The 1992 Consensus is the Taiwan Consensus

The 1992 Consensus is the Taiwan Consensus
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 19, 2011

Summary: During the just concluded presidential election, Tsai Ing-wen lost to Ma Ying-jeou. She lost not as a result of her campaign strategy, but because the DPP's core concepts have diverged too far from the underlying cross-Strait reality. If the DPP seeks a return to power, it must first overcome this, its greatest hurdle.

Full Text Below:

During the just concluded presidential election, Tsai Ing-wen lost to Ma Ying-jeou. She lost not as a result of her campaign strategy, but because the DPP's core concepts have diverged too far from the underlying cross-Strait reality. If the DPP seeks a return to power, it must first overcome this, its greatest hurdle.

Some have criticized the "Taiwan consensus" as being too devoid of content. Some have criticized Tsai Ing-wen for refusing to recognize the 1992 Consensus. Such pragmatic public concerns are valid. But the real problem is more fundamental. The raison d'etre of the DPP since its very founding, has been to sever the umbilical cord between Taiwan and Mainland China. It has been to establish an independent "Nation of Taiwan," that will insulate Taiwan from Mainland influence. The vast majority of DPP supporters embrace this dream. The achievement of this goal remains at the heart of the DPP.

The two sides of the Taiwan Strait have long been at loggerheads with each other. Many on Taiwan hate and mistrust the Mainland. Essentially the DPP advocates distancing Taiwan from the Mainland. For this, it has garnered considerable support. It can easily cast itself as a "champion of Taiwan." When cross-Strait relations are tense, the DPP can easily incite mob sentiment in order to rally public support. But when cross-Strait tensions are relaxed, and cross-Strait relations are warm, the DPP loses that support. It loses that support because its basic posture is diametrically opposed to the larger historical currents.

Ma Ying-jeou eventually prevailed amidst bitter fighting. Ma won not primarily because the voters supported the 1992 Consensus. Ma won because everyone wanted the two sides to increase cooperation and reduce tensions. Ma Ying-jeou used the 1992 Consensus and the one China constitution to lay a foundation for his cross-Strait policy. The Mainland is willing to go along with Ma's position. Ma's reasoning is able to withstand the test of constitutionalism and jurisprudence on Taiwan. As a result it has become the basis for bilateral exchanges and consultations. Therefore, Ma Ying-jeou's cross-Strait policy is practicable in the real world. Following the cross-Strait thaw, Taiwan has been the recipient of real world benefits. In the absence of better alternatives, most people see no reason to shout "Stop."

The DPP's fundamental policy toward the Mainland, is to see the other side as the enemy, one that must be resisted with all one's might, whose influence on Taiwan must be totally excluded, the way it was during the Cold War. But this is no longer the way things are. The world is changing. The tides are shifting. The Mainland is changing. Today's Mainland is not merely undergoing a swift economic rise. It is also becoming an important player on the international stage. Its society is changing. It will inevitably move toward liberalization. Current cross-Strait interactions are closely knit. This is unprecedented in Taiwan's history. Marriage, education, business, tourism, film and television arts have all made cross-Strait relations closer than ever. Some Mainland schools have even used Taiwan pop singer Jay Chou's lyrics as teaching material. Some Mainland students on Taiwan have become Internet celebrities. Cross-Strait relations long ago ceased being the way the DPP perceives them. They will be even more different in the future.

As a result of the DPP's basic posture, it refuses to keep up with these changes. Instead, it chooses to turn a blind eye to them. The DPP leaves people with the impression they would do everything in their power to forestall closer relations with the Mainland, merely to ensure Taiwan's separateness. But in an era of globalization and the Internet, exchanges are the norm. The closed-door policy is obsolete. People go where they want, and do what they wish. Due to cultural and ethnic affinity, economic dependence, and geographical proximity, exchanges between Taiwan and the Mainland are thriving. They will continue to deepen in the future. If the DPP refuses to face even this reality, how can it possibly offer a practical and feasible cross-Strait policy?

Ma Ying-jeou has found a way to communicate with the Mainland. He has found a common language. But the DPP's fundamental posture is too far removed from the Mainland's. It is unable to find common ground. Actually the KMT's cross-Strait rhetoric has undergone repeated revision over the decades. It has gone from denouncing Beijing as a "bandit regime," to silence regarding Beijing's jurisdiction over the Mainland, It has gone from "recovering the Mainland" to peaceful coexistence. Step by step, it has moved closer to reality, until eventually arriving at the 1992 Consensus. If the century-old KMT can make such a huge adjustment, why can't the DPP? Why can't the DPP be bolder and more flexible? Why isn't the DPP better able to respond to reality?

