Tsai Ing-wen's Three Illusions

Tsai Ing-wen's Three Illusions
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 10, 2011

Summary: Following last weekend's presidential debate, Tsai Ing-wen presented her cross-Strait policy platform. One. She would repudiate the 1992 Consensus and replace it with her so-called "Taiwan consensus." Two. She would replace SEF and ARATS with her so-called "cross-Strait dialogue working group." In sum, Tsai Ing-wen intends to shred the 1992 Consensus immediately upon taking office. She intends to overturn the cross-Strait dialogue and consultation table. She expects Beijing to wait passively until she trots out her "Taiwan consensus" and "cross-Strai dialogue working group." This is not mere fantasy. This is delusion. This is nothing short of suicide.

Full Text Below:

Following last weekend's presidential debate, Tsai Ing-wen presented her cross-Strait policy platform. One. She would repudiate the 1992 Consensus and replace it with her so-called "Taiwan consensus." Two. She would replace SEF and ARATS with her so-called "cross-Strait dialogue working group."

Take the 1992 Consensus. The Ma administration and the Beijing regime consider the 1992 Consensus the basis for cross-Strait relations. The Ma administration refers to the "1992 Consensus, one China, different interpretations." The Hu regime refers to the "1992 Consensus, seeking agreement while setting aside differences." The two sides' positions overlap. They hold different interpretations about the meaning of one China. But they concur with the wording used in the 2008 Bush-Hu hotline conversation. In other words, the 1992 Consensus means the Republic of China must return to Republic of China as defined in the Constitution of the Republic of China. It must return to "one China, different interpretations." But Taiwan independence forces have taken Tsai Ing-wen hostage. She refuses to accept the Constitition of the Republic of China and "one China, different interpretations." She refuses to accept the 1992 Consensus. President Ma Ying-jeou repeatedly asked Tsai Ing-wen why she refuses to accept the 1992 Consensus. After all, the "one China" in the 1992 Consensus is the Republic of China. Tsai Ing-wen's unspoken answer was how can the Taiwan independence movement possibly accept it?

The 1992 Consensus is a term used by authorities on both sides of the Taiwan Strait almost every day. Yet Tsai Ing-wen stubbornly insists that it "does not exist." Instead, she would replace the 1992 Consensus with the clearly non-existent "Taiwan consensus."

Tsai Ing-wen says the "Taiwan consensus" is a "democratic process." In other words, the "Taiwan consensus" has yet to be debated and studied, let alone turned into law. It is currently nothing more than an empty suggestion.

Tsai Ing-wen's so-called "Taiwan consensus" has two problems. One. Suppose the "Taiwan consensus" actually does "start over from a blank slate?" Suppose it actually is a "democratic process?" If it is, then Tsai Ing-wen must repudiate it for the same reason she repudiates the 1992 Consensus. She must officially forsake the "Taiwan Independence Party Platform" and the "Resolution for a Normal Nation." After all, these Taiwan independence programs have never been approved by the "democratic process." In fact the 1992 Consensus was the cornerstone of Ma Ying-jeou's National Policy Platform during the 2008 presidential election. How can Tsai claim it has not been subjected to the "democratic process?" Two. Tsai must first explain her own position on a number of matters. Doesn't the Constitution of the Republic of China represent the constitutional and legal consensus on Taiwan? If it does, then why refuse to accept "one China, different interpretations?" If it does not, then why not openly repudiate the Republic of China? Why not openly champion Taiwan independence?

Now let us address the matter of the SEF and ARATS. Tsai Ing-wen has proposed a "cross-Strait dialogue working group." She has done so because she realizes that if she is elected, the SEF and ARATS dialogue mechanism will disintegrate. This is why she feels compelled to establish a "cross-Strait dialogue working group."

In sum, Tsai Ing-wen's cross-strait policy framework has two problems. One. She stubbornly insists on denying the existence of the 1992 Consensus, which already exists and has worked perfectly for years, and replacing it with her so-called "Taiwan Consensus." Two. She stubbornly insists on nullifying the SEF and ARATS, two long-established, smoothly-operating cross-Strait groups, and replacing them with her so-called "cross-Strait dialogue working group." But both Tsai's "Taiwan consensus" and "cross-Strait dialogue working group" are empty shells. Nobody has any idea what they actually mean.

Beijing has already warned Tsai Ing-wen not to harbor "three illusions." Beijing says the DPP harbors "three illusions." One. The Democratic Progressive Party will return to power, sooner or later, The Mainland must face this fact. Actually the first question the Mainland must ask is "Does the DPP accept the 1992 consensus?" Two. Beijing says if the Democratic Progressive Party returns to power it may try to persuade the Mainland to reach an "alternative consensus." It may try to persuade Beijing to accept Tsai Ing-wen's "Taiwan consensus." Three. Beijing says the DPP intends to steal credit for any number of agreements reached over the past three years as the result of cross-Strait rapproachment. Does Tsai Ing-wen really think she can successfully steal credit for ECFA, direct flights, and Mainland tourists coming to Taiwan?

Mainland policy advisor Zhou Zhihuai is a spokesperson for the Beijing authorities. Zhou warned the DPP not to harbor "three illusions." He warned the DPP to forsake Taiwan independence, forsake its "three illusions," and to affirm the 1992 Consensus, He said "There is no alternative." Without the 1992 Consensus, cross-Strait peaceful development will run aground. Zhou Zhihuai said the 1992 Consensus is Beijing's bottom line. The DPP must face this fact.

Prior to this, Hu Jintao made it clear that the 1992 consensus is a prerequisite for cross-Strait dialogue and consultation. Would Tsai Ing-wen's "cross-Strait dialogue working group" adhere to this premise? Hu also made it clear that the 1992 Consensus is an important basis for peaceful development Would this be part of Tsai Ing-wen's "Taiwan consensus?" Taiwan Affairs Office Director Wang Yi also said "The 1992 Consensus cannot be denied."

