The DPP Should Encourage Beijing to Adopt One China, Different Interpretations

The DPP Should Encourage Beijing to Adopt One China, Different Interpretations
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 21, 2011

Yesterday, during the last party primary debate, Tsai Ing-wen finally unveiled her Mainland policy. The result was disappointing. As usual, she resorted to her strong suit -- flowery but empty emotional rhetoric. But when she addressed policy, her rhetoric was either hollow or self-contradictory. This was especially true of her Mainland policy.

Tsai Ing-wen longer says that she does not recognize the 1992 Consensus. She says only that she will not allow herself to be trapped within its "historical framework." She said that both sides have previously repudiated the 1992 Consensus. She also said she did not know what the 1992 Consensus meant. The fact is authorities on both sides have no choice but to endorse the 1992 Consensus. The 1992 Consensus is the underlying basis for cross-Strait peace. In other words, authorities on the two sides have already escaped their "historical framework." Only Tsai Ing-wen remains trapped in an "historical framework." She remains trapped because in 2000 she prevented Chen Shui-bian from accepting the 1992 Consensus.

In fact, the "historical framework" no longer exists. Tsai Ing-wen is merely trapped within her own "Tsai Ing-wen framework." She is also trapped within the "two states theory" and "opposition to ECFA." These are all part of Tsai Ing-wen's own idiosyncratic framework. No one else is trapped within it.

The Democratic Progressive Party hopes to win the 2012 presidential election. It hopes to pacify the nation following the election. If so, it must establish a cross-Strait framework that transcends the DPP's past cross-Strait framework, and the KMT's current cross-Strait framework. In order to transcend the DPP's past cross-Strait framework, the DPP must reaffirm the Republic of China and renounce Taiwan independence. In order to transcend the KMT's current cross-Strait framework, the DPP must uphold the 1992 Consensus. It must do even more. It must encourage Beijing to publicly and actively implement "One China, Different Interpretations." This is how the DPP can liberate itself from its "historical framework."

The DPP repudiated the 1992 Consensus and One China, Different Interpretations. Its main reason for doing so, was that it refuses to recognize the Republic of China and its One China Constitution. The reason it refuses to recognize the Republic of China and its One China Constitution, is that it is attempting to engage in "backdoor listing." Basically it remains a prisoner of Taiwan independence.

But the DPP has another reason for refusing to recognize the 1992 Consensus. Beijing has yet to openly and actively adopt the One China, Different Interpretations position. Conversely, it is precisely because Beijing has yet to openly and actively adopt the One China, Different Interpretations position, that enables the DPP to continue repudiating the 1992 Consensus.

Suppose the DPP openly renounces Taiwan independence? Suppose it sincerely reaffirms support for the Republic of China, and ceases engaging in deceitful "backdoor listing?" It could then justifiably demand that Beijing openly and actively adopt the One China, Different Interpretations position. Doing so would allow the DPP to transcend its past framework. It would allow the DPP to transcend even the KMT's current framework, It would exert pressure on Beijing, and receive support from a majority of the public.

The 1992 Consensus is the premise and foundation for improving cross-Strait relations. If the DPP refuses to recognize the 1992 Consensus, it cannot maintain peaceful cross-Strait relations. Therefore the DPP should take advantage of the leverage it offers. It should proclaim that it recognizes the 1992 Consensus. It should demand that One China, Different Interpretations be made part of the 1992 Consensus. If the 1992 Consensus includes One China, Different Interpreations, the Democratic Progressive Party should express its support. If the 1992 Consensus does not include One China, Different Interpretations, then the DPP can refuse to offer its support. This would be a legitimate political position. Beijing would probably respond reasonably. If so, most people would back the Democratic Progressive Party on this matter.

The 1992 Consensus is the premise and foundation for improving cross-Strait relations. But it has fallen into the gap between Taipei's One China, Different Interpretations position, and Beijing's Different Interpretations of One China position. The Ma administration has persuaded Beijing to refrain from openly repudiating One China, Different Interpretations. This is where the DPP can transcend the KMT. It can encourage Beijing to openly adopt the One China, Different Interpretations position. This would enable the DPP to gain the upper in its struggle with the KMT. It would enable the DPP to seize the initiative when dealing with Beijing.

On March 22, 2008, Ma Ying-jeou was elected president. Four days later, on March 26, Chairman Hu Jintao spoke to President George W. Bush on the Bush/Hu hotline. He said "[The two sides acknowledge that there is only one China, but have different definitions of what that One China is." This has been interpreted as One China, Different Interpretations. But in the Chinese language version of the Xinhua News Agency transcript, no such language appears. And Beijing has never mentioned it since. Three years later, on March 26 this year, Taiwan Affairs Office Director Wang Yi said: "Currently relations between the two sides are good. They embody the One China principle and the 1992 Consensus. The two sides have different interpretations of the meaning of One China, Nevertheless we are able to seek common ground, This is the essence of the 1992 Consensus." On its third anniversary, Wang Yi appears to have reintroduced the One China, Different Interpretations position on the Bush/Hu Hotline. Apparently Beijing knows that the 1992 Consensus must include One China, Different Interpretations. That is the only form of 1992 Consensus acceptable to the public on Taiwan.

