Repudiating 1992 Consensus: Tsai Ing-wen Must Pull Back From the Abyss

Repudiating 1992 Consensus: Tsai Ing-wen Must Pull Back From the Abyss
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 28, 2011

Summary: Tsai Ing-wen refuses to recognize the 1992 Consensus. She even insists that Beijing does not recognize "one China, different interpretations." She is apparently afraid that Beijing might recognize "one China, different interpretations." She is unwilling to see it happen. Therefore if she is elected president, she will not only undermine the 1992 Consensus as a basis for dialogue, she will make it difficult to reaffirm "one China, different interpretations." This is the folly of ramming one's head against a brick wall. She should realize she is hurtling toward an abyss and pull back on the reins.

Full Text Below:

Tsai Ing-wen refuses to recognize the 1992 Consensus. She even insists that Beijing does not recognize "one China, different interpretations." She is apparently afraid that Beijing might recognize "one China, different interpretations." She is unwilling to see it happen. Therefore if she is elected president, she will not only undermine the 1992 Consensus as a basis for dialogue, she will make it difficult to reaffirm "one China, different interpretations." This is the folly of ramming one's head against a brick wall. She should realize she is hurtling toward an abyss and pull back on the reins.

Actually, in recent months, Tsai Ing-wen has been stealthily leaning toward "one China, different interpretations." For example, she said "one China, different interpretations" could be included in any discussion of a "Taiwan consensus." She said that "The 1992 Consensus does not equal one China, different interpretations. If it did, why not simply refer to it as "one China, different interpretations." Why refer to it as the 1992 Consensus? These remarks suggest that if elected, she might attempt to return to "one China, different interpretations."

If Tsai Ing-wen is elected, she will still attempt to use her "cross-Strait dialogue working group" to remedy her rift with Beijing, She will also attempt to use to use her "stable economic dialogue group" to remedy the economic crisis, Therefore she must return to the source. the Constitution of the Republic of China, She must persuade Beijing to recognize "one China, different interpretations" in accordance with the one China Constitution. Otherwise Tsai Ing-wen will have no way out on the issue of cross-Strait relations.

The 1992 Consensus is important because it facilitates Taipei's advocacy and Beijing's acceptance of "one China, different interpretations." In recent years, the Ma administration has treated the 1992 Consensus and "one China, different interpretations" as a package deal. Its relentless efforts have convinced Beijing to "seek common ground while setting aside differences," and to adopt a posture of "mutual non-denial." Ma Ying-jeou has not been 100% successful in convincing Beijing to recognize "one China, different interpretations." Nevertheless he has made substantial progress.

One reason Tsai Ing-wen cites for refusing to recognize "one China, different interpretations," is that Beijing has yet to publicly recognize "one China, different interpretations." Beijing's "seeking common ground while setting aside differences" may not equal "one China, different interpretations," at least not word for word. But it is extremely close to "one China, different interpretations." Besides, Tsai Ing-wen said only that Beijing does not recognize "one China, different interpretations." More importantly, Beijing has never criticized or repudiated the Ma administration's repeated advocacy of "one China, different interpretations," and its assertion that "the term one China refers to the Republic of China." After all, so-called "different interpretations" could be considered either "mutual recognition" or "mutual non-denial."

Besides, Beijing has publicly acknowledged "one China, different interpretations." It did so on two important occasions. The first was during the March 2008 hotline exchange, when Hu Jintao told President Bush, "The Chinese Mainland and Taiwan will resume negotiations on the basis of the 1992 Consensus, This means that both sides recognize that there is only one China, but agree to interpret its meaning differently." The other was in May of this year, when Taiwan Affairs Office Director Wang Yi said, "Although the two sides have different understandings of the meaning of one China, we can nevertheless seek common ground, This is the essence of the 1992 Consensus."

Should Tsai Ing-wen advocate "one China, different interpretations?" Whether she should, and whether Beijing has publicly recognized "one China, different interpretations" are entirely different matters. Whether Beijing ought to recognize the Republic of China is one thing, Whether Tsai Ing-wen ought to recognize the Republic of China is another thing altogether. After all, if Tsai Ing-wen refuses to recognize the Republic of China, how can she run for president of the Republic of China?

As we pointed out earlier, the Ma administration has repeatedly advocated "one China, different interpretations," and insisted that "the term one China refers to the Republic of China." Yet Beijing has neither criticized nor repudiated Ma's statements. Ma has gradually convinced Beijing to "seek common ground while setting aside differences," and to address the issue rationally. If Tsai Ing-wen is elected and refuses to recognize the 1992 Consensus, she will have to reaffirm the "one China Constitution" and "one China, different interpretations." Unless of course, she is deliberately using "one nation on each side" and "Taiwan independence" to provoke a showdown with Beijing. But will Beijing lightly permit Tsai Ing-wen to retreat to "one China, different interpretations" or the "one China Constitution?" Or will Beijing take advantage of the situation to pressure Tsai Ing-wen into accepting "one China" or the "one China principle?" Will it refuse to let her to cling to "one China, different interpretations?"

Tsai Ing-wen herself said that "Beijing does not recognize one China, different interpretations." If Beijing refuses to allow Tsai Ing-wen to retreat to "one China, different interpretations," would that be Tsai Ing-wen's intention?

