Tsai Ing-wen is the One Repudiating the Taiwan Consensus

Tsai Ing-wen is the One Repudiating the Taiwan Consensus
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 7, 2011

Summary: Many people do not understand DPP chairman and presidential candidate Tsai Ing-wen. What does she mean when she holds forth on her "Taiwan consensus?" Tsai Ing-wen says "The Taiwan consensus is simply the process of Taiwan's democratization." Tsai Ing-wen's explanation is not wrong. Political parties may hold different positions on reunification and independence. But a consensus can still be achieved through the democratic process. A direct presidential election is the clearest example of just such a democratic process. The outcome of such a democratic election is the clearest example of a Taiwan consensus.

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Many people do not understand DPP chairman and presidential candidate Tsai Ing-wen. What does she mean when she holds forth on her "Taiwan consensus?" Tsai Ing-wen says "The Taiwan consensus is simply the process of Taiwan's democratization." Tsai Ing-wen's explanation is not wrong. For the 23 million Republic of China citizens who live on Taiwan, the "Taiwan consensus" ought to be an uncontroversial topic. We are all Taiwanese. We all love Taiwan. Political parties may hold different positions on reunification and independence. But a consensus is still possible through the democratic process. A direct presidential election is the clearest example of such a democratic process. The outcome of such a democratic election is the clearest example of a Taiwan consensus.

Unfortunately Tsai Ing-wen persists in obfuscation. The Taiwan consensus is not the Democratic Progressive Party consensus. Voters on Taiwan will decide. The ruling and opposition parties, which compete for power, must accept their decision. The Taiwan consensus is not a unilateral laying down of the law.

Tsai Ing-wen argues that when voters on Taiwan arrive at a consensus, cross-Strait relations will actually be more stable, and the Mainland will actually be happier. The Mainland will no longer have to worry about ruling party changes under Taiwan's democracy. The Mainland will realize that government policy will not change merely because the ruling party has changed. Tsai argues that "When the government holds consultations, rooted in the will of the people, and expressed through a democratic and transparent process, the rights of our citizens will be assured." Tsai promises that if she is elected, she will establish a "dialogue group" and consult with opponents Ma Ying-jeou and James Soong.

Tsai Ing-wen's rhetoric is unassailable. Since the 1996 presidential election, the Republic of China has undergone two ruling party changes. During this period, cross-Strait policy underwent little change. The only difference was the pace of change. The Mainland is unconcerned about which party rules on Taiwan. But cross-Strait relations must not regress. This is also consistent with the interests and expectations of the public on Taiwan.

President Chiang Ching-kuo opened the doors to cross-Strait communications. Veterans could visit their birthplace. Contacts were no longer forbidden. Chiang's reasoning was simple. People on both sides are friends and relatives. What right did the government have to keep friends and relatives apart? President Lee Teng-hui expanded these exchanges. We went from individual contacts to economic and trade exchanges. The scope may have been limited. But Taiwan businessmen are now our friends and neighbors. Later Lee's "avoid haste, be patient" policy limited the pace of these exchanges. But Lee was unable to prevent Taiwan businessmen from moving to the Mainland.

President Chen Shui-bian invoked "New Centrist Path" rhetoric, enabling the Democratic Progressive Party to attain power. But he could not overturn the foundation for cross-Strait exchanges laid down by the KMT. Chen Shui-bian was in office for eight years. His scorched earth diplomacy led to a cross-Strait freeze. But private sector exchanges never ceased. Cultural and creative exchanges enabled talent from Taiwan to shine on the Mainland.

When Chen Shui-bian was elected, he spoke of an "inter-party cross-Strait policy group." The group was to be headed by former Academia Sinica Chairman Lee Yuan-tse. But this idea was blocked by the National Security Organization, then headed by Chiu Yi-jen and Tsai Ing-wen, and died a natural death. When Chen Shui-bian was "re-elected" in 2004, he spoke of an "inter-party peace and stability committee." Before taking office he even sought out SEF chairman Koo Chen-fu, Lee Yuan-tse, TSMC chairman Morris Chang, PTV chairman Wu Feng-shan, Taiwan Thinktank chairman Chen Po-chih, hoping to establish a consultation team. Chen Shui-bian expressed a desire to chair the team. He invited representatives from the community to participate. Together they studied the possibility of a cross-Strait peace development program. Unfortunately nothing came of these proposals.

Tsai Ing-wen was involved in every one of these projects. She cannot possibly be unaware of what was going on. Cross-Strait policy is central to DPP policy. Chen Shui-bian did nothing for eight years. The obstacle was not the Mainland. The obstacle was not a lack of consensus on Taiwan. The obstacle was the DPP. The DPP was unable to break free from constraints imposed upon it by Taiwan independence fundamentalists.

Tsai Ing-wen clearly understood the importance of dialogue to her own election bid. So why did she refuse to dialogue with Ma Ying-jeou following his election to president in 2008? Lest we forget, when Chen Shui-bian was elected in 2000, KMT Chairman Lien Chan and PFP Chairman James Soong personally visited the Presidential Palace to dialogue with Chen Shui-bian. In 2005 James Soong secretly met with Chen Shui-bian and was denounced for his treachery.