Unless the DPP wants to precipitate another cross-Strait political conflagration, it cannot repudiate the 1992 Consensus. In the Democratic Progressive Party's struggle to avoid coercion, it has passively accepted the 1992 Consensus. It has also struggled to avoid the Ma adminstration or the Beijing authorities from making further progress with One China, Different Interpretations. To wit, Wang Yi's talk in March. The DPP cannot repudiate and reject the 1992 Consensus. But it can use it to gain leverage. It can raise the ante and improve its bargaining position by transcending One China, Different Interpretations.

民進黨應促北京正面採行「一中各表」
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.04.21

蔡英文承諾在昨日終場政見會中闡釋她的中國政策，結果依然令人失望。以華麗但空泛的詞藻訴諸感性仍是她的強項，但在論述政策時卻不是流於空洞，就是自相矛盾，其中國政策尤然。

蔡英文不再說不承認「九二共識」，只說她不會陷入「歷史框架」。她說兩岸當權者皆曾否認「九二共識」，且也不知「九二共識」的內容是什麼？但實情則是，如今的兩岸主政者非但皆支持「九二共識」，且以「九二共識」為兩岸和平發展的基礎及前提。也就是說：兩岸當局已經走出「歷史框架」，唯蔡英文卻仍陷「歷史框架」中，因為她在二○○○年曾阻擋陳水扁接受「九二共識」。

其實「歷史框架」已不存在，蔡英文只是陷於「蔡英文框架」。除了「九二共識」，還有「兩國論」及「反對ＥＣＦＡ」，這些皆是別人沒有而唯蔡英文獨有的「框架」。

民進黨若欲贏得二○一二總統大選，並想在當選後能平順治國，就須建立一套超越民進黨過去，及超越國民黨現在的兩岸論述。所謂「超越民進黨過去」，就是回歸中華民國，揚棄台獨；所謂「超越國民黨現在」，就是維持「九二共識」，且進一步促使北京公開正面地採行「一中各表」的政策。這也就是民進黨應當走出的「歷史框架」。

民進黨否認「九二共識／一中各表」，主要原因是不承認一中憲法的中華民國；而不承認一中憲法的中華民國，主要是因想「借殼上市」，本質上仍是台獨。

不過，民進黨不承認「九二共識」的另一原因，是認為北京並未公開正面地採行「一中各表」；從另一角度來看，也正因北京未能公開正面地採行「一中各表」，使民進黨仍有否認「九二共識」的空間。

因而，若是民進黨公開揚棄台獨路線，真實回歸中華民國（不是借殼上市）；即可理直氣壯地要求北京公開正面採行「一中各表」的政策。如此既可超越民進黨的過去，又可超越國民黨的現在，應當會對北京形成壓力，亦會受到多數國人支持。

「九二共識」是兩岸改善關係的前提與基礎，民進黨若不接受「九二共識」，絕無可能維持和平互動的兩岸關係。因而，民進黨應可借力使力，一方面宣示接受「九二共識」，但另一方面強調「一中各表」必須包含在「九二共識」之中；若「九二共識」包含「一中各表」，民進黨即表支持；若「九二共識」否定「一中各表」，則民進黨即不能接受。這是一個合情合理的政治折衝，相信北京亦應對民進黨有合情合理的回應；若能如此，台灣多數民眾亦願為民進黨的後盾。

「九二共識」是兩岸改善關係的前提與基礎，但迄今仍在我方主張「一中各表」、對方主張「各表一中」的拉鋸之中。馬政府現在已經做到的，是北京方面「不公開正面否認一中各表」；民進黨在這方面能夠超越國民黨的空間，即在設法促使北京「公開正面採納一中各表」。這非但可使民進黨將與國民黨競爭的劣勢地位翻轉，也能在與北京折衝的互動關係中取得主動地位。

二○○八年三月二十二日，馬英九當選總統，四天後，三月二十六日，胡錦濤主席在布胡熱線中主動向小布希總統說：「（兩岸）雙方承認只有一個中國，但同意對其定義不同。」這被解讀為同意「一中各表」；但在中文版的新華社稿中無此節，且此後北京即不再有此類言論。三年後，今年三月二十六日，國台辦主任王毅說：「兩岸目前的良好關係，是體現了一個中國的九二共識；儘管對於一個中國的涵義，雙方認知不同，但我們可以求同存異，這是九二共識的精髓所在。」王毅的談話，在「布胡熱線」三周年發表，似是再一次且是布胡熱線後第一次又聽到北京發出類似「一中各表」的論述。可見，北京亦知，包含「一中各表」的「九二共識」，是台灣人民唯一可以接受的「九二共識」。

除非民進黨想將兩岸關係再次推進政治煉獄，它絕無否定「九二共識」的空間。民進黨為了避免在受裹脅的情勢下，被動接受「九二共識」，亦為了避免馬政府或北京政府率先在「一中各表」上更有進展（如王毅三月談話）；故而民進黨根本沒有否定及拒絕「九二共識」的本錢，卻有借力使力，用加碼來改善及鞏固「一中各表」的超越空間。