Frankly, the DPP's cross-Strait policy has never worked. Chen Shui-bian ruled for eight years. Cross-Strait relations remained frozen and stagnant. This was in part due to Mainland resistance. But it also shows how cross-Strait policy is the DPP's Achilles Heel. Even during the recent election, Tsai Ing-wen failed to advance any concrete, real world policy. The DPP's problem is that a ruling party must respond to the practical needs of the people. A political party incapable of dealing with cross-Strait issues, cannot meet the needs of the public on Taiwan.

In order to acquire the authority to govern, a political party must offer a workable and pragmatic cross-Strait policy. It must offer people solutions to their problems. It must protect their interests. It must seek out business opportunities. It must respond to future trends, and engage in advance planning. Political parties must confront the reality of people's needs. Only then can they provide them with the answers they seek. If the DPP wants the opportunity to serve the people, it must offer them an honest to god cross-Strait policy.

九二共識就已經是台灣共識
2012-01-19中國時報

這次總統大選，蔡英文輸給了馬英九，其實不是因為戰略失誤，而是受限於民進黨核心理念與兩岸現實的根本性差距。民進黨想重新執政，必須先克服這個最大難關。

有人批評「台灣共識」內容過於空洞，有人認為蔡英文否認「九二共識」，令務實派民眾擔憂，這些都沒錯，但更根本的是，民進黨創黨以來的存在基礎，就是要切斷台灣與中國臍帶，建立獨立的台灣國，讓台灣不再受中國大陸的力量左右。民進黨的支持者絕大多數都懷抱著這個夢想，而實現這個目標，則是民進黨最核心的存在價值。

兩岸過去長期對立，台灣有不少民眾既厭惡又不信任中國大陸，在基本理念上主張與中國拉開距離的民進黨，可以吸引到相當支持，也很容易被視為台灣的捍衛者。當兩岸關係緊張時，民進黨可以因此輕易得到民氣的匯集，問題是，當民意傾向兩岸和解加強交流時，民進黨就因為主戰的基本姿態與主和的大趨勢南轅北轍，而頓失空間。

馬英九之所以最後能在苦戰中勝出，與其說選民真的那麼支持「九二共識」，不如說大家都希望兩岸降低緊張增加合作，而馬英九以「九二共識」與「一中憲法」搭建起的兩岸政策，大陸可以勉強睜隻眼閉隻眼，台灣本身在憲法法理上也說得通，成為雙方交流協商的基礎。因此，馬英九這個兩岸政策，放在現實環境中是可以操作的。兩岸解凍後台灣感受到實質獲益，如果沒有更好的方案，大多數人覺得沒有理由叫停。

而民進黨對中國的基本政策，是把對方設定為敵人，必須全力對抗，並在台灣內部排斥其影響力，和當年冷戰時差不多。問題是，現實已經不是這樣了。世界在變、潮流在變、中國也在變，現在的中國大陸，不只經濟迅速崛起、成為國際舞台要角，內部社會也出現變化，而且必然會走向開放。目前兩岸互動之綿密深刻，是台灣歷史上所僅見，通婚、求學、經商、旅遊、影視藝文，彼此的關係愈來愈緊密。當大陸有學校拿周杰倫的歌詞入題時，當陸生在台體驗在網上爆紅時，現在的兩岸關係，早已不是民進黨原始設定的狀態了，而未來更不會是。

對於這個新態勢，民進黨卻因為自己的基本立場跟不上變化，而選擇視而不見，甚至讓人感覺民進黨如果做得到的話，會想阻撓兩岸交流避免關係拉近，以保持台灣的獨立性。但在這個全球化的網路時代，交流穿透是常態，閉關自守已過時。人的腳會自己走向想去的地方，基於文化、種族、經貿與地理上的接近性，台灣與大陸的交往，現在活絡，未來將更繼續擴大深化，如果連這個如此巨大的現實都不能面對，如何能夠提出務實可行的兩岸政策？

馬英九找到了和中國的共同語言，但民進黨的基本立足點和中國差太遠，目前找不到交集。其實，回顧國民黨的兩岸政策，數十年來也作了相當大的修正，從「匪偽政權」到不否定對方的治權，從「反攻大陸」到和平共存，一步一步朝現實靠攏，最後設計出「九二共識」處理模式。百年老店的國民黨都可以做這麼大的調整了，民進黨為什麼不能更大膽、更有彈性、也更能回應現實？

坦白講，民進黨的兩岸政策從來沒有成功過。陳水扁執政八年，兩岸關係冰凍停滯，這固然與中國當局的抵制有關，但也說明了兩岸政策的確是民進黨的罩門。而即使到了這次大選，蔡英文同樣沒提出什麼在現實中行得通的具體政策。問題是，執政黨必須解答人民的現實需要，一個無法處理兩岸問題的政黨，是不敷當前台灣人民需求的。

不要說想取得政權就必須提出務實可行的兩岸政策，光是要替人民解決問題、維護權益、爭取商機、並因應未來趨勢作前瞻性規畫，政黨就必須正視現實為人民的需求提供解答。民進黨想爭取為民服務的機會，就不能在兩岸政策上交白卷。