識，而使陳水扁八年走不回他的「新中間路線」；難道現在還要再一次以「不承認九二共識」，讓國人去領教蔡英文的「理性讓民主更有力」？

蔡英文說，「九二共識」是「歷史框架」，其實那只是蔡英文在一九九九及二○○四年自己套在自己頭上的「蔡英文框架」。蔡英文不肯自己解下這副「框架」，卻想要國人在總統大選中承認並接受「蔡英文框架」成為「全民共業框架」，藉以向北京展現「蔡英文框架」的民意正當性；這究竟是蔡英文的宏謨大志，還是瘋人囈語？

這一切的辯論，可能皆將歸結到對蔡英文人格整合的評價。領十八趴，卻反十八趴；關說國光，卻反國光；催核四趕工，卻反核四；歌頌貿易立國，卻反對出口導向；自家墓園豪華，卻去消費馬英九的亡父；主張清正初選，卻縱容操作「唯一支持」、「蔡馬馬」；兩國論害了李登輝，自己仍反對「一中各表」；「反對九二共識」害了陳水扁，自己仍不肯脫下這個「蔡英文框架」。

如此善變且自相矛盾，蔡英文的人格品質必須禁得起民意的深究。蔡英文的優勢是形象清新，但形象清新並不等於人格整合；當社會評價逐漸開始思索蔡英文的人格品質，並引發議論及質疑，選戰的主軸或許將會由操作面，轉向基本面。蔡英文贏了初選，此時卻是修補政策矛盾及填充人格缺口的開端。