Tsai Ing-wen acknowledged the existence of "1992 talks," but denied the existence of a "1992 consensus." She cast the 1992 consensus as a "KMT/CCP consensus," and proposed a "Taiwan consensus" in its stead. But she forgot that the 1992 talks were proposed by President Lee Teng-hui, in order to shelve cross-Strait confrontation. Negotiators did not used the words "1992 consensus." But they reached the conclusion that "there is only one China, but each side has its own interpretation." This tacit understanding between the two sides was reaffirmed in 2005, during the "Lien/Hu Summit." It became the primary plank in Ma Ying-jeou's 2008 political platform. It was vigorously reaffirmed. It received seven million votes. This is how the democratic process on Taiwan established a Taiwan consensus. This consensus was the basis for 17 cross-Strait agreements in three years, all of which were submitted to the Legislative Yuan for review. This is the democratic process. It conforms strictly to Tsai Ing-wen's own logic. She cannot deny it.

Democracy and cross-Strait peace are the Republic of China's most cherished achievements. Just over a month from now, voters on Taiwan will once again participate in the democratic process. Tsai Ing-wen says "The nation is of greater significance than any political party." She must demonstrate her allegiance to this principle through her actions, and not just words. Only then can she convince the public to return the DPP to power.

否定台灣共識的恰是蔡英文自己
2011-12-07中國時報

很多人搞不清楚民進黨主席、總統候選人蔡英文強烈主張的「台灣共識」到底內涵是什麼？蔡英文一句話簡單說明，「台灣共識就是台灣民主化的過程。」蔡英文的說法沒有錯，對身處台灣的二千三百萬人民而言，「台灣共識」理應是一個沒有疑義的概念，我們都是台灣人，我們都愛台灣，即使內部有著不同的政黨立場、統獨主張，都可以透過民主程序取得多數共識，總統直選就是最明確的民主程序，就是最清楚的台灣共識。

遺憾的是，蔡英文自己到現在還沒搞清楚，台灣共識不是民進黨的共識，對於台灣人民的選擇，競逐權力的朝野政黨都必須接受，而非片面否定。

蔡英文說，有了台灣人民共同立場的時候，對中國來講其實是更穩定的兩岸關係，不需要憂心當台灣在民主機制下，有政黨輪替的時候，政策會不會發生變化，「我們的人民也可以得到保證，政府在協商時候是以整體人民的立場，而且是透過民主、透明的程序來進行」。她強調，當選後要組成「兩岸對話小組」，邀請她的對手馬英九和宋楚瑜共同協商。

蔡英文的說法無庸置疑，自從一九九六年總統直選以來，台灣已經兩次政黨輪替，在這個過程中，兩岸政策的大方向並沒有巨大改變，只是速度與密度有異。中國大陸並不擔心台灣的政黨輪替，但對兩岸關係則有不容倒退的期待，這樣的期待其實也符合台灣人民的利益和期待。

兩岸關係自蔣經國總統拍板開放交流，從老兵可以返鄉探親的那一刻開始，交流之門就不能再禁絕，原因很簡單，兩岸既是友更是親，親友之情豈是政治力所能隔絕？李登輝繼任總統更擴大交流，從人倫之常一步就走到了經貿交流，即使範圍不是那麼大，但「台商」已經成為我們的左鄰右舍，即使後期「戒急用忍」限縮交流的節奏和步伐，卻無法阻絕台商登陸之勢。

同樣的，靠著「新中間路線」取得執政的陳水扁總統和民進黨，也不可能翻轉國民黨執政時期奠下的兩岸交流基礎。陳水扁八年任內，因為烽火外交讓兩岸關係停滯，但民間交流卻從未間斷，文化交流讓台灣演藝文創在大陸發光發熱。

陳水扁甫當選就要組「跨黨派兩岸政策小組」，由主張開放的前中研院長李遠哲領軍；這個構想卻在邱義仁、蔡英文主導的國安團隊阻撓下無疾而終。二○○四年陳水扁連任，再次想組成「跨黨派和平穩定委員會」，甚至在就職前就找了海基會董事長辜振甫、李遠哲、台積電董事長張忠謀、公視董事長吳豐山、台灣智庫董事長陳博志等人會商籌組架構小組；陳水扁意欲親任主委，邀請具有代表性的社會人士參與，共同研議兩岸和平發展綱領，可惜還是沒有下文。

這些發展歷程蔡英文幾乎全參與，她不可能不明白，兩岸政策同樣是民進黨執政的核心政策；陳水扁八年無功，其阻力既非來自大陸，亦非缺乏台灣共識，而是民進黨無法擺脫基本教義派的束縛。

蔡英文明白自己當選後朝野對話的重要，為什麼二○○八年馬英九當選總統後卻三番兩次拒絕對話呢？不要忘了，二○○○年陳水扁當選，國親兩黨主席連戰和宋楚瑜親赴總統府與扁對話；二○○五年宋楚瑜更冒罵名與扁再會。

蔡英文承認「九二會談」卻否定「九二共識」，質疑九二共識只是「國共共識」，因而提出「台灣共識」。她忘了，九二會談是李登輝總統任內兩岸兩會對擱置爭議提出的一個方案，即使沒有「九二共識」的名詞，卻有「一個中國，各自表述」的結論或默契。這個默契在二○○五年國共兩黨「連胡會」進一步確認，也成為馬英九競選二○○八年時提出的政見主張，且獲得七百多萬選票的高度肯定，這就是經過民主程序認可的台灣多數共識，在這個共識基礎下，兩岸兩會在這三多年來簽署十七項協議，都送立法院備查或審查，這也是民主程序。依照蔡英文的邏輯，有什麼道理否定之？

台灣民主、兩岸和平是最值得珍惜的成果，一個多月之後，台灣將再次經過民主的洗禮，蔡英文必須以實際行動展現她口中所聲稱「國家的意義大過政黨」，才能爭取民眾對民進黨重返執政的信心。