DPP Must Not Duck the Issue of Reunification

DPP Must Not Duck the Issue of Reunification
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 18, 2011

Summary: During the 2012 presidential election, DPP candidate Tsai Ing-wen was highly vocal. In the end however, she lost by a 6% landslide margin. The Democratic Progressive Party longs to return to power. But the huge margin of victory shows that the biggest obstacle standing in the way of the DPP returning to office is not the DPP's election tactics, but its overly rigid ideology. The DPP must undergo a bold transformation. It must adopt a pragmatic cross-strait policy. More than the future of Taiwan is at stake. Also at stake is whether voters will ever entrust power to the DPP.


Full Text Below:

During the 2012 presidential election, DPP candidate Tsai Ing-wen was highly vocal. In the end however, she lost by a 6% landslide margin. The Democratic Progressive Party longs to return to power. But the huge margin of victory shows that the biggest obstacle standing in the way of the DPP returning to office is not the DPP's election tactics, but its overly rigid ideology. The DPP must undergo a bold transformation. It must adopt a pragmatic cross-strait policy. More than the future of Taiwan is at stake. Also at stake is whether voters will ever entrust power to the DPP.

The election result was an embarrassment to the DPP. During her campaign Tsai relentlessly castigated KMT presidential candidate Ma Ying-jeou's cross-Strait policy. She said it undermined "Taiwan's sovereignty." She said it only looked after the interests of big business. She said it neglected the welfare of the majority of ordinary citizens. Yet Ma Ying-jeou received over half the vote. This shows that most voters did not buy into the DPP's simplistic and distorted spin control.

Does the DPP really believe in Taiwan's democracy? If it does, it should realize that over half the voters cannot possibly be guilty of "pandering to [Mainland] China and selling out Taiwan." In fact, the election was essentially a referendum on the 1992 Consensus. The majority of voters demanded both national sovereignty and cross-Strait peace. The 1992 consensus perfectly fills the bill in both cases. Meanwhile, voters agreed that the incumbent deserved a second term. This election result shows that they think the path the nation is taking is correct, and that they are satisfied with the status quo.

Republic of China citizens have spoken. How will the DPP choose to interpret what they have said? Will it inadvertently or deliberately misinterpret what they have said? The DPP's decision will determine its fate as a political party. For example, will Deep Greens argue that Tsai Ing-wen lost support in the south because she did not campaign as vigorously as Chen Shui-bian did in 2000? The DPP may find itself hijacked by Taiwan independence extremists.

In fact, the election result was determined by a five to six percentage point swing vote, by so-called "economic voters" who voted their pocketbooks. During the local level five cities mayoral elections, these voters were willing to support the Democratic Progressive Party as a check on the ruling KMT. They enabled the DPP to win 49% of the vote. But a year later, during the central level elections, despite these voters' dissatisfaction with the Ma administration, they refused to vote for the DPP. The DPP was unable to win more than 45% of the vote. This was to be the fate of the Democratic Progressive Party in the central government level election.

Actually, DPP leaders know the main battle during the presidential election was fought over the swing vote. That is why one seldom saw DPP party flags at DPP election rallies. That is why Tsai Ing-wen made a point of proclaiming that "Taiwan is the Republic of China, and the Republic of China is Taiwan." That is why she trotted out her "grand coalition" concept late in the campaign. Tsai Ing-wen refuses to accept the 1992 consensus. But the words "Taiwan independence" also vanished from Pan Green election rallies. Instead, Tsai Ing-wen touted her "Taiwan consensus." To some extent she was attempting to blur the line between Deep Green and swing voters. But her "Taiwan consensus" was devoid of substance. As a result it backfired. Voters were not reassured. They refused to give her carte blanche. Voters in 2000 had already given the DPP a chance, During his campaign, Chen Shui-bian proposed a "New Centrist Path." During his inauguration, he promised to abide by his "Five Noes." But less than four years later, he reneged on those promises. He even adopted an extremist, de jure Taiwan independence posture. The lesson is clear. The voters are clearly afraid. They fear that even if Tsai Ing-wen wins, the DPP may still cling to its rigid ideology.

This is another lesson learned from the election results. In future elections the DPP cannot rely on elections to motivate transformation, It must spell out its cross-Strait policy during the election campaign. Tsai Ing-wen has been party chairman for four years. During that time, she has deliberately avoided discussing cross-Strait policy, Evading the issues may temporarily keep peace within the DPP. But this sort of ambiguity will never win over rational swing voters.

Following the election, the DPP has been engaging in some soul-searching. It is clear that the pragmatists within the party are gaining ground. For example, DPP Central Standing Committee Member Tuan Yi-kang urged the DPP to be honest about the 1992 Consensus. DPP Legislator Chen Ming-wen was equally blunt. He said the DPP's China policy collides with reality. This is encouraging. But Tsai Ing-wen is about to leave office in May. Once she does, the DPP will elect its party chairman. As a matter or record, DPP leaders often pander to Deep Greens during internecine power struggles, using ideology as a tool for infighting. If so, the Democratic Progressive Party may find itself adopting an even more extremist Taiwan independence path. If it does, it will find it even harder to return to power.