Consider Tsai Ing-wen's plight. Beijing could refuse to let her adopt a "one China, different interpretations" stance. If she recognizes the 1992 Consensus before the election, she can avoid that risk. But if she repudiates the 1992 Consensus before the election, she will have no room to retreat after the election. Bejing could pressure her to accept the "one China principle." Ma Ying-jeou and the KMT have achieved a measure of trust with Beijing. They have convinced Beijing to accept "one China, different interpretations," "no [immediate] reunification, no independence, no use of force," and even the assertion that "one China refers to the Republic of China," But Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP have not achieved the same measure of trust. They might not be able to do what Ma and the KMT have been able to do. In fact, we can say with absolute assurance that they will not be able to what Ma and the KMT have been able to do.

If Tsai Ing-wen is elected, she might destroy the 1992 Consensus as a means of "seeking common ground while setting aside differences." She must do everything possible to stabilize cross-Strait relations, Taiwan independence forces however, will not grant her much latitude. Beijing meanwhile, will adopt a two-pronged, carrot and stick, "listen to her words and look at her actions," strategy. It will be ready to touch Taipei's political and economic nerves. A newly elected President Tsai would be in a terrible dilemma. She would be beseiged from without and within. She would be unable to advance or retreat.

If Tsai Ing-wen is sufficiently deluded to lead the nation in the wrong direction, she will be beyond redemption. Does she truly not know she is hurtling toward an abyss? Does she truly not know she must pull back on the reins?

否定九二共識 蔡英文應懸崖勒馬
【聯合報╱社論】
2011.12.28 02:07 am

蔡英文非但否定「九二共識」，甚至屢指北京不承認「一中各表」，狀似深恐或不樂見北京承認「一中各表」；因而，她若當選總統，非但將失去「九二共識」的對話基礎，甚至也將很難回到「一中各表」的操作空間。這是推車撞壁的愚妄行徑，應當懸崖勒馬。

近月以來，蔡英文其實有偷偷向「一中各表」靠攏的跡象；包括她說「一中各表可以納入台灣共識的討論」，又說「九二共識不等於一中各表，如果是，那就叫一中各表好了，何必說是九二共識」。這些，皆是她在若當選後可能嘗試回到「一中各表」的伏筆。

蔡英文若當選，她倘欲以「兩岸工作對話小組」補救她與北京的裂痕，又欲以「安定經濟對話小組」挽救經濟危機，她就絕對必須回到原原本本、原汁原味的中華民國憲法，並根據「憲法一中」向北京爭取「一中各表」，捨此蔡英文在兩岸問題上絕無活路。

「九二共識」之所以非常重要，在於它能便利載送及發展「一中各表」。這幾年來，馬政府以「九二共識」挾帶「一中各表」，與北京纏、鬥、魯、拗，終於使北京走向「求同存異」，其實也就是將北京帶入了「互不否認」的架構；馬英九雖未使「一中各表」完全成功，但已見極其重大的成就。

蔡英文否定「一中各表」，理由之一是，中國未公開承認過「一中各表」。但北京的「求同存異」，即使不是與「一中各表」字字相同，卻已十分接近「一中各表」。何況，蔡英文只說，北京未承認「一中各表」，但更重要的，卻是北京迄今從未批駁或否認過馬政府反覆主張的「一中各表」，及「一個中國就是中華民國」。豈不知，所謂的「各表」，可以是「相互承認」，也可以是「互不否認」。

何況，北京並非沒有公開承認過「一中各表」。最重要的有兩次：一次在二○○八年三月的熱線電話中，胡錦濤向小布希說：「中國大陸和台灣將在九二共識的基礎上恢復談判，意即雙方承認只有一個中國，但同意其涵意各自表述。」另一次在今年五月，國台辦主任王毅說：「儘管對於一個中國的涵義，雙方認知不同，但我們可以求同存異，這是九二共識的精髓所在。」

尤其，蔡英文應否主張「一中各表」，其實與北京是否公開承認「一中各表」根本是兩回事。因為，北京未承認「中華民國」是一回事，蔡英文應承認「中華民國」卻是另一回事。否則，蔡英文若不承認「中華民國」，又怎能選中華民國總統？

前文指出，馬政府反覆主張「一中各表」及「一個中國就是中華民國」，非但未見北京批駁否認，且已漸將中共帶向「求同存異」；衡情論理，蔡英文若當選，又否定九二共識，除非她欲以「一邊一國」或「台獨」與北京攤牌對撞，不然，她也必須回到「憲法一中」及「一中各表」。但是，屆時北京會不會輕易讓蔡英文回到「一中各表」或「憲法一中」？會不會趁勢迫使蔡英文直接接受「一個中國」或「一個中國原則」，連「一中各表」的餘地都不給她？

因為，蔡英文自己說的，「北京不承認一中各表」；而北京屆時若不給蔡英文「一中各表」的空間，豈不亦正合蔡英文之本意？

就蔡英文的處境而言，她倘接受「九二共識」，在若當選後或可避免「求一中各表而不可得」的危境；但如今她刻意自毀「九二共識」的操作空間，卻必將毫無緩衝地面臨「一中原則」的直接壓力。以民進黨及蔡英文的兩岸信任度言，馬英九及國民黨如今做得到的，如「一中各表」、「不統／不獨／不武」、「一個中國就是中華民國」，未來民進黨及蔡英文未必能做得到，甚至可斷言絕對做不到。

可以想像，蔡英文若當選，又自毀了「九二共識」這個「求同存異」的操作利器，她一方面必須千方百計去穩定兩岸關係，另一方面台獨勢力又不容她讓步太大，而再一方面北京則發動「聽其言／觀其行」的軟硬兩手策略，隨時可以扯動台灣的政經神經；那將是怎樣一個焦頭爛額的「蔡總統」？那又將是如何一個內憂外患、進退失據的台灣？

若是自誤誤國至此地步，蔡英文恐是九死莫贖，豈能不懸崖勒馬？