The President of the Republic of China must abide by the 1992 Consensus. One China, different interpretations is consistent with the Constitution. For the Beijing authorities, the 1992 Consensus allows "seeking commonalities while shelving disagreements," while opposing Taiwan independence. Tsai Ing-wen refuses to recognize the 1992 Consensus. To the public on Taiwan, she has cast doubts about her allegiance to the Constitution. To the Beijing authorities, she has marked herself as a champion of Taiwan independence. Her reckless unilateralism has provoked clashes on Taiwan and in Beijing. Even assuming her demagogic "Three Little Pigs" election ploy wins her the election, the nation will be in turmoil, within and without. She will be hoisted on her own petard.

In sum, Tsai Ing-wen intends to shred the 1992 Consensus immediately upon taking office. She intends to overturn the cross-Strait dialogue and consultation table. She expects Beijing to wait passively until she trots out her "Taiwan consensus" and "cross-Strai dialogue working group."

This is not mere fantasy. This is delusion. This is nothing short of suicide.

蔡英文的三個幻想
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.12.10

上周末辯論後，蔡英文的兩岸政策架構所呈現的樣態是：一：在綱領上，以「台灣共識」否定「九二共識」；二、在機制上，以「兩岸對話工作小組」，取代兩岸兩會。

先談綱領。如今，馬政府與北京政權皆以「九二共識」為兩岸關係的基本綱領；馬政府稱「九二共識／一中共表」，胡政權則謂「九二共識／求同存異」；雙方的交集是「對一個中國的涵義認知不同，但同意對其各自表述」（二○○八布胡熱線語）。也就是說，「九二共識」的準則與底線是，「中華民國應是回到『一中各表』的中華民國憲法的中華民國」；但蔡英文被台獨勢力挾持，拒絕接受「一中各表」的中華民國憲法，因而否定「九二共識」。所以，馬英九總統屢次問蔡英文：「一中」就是「中華民國」，為何妳不接受？蔡英文未說出的答案則是：台獨豈能接受？

「九二共識」一詞，幾乎每日皆出自海峽兩岸執政當局之口，但蔡英文卻偏偏謂其「不存在」；她反而欲以明明才是「不存在」的「台灣共識」，來取代「九二共識」。

蔡英文說，「台灣共識」是一個「民主程序」；也就是說，「台灣共識」尚待辯論、研議，甚至立法，現在還只是一個空殼子而已。

此說至少有兩點可議：一、倘若「台灣共識」真的是一種「歸零思考」的「民主程序」，則蔡英文就應當像否定「九二共識」一樣，先一併正式否棄《台獨黨綱》及《正常國家決議文》，因為這些台獨綱領，無一經由「民主程序」而形成。何況，「九二共識」是馬英九自二○○八年大選即提出的國政綱領，豈能謂「未經民主程序」？二、蔡英文必須先說明，「中華民國憲法」是否即是法制上的「最高台灣共識」？倘若是，為何不接受「一中各表」？倘若不是，則何以不公開否定「中華民國」？或公開倡議「台獨」？

再論機制。蔡英文提出「兩岸對話工作小組」之議，顯已感知，她若當選，兩岸兩會的協議對話機制必告中止，因此必須另設「兩岸對話工作小組」。

總括前論，蔡英文的兩岸政策架構樣態是：一、偏偏要否定已經存在並運行平順的「九二共識」，而另提「台灣共識」；二、又偏偏要停廢已經存在並運作平順的兩岸兩會，而另提「兩岸對話工作小組」。問題是：「台灣共識」及「兩岸對話工作小組」，都只是一個放了幾把空心菜的空殼子，根本不知究竟為何物？

北京已經勸告蔡英文不必存有「三個幻想」。北京認為，民進黨的「三個幻想」是：一、民進黨早晚會執政，大陸必須面對（其實，大陸必須面對的第一個問題就是：「民進黨是否接受九二共識？」）。二、民進黨一旦執政，一定會與大陸談出「其他共識」（是要北京接受蔡英文的「台灣共識」嗎？）。三、民進黨打算收割過去三年多兩岸多項協議的成果（蔡英文難道要「收割」ＥＣＦＡ、直航及陸客來台等等？）。

為「勿存三個幻想」傳話的大陸智囊周志懷說：民進黨不要異想天開，必須丟掉這「三個幻想」；亦即要放棄台獨，堅持九二共識，「捨此之外，無路可走」；否則，兩岸和平發展必將面臨挑戰。周志懷說：「九二共識」是北京的政策底線，民進黨必須面對。

在此之前，胡錦濤已明言：「九二共識」是對話協商的必要前提（「兩岸對話工作小組」要不要這個「前提」？），也是和平發展的重要基礎（「台灣共識」要不要這個「基礎」？）。國台辦主任王毅更說：「九二共識不容否定。」

其實，「九二共識」，對中華民國總統而言，就是遵守「一中各表」的憲法準則；對北京當局而言，就是可以「求同存異」，但反對台獨。蔡英文否定「九二共識」，對內產生國憲認同的疑義，在北京則指其為台獨；這是內外都擺不平的盲動政策及單邊主義，即使她憑「三隻小豬」的民粹氛圍而當選，屆時也必是內外交煎，頭過身不過！

總括而論，蔡英文的兩岸政見是：上任後要立即撕毀「九二共識」，並掀翻兩岸兩會的對話協商桌子！要北京等她端出「台灣共識」及「兩岸對話工作小組」再說！

這不只是幻想，已是非愚即妄，更不啻是自殺。