Of course the future need not be so grim, For the next two years at least, no more elections are scheduled. Younger, middle-aged party leaders are looking to make their move. They may take advantage of the opportunity to discuss the DPP's cross-Strait policy direction. This however, may be difficult. The centrists and Taiwan independence extremists within the DPP are poles apart. But this is something the party must tackle, Otherwise the DPP will never break through Tsai Ing-wen's 45% ceiling. It will never return to power.

檢討兩岸路線 民進黨不應迴避
2012-01-18中國時報

二○一二年的總統大選，呼聲甚高的民進黨總統候選人蔡英文，最後不但功敗垂成，而且還是以六個百分點吞下了敗績。這樣的差距標示出，民進黨未來要成為執政黨，最大的障礙不在於選舉的戰術層面，而在於民進黨僵固的意識形態；民進黨能不能勇敢轉型，走向務實的兩岸政策，攸關的不只是台灣的未來，也攸關選民敢不敢放心的將政權交給民進黨。

確實，這樣的選舉結果，對民進黨是很難堪的。在競選過程中，蔡英文多次批評國民黨總統候選人馬英九的兩岸政策，不但傷害台灣主權，而且只照顧大企業利益，沒有顧及大多數升斗小民的生活；但是馬英九仍然贏得過半支持，顯示多數選民並不接受民進黨這套簡化、扭曲的論述。

如果民進黨對台灣的民主有起碼的信心，他們應該了解，不可能會有過半選民支持他們口中傾中賣台的政權。事實上，這次的大選就是對九二共識的一次公投，多數選民既要主權尊嚴、也要兩岸和平共利，而九二共識正是可以兼顧二者的最適模式；同時，選民同意現任者連任，顯示的是，國家發展方向並未偏誤，他們對現狀還算是滿意的。

所以，台灣的民意已作出判決，民進黨要如何解讀至為重要，無心或蓄意的錯誤解讀，對一個政黨的發展，將有致命的後果。例如，深綠陣營如果認定蔡英文之所以無法將南部選票極大化，完全是因為她不像陳水扁當年那麼「衝」，未來的民進黨可能又要受到極獨路線的綁架。

事實上，主導這次大選結果的，還是為數五到六個百分點的中間選民，或是所謂的經濟選民。在五都這樣的地方選舉中，他們可以支持強力監督執政黨的民進黨，讓該黨拿下四成九的得票；但事隔一年，在中央級的選舉時，這些中間選民即使不滿意馬政府，但並未轉向民進黨。衝不破四成五，成了民進黨中央選舉的新宿命。

其實，民進黨領導人很清楚，這次總統大選的主要戰場就在中間選民，否則，不會在大型造勢場合罕見一隻黨旗；蔡英文也不必提出「台灣就是中華民國、中華民國就是台灣」，更在選舉後期提出「大聯合政府」主張。蔡英文不接受九二共識，但「台灣獨立」這樣的字眼，也在綠營選舉場合絕跡，蔡英文提出「台灣共識」，某種程度就是試圖以模糊化來兼顧深綠與中間選民；但台灣共識沒有實質內容，反而讓中間選民無法放心，不敢輕易的空白授權。因為，選民在二千年時已經給民進黨一次機會了，陳水扁在該次選舉提出新中間路線、就職時還宣示四不一沒有，卻不到四年就全盤推翻，還試圖走法理台獨的極獨路線；殷鑑不遠，蔡英文如果當選，民進黨是否能走出僵化的意識形態，選民顯然沒有信心。

所以，這次大選結果的另一個教訓在於，未來的民進黨不可能靠選舉來帶動轉型，他們一定要在選舉時提出清楚的兩岸政策；蔡英文擔任黨主席四年來，刻意迴避兩岸政策討論，也許一時之間讓民進黨維持表面的和諧，但這樣的模糊化，卻無法說服理性的中間選民。

從選後的一些反省聲浪中可以發現，民進黨務實派有抬頭的跡象。例如，民進黨中常委段宜康呼籲民進黨應誠實面對九二共識；立委陳明文也坦白說出，民進黨的中國政策和現實狀況衝突。這是可喜的一面，但令人憂慮的是，蔡英文卸任後，民進黨將於五月進行黨主席選舉；觀諸以前的例子，民進黨經常在權力競爭時，以路線之爭作為鬥爭工具；如果黨內有人刻意討好深綠來贏得黨主席職位，未來的民進黨可能更走向極獨，更不利執政。

當然，發展也不必然全是悲觀，至少未來二年沒有選舉，志在政途的中生代，也許可以趁著這段時間好好討論民進黨的兩岸路線。這很困難，因為民進黨內的中間派與極獨，目前連基本的共識都沒有；但這是一定要做的事，否則，民進黨可能突破不了蔡英文的四成五障礙，永遠和執政無緣。（大選系列